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THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND 
OF THE WAR 

1870-1914 



THE 

DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND 

OF THE WAR 

1870-1914 



BY 



CHARLES SEYMOUR, Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN 
YALE COLLEGE 




NEW HAVEN 

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

LONDON • HUMPHREY MILFORD 

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

MDCCCCXVI 






h <o ^ 



Copyright, 1916, by 
Yale University Press 



First published, April, 1916 
Second printing, August, 1916 
Third printing, October, 1916 
Fourth printing, March, 1917 
Fifth printing, October, 1917 
Sixth printing, February, 1918 
Seventh printing, April, 1918 
Eighth printing, September, 1918 
Ninth printing, October, 1918 



- 






TO 
G. W. S. 



PREFACE 

The study which follows does not profess to be a 
detailed history of the diplomacy of the past forty-five 
years. It attempts merely to correlate in their logical 
sequence the most significant events of recent Euro- 
pean history and to show how the great disaster was 
the inevitable result of their reaction upon each other. 
The author's aim is to indicate the manner in which 
German primacy in continental politics, first acquired 
by Bismarck and maintained by William II, led, in 
combination with the economic and moral transfor- 
mation of the Empire, to Germany's new conception 
of the role she must play in world politics. The effect 
upon British policy was such that a far-reaching 
diplomatic revolution took place, and was succeeded 
by the series of crises which marked the diplomatic 
conflict of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. 
The last of these crises, that of 1914, was the 
most serious and could not be settled peacefully, 
partly because Germany felt it essential at this time 
to reinforce her prestige, partly because her vital 
interests in the Near East seemed to be at stake. 

I am deeply indebted to those who have given their 
constant and invaluable assistance : to Professor S. B. 
Hemingway, Dr. E. W. Nichols, and my sister, Mrs. 
G. C. St. John, for criticisms and suggestions; to 
Professor S. L. Mims, for aid in the reading of proof; 
above all to my wife, who has made the book her own 
by untiring labor in the construction of every chapter 
and in the reading of every page of proof. 

Yale College, March 6, 1916. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



PAGE 



Preface ........ 

Chapter I. Introduction ..... 

Chapter II. Bismarck and the Triple Alliance. 
Problems confronting Bismarck after 1871 — Dis- 
ruptive elements in Germany — Necessity of inter- 
national peace — Fears of the other Powers — Special 
danger of French attempt at revenge — Bismarck's 
hope of creating an alliance between Russia, 
Austria, and Germany — Relations of Prussia 
with Russia — Relations with Austria — Beust and 
Andrassy — Magyars accept an understanding with 
Bismarck — Andrassy's eagerness for an entente 
with Russia — The League of the Three Emperors — 
Characteristics — Bismarck unable to transform it 
into an alliance — Collapse of the League — The war 
scare of 1875 — Mutual suspicion of France and 
Germany — German threats — Intervention of Rus- 
sia — Effects — The Near Eastern Crisis — Conflict 
of Austrian and Russian ambitions — Russo-Turkish 
War — Peace of San Stefano — Congress of Berlin — 
Russian disappointment — Hostility towards Ger- 
many — Bismarck concludes an alliance with Aus- 
tria — Hopes to include Italy — Relations of Italy 
with France and the Teutonic Powers — Anti- 
French sentiment in Italy after 1871 — Effects of 
French occupation of Tunis — Formation of the 
Triple Alliance — Effects — The hegemony of Ger- 
many ........ 



12 



x TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Chapter III. The Dual Alliance. Germany's posi- 
tion threatened by a Franco-Russian rapproche- 
ment — Geographical factors favoring such a com- 
bination — Checkerboard diplomacy — Relations of 
the two nations in the past — Factors of separation — 
Effect of the war scare of 1875— Effect of the 
Congress of Berlin — And of the Austro-German 
Alliance — Franco-Russian understanding post- 
poned by Bismarck's diplomacy — Growing senti- 
ment in both countries favoring an alliance — 
Effect of the death of William I and the accession 
of William II — Effect of the dismissal of Bis- 
marck — Financial assistance given by France to 
Russia — Attitude of the French Government — Visit 
of Admiral Gervais' fleet — Conclusion of the Dual 
Alliance — Moral effects — Lack of practical results — 
Policy of the Kaiser — Encouragement of French 
colonial policy and Russian expansion in the Far 
East — Sentimental rapprochement of France and 
Germany — Effects of the Kaiser 's policy — Germany 
retained her control of continental diplomacy . 38 

Chapter IV. German World Policy : Economic Fac- 
tors. Relation of German diplomatic influence to 
her economic development — Character of the eco- 
nomic transformation of Germany — Growth of the 
population — And consequent economic problem — 
Shifting of population — Rise of new industries — 
Effect of German unification — Growth of banks — 
Of mineral and metal industries — Development of 
foreign trade — Factors in German success — Cheap- 
ness of German goods — Their serviceability — Scien- 
tific salesmanship — Statistics of German com- 
merce — Development of German shipping — Growth 
of Hamburg — Of the great steamship lines — Crea- 
tion of a navy — Necessary adjunct to large mer- 
cantile marine — Opinion of von Biilow — Enthu- 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xi 

PAGE 

siasm for naval development — Colonial movement — 

The Bagdad Railway — Desire for political world 

power — New aspect of German ambitions . . 61 

Chapter V. German World Policy: Moral Factors. 
Psychological transformation of Germany — Exact 
definition of German attitude impossible — Its vary- 
ing shades — Universal longing for expansion and 
power — The Kaiser's speeches — Desire for world 
prestige — Characteristics of German mentality that 
explain this attitude — Belief in the world mission 
of Germany — And in the right to carry out this 
mission by force — Fostered by University teach- 
ings — Treitschke and his doctrine — The righteous- 
ness and beneficence of war — Aggressive tone 
adopted in certain quarters of Germany — Confi- 
dence in Germany's strength and in the weakness 
of her rivals — In other quarters German attitude 
tinged with fear — Resulting tone of defiance — 
German attitude not translated into a single pol- 
icy — The Pan-Germans and the Colonial party — 
Other shades of opinion — Effect of German attitude 
upon other Powers ...... 89 

Chapter VI. British Foreign Policy. Importance to 
Germany of the British attitude — Principle of 
British policy — Greatness and security of her 
colonial and maritime empire her single aim — 
Explanation of apparent contradictions — Relations 
of Great Britain with France — Rivalry in Egypt — 
British purchase of Suez Canal shares — British 
intervention in Egypt, 1882 — French bitterness — 
The British in the Soudan — Gordon — Kitchener's 
expedition for the recovery of the Soudan — Meet- 
ing with Marchand at Fashoda — Diplomatic crisis — 
Surrender of France — French hostility towards 
Great Britain — British relations with Russia — 
Quarters in which their interests conflicted — The 



xii TABLE OF CONTENTS 



PAGE 



Near East>— The Central East— The Far East- 
Russia on the Pacific — Interests of Great Britain 
in China — The acquisition of Hong Kong — Effects 
of the rise of Japan — Russia, Germany, and France 
forbid Japanese acquisition of Port Arthur — The 
advance of Russia in Manchuria — British fears — 
Anglo- Japanese alliance — British hostility towards 
Russia during Manchurian war — Relations of 
Great Britain with Germany — Good feeling between 
the Governments preserved by Bismarck and Salis- 
bury — Colonial rivalry alleviated by compromises — 
Various treaties — Possibility of Anglo-German 
alliance — Sudden reversal of British policy . . 115 

Chapter VII. The Diplomatic Revolution. Character 
of the diplomatic revolution — Change in French 
policy — Accession of Delcasse to power — Relations 
of France with Italy — Ameliorated by dismissal of 
Bismarck and fall of Crispi — Franco-Italian 
conventions — French Mediterranean policy — Mo- 
rocco — Delcasse 's attitude towards Great Britain — 
Accession of Edward VII — Commercial interests 
favor a Franco-British reconciliation — Efforts of 
Edward VII— The Convention of 1904— Effects— 
Settlement of African questions — Step towards the 
restoration of the balance of power — Tendency 
towards a British understanding with Russia — Is- 
sues between the two nations — Anglo-Russian Con- 
vention of 1907 — Its scope and effects — Its import- 
ance — Change in the international diplomatic sit- 
uation since 1898 — Restoration of the equilibrium 140 

Chapter VIII. The Conflict op Alliances. Effect 
of the diplomatic revolution upon German policy — 
Germany convinced of necessity of maintaining 
diplomatic prestige of the Empire — Belief that Ger- 
many's position was threatened by new attitude of 
France — Necessity of reinforcing German pres- 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii 

PAGE 

tige after 1904 — The Moroccan affair— Disembark- 
ation of the Kaiser at Tangier — Veto placed upon 
French Moroccan policy — Resignation of Del- 
casse — Humiliation of France — The Conference of 
Algeciras — The Bosnian crisis — Relation to Young 
Turk Revolution — Austria annexes Bosnia and 
Herzegovina— Protests of Serbia and Russia- 
Overridden by Austria and Germany — Restoration 
of German prestige — French aggression in Mo- 
rocco — International conditions suitable for an- 
other blow on part of Germany — German gunboat 
Panther despatched to Agadir— German de- 
mands—Resisted by France who finds support in 
Great Britain — Circumstances in Germany not 
favorable for enforcing her demands — Compromise 
effected — Disappointment of Germany — Certainty 
of a renewal of the conflict .... 166 

Chapter IX. The Near Eastern Question. Import- 
ance of the Near Eastern Question— Its character 
in general — Aspects of the problem in the nine- 
teenth century — Dismemberment of Turkey in 
Europe — Serbian and Grecian independence; — 
Later independence of Rumania and Bulgaria — 
Aspirations of the great Powers in the Near East- 
Russian interests— At first opposed by Great Brit- 
ain—At close of the century Anglo-Russian accord 
in Near East foreshadowed — Austrian interests in 
the Balkans — More vital in recent times — Austrian 
hostility towards Russia — Germany's interest in 
Near East resulted from world policy — Plans for 
development of Mesopotamia— Support given to 
Turkey and Austria— Importance of the Young 
Turk revolution— Its character— Its effects— An- 
nexation of Bosnia by Austria— Effect upon 
Serbia— Young Turk regime in Macedonia— Effect 
upon Bulgaria— Young Turk attitude towards 



xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS 



PAGE 



Crete — Venizelos — Policy of Greece — Young Turk 
opposition to Italian development in Tripoli — Italy 
declares war on Turkey ..... 194 

Chapter X. The Balkan Wars. Significance of 
Italy's attack upon Turkey — Attitude of the 
Powers — The Italian army in Tripoli — The dead- 
lock — Treaty of Lausanne — Attitude of the Balkan 
States — Factors favorable to their union — The 
formation of the Balkan League — Hope of preserv- 
ing peace with Turkey — Beginning of first Balkan 
War — Bulgarian victories at Kirk Kilisse and 
Lule Burgas — Greek and Serbian successes — Peace 
negotiations — Renewal of the war — Turks yield — 
Treaty of London — Terms — Question of Albania — 
Effects of its settlement upon Serbian policy — 
Bulgarian desire for Macedonia — Attitude of Ger- 
many and Austria — Bulgaria attacks Serbia and 
Greece — Defeat of Bulgaria — Entrance of Ruma- 
nia — End of second Balkan War — Treaty of 
Bukarest — Attitude of great Powers — Especially 
of Austria and Germany — Teutonic Powers deter- 
mined to revise Balkan settlement — Necessity of a 
conflict with Serbia — Murder of the Archduke . 221 

Chapter XI. The Crisis of 1914. Summary of inter- 
national conditions in 1914 — German anxiety 
aroused by the Triple Entente — And by the failure 
of German efforts to break it — Necessity of an 
alteration in the Balkan settlement — Circumstances 
favorable for action — Austrian assistance assured — 
Abstention of the other Powers probable — Weak- 
ness of Russia — Decadence of Franee — Great Brit- 
ain incapable of interfering on the Continent — 
Character of the stroke planned by Austria and 
Germany — In the Balkans — The Austrian note to 
Serbia — Character of the Austrian demands — The 
two impossible conditions — The Serbian reply — 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xv 

PAGE 

Pronounced unsatisfactory by Austria — War de- 
clared on Serbia — Attitude of Russia — Determined 
to protect Serbia — Attempts of Sir Edward Grey 
to find peaceable solution — International confer- 
ence suggested — Refused by Germany — Austria 
refuses to continue conversations with Russia — 
Austria's belief that Russia would stand aside — 
New formula suggested by Russia refused by 
Germany — Russian mobilization — Opposite effects 
upon Austria and Germany .... 245 

Chapter XII. The Diplomatic Break. Effects of 
Russian mobilization — Austrian concessions — Re- 
sumption of conversations with Russia — Accepts 
principle of mediation — Contradictory attitude of 
Germany — The Kaiser's warning to Russia — The 
German ultimatum — Its character — Russia refuses 
to demobilize — German declaration of war on 
Russia — On France — Germany 's hope of peace with 
Great Britain — German offer of neutrality agree- 
ment — Refused by Great Britain — German convic- 
tion of British pacifism — The question of Belgian 
neutrality — British belief in the necessity of the 
independence of the Lowlands — Belgian neutrality 
guaranteed in 1839 — Construction of German stra- 
tegic lines on Belgian frontier — Germany 's demand 
to Belgium — Refused — Effect on British policy — 
German invasion of Belgium — Her justification — 
Great Britain enters the war — German invasion of 
Belgium forced by military necessity — German 
aggressive action in crisis of 1914 necessitated by 
principles of the policy adopted since 1871 . . 266 

Bibliography 288 

Index 295 



THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND 
OF THE WAR 

1870-1914 



CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 
heir apparent to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist 
in the streets of the chief town of Bosnia. Doubtless 
not more than the merest handful of the millions who 
read the news on the following day, realized that the 
murder would carry in its train consequences of 
extraordinary moment. The popular mind had become 
accustomed to assassination of royalty. The Empress 
Elizabeth of Austria, King Humbert of Italy, King 
Carlos of Portugal, King George of Greece, had all 
experienced a similar fate and the international 
diplomatic situation had not been affected. Who 
could guess that this new crime would prove to be of 
greater significance! And yet within five weeks of 
the murder and apparently as a direct result, the five 
greatest Powers of Europe were battling in the most 
terrific war of history. 

It very soon became obvious that so great a catas- 
trophe could not have resulted solely from the 
assassination of a single man, even though he were 
archduke and future emperor. Other forces must 
have been at work, of wider scope and more vital 
significance. The murder was merely the occasion of 
the conflict, the spark igniting the magazine ; if it had 
not been for thirty years' accumulation of powder, 
there could have been no explosion. History shows 



2 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

that great events find their genesis in influences which 
work for a long time separately and silently, bnt which 
when brought together by some comparatively minor 
factor, are powerful in their union to produce results 
of the utmost magnitude. So it was in the case of the 
war that broke out in 1914. And to comprehend, even 
in the most general fashion, the influences which by 
their combination resulted in the titanic conflict, a 
survey of the previous forty-five years of diplomacy 
is essential. 

Even the most superficial consideration of the 
generation that followed the Franco-Prussian War, 
leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the factor of 
vital significance during this period was the develop- 
ment of the new German Empire. It was Germany 
that forced the new conditions which contained the 
germs of the international struggle. Not that German 
policy was more aggressive or more nationally selfish 
than that of the other states ; but that simply by her 
entrance into the circle of great nations and by her 
extraordinary growth, new elements were introduced 
into the diplomatic situation, which were destined to 
result inevitably in conflict. The other states were 
simply passive, in the sense that they pursued their 
policy along much the same lines as those followed 
previous to 1871. Germany was the active agent. 

By defeating France and forcing upon her a humil- 
iating peace in 1871, Germany attained her political 
unity and at once secured a position of unquestioned 
weight in the councils of the great Powers. A decade 
later, she organized the Triple Alliance, which guar- 
anteed the support of Austria and Italy and soon 
assured to her a preponderant role in European 
diplomacy; by means of this coalition of the three 



INTRODUCTION 3 

states of central Europe and despite the Dual Alliance 
of France and Russia which was formed in 1891, 
Germany practically controlled the Continent from 
1882 to the end of the century. 

This position of primacy she utilized skillfully to 
secure a period of uninterrupted peace on the Conti- 
nent, which gave her the necessary opportunity for 
organizing her imperial political institutions and 
developing the industrial and commercial activities 
essential to the economic life of the nation. With 
increasing intensity, the Germans created new indus- 
tries, built up their mercantile marine, opened up new 
markets, laid down vessels of war, dreamed of 
colonies. And as a result partly of economic necessity 
and partly of a moral transformation that came over 
the Empire, German policy began to concern itself 
not merely with European matters, but with every- 
thing that went on over all the globe. It was the 
inauguration of Germany's ™ "World Policy." 

It was inevitable that the policy of the other states 
should be affected by the successful growth of Ger- 
many, and when they recognized its true significance, 
a new period opened in the history of European 
diplomacy. The more far-sighted in France and 
Great Britain perceived with inexorable lucidity that 
Germany's new policy must necessarily threaten the 
position of their own countries. In the face of the 
common danger they agreed to put an end to their 
traditional enmity and, together with Russia, to form 
a tentative combination, which was designed merely 
to preserve the balance of power threatened by the 
growth and ambitions of Germany. The latter Power, 
disquieted by this apparent barricade to the realiza- 
tion of her hopes and in order to reinforce her prestige, 



4 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

adopted a policy of bluster, which was at times 
successful, but which culminated in welding the loose 
understanding between the three Powers into a 
comparatively solid force of opposition. 

Under such conditions there arose a diplomatic 
conflict scarcely less bitter than the war which was 
to succeed it. On the one side stood the Entente 
Powers, unalterably convinced that the development 
of the German world policy spelled their ultimate or 
their immediate ruin; on the other, Germany, equally 
determined in the belief that failure to win for herself 
a position in world affairs comparable to her influence 
in European matters, meant economic and national 
disaster. Between such opposite poles there could 
be no compromise. With each successive crisis the 
tension increased. Finally, in the summer of 1914, 
the strain suddenly exerted upon the thread of fate 
proved too severe and it snapped. 

If, as seems obvious, the development of Germany — 
military, naval, economic, national — was the essential 
leit-motif of the international drama which was to 
have such a tremendous denouement, we ought to 
remind ourselves briefly of the circumstances under 
which united Germany came into being. The founda- 
tion of the German Empire in 1871 was, perhaps, the 
greatest political fact of the nineteenth century. 
Both because of the immediate effects of the process 
of unification and because of the ultimate consequences, 
which were not at once revealed, any survey of recent 
diplomatic history must go back to the great triumph 
of Prussia and Bismarck in 1871. 

Previous to that date, Germany as a political state 
was non-existent. The hundred and more kingdoms, 
principalities, duchies and cities which were loosely 



INTRODUCTION 5 

bound together in the German Federation, formed 
something more than a geographical expression, for 
they were sentimentally united by language and by 
pride in a common literature and music; but they 
formed nothing like a nation in the political sense. 
From disunion comes weakness, and all through the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Germany was 
the prey of Europe. Although the two chief German 
states, Austria and Prussia, were reckoned as great 
Powers, their mutual jealousy had on more than one 
occasion left Germany impotent before the attack of 
a powerful foe on the east and on the west. 

For centuries the dream of a politically united nation 
had filled the minds of Germans. The dream went 
back to the days of Charlemagne and Frederick 
Barbarossa, the red-bearded emperor who, according 
to legend, was not dead but sleeping, and was destined 
to awake and reunite Teutonia and rule the world. 
From the time of Otto the Great, all through the 
Middle Ages down to the days of Wallenstein, the 
unity of Germany formed the subject of the most 
exalted plans. But whenever a definite attempt was 
made to transform the vision into fact, the mutual 
hatred of the warring German states proved disas- 
trous and the dream of union was never realized. The 
forces of disintegration always triumphed over those 
of consolidation. 

"With the fall of Napoleon, it seemed for a moment 
as though the hope of unification might be fulfilled. 
The burst of patriotism which informed the war of 
liberation against the French Emperor was enforced 
by the conviction that the national aspiration was 
about to be satisfied ; the youths who pressed on from 
Leipsic, driving the French across the Rhine, fought 



6 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

the more fiercely in the belief that they were fighting 
for a united Fatherland. The stirring war songs of 
the period are all imbued with the idea that once 
Germany was freed from the foreign yoke, she would 
be united. But the hopes of the peoples were deceived 
by the princes. The popular enthusiasm for national 
unity based upon liberalism was not in accord with 
the designs of the diplomats and sovereigns who 
planned the map of Europe in 1815, and Germany was 
left disunited. 

A generation later, in 1848, the German Liberals 
made another effort to attain national unity. For the 
moment the reactionary Austrian Government was 
paralyzed by a revolution which spread through all 
the Hapsburg possessions; the King of Prussia was 
intimidated by the Berlin mob; and the Liberals, 
meeting at Frankfort, had free hand. But their 
attempt was again frustrated by the opposition of the 
princes. Austria, which soon recovered her control 
and stamped out revolution, refused to sanction a 
centralized Germany founded upon liberal principles. 
And the King of Prussia would not take the imperial 
crown from the hands of the people, " picked up out 
of the mud," as he said; he would reign as emperor 
only by the grace of God and at the invitation of his 
fellow princes. 

The failure of the German Liberals in 1848 was 
succeeded by the far different method of Bismarck, 
which ultimately proved successful, although the cost 
was great. The Liberals had hoped that unification 
might be accomplished peacefully through a national 
Parliament, representing the German people, and that 
the result would be a liberal confederation, not unlike 
the United States of America. In the mind of Bis- 



INTRODUCTION 7 

marck, the sole means of union was to be found in 
the Prussian King and army. Austria, the great 
stumbling-block to unity, must be driven out of 
Germany by war; the other German states must be 
compelled by force to accept union under the Prussian 
domination. With the strongest army in Europe as 
his instrument, Bismarck carried this policy into effect 
by means of three wars : the war of 1864 with Denmark, 
of 1866 with Austria, and of 1870 with France. 

It was in 1862 that Bismarck was called to minis- 
terial power in Prussia, and he lost no time in 
developing his policy. Under William I, who had been 
a soldier from his youth and had made the campaigns 
against Napoleon, the Prussian army had been thor- 
oughly reorganized, and offered to the diplomacy of 
the new minister the material force necessary for the 
success of his plans. A quarrel that sprang up in 
1863 between the King of Denmark and the German 
states, over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, 
presented the opportunity he desired. Persuading 
Austria to act with Prussia, Bismarck brought on a 
war with Denmark in 1864, in which the smaller 
Power was naturally overwhelmed. Denmark sur- 
rendered the two duchies to the rulers of Austria and 
Prussia. 

Realizing that so long as Austria remained a member 
of the German Confederation, Prussia could not hope 
to unify Germany under her own control, Bismarck 
did not seek to prevent the quarrel that soon developed 
over the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein. In 
both his military and diplomatic arrangements he was 
thoroughly prepared for the struggle with Austria 
that was to decide the hegemony of Germany. The 
Prussian army had been brought to the highest degree 



8 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

of efficiency by the Minister of War, Roon, and was 
led by that master of strategy, Moltke. Bismarck had 
received from Napoleon III a guarantee of benevolent 
neutrality, in return for vague promises of compen- 
sation for France along the Rhine. He obtained the 
active assistance of Italy in his attack upon Austria 
by promising that Italy should win the province of 
Venetia. 

The war with Austria, which broke forth in 1866, 
was brief and decisive ; it completely fulfilled the hopes 
of Bismarck. Austria, defeated in a seven weeks' 
campaign and with her main army crushed at Sadowa, 
agreed to withdraw from the German Confederation, 
and allow Prussia to organize a centralized union of 
the North German states under Prussian domination. 
Hannover and some five smaller states were annexed 
to Prussia outright, despite their protests. 

It was the first step towards national unity ; the new 
North German Federation was solidly constituted and 
led by Prussia formed a powerful political entity. 
But it was incomplete. There still remained the states 
of South Germany, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, 
who were jealous of Prussia, resentful of the position 
of mastery that she was securing, and who appeared 
determined on remaining aloof. Bismarck perceived 
that to bring them into the union a third war would 
be necessary, preferably directed against France, the 
national enemy of Germany ; a war in which the states 
of both North and South Germany should fight 
together side by side. 

By a series of diplomatic manoeuvres, which force 
our admiration if not our approval, and favored by 
the rash and bellicose attitude of the French Govern- 
ment, Bismarck precipitated the Franco-German War 



INTRODUCTION 9 

in 1870. With equal skill he saw to it that the struggle 
was regarded as a national and not merely a Prussian 
quarrel, and that South Germany stood by the North 
German Federation. The entire country was a unit, 
and the sentiment of national consciousness aroused 
by battling against a common foe was enforced by the 
common victory. The brave, but ill-equipped and 
miserably officered French armies proved totally 
incapable of coping with the Germans, who were 
splendidly organized and directed by the genius of 
Moltke. Overwhelmed at Sedan in September, 1870, 
the French Emperor surrendered; four months later 
Paris capitulated, and the Provisional Government of 
France accepted the German terms. In order that 
France might be stripped of future powers of offence 
and defence, Alsace-Lorraine was taken from her, and 
she was forced to pay an indemnity of five billion 
francs (Treaty of Frankfort). 

Through this national victory over France, Bis- 
marck's hope of persuading the South German states 
to enter the union was realized. While the German 
guns were still thundering outside the walls of Paris, 
at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, painted with all 
the scenes of the triumphs of Louis XIV, the King 
of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor and 
accepted by the rulers of all the German states. A 
consolidated unified Germany, in which the principle 
of centralization triumphed over all factors of dis- 
union, became a definite fact. 

Thus was born in Europe a new political state, whose 
entrance upon the international stage was destined to 
have the most far-reaching consequences. The whole 
set of international conditions which rested upon the 
division of Germany disappeared. France was humil- 



10 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

iated and her material power broken, at least for the 
moment. The creation of united Germany brought 
with it the completion of Italian unity, for upon the 
withdrawal of the French troops, which had been 
stationed at Rome to protect the Pope, Victor 
Emmanuel was able to make of Eome the capital 
of his kingdom. German unification also reopened 
the Near Eastern Question, for Bismarck, in order 
to win the benevolent neutrality of Russia in 1870, 
had agreed to her violation of the neutrality of the 
Black Sea, which had been guaranteed by the Treaty 
of Paris in 1856; Russia could once more send her 
warships down to the Bosphorus and again threaten 
Constantinople. 

More important than the immediate political results 
were the moral effects of the methods employed by 
Bismarck in the unification of Germany. Instead 
of coming through the application of liberal and 
nationalistic principles, as the idealists of 1815 and 
1848 had hoped, it was consummated in direct contra- 
vention to those principles. It was the product of 
force not unadulterated with trickery. The theory 
of brute strength, of "blood and iron," had triumphed. 
By the incorporation of a Danish duchy, by the forcible 
annexation of Hannover to Prussia, by taking Alsace- 
Lorraine without the consent of its inhabitants, Bis- 
marck had frankly given effect to the doctrine that 
might is right. The generous nationalistic theories 
of the French Revolution were crushed under the fist 
of military armaments, and for them was substituted 
the 

good old plan, 
That he should take who has the power, 
And he should keep who can. 



INTRODUCTION 11 

The effect upon Germany was inevitable. Having 
witnessed the failure of the liberal and the success of 
the Bismarckian method, the German people "con- 
ceived thereby a faith in force, a veneration of power 
and might that has directed in large part the subse- 
quent course of German life and history." 1 The 
material prosperity that followed upon the military 
and political success of Bismarck only enhanced their 
belief that "iron is gold." 

The world did not realize at once the full significance 
of the Prussian victory and the acceptance of Prussian 
methods by Germany; and the ultimate consequences 
of Prussian domination in Germany were not com- 
pletely manifested until the twentieth century. For, 
after securing the unification of Germany, Bismarck 
was careful to allay the fears caused by his methods 
and extraordinary success. During the twenty years 
that followed the birth of the German Empire, he made 
use of quite different weapons than those by which 
he had carried out his earlier policy. War and brute 
force had served their turn ; what he desired after the 
war with France was a period of uninterrupted peace 
in which he might consolidate the Empire and foster 
its economic development. Above all he was anxious 
to preserve the new diplomatic prestige that Germany 
had won on the Continent of Europe. The study 
of how he worked towards these ends is essential 
to an understanding of contemporary international 
relations. 

i Priest, Germany since 174.0, 123. 



CHAPTER II 
BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 

With the successful termination of the last of the 
three wars that led to German unity, Bismarck com- 
pleted the task which so many had attempted and 
which he alone had been able to carry through. But 
his diplomatic labors were not finished, for the prob- 
lem which confronted him after 1871 was one of hardly 
less difficulty and demanded, perhaps, the exercise of 
even greater adroitness than all his diplomatic and 
military victories of the earlier period. The success 
of his policy in the political organization of the new 
Empire and the preservation of the European peace 
after the close of the war with France, was no less 
than that which he achieved in the unification of Ger- 
many, and it certainly affected the recent history of 
Europe to an equal degree. 

His first problem was obviously the actual consoli- 
dation of the new federated Germany : the translation 
of the forms that had been fixed in 1871 into fact. 1 The 
task was one of herculean character. As we observed, 
the states of southern Germany had always looked to 
Vienna for guidance and been jealous of Berlin; the 
victory of Prussia over Austria in 1866 had been 
regarded by them in the light of a national disaster. 
With their racial dislike and their political fear of 
Prussia, they were none too enthusiastic in their 

i Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine, ii, 368 ; Von 
Poschinger, Life of the Emperor Frederick, 359. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 13 

acceptance of the new Germanic constitution, which 
gave practical hegemony to the Hohenzollerns. 2 Bis- 
marck had also to face the protests of Poles, Danes, 
and Alsatians, who had been included in the Empire 
against their will and in defiance of the rights of 
nationality. In the North, Hanoverians complained 
of their annexation to Prussia ; in the South, intriguing 
prelates fostered the particularist elements, hoping 
thus to weaken the power of the State and increase 
that of the Church. 8 

"With such factors of disruption constantly working 
against him, Bismarck found his policy of centraliza- 
tion to be one that called for all his administrative skill. 
He finally succeeded, and Germany became a political 
unit, thanks in large measure to the national victory 
over the traditional enemy across the Rhine, to the 
self-abnegation of the German princes, and to the 
almost universal consciousness that national strength 
could come only from union. But in order to succeed, 
peace with foreign countries was necessary and a 
period of international calm must be ensured. In 
Bismarck's opinion, Germany was ''satiated" and her 
interests demanded only the opportunity to absorb 
what she had secured. As war during the preceding 
period had been the essential condition of German 
unification, so, after 1871, the preservation of the 
status quo offered the only assurance of German 
development. 4 

2 Bismarck, Eeflections and Beminiscences (ed. Butler), ii, 128; Hano- 
taux, op. cit., ii, 372-373; Oncken, "The German Empire," in Cambridge 
Modern History, xii, 137; Bourgeois, Politique Etrangere, iii, 763, 766; 
cf. the remark of the Wittelsbach monarch: "Ich unterwerfe mich 
keinem Hohenzollern, " White, Seven Great Statesmen, 463. 

s Bismarck, Eeflections, ii, 189, 249; Hanotaux, op. cit., ii, 369. 

* Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 763. 



14 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

The difficulty of ensuring the preservation of the 
status quo, however, was not small. Notwithstanding 
the constant expressions emanating from the German 
Chancellor to the effect that the new Empire enter- 
tained no further military ambitions, the other states 
found real cause for anxiety in the rapid success of 
Germany, and their attitude was inevitably one of 
agitated watchfulness. The smaller states, having 
witnessed the extent and variety of Prussian annexa- 
tions, were not entirely reassured as to their own fate. 
Prussia had rendered military force the order of the 
day, and an atmosphere of febrile anxiety resulted, 
especially in the countries that were impotent to 
defend themselves. " There is no longer any protec- 
tion," said one statesman, "for the small and the 
weak." The larger states also felt that they must 
be on their guard. They found a centralized political 
entity, based on the strongest army in the world, far 
less to their taste than the "impotent galaxy of 
squabbling states, chiefly notable for literature, art, 
and music, ' ' which had been the Germany of the earlier 
period. 

Such distrust was an obstacle to the fulfilment of 
Bismarck's sincerely pacific policy. Moreover, he had 
to face the special danger of disturbance which might 
arise from the French desire for revenge. The 
humiliation of defeat was not soon forgotten in France, 
and all chance of closing up the wound was prevented 
by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, which kept it an open 
sore. As a German historian has said, the new 
structure of the German Empire was burdened at the 
very outset by a French mortgage, as it were, since 
in the future every foreign foe of Germany could 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 15 

reckon unconditionally upon French support. 5 It was 
the price paid for Alsace-Lorraine. Of this the 
Germans were not unaware, and the most harmless 
words and actions of the French filled them with the 
certain belief that the war of revenge would burst 
forth on the day when the German armies left the 
French soil ; nor was their conviction lessened by the 
speed with which the war indemnity was paid. Bis- 
marck realized acutely the danger that threatened, 
and always stood in deadly fear of the coalition of 
some state with France, designed to break down the 
new position of Germany. 6 

As the best means of preventing such an anti- 
German coalition and of assuring a continuance of 
the status quo, he sought to create a diplomatic com- 
bination of his own. He realized the hazards of 
Germany's position, which was unprotected by natural 
frontiers of defence, and set down between three 
Powers with two of whom she had recently been at 
war ; and he considered that it was of vital importance 
to Germany to become one of a political alliance which 
would lessen the chances of an anti-Teutonic combi- 
nation, and which would, by intimidation, forestall 
any possible attempt at revenge on the part of France. 
During the decade that followed the unification of 
Germany the foreign policy of Bismarck was chiefly 
directed towards the creation of such an alliance. His 
first attempts to bring Russia and Austria into a 
political coalition with Germany were frustrated, 
largely because of the jealousy of the two first-named 
Powers in the Near East. Austria, however, joined 

b Oncken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 136. 
• Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 252. 



16 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

with Germany, and in 1882 the place originally 
designed for Russia was taken by Italy. 

As early as 1870 and before the end of the war with 
France, Bismarck had determined that a permanent 
understanding, and if possible an alliance, between 
the three imperial Powers, Germany, Austria, and 
Russia, should be the keystone of his foreign policy. 7 
Friendly relations with Russia were, in his opinion, 
natural and desirable for both Germany and Russia. 
They were traditional for each nation and royal 
family; with the exception of a brief period during 
the wars of Frederick the Great and the factitious 
alliance of Prussia with Napoleon in 1812, the Hohen- 
zollerns and Romanoffs had invariably recognized 
their mutual interests and remained on terms of close 
friendship. Bismarck himself had done much to bring 
the two states together during his stay as Ambassador 
in St. Petersburg, and in 1863 he had further won the 
good-will of the Tsar by refusing to take advantage 
of a Polish revolt or to aid the rebels. 8 

During the war of 1870, the understanding had not 
been broken, for Bismarck persuaded Russia to adopt 
an attitude of friendly neutrality by acceding to her 
demand that the Treaty of Paris be abrogated so as 
to allow Russia to send her warships out on the Black 
Sea. Russia did nothing to hinder the creation of a 
new and powerful German state, inasmuch as her 
position in the Near East found compensation ; hence- 
forth she could again bear aid to her kinsmen in the 
Balkans, and find a new opportunity of menacing 

i Bismarck, Beflections, ii, 248, 249. 

8 Benedetti, Studies in Diplomacy, 77-80; Lowe, Bismarck, i, 241- 
245, 302-304. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 17 

Turkey. 9 The political bonds which thus united Ger- 
many and Russia were drawn closer by the deep 
personal affection that existed between the Kaiser 
William and his nephew, the Tsar Alexander II. 10 

To come to an understanding with Austria was, in 
Bismarck's opinion, no less desirable for Germany; 
but it proved at the outset more difficult. Two cen- 
turies of mutual jealousy and hostility had left traces 
which were not to be eradicated in a moment. The 
conquest of Silesia by Frederick the Great was not 
entirely forgotten or forgiven by Austria. The defeat 
of 1866 and what amounted to Austria's expulsion 
from Germany still rankled. And the Austrian 
Chancellor, Beust, had always been the bitterest foe 
both of Prussia and of Bismarck. 

The restraint displayed by Bismarck in his treat- 
ment of Austria after her defeat by Prussia had done 
much to smooth matters between the two states. 11 
Austria, on her side, had raised no objections to the 
union of Germany under Prussian hegemony, although 
it was contrary to the Treaty of Prague, and Francis 
Joseph saluted the transformation of Germany with 
at least outward cordiality. 12 Bismarck's readiness to 
pass over the Austrian negotiations with France 
immediately before the Franco-German War, had also 
gone far to facilitate an understanding. The real 
obstacle to the union of Austria and Germany was to 
be found in the policy of Beust, who retained his 

o Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 785. 

io Schneider, L'Empereur Guillaume, iii, 312; Bismarck, Reflections, 
ii, 268. 

ii Andrews, The Historical Development of Modern Europe, ii, 251. 
Although defeated by Prussia, Austria had suffered no loss of territory 
except the surrender of Venetia to Italy. 

12 Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 768. 



18 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

ancient hatred of Prussia and could be bribed by no 
offer to enter into treaty arrangements. Bismarck 
determined to get rid of Beust. 13 

He found his opportunity in the domestic jealousy 
that existed in the Austro -Hungarian Monarchy. It 
must not be forgotten that the Hapsburg Empire was 
a heterogeneous compilation of mutually hostile 
nationalities, of which there are three main divisions : 
the German, the Hungarian or Magyar, and the Slav. 
By a compromise reached in 1867, the German and 
Magyar elements divided the power to the exclusion 
of the Slav; but their mutual jealousy still persisted. 14 
When Beust, who represented the German element 
and was in difficulties owing to trouble with the Slavs, 
refused to accept the advances of Bismarck, the latter 
turned to the Magyars. 

The Magyar party, led by Count Andrassy, saw in 
the German alliance an opportunity for making them- 
selves supreme in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
They were little affected by the Prussian victory of 
1866 and felt no disappointment at the exclusion 
of Austria from Germany. Their ambitions were 
directed rather to the Southeast. They were desirous 
first of maintaining Magyar supremacy over the Slav 
races in the Austrian Empire, and then of extending 
the hegemony of their race over the Slavs of the 
Balkans. An understanding with Germany would 
undoubtedly facilitate the success of their policy; 
they would agree to accept Bismarck's offers on 
condition that he would permit them to exploit the 
rich field of the Balkans. A bargain, based on such 

is Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 787. 

i* Beavan, Austrian Policy since 1867, 7 ; Steed, The Hapsburg 
Monarchy, passim. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 19 

terms, was struck with Germany. Bismarck, who had 
come into contact with Andrassy through the naive 
mediation of Beust himself, planned with the former 
the overthrow of the latter. The plot succeeded, Beust 
was dismissed in 1871, and his place was filled by 
Andrassy. It meant that the new Austrian Govern- 
ment would renounce all claim to its German heritage, 
would seek compensations in the Balkans, and would 
enter into terms of close friendship with Germany. 15 

Andrassy was the more ready to enter into Bis- 
marck's scheme of a triple understanding between the 
imperial Powers, since he sincerely desired to strike 
a bargain with Eussia. The chief obstruction to his 
policy of extending the sway of the Magyar race over 
the Slavs of the Danube and Balkans, was the assist- 
ance which they were likely to receive from Eussia. 
But Eussia also had her fear of difficulties with the 
Poles of Galicia, who were supported by Austria. 
Andrassy agreed to withdraw the support that the 
Poles had found at Vienna, on condition that Eussia 
would deliver the Slavs of the Danube and Balkans 
over to the Magyars. 16 

The policy of Andrassy and Bismarck thus coincided 
and there resulted what historians have called the 
League of the Three Emperors. Bismarck counselled 
his Emperor to make a visit to Francis Joseph at 
Ischl, in August, 1871, which was returned by the 
latter at Salzburg. Andrassy sent the Archduke 
William to the Eussian manoeuvres in the summer of 
1872, with the result that the Tsar consented to meet 
Francis Joseph and the Kaiser William at Berlin 

15 White, Seven Great Statesmen, 471. See also, Thiers, Notes et 
Souvenirs, 92. 

ie Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 787-789. 



20 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

in September of the same year. Other interviews 
followed in 1873 and the two following years, appar- 
ently demonstrating the permanence of the entente. 17 
But the League of the Three Emperors was in no 
sense an alliance and hardly a league, and Bismarck 
found it impossible to give to it anything of real 
solidity. Nor could he use it as a weapon of intimi- 
dation against France; the French conviction that in 
the interviews of the Emperors were to be found a 
series of plots formed against them under the malign 
genius of Bismarck, was wholly at fault. Andrassy 
favored the combination solely in order to preserve 
the status quo in Central Europe, so that he might 
carry out his plan of subjugating the Slavs. He 
entered into the triple understanding, not to assist 
any movement directed against France, but simply to 
come to a compromise with Russia. 18 And the Tsar 
was by no means willing to act as Bismarck's tool in 
keeping France entirely disarmed and at the mercy 
of Germany. At the very moment of the interview at 
Berlin, in September, 1872, Alexander sent word to 
the French President, Thiers, that he had nothing 
to fear from what might transpire there ; and Gortcha- 
koff, the Russian Chancellor, said to the French 
Ambassador at Berlin: "We are not indifferent to 
your army or to your reorganization. On this point 
Germany has not the right to address any criticism 
to you. I have said, and I repeat with pleasure, that 
we need a strong France. ,n9 

1 7 Hanotaux, France Contemporaine, i, 498 ; Bismarck, Reflections, 
ii, 249; Seignobos, I'Europe Contemporaine, 780. 

is Hanotaux, op. cit., i, 500. 

is Broglie, La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron d Berlin, 47. See also, 
Thiers, Notes et Souvenirs, 333 ; Gavard, Le Proems d 'Arnim, 59. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 21 

Bismarck's hope of definitely transforming the 
League of the Three Emperors into a solid alliance 
and guaranteeing the status quo against any disturb- 
ance on the part of France was thus not realized. 
Even the understanding that existed between the three 
Empires was soon destroyed by the strain of two 
crises. The first of these occurred in 1875, when it 
seemed as if war might again break out between France 
and Germany. The moral assistance brought by 
Russia to France on this occasion was such as to 
separate Russia and Germany. The second crisis took 
place in 1878 as a result of the Near Eastern situation, 
and brought Austria and Russia face to face in the 
Balkans. The hostility between the two Powers made 
a continuance of their understanding impossible, and 
forced Bismarck to recognize that his scheme of a 
triple imperial alliance was impracticable. 

The crisis of 1875 was the culmination of the policy 
of intimidation adopted by Bismarck with regard to 
France. From the moment when he opened negotia- 
tions in 1871, he was determined that France should 
be so crushed that she would be unable to lift her 
head against Germany for a generation. It was for 
this reason that he imposed a war indemnity so heavy 
that she was allowed four years in which to pay it, and 
which he later regretted as being too small. 20 It was 
to prevent any counter attack on the part of France 
that Germany took Alsace-Lorraine, which shifted the 
frontier from the Rhine to the Vosges and protected 
the states of South Germany from a sudden French 
invasion. The same fear of the recrudescence of 
France accounts for the successful demand of the 

2°Gabriac, Souvenirs diplomatique* de Bussie et de I'Allemagne, 155. 



22 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

German army staff that the fortress of Metz, in the 
midst of a district linguistically French, should be 
taken from her. 21 "This treaty," said Thiers of the 
Treaty of Frankfort, "is impregnated with the fear 
that France inspires in our foe. ' ' 22 

Both Thiers and Bismarck ardently desired the 
continuance of peace, but everything that they did to 
ensure peace awoke mutual suspicion. To reorganize 
France and safeguard her national existence was the 
only care of the French leaders, but in the efforts 
made by Thiers and Gambetta to reorganize their 
nation, Bismarck saw preparations for an immediate 
war of revenge. 23 On the other hand, the French did 
not understand the mystery of the interviews of the 
three Emperors, and saw in them and in Germany's 
construction of forts and strategic lines, the active 
and brutal hand of Bismarck always threatening 
them. 24 As time went on, the mutual suspicion in- 
creased. The success of the French monarchists in 
ousting Thiers in 1873, seemed to the Germans to 
presage a crusade for the restoration of the Pope's 
temporal power at the very moment when Bismarck 
was fighting the Papacy in the Kulturkampf. Finally 
in 1875 the suspicion reached its culmination in a 
serious crisis. 

It was the year of the proclamation of the French 
Republic, and the Germans saw in this and in a vote 

2i Oncken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 136 ; Busch, BismarcTc 
in the Franco-German War, ii, 341 ; Blowitz, Memoirs, 161. 

22 Bourgeois, Politique Etrangere, iii, 757. 

23 Von Poschinger, Life of the Emperor Frederick, 360; Gavard, Le 
Proces d'Arnim, 94; Hanotaux, op. cit., i, 338, 494; ii, 370; Gabriac, 
Souvenirs diplomatiques, 141. 

24 Thiers, Liberation du Territoire, ii, 182-192. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 23 

passed by the French Legislative Chambers, which 
increased the army of France, the clearest indication 
that the conflicting parties in that country were coming 
to an understanding in preparation for a war of 
revenge. In answer, Bismarck let drop a disquieting 
phrase to the effect that he would not wait until France 
was ready for war, and that he knew that she would 
be ready in two years. 25 In April, 1875, there was a 
general rustle of arms and the German Crown Prince 
did not conceal the fact that Berlin was filled with 
warlike tendencies. So far as Bismarck's intentions 
went, it is probable that he merely hoped to frighten 
France by his sabre-rattling and that he found a 
"pledge of peace in not allowing France the certainty 
of not being attacked, no matter what she did." 
Doubtless he hoped to warn her that any resumption 
of an aggressive policy on her part would not be 
tolerated by Germany. 26 

But it is possible that the German army party, led 
by Moltke, were more serious in their intentions and 
were determined to finish once and for all with France. 
They doubtless believed that an eventual war was a 
certainty and that in eighteen months France would 
be able to wage it on nearly equal terms. According 
to one of the articles published at the time, Germany 
could not believe that Europe would be tranquil so 
long as a struggle were possible and France remained 
in a position to survive and recommence the duel. 
"Germany was troubled by the consciousness of having 

25 Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 777 ; Hanotaux, op. cit., ii, 410 ; Broglie, La 
Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron d Berlin, 166, 182. 

28 Chicken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 141 ; Hippeau, Eistoire 
diplomatique de la troisieme Republique, 84, 109. 



24 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

only half crushed her enemy and of being able to 
defend herself only by sleeping with one eye open." 27 

Whether or not the German military party were 
really determined to crush France at this opportunity 
has never been definitely established. At any rate 
their sentiments were thus described by Blowitz in a 
sensational article in the Times, which helped to wake 
Europe to the danger of the situation. 28 The French 
Foreign Minister telegraphed the fears of France to 
London and St. Petersburg, with the result that France 
was saved from the peril of a German attack, if peril 
there was, by the protests of England and especially 
of Eussia. Lord Derby instructed the British Ambas- 
sador at Berlin to exert his influence to calm the 
manifestations of war-fever in Berlin, and Queen 
Victoria expressed her desire that Europe should be 
spared serious trouble. 29 At St. Petersburg, the Tsar 
assured the French Ambassador that he would prevent 
any such attack as France feared on the part of Ger- 
many, and he immediately took steps to let the German 
Government know his sentiments. 30 

Berlin at once became pacific, and the danger of war 
between France and Germany passed. But the crisis 
was* of the utmost importance, since it proved definitely 
that the understanding built up between the three 
Emperors could not be utilized for the purpose of 
intimidating France. And inevitably it opened a rift 

27 Blowitz, Memoirs, 102, 111; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 
124; Morier, Memoirs, ii, 333-345. 

28 Blowitz, Memoirs, 103. 

29 Hanotaux, op. cit., ii, 407; Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 775, 780; Gavard, 
TJn Diplomat a Londres, 242-243. 

so Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 188, 236 ; Tardieu, France and the 
Alliances, 126; Hanotaux, France Contemporaine, iii, chap, iv; Daudet, 
Histoire diplomatique de I' Alliance Franco-Russe, 78-112. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 25 

between Germany and Russia. It became clear that 
Germany had need of a weak France, Russia of a strong 
France ; so long as the degradation of France remained 
the keystone of Bismarck's policy, an alliance between 
Slav and Teuton was out of the question. This rift 
was widened by the ever-increasing personal animosity 
that existed between Bismarck and the Russian 
Chancellor, Gortchakoff. 81 With the Near Eastern 
crisis of 1878 it became a gulf. 

Both Austria and Russia had vital interests in the 
Near East and it was almost inevitable that sooner 
or later those interests would conflict. Russia, search- 
ing for an ice-free port and coveting control of the 
Dardanelles, looked upon Constantinople as her natural 
heritage. She was, moreover, the natural protector 
of her Slav kinsmen in the Balkans. By sentiment 
and policy she was impelled toward aggressive action 
in the Near East. Austro-Hungary, especially after 
her expulsion from Germany, also looked to the South- 
east as a field for expansion, actuated by economic as 
well as by political motives. When the clash with 
Russia came, the understanding entered into by the 
Tsar and Andrassy under Bismarckian auspices, was 
doomed. 

The temporary rapprochement of the two Powers 
in 1872 resulted from the desire of each to have a free 
hand with which to deal with internal difficulties. 
The domestic problems of each Empire demanded a 
more prompt solution than the questions of foreign 
policy which sometime must separate Russia and 
Austria. For the moment the maintenance of the 
status quo in the Orient was as desirable as in the 
Occident, and like Bismarck, Andrassy sought it in 

81 Bismarck, Beflections, ii, 114; Hanotaux, op. cit., 497. 



26 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

the Russian understanding. 32 But although the chances 
of conflict between Austria and Russia were thus laid 
aside, they were not destroyed, and in 1878 the clash 
of their Near Eastern ambitions took place, and 
definitely terminated Bismarck's hope of a triple 
imperial alliance. 

For many years the decadence of the Turkish 
Empire had presented the most difficult problem con- 
fronting Europe ; Ottoman weakness was a temptation 
to the greed of the great Powers, and Turkey's treat- 
ment of her Christian subjects a constant provocation. 
In fear of the results, should its Empire go to pieces, 
Great Britain and France had saved it from Russia 
in 1855, and the Treaty of Paris had proclaimed the 
sacredness of its integrity. Turkish decadence, how- 
ever, could not be remedied. The finances of the Porte 
were chaotic, sustained only by paper currency and 
foreign loans ; its administration was weak and at the 
same time tyrannical. Finally in 1875, a revolt began 
in Bosnia, which had its origin in the misery dealt out 
by the Turkish governors and in the hope offered by 
Turkish weakness. 

For two years the Powers of Europe sought vainly 
to arrange matters between the Sultan and his Chris- 
tian subjects ; the rebellion could not be checked, and 
spread until it included most of the Balkan provinces. 
Finally, in 1877, after receiving repeated appeals for 
assistance from her Slavic kinsmen, Russia declared 
war on Turkey, in order to bring them aid. 83 The 

32 Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 790; Hanotaux, op. cit., 380. 

33 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, iv, passim; Phillips, Modern 
Europe, 494-505; Bourgeois, op. cit., 793-799; for the causes of the war, 
Songeon, Histoire de la Bulgarie, 332 sq. ; for its course, Kiistow, Der 
Krieg in der Turtcei. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 27 

campaign was long and bloody. At first the Russians 
were unable to make headway against the valiant and 
intelligent resistance of the Turks, but in the spring 
of 1878 they broke down their obstinate defence by 
force of numbers. They advanced to within cannon- 
shot of Constantinople, and there dictated the terms 
of the peace (San Stefano). 34 According to the treaty, 
Turkey in Europe was dismembered. She retained 
only a narrow and broken strip of territory from the 
Bosphorus to the Adriatic, and was forced to see the 
rest of the Balkan Peninsula divided up on paper 
between Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, 
the first-named receiving Rumelia to the south and 
most of Macedonia. 

But Russia had counted without the other Powers, 
and her partition of the Balkans was not allowed to 
go into effect. Great Britain was absolutely opposed 
to the division of the Turkish Empire among the 
Balkan states, and especially disliked the enormous 
accession of territory provided for Bulgaria; the 
Balkan Principalities would be, in her opinion, simply 
clients of the Tsar who had freed them ; the more their 
power was increased, the greater would be the influence 
of Russia in the Near East. 35 Nor was Austria 
inclined to allow her pathway to the iEgean and lower 
Adriatic to be barred and her influence in the Balkans 
nullified by the threatened protectorate of Russia over 
the Slavic states. 

Realizing the determination of the two Powers, 

s^Seignobos, L'Europe Contemporaine, 602, 782-784; Phillips, op. 
cit., 514-515; Hippeau, Histoire diplomatique de la troisidme Republique, 
181-197. 

35 Circular despatch of Lord Salisbury, April 1, 1878, published in 
Anmial Begister, 1878, Appendix; Hippeau, op. cit., 176. 



28 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OP THE WAR 

Russia did not insist upon the acceptance of her 
scheme and agreed that the Treaty of San Stefano 
should be discussed and revised at an international 
congress. A few months later she saw her plan torn 
to pieces by the Congress of Berlin, which settled the 
matter in July, 1878. 36 Turkey retained the larger 
part of her former European possessions, and although 
Rumania was granted absolute independence and 
Bulgaria became an autonomous tributary princi- 
pality, the latter did not receive Macedonia nor even 
Eastern Rumelia. The power of Russia's proteges 
was thus not increased as she had hoped, and she was 
at the same time forced to witness the development 
of Austrian plans for control in the Balkans, since 
Austria received permission to occupy and administer 
the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 37 Once 
more, as in the time of the Crimean War, Russian 
schemes for predominant influence in the peninsula 
were blocked. 

After this diplomatic conflict of Austria and Russia, 
a continuance of the understanding between the three 
Empires was extremely difficult, and its development 
into an alliance impossible. The irreconcilable inter- 
ests of Austria and Russia in the Near East were laid 
bare and any compromise between the two Powers 
was obviously out of the question. The relations 
between Russia and Germany were also embittered. 38 
Russia, in her vexation at the result of the Berlin 
Congress, saw the explanation of her diplomatic 

38 Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 233-236; Andrews, op. tit., ii, 321-323; 
Cahuet, La Question d'Orient, 399 sq. 

37 The text of the treaty is printed in Annual Register, 1878, Appen- 
dix; cf. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe, ii, 515? 

38 Oncken, in Cambridge Modem History, xii, 143. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 29 

defeat in what she believed to be the underhand 
intrigues of Germany. The ill-feeling that already- 
existed between Bismarck and Gortchakoff was 
heightened; the Eussian Chancellor called the Con- 
gress the " darkest episode in his career," and laid 
the blame entirely upon Bismarck. 39 

Russian feeling was not entirely justified by the 
actual facts. It does not appear that Bismarck took 
sides against Russia in the Congress, and he was 
apparently sincere when he professed his absolute 
indifference to the Eastern Question, saying that "it 
was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier." 
Furthermore, it was certainly in consonance with his 
general policy not to offend Russia; so that we may 
believe that he really did his utmost at Berlin to play 
the role of "the honest broker," as he professed. 40 
But it was impossible to convince Russia that Ger- 
many had not acted as agent for Austrian ambitions 
in the Near East. The Russian press covered Bis- 
marck with invective and frankly called him a traitor ; 
members of the Russian royal family passing through 
Berlin refused to meet him, the Tsar protested to the 
Kaiser that Bismarck was an ingrate. Russian tariffs 
on German goods were raised, and Russian armies on 
the German frontier were increased. 41 

Notwithstanding the wave of anti-German feeling 
that swept through Russia at this time, Bismarck was 
by no means inclined to break with a Power whose 
friendliness he believed to be essential for Germany; 

39 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 127. 

40 Von Poschinger, Life of the Emperor Frederick, 381 ; Bismarck, 
"Reflections, ii, 288. 

4i White, Seven Great Statesmen, 476; Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 234- 
236; Hohenlohe, Memoirs, ii, 427. 



30 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

convinced that the display of Russian ill-humor was 
merely temporary and resulted from emotion, he still 
hoped to preserve good relations with the Slav state. 
But he could not fail to realize that the break between 
Eussia and Austria was definite, for it rested upon 
the conflict of interests and not upon sentimental 
grounds. And he saw plainly that Germany must 
choose between Russia and Austria, for she could not 
be the ally of both. 42 Not without difficulty he decided 
at last that the Austrian alliance would be more useful 
to Germany than the Russian. Despite the protests 
of the old Kaiser William, who could not but feel that 
alliance with Austria meant an ultimate break with 
Russia, and was only persuaded by Bismarck's threat 
of resignation, the German Chancellor *at once made 
advances to Andrassy. They were acceptable to the 
Austro-Hungarian Government, and in October, 1879, 
a defensive alliance was signed between the two 
Powers. 43 

According to the terms of the treaty, which were 
secret, if either Austria or Germany were attacked 
by Russia they were bound to lend each other recip- 
rocal aid with the whole of their forces, and not to 
conclude peace, except jointly and in agreement. If 
one of them were attacked by another Power, the Ally 
was to observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality; 
and if the attacking Power were supported by Russia, 
the obligation of reciprocal help would come into force 

42 Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 255-257; Buseh, Diary, ii, 223; Hanotaux, 
op. cit., i, 498. 

43 Correspondence of William I and Bismarck (ed. Ford), ii, 200-202; 
Busch, Diary, ii, 475-489; Bismarck, "Reflections, ii, 266, 268; Oncken, 
in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 144. The text of the treaty is 
printed in Price, Diplomatic History of the War, 273-274. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 31 

and the war would be waged jointly until the joint 
conclusion of peace. 

" By the conclusion of the alliance with Austria, 
Bismarck received the guarantee that he had been 
seeking against an attempt at revenge on the part 
of France. Should France dare to attack Germany, 
he was assured of Austrian neutrality, and if France 
secured the assistance of Russia against Germany, he 
was certain of Austrian assistance. The position that 
Germany had won by the Peace of Frankfort was thus 
stamped with the character of stability and perma- 
nence. Bismarck, however, was not satisfied with the 
new combination and sought to render it stronger by 
the inclusion of a third Power. As he could not make 
assurance doubly sure by the inclusion of Russia he 
turned to the south and determined that the place that 
Russia was to have occupied, should be taken by Italy. 
The adhesion of Italy to the Austro-German pact 
would set up in Central Europe a solid block of Powers, 
sufficient to maintain the status quo against any 
opposing group that could be marshalled against them. 

That Italy should have consented to enter the 
Teutonic alliance seems at first glance anomalous. 
A Latin Power, her racial sympathies were naturally 
with France; moreover she owed to France her first 
advance towards national unity, since it was Napoleon 
who had driven the Austrians out of Lombardy in 
1796 and later brought the whole peninsula under his 
suzerainty; to his genius Italy owed her civil and 
economic organization. Napoleon III had enabled 
Italy again to free herself from Austrian misrule in 
1859, and establish her independence under Victor 
Emmanuel. 

It is true that the relations of Italy with Prussia 



32 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

had been close in 1866 and that it was only .through 
Prussian assistance that Italy had finally won 
Venetia. 44 But Italian gratitude was largely de- 
stroyed when Prussia imposed a peace that left the 
Trentino and Trieste in the hands of Austria. Italy 
had always regarded Austria as the traditional and 
national foe, and the fact that the Hapsburg still held 
territory which was claimed as Italian, did not lessen 
the bitterness that informed the relations of the two 
states. In Italy, a party that made up by zeal for its 
paucity of numbers, demanded loudly and constantly 
that the unredeemed provinces be reclaimed by force. 
In Austria, on the other hand, the anti-Papal policy 
of the Italian Government gave offence to the powerful 
Catholic party. Furthermore, the economic and mari- 
time interests of the two countries clashed in the 
Adriatic and on the Albanian coast, and the rivalry 
in this quarter seemed so keen as to render an alliance 
a practical impossibility. 

But circumstances played into Bismarck's hands. 
Italian gratitude to France for the assistance of 
Napoleon III was almost obliterated by the subsequent 
policy of the Emperor, which the Italians considered 
to be calculated perfidy. After promising that Italy 
should be freed from the Alps to the Adriatic, he had 
made a treacherous peace with Francis Joseph, in 
1859, leaving Venetia in Austrian hands. He had, 
moreover, maintained the Pope in Rome for ten years, 
so that it was not until the defeat of France in 1870 
that the King of Italy was able to make Rome his 
capital. 

4* Italy had entered the war of 1866 against Austria with Prussia, 
and although defeated on the field of battle, received Venetia as the 
price of her cooperation and as the result of Prussia's victory. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 33 

Even after the establishment of the Third Republic, 
French policy continued to be ultramontane and 
consequently anti-Italian. At the moment when Bis- 
marck was winning Italian sympathies by his struggle 
against the Papacy, the French royalists were making 
noisy manifestations in favor of the reestablishment 
of the temporal power. The ministers who showed 
themselves hostile to ultramontane demonstrations 
were forced to resign: first Jules Favre in 1871, and 
then Thiers in 1873. "Our chief enemy," said the 
leading Italian paper, "is the Papacy, and with the 
Papacy, France ; that is to say the implacable enemies 
of Germany." 45 

The identity of adversaries and consequently of 
interests thus pushed Italy in the direction of an 
understanding with Germany, and Italy began to 
consider the possibility of an alliance. In 1872 
Prince Humbert went to Berlin, where he was received 
with enthusiasm by the Prussian Government and 
people, and in the following year Victor Emmanuel 
visited the capitals of Austria and Germany. In 1875, 
at the beginning of the war scare and while Italy was 
arming, Francis Joseph came to Venice, where he met 
the King of Italy, and thus publicly affirmed the 
reconciliation of the two countries. 46 Austria had done 
much to render a friendly understanding possible by 
her moderate attitude: Francis Joseph, head of the 
most Catholic of states, accepted the Italian occu- 
pation of Rome, and thus gave to the Italian ministers 
a guarantee that their most precious victory would 

^s Feiling, Italian Policy since 1870, 4-5; Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 770; 
Seignobos, op. cit., 780; King and Okey, Italy Today, 288. 
"Hanotaux. oq. cit., iu. 378-383. 



34 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

not be contested at Vienna. 47 The Italian Govern- 
ment, on its side, exerted efforts to stem the tide 
of irredentism. 

Something more, however, was necessary if Italy 
were to overcome completely her traditional hostility 
towards Austria and enter into the Austro-German 
combination. That additional factor was furnished 
in 1881, largely under Bismarckian auspices. Young 
Italy was indulging in dreams of grandeur and it was 
in the Mediterranean that she hoped to realize them. 
Especially did she consider control of part of the 
North African seaboard to be essential to her strategic 
security as well as to her commercial development. 
As early as 1838 Mazzini had declared that " Northern 
Africa is Italy's inheritance. " 48 It was therefore with 
a jealous eye that she regarded the French colonial 
empire in Algeria, and with no secrecy that she looked 
forward to gaining compensation in Tunis. That 
province is geographically the continuation of Sicily 
and it adjoins Tripoli, which it was understood might 
be taken by Italy whenever she dared. 

It might have been expected that Bismarck, seeking 
for the friendship of Italy, would have assisted her 
in the conquest of the African province. But the 
methods of the German Chancellor were less direct, 
and he liked to kill two birds with one stone. He knew 
that the French minister, Jules Ferry, was anxious 
to develop the colonial policy of France and that at 
the Congress of Berlin the French were receiving 
encouragement from Great Britain to extend their 
African empire by the addition of Tunis. To this 
proposal Bismarck made no objection, and is said 

47 Memorial diplomatique, October 4, 1873, 626. 

4 8 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 83. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 35 

to have volunteered bis cordial assent. The colonial 
policy of France would help to make the French 
forget the "gap in the Vosges," and when they were 
busy in Tunis they would cease to think of the Rhine 
frontier. At the same time the acquisition of Tunis 
by France would arouse such bitterness in Italy that 
Bismarck could undoubtedly secure the consent of the 
Italian Government to an alliance with Austria and.. 
Germany. Encouraged by Great Britain and Ger- 
many, Ferry sent an expedition to Tunis in 1881, and 
transformed it into a French protectorate. 49 

Bismarck's calculations were justified by the results. 
At the moment when the Italian Government was over- 
whelmed with rage and disgust at the march stolen 
on them by France, Bismarck had no difficulty in 
persuading Italy that her interests lay in an alliance 
with the Teutonic Powers. The ancient enmity to 
Austria was forgotten in the desire for revenge on 
France ; impelled by pique, Italy threw herself into 
the compact of Germany with Austria, and in 1882 the 
Triple Alliance was thus formed. 50 

The completion of this alliance gave to Bismarck 
that solid bulwark for which he had been seeking ever 
since the war with France. It guaranteed the diplo- 
matic position that Germany had won in 1871 and it 
strengthened it. It assured the status quo and gave 
to Germany free hand for the solution of her internal 

4 9 Busch, Diary, ii, 475; Crispi, Memoirs, ii, 97-104; Hanotaux, op. 
eit., iv, 387; Despagnet, La troisieme Eepuolique et le Droit des Gens, 
234; Adam, Apres I' Abandon de la Revanche, 174, sq. ; Pincm, France et 
Allemagne, 55; Eambaud, Le France Coloniale, 140 sq. ; Picquet, Cam- 
pagnes d'Afrique, 141 sq. ; White, Seven Great Statesmen, 477; Hippeau, 
Eistoire diplomatique de la troisieme Republique, 383-406. 

bo Crispi, Politica Estera, 44-47 ; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 
126, 130-132; Eeventlow, Dentschlands auswartige Folitik, 8-11. 






36 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR 

problems. A single-handed attack on Germany by- 
France would be the wildest chauvinistic madness; 
an attack in conjunction with Russia would find 
Germany supported by both Austria and Italy. The 
alliance was purely defensive, but under the circum- 
stances that was all that Bismarck desired; as far 
as foreign relations were concerned, Germany's 
strength was in sitting still. 

By means of the alliance Bismarck began to exercise 
what was virtually a diplomatic mastery over Europe. 
Both French and German historians have agreed that 
with it the hegemony of Germany began ; 51 the military 
primacy secured by the war with France, now became 
a political primacy. The friendliness of Spain was 
assured. The German tendencies of Lord Salisbury 
made certain the cooperation of Great Britain, which 
was furthermore guaranteed by the understanding 
between Italy and Great Britain. And even the new- 
born colonial aspirations of Germany did not seriously 
disturb the cordiality of Anglo-German relations. 
France was isolated and involved in bitter quarrels 
with Italy and Great Britain; her attention was thus 
distracted from the continental situation, and Bis- 
marck received a double assurance that he had nothing 
to fear from that side of the Rhine. 

The single cloud on the horizon was the possibility 
of a diplomatic combination between France and 
Russia. But Bismarck had perfect confidence in his 
ability to prevent this contingency, and he never 
neglected an opportunity of cultivating good feeling 
with Russia in order to obviate the chance of her 
casting in her lot with France. Although he preferred 

oi Oneken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 159 ; Tardieu, France 
and the Alliances, 132. Cf. also, White, Seven Great Statesmen, 478. 



BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 37 

Austria, when forced to choose between that Power 
and Russia, he always held to his conviction that the 
interests of Germany and Russia were closely allied, 
and that a definite breach could always be avoided. 
With the fall of Gortchakoff the relations of the two 
countries began to improve, and Bismarck was soon 
able, in spite of his alliance with Austria, to create 
what almost amounted to an understanding with the 
Government of the Tsar. In 1884 and 1887 he con- 
cluded treaties with Russia, stipulating mutual neu- 
trality if either Russia or Germany should be attacked 
by a third Power. 62 

Bismarck thus reinsured the German position of 
preponderance against any attack by a hostile coali- 
tion. If France should threaten, he had a promise 
from Russia that she would remain neutral. So long 
as Germany abstained from aggressive action, there 
was no need to fear any assault. Secure from all 
danger, Germany could turn her whole energy into 
the organization and consolidation of her domestic 
political system and the development of her latent 
economic forces. 

52 Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 271, 273; Annual Register, 1884, 300; 
Headlam, Bismarck, 442, 443; Keventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige 
Politik, 3, 5, 18-23. 



CHAPTER III 
THE DUAL ALLIANCE 

The success of Bismarck's diplomacy after 1871, 
which isolated France and led to German primacy on 
the Continent through the creation of the Triple 
Alliance, forms, perhaps, his chief title to greatness. 
It is at any rate a manifestation of diplomatic skill 
hardly less to be admired than his earlier policy which 
resulted in the unification of Germany. Disappointed 
in his plan of an alliance of the three Empires, he had 
nevertheless succeeded in building up a solid coalition 
of the chief states of central Europe, preserved friend- 
ship with Russia, maintained cordial relations with 
Great Britain, and, by encouraging the colonial aspira- 
tions of France, fostered quarrels which incapacitated 
her for action on the Continent. The peace of Europe 
was secured, Germany's political supremacy was 
recognized, and Bismarck could proceed with his plans 
of internal consolidation and industrial development. 

But the maintenance of Germany's position was 
a task of extreme difficulty. Bismarckian diplomacy 
had succeeded, but it had sown seeds of future develop- 
ments that were likely to disturb the conditions upon 
which German primacy rested. One of the most 
important of these conditions was the separation of 
France and Russia; and the process of creating 
the international greatness of Germany had brought 
factors into play which made a diplomatic union 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 39 

between France and Russia a probability if not a 
certainty. 

Each Power was isolated to a greater or less extent 
by the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, and naturally 
began to look to the other for support. Each Power, 
furthermore, felt itself the victim of some stroke of 
Bismarckian diplomacy: France had been humiliated 
and dismembered by the Treaty of Frankfort, and 
although she smothered outward manifestations of the 
spirit of revenge, could not but regard Germany as 
the national enemy; Russia considered that Germany 
had been largely responsible for the Treaty of Berlin, 
which shattered her dream of control in the Near East, 
and on that account bore her ill-feeling. Neither 
Power was content to accept the verdict of these 
treaties as final, and sooner or later each was 
bound to come to the realization that the continental 
equilibrium could be reestablished only by a rapproche- 
ment. The Balkans and the spire of Strasburg 
cathedral were destined to dominate European politics. 

A glance at the map will suffice to indicate that from 
geographical necessity France and Russia are natural 
allies. The former Power, protected on the north, 
west and south by the sea, on the southwest by the 
Pyrenees, on the southeast by the Alps, finds her 
eastern frontier open at many points to the attack 
of a hostile nation. To distract the attention of an 
enemy advancing from that side, she has need of a 
friend in the East. The value and necessity of such 
a friendship has constantly been recognized by the 
rulers of France and demonstrated by the course of 
her international relations. 1 

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the 

iDaudet, Eistoire Diplomatique de V Alliance Franco-Busse, 2-35. 



40 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

national foe on her eastern frontier was Austria, 
France sought alliance in turn with Turkey, with 
Sweden, and with Brandenburg. In the eighteenth 
century, during the wars of Frederick the Great of 
Prussia, an alliance with Austria was consummated. 
Half a century later, Napoleon signed treaties of 
alliance with Russia on two separate occasions, 
believing that the friendship of the Power farthest 
east was the surest guarantee of the security of 
France's position and the success of her development. 
Similarly under the Restoration that followed the fall 
of Napoleon, an understanding with the Tsar helped 
France to regain her international prestige and 
embark on the enterprise that was destined to found 
her colonial empire in North Africa. 

Russia on her side had often sought alliance or 
friendship with France. Peter the Great realized 
keenly the value of French support at the time when 
he was endeavoring to make a modern European state 
out of the half -barbarous Moscovy, and many of his 
successors, notably Catherine II, recognized the truth 
of the principle that Russia had need of a strong and 
friendly France. The Empire of the Tsars, a half 
Asiatic Power, must have the assistance of a western 
Power if it was to play a role of importance in Euro- 
pean affairs. France was the nation to which it 
looked for assistance, for with the vast frontiers of 
Russia largely open to the attack of Austria and 
Prussia, it naturally sought support from the nation 
in their rear, in order to neutralize the danger. 

History shows that adjacent and contiguous coun- 
tries are often, by the fact of their geographical 
location, hostile to each other; those separated often 
have allied interests. So it was in the case of Russia 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 41 

and France. It is an example of what may be termed 
checkerboard diplomacy: all the red squares have a 
natural tendency to join in alliance against the black 
squares. 

Although nature and history thus presented a 
Franco-Russian alliance as a development to be 
expected and desired by both nations, there existed 
many obstacles to its consummation, even after Bis- 
marck had formed the Triple Alliance. Memories of 
the past hindered a cordial rapprochement. Napo- 
leon's capture of holy Moscow in 1812, his nephew's 
attack upon the Crimea in 1855, Russia's indifference 
to the plight of France in 1870, left vestiges of mutual 
bitterness in both countries. Russia remembered that 
Napoleon III, to avenge a fancied slight and to gain 
the prestige of an alliance with Great Britain, had 
helped to block the Slav advance towards Constanti- 
nople. France could not forget that her call for help 
in 1870 had been silenced by Bismarck's bribe of 
acquiescence in the tearing up of the Treaty of Paris, 
and that Russia for the sake of sending warships on 
the Black Sea, had left her to her fate. 

The two countries were also separated by the differ- 
ence in their domestic political regimes, and their 
Governments sometimes found it difficult to under- 
stand each other: France was a democratic republic, 
and Russia an autocratic monarchy. The radical 
tendencies of the French people and ministers fright- 
ened the Tsar and his advisers, who feared lest their 
holy empire might be contaminated by contact with 
the nation of revolutions. France on the other hand, 
had no sympathy with Russian political methods : the 
efforts of the Poles to win their freedom met with the 
sentimental approval, if not the material support of 



42 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR 

Frenchmen; and Russian revolutionaries in exile not 
infrequently found a kindly haven of refuge in Paris. 2 
The personalities and opinions of their statesmen 
also tended to keep the two nations apart. President 
Grevy, who was elected to the supreme office of France 
in 1879, was firmly opposed to any alliance with 
Russia. He argued the necessity of a period of quiet 
during which France might recuperate, and he feared 
that negotiations with Russia would alarm Germany 
and lead to a resumption of her menaces and possibly 
something worse ; nor did he believe that negotiations 
would result in any sort of a definite understanding. 
In his opinion, complete isolation was the wisest 
policy for France and afforded the only assurance of 
her peaceful renaissance. 3 On the other hand, French 
statesmen and diplomats were unable to secure the 
personal approval of the Tsar and his ministers. It 
did not smooth the path to friendship that a man who 
had publicly insulted Alexander in 1867 should become 
Prime Minister of France hardly more than a decade 
later. 4 And the representatives of France at St. 
Petersburg were very frequently in diplomatic hot 
water; more than one French Ambassador lost the 
favor of the Russian court by his faux pas, which 
created the worst impression in a circle where etiquette 
was of the utmost importance. 5 

2 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 4. 

3 Daudet, Histoire Diplomatique, 125. 

* M. Floquet, who had become Prime Minister, had in 1867, met the 
Tsar on his visit to Paris with the cry, "Vive la Pologne, " Annual 
Begister, 1888, 243. 

s Admiral Jaures, who represented France, remarked, when he was 
shown the portraits of the ancient Tsars, "Who are those hideous 
fellows?" Again in discussing Nihilism with the Minister of the 
Interior, he said, "You can only get out of this fix by becoming a 
Republic," t>audet, Histoire Diplomatique, 155. 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 43 

Thus, notwithstanding Bismarck's belief, which he 
expressed as early as 1856, that a Franco-Russian 
alliance was in the nature of things, the two countries 
remained isolated. And the elements of hostility were 
not unskillfully exploited by Bismarck, whose entire 
policy was affected by his dread of a coalition. 
Nevertheless, the general tendency of the two nations 
to come together was discernible, despite incidental 
factors of separation. And the same events that 
weakened the understanding between Germany and 
Russia assisted the tendency. 

It will not be forgotten that the understanding of 
the three Emperors first threatened dissolution as a 
result of the war scare of 1875. As we saw, the policy 
of intimidation employed by Bismarck towards France 
resulted in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and a 
fear of the reopening of the Franco-German duel. In 
1875 there appeared the bellicose articles in the 
German papers which, coupled with the increase of 
German armaments, seemed to presage an immediate 
attack upon France. The French ministers, sincerely 
terrified, sought the assistance of the other Powers, 
and particularly that of Russia. Largely because of 
the firm tone adopted by the Tsar on this occasion, 
the warlike schemes of Germany, if they existed, were 
not prosecuted. All through the crisis Russia encour- 
aged France to have no fear and to trust in Russian 
friendship. The Tsar, in a personal interview with 
the French Ambassador, told him that Russia would 
stand by France, that the two countries had interests 
in common, and that he hoped that their relations 
would become more and more cordial. And the 
Russian Chancellor, Gortchakoff, announced the assur- 



44 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

ance of peace in such a way as to imply that Russia 
was responsible for the salvation of France. 6 

The attitude assumed by Russia at this time neces- 
sarily threw a cloud over the German-Russian entente 
and increased very obviously the cordiality of Franco- 
Russian relations. The gratitude of the whole French 
nation rose to the Tsar. All the French papers 
expatiated upon the service done to the Republic by 
her friend in the East, and the President expressed 
the warmth of French feeling in a personal letter to 
the Tsar. 7 Thus the ill-considered brutality of German 
threats brought the Franco-Russian rapprochement 
into the light of possibility. 

The next step in the coming together of the two 
nations was the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Russia 
saw her plan of control in the Balkans torn up and 
notwithstanding the protestations of honesty that 
Bismarck uttered, she more than half suspected that 
Germany had been guilty of double dealing in favor 
of Russia's rival, Austria. At all events the crisis, 
which humiliated Russia in her prestige at the same 
time that it affected adversely her material interests, 
severed temporarily the bonds of German-Russian 
intimacy. It was a case of the farther is from Ger- 
many the nearer is to France, and the Russian news- 
papers began to advocate the French alliance with 
warm enthusiasm. 8 The following year saw the 
conclusion of the Austro-German alliance, and Russia 
realized plainly that Germany, having to choose 
between Russia and Austria, had deliberately elected 

« Hanotaux, Eistoire de la France Contemporaine, iii, 277; Daudet, 
Histoire Diplomatique, 84. 

7 Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine, iii, 285. 

8 Hanotaux, Eistoire de la France Contemporaine, iv, 427. 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 45 

the latter Power. When in 1882 Italy signified her 
adhesion to the Teutonic combination, the Russian 
position, if not quite comparable to the isolation of 
France, was at any rate that of an outsider. 

For another decade the diplomatic skill of Bismarck 
was sufficient to keep Russia and France apart, and 
had he remained in office their ultimate rapprochement 
might have been postponed still longer. Notwith- 
standing the hostility of the journals of Russia to 
Germany and the uncompromising antipathy of the 
"Slavist" party, and despite fiscal and commercial 
quarrels, Bismarck managed, after 1884, to bring 
about a resumption of cordial relations with Russia. 
With tact and adroitness he showed the new Tsar, 
Alexander III, that monarchical Germany was likely 
to be a far better friend than revolutionary France. 
He commanded the German press to flatter and 
conciliate Russia on every occasion. The royal 
families of each nation exchanged visits, and Russian 
favor was secured by expelling from Berlin all persons 
suspected of hostility to the Government of the Tsar. 9 
More significant still, Bismarck brought about a 
meeting of the three Emperors in 1884 at Skiernevice, 
which sealed the compact of reinsurance drawn up by 
Bismarck six months previously, and which stipulated 
for a benevolent neutrality in case either Germany 
or Russia were attacked by another Power. In 1887 
this reinsurance treaty was renewed. 10 

But presages of the coming revolution in diplomacy 
began to appear with increasing frequency. In the 
West, France was meditating a reinvigo ration of her 

s Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 134-137. 

loReventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige Politih, 18-23; Daudet, His- 
toire Diplomatique, 169-170. 



46 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

continental policy, and for this, an understanding with 
Russia was necessary. With the fall of Jules Ferry 
from power in 1885, the Government of France lost 
much of its ardor for colonial expansion and again 
took thought of the possibility of revenge on the 
Rhine and of reinforcing the position of France in 
Europe. The Radical party, which was constantly 
increasing in numbers, demanded a reversal of policy, 
leading to the renunciation of distant conquests and 
an alliance with some foreign Power against Germany, 
as the sole possible guarantee of the existence of 
France as a great nation. 11 Bismarck's attempt to 
intimidate France in 1887, by the arrest of a French 
commissioner of police, Schnoebele, and the passing 
of a law which increased the German army, only 
tended to augment the rising feeling against Germany 
and the sentiment that favored a close understanding 
with Russia. 12 

In the following year Germany practically closed 
Alsace-Lorraine to French citizens and even to persons 
coming from France; relations between the two 
countries became consequently still more embittered. 
The spirit of nationalism which made possible the rise 
and popularity of Boulanger, captured the mass of the 
French nation, seemed likely to result in a conflict with 
Germany, and made an understanding with Russia 
still more popular. Furthermore, the retirement of 
President Grevy, who was always the obstinate 

ii Eckhardt, Berlin, Wien, 'Rom, 15 ; Due de Broglie, Discours, iii, 14, 
23; Pinon, France et Allemagne, 70 sq.; Albin, Le Coup d'Agadir, 61; 
Eose, The Origins of the War, 100. 

12 Annual Register, 1887, 213; 1888, 243; Tardieu, "La Politique 
Exterieure de 1 'Allemagne, " in Questions Actuelles de Politique 
Etrangere, 1911, 73; Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 3. 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 47 

advocate of a policy of isolation, tended to render 
negotiations with Russia possible. 

In the latter country, notwithstanding the rein- 
surance treaties, friendly relations with Germany 
appeared less stable. A Near Eastern crisis had 
again separated the two nations, and the cordial 
support manifested by France on this occasion 
strengthened the idea of a Franco-Russian alliance. 13 
Still greater was the effect of Bismarck's publication 
of the text of the Triple Alliance in 1888 ; Russia was 
wounded and alarmed when she discovered the extent 
of the preparations made against her by Austria and 
Germany. 

The new tone of intimidation adopted at this time 
by Bismarck, not merely towards France but towards 
all Europe, aroused Russian fears. Only a few days 
after publishing the text of the Triple Alliance, the 
German Chancellor, in an acrid speech, asserted the 
necessity of maintaining Germany's position on the 
Continent; his terms were so unmeasured that it 
seemed as though he were attempting to overawe all 
the PoAvers, and Russia in particular: "The fears 
that have arisen in the course of the present year 
have been caused by Russia more even than by France, 
chiefly through an exchange of provocations, threats, 
insults, and reciprocal investigations, which have 
occurred during the past summer in the Russian and 
French press. . . . God has given us on our flank the 
French, who are the most warlike and turbulent nation 
that exists, and He has permitted the development in 
Russia of warlike propensities which, until lately, did 
not manifest themselves to the same extent. . . . By 
means of courtesy and kind methods we may be 

is Annual Register, 1887, 263. 



48 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

easily — too easily perhaps — influenced, but by means 
of threats, never. We Germans fear God and nothing 
else in the world. ' m 

In such terms Bismarck warned France and Russia 
to keep apart and practically asserted the mastery of 
Germany in Europe. Germany desired that the peace 
should be kept, but it must be the Pax Germanica. 
Whether or not the harsh and domineering attitude 
assumed by Bismarck would have succeeded in its 
purpose and frightened Russia into an avoidance 
of an understanding with France, cannot be deter- 
mined. Bismarck was sure of his ground and certain 
of his ability to keep the two nations permanently 
separated. What is certain is that at the moment 
when Russia was in doubt as to whether she should 
accept Germany's warning and shun an understanding 
with France, or whether she should accept the chal- 
lenge, the two personalities which more than anything 
else held Russia to Germany were removed in quick 
succession, the one by death, the other by disgrace. 

In 1888 the aged Kaiser William I died, and in 
March, 1890, Bismarck was dismissed. 
is The old Kaiser had always looked upon Russia and 
Prussia as natural friends, and it was largely through 
his influence that the two nations had not become 
frankly hostile after the Congress of Berlin. He had 
opposed the alliance with Austria because he feared 
that it would give umbrage to Russia, and to his last 
day he had worked for a close understanding with his 
beloved great-nephew, the Tsar. 15 To the Russophile 
Emperor there succeeded, after the brief hundred-day 

i* Annual Register, 1888, 267-269; Singer, GeschicMe des Dreibundes, 
89-91 ; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 144-145. 
is Schneider, L 'Emvereur Guillaume I, passim. 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 49 

reign of Frederick III, the youthful prince, William II, 
whose desires and policy were unknown quantities; 
Europe waited in anxiety, wondering whether he would 
use the enormous power bequeathed to him for peace 
or for war. 

Almost his first words seemed a threat. His acces- 
sion was signalized by an address to the army first 
of all: "I swear to remember that the eyes of my 
ancestors look down on me from the other world and 
that I shall one day have to render account to them 
for the glory and honor of the army." On the same 
day he expressed similar sentiments to the navy. It 
was not until three days later that he issued a 
proclamation to his people. ' ' Men everywhere remem- 
bered that his father had first addressed his people, 
and then his army and navy. The inference was 
unavoidable that the young Kaiser meant to be a 
Frederick the Great rather than a citizen emperor as 
his father had longed to be known. ' no 

To France and Russia, who were already agitated 
by the fear of a resumption of aggressive policy on 
the part of Germany, this army order, coming as it 
did, seemed to proclaim the advent of a Hohenzollern 
possessing all the martial traits of his forefathers 
and all the imprudence and recklessness of youth. 
Their alarm brought them closer together. At such 
a moment when they were anxiously awaiting some 
fresh manifestation of the Kaiser's intentions, arrived 
the news of Bismarck's dismissal (March 8, 1890). 
The one man who possessed the power to separate 
France and Russia thus disappeared. In Russia, the 
disgrace of Bismarck aroused not merely surprise but 

18 The proclamations are printed in Elkind, The German Emperor 's 
Speeches, 4-7. 



50 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

dismay. For despite the brutality with which the old 
Chancellor had fulminated against Russia in 1888, 
he was recognized as a force making for peace; and 
notwithstanding his unpopularity with the Slavist 
party, he was always regarded by the Tsar as a friend 
of Russia. With his removal from the political stage 
it seemed as though the ties of friendship that bound 
Russia and Germany were completely loosened. 17 

The French were not slow to seize their opportunity 
and give to their relations with Russia the character 
they desired. In one respect these relations had 
been ameliorated in striking fashion even before the 
dismissal of Bismarck, for Russia was exceedingly 
grateful for the financial assistance that was given 
by France at the moment when Russia was seeking 
capital to be used in her industrial and commercial 
development. The aid brought by France to the 
Russian economic policy established a broad material 
basis for the political alliance that France was seeking. 

Previous to 1888 Russian loans had generally been 
floated by a small group of Berlin bankers, who 
remained masters of the market value of loans on 
Exchange. Russia was thus largely dependent upon 
a coterie of Prussian financiers. But in 1888 the 
initiative of a number of French bankers led to a 
change in Russian financial methods. They suggested 

17 Hohenlohe (Memoirs, ii, 412, 413) says that the Grand Duke of 
Baden believed that the chief cause of Bismarck's disgrace was that 
he desired a close understanding with Eussia, even if it meant a split in 
the Triple Alliance. Eelations with Eussia were cool after Bismarck's 
fall, Ibid., ii, 428. Eambaud, on the other hand, believes (Histoire de 
la Russie, 825) that the retirement of Bismarck did not hasten the Dual 
Alliance, that it had already been forced by his brutality; in support 
of this thesis he quotes Caprivi, ' ' The interview of Kronstadt has simply 
made visible to the eyes what has long existed. ' ' 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 51 

that the Russian loans be floated on the French market 
and subscribed for by the French people. The sug- 
gestion was accepted by the Russian Minister of 
Finance, and in the same year a loan of five hundred 
million francs was thus floated. In the two following 
years other loans, amounting to more than a billion 
and a half, were similarly floated and were subscribed 
for by more than a hundred thousand persons. 18 
Instead of seeing her commerce and industrial enter- 
prises controlled by a group of bankers, Russia became 
debtor to the French people. Since the number of 
subscribers was so large, it was impossible to manipu- 
late the market value of the loans to Russia's disad- 
vantage. To France, who was anxious to lend the 
money and desired the favor of Russia, and to Russia, 
who needed the capital and liked the terms, the 
arrangement was mutually satisfactory. 

Taking advantage of the friendliness created by the 
success of the loans, and the anxiety caused in Russia 
by the accession of "William II and the dismissal of 
Bismarck, the French Ministers lost no time in further 
improving relations with the Slav Government. In 
1890 the French Minister of War placed at the disposal 
of Russia the great arms factory at Chatellerault. At 
the same time the Minister of the Interior arrested 
a band of Nihilists engaged in making bombs to be 
used against the Tsar ; nothing could have been found 
that would more certainly secure the gratitude of the 
Russian Government. The French Foreign Minister, 
Ribot, and the Ambassador at St. Petersburg, de 
Laboulaye, worked constantly for the development of 
the friendly feeling with Russia into an actual alliance. 

isDaudet, Histoire Diplomatique, 246-279, 282-297; Eeventlow, 
Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 3-5; Annual Begister, 1888, 243. 



52 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

"Every day the atmosphere grew more favorable. 
With statesmanlike perspicacity M. de Laboulaye saw 
that the time had come for action, and that only the 
approval of the people was required to bring to a 
successful issue these combinations, previously con- 
ceived in the secret councils of the two Chancelleries." 19 

To win the expression of popular approval which 
was deemed necessary, it was essential to stage an 
act which would publicly make manifest the rapproche- 
ment of the two nations. This was effected in the 
summer of 1891, when the French fleet sailed to 
Russian waters under the command of Admiral 
Gervais, and on July 25, anchored off Kronstadt. 
The French received an enthusiastic welcome and 
there followed a fraternization of the sailors and 
officers of the two fleets which was warmly applauded 
both in France and in Russia. 20 The Tsar visited the 
French flagship and listened with uncovered head to 
the French band playing the national airs of the two 
countries : the revolutionary Marseillaise received the 
homage of the autocrat of the East, and the con- 
cord of the two countries hitherto isolated was thus 
symbolized. 

The warmth of approval which this demonstration 
evoked in both nations made the determination of some 
sort of pact inevitable. Although the existence of the 
alliance was not officially stated until 1896, the treaty 
was signed in August, 1891, nor was it then denied 
that the relations of France and Russia had entered 
upon a new phase. 21 In the following year the alliance 
was supplemented by a military arrangement of a 

is Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 11. 

2°Daudet, Histoire Diplomatique, 299-314; Annual Register, 1891, 262. 

2i Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 12-13. 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 53 

defensive character, which undoubtedly stipulated for 
mutual defence in case either Power should be 
attacked. 

The coming together of France and Eussia in a 
defensive coalition, apparently ended the diplomatic 
hegemony of Germany and restored the equilibrium 
that had been destroyed by the German victories of 
1870 and the creation of the Triple Alliance. Diplo- 
mats in both France and Germany believed that the 
balance of power was recovered, and in the latter 
country not a few agreed with Bismarck that German 
supremacy would end with the rise of the opposing 
combination. The dismissed Chancellor from his 
retreat covered with bitter sarcasms the policy of the 
young Kaiser, who had been impotent to prevent what 
Bismarck had so long staved off. 

It is true that at first the new alliance seemed 
destined to have an enormous moral effect. It was 
not formed to satisfy the French ambition for revenge, 
nor could it be counted upon for the winning back of 
Alsace-Lorraine; in no sense could it be regarded 
as an offensive league against Germany. But it 
apparently announced to the world that the two 
nations were determined that their independence of 
action should not be shackled by German domination. 
1 'It insured us in Europe a moral authority which, *\ 
since our defeats, had been wanting to us. It aug- 
mented our diplomatic value. It opened to us the field 
of political combinations, from which our isolation 
had excluded us. From mere observation, we could 
pass to action, thanks to the recovered balance of 
power." 22 

22 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 14 ; cf . Eeventlow, Deutschlands 
auswartige PolitiJc, 31. 



54 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

But the effects of the alliance were more apparent 
than real, and although the two nations may have 
acquired a new moral authority, their combination did 
not affect the practical control of Germany as much 
as had been expected. For some years, the Allies, 
as Tardieu says, were too exclusively absorbed in 
contemplating the fact of their union, and too desirous 
of multiplying outward manifestations that might 
convince the world at large of its reality. There were 
without question endless official visits made and 
returned, and a constant interchange of congratulatory 
addresses; that the practical value of the alliance 
was enhanced by such demonstrations is by no means 
certain. It is undeniable that both nations played 
into the hands of Germany: France by allowing her 
foreign policy to be paralyzed by domestic dissensions ; 
Russia by directing her activities from Europe to 
Asia. 

It resulted that the mastery of Germany, which 
Europe had experienced during the latter years of 
the Bismarck regime, was indeed less ostentatious 
under William II, but it was in reality no less effective. 
For another decade, following the Franco-Russian 
alliance, Germany exercised a very actual hegemony 
on the Continent. The explanation for this fact, which 
has not always been clearly recognized, is to be sought 
in two directions: partly in the failure of the 
French and Russian diplomats clearly to define and 
coordinate the interests of their countries; partly in 
the skill with which the young German Kaiser handled 
the situation. 

To meet the new Franco-Russian combination Ger- 
many had an untried emperor and was deprived of 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 55 

the services of the veteran Bismarck, whose genius 
had first won for the Empire its position of supremacy, 
and then successfully maintained it so long as he was 
in office. In this difficult situation, the new sovereign, 
whose chief characteristic in popular judgment was 
an opinionated conceit combined with the ability to 
make bellicose speeches, displayed at once the enigma 
of his character and the brilliance of his diplomacy. 

William II was then thirty-two years of age. In 
him there was to be found a melange of the salient 
traits of his various ancestors. Born and brought up 
in the midst of a militaristic circle and influenced by 
the ancient militarist traditions of his race, he never- 
theless was to keep the peace for quarter of a century ; 
the ambition and aggressiveness of Frederick the 
Great was in him balanced by the caution of Frederick 
William I. The flighty brilliance and impetuosity of 
his great uncle, Frederick William IV, was offset by 
the power of application and laborious drudgery, 
characteristic of the Great Elector. Bound by the 
traditions of the Hohenzollerns to the Junkers and 
imbued with a thoroughly mediaeval spirit, he was at 
the same time essentially modern in his tastes and 
delighted in the society of bourgeois manufacturers 
and Hebraic capitalists. 

One characteristic of his family was dominant in 
his nature : the will to rule. The power that God had 
bestowed upon the monarch was not, in his opinion, 
to be shared. Frederick William IV had written to 
Bunsen: "You all have good motives in your advice 
to me and you are good in the execution of orders, 
but there are things which are revealed only to one 
who is king, things which as Crown Prince were 
withheld from me and which I have only learned 



56 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

by becoming king." Such were the feelings of 
William II. His personal will must guide the fortunes 
of Germany, within the Empire and without: "He 
who stands in my path, him will I shatter (den 
zerschmettere ec/i)." 

It is therefore necessary to regard Germany's policy 
as, to a large extent, the Kaiser's policy. The 
influence of capitalists and Junkers, of commercials 
and militarists must be taken into consideration; but 
in the last instance it was the Kaiser who decided. 
To him, accordingly, must go the credit for the success 
of Germany's policy during the years that followed 
1891, a policy marked by a subtlety, a diplomatic 
cleverness worthy of the founder of the Empire. 
For ten years he played the most delicate game, 
working for friendly relations with each of the new 
allies, diverting their attention from European matters 
which might give them an opportunity for working 
together against Germany, encouraging their feuds 
with other countries. The sovereign who was univer- 
sally regarded as the man of war thus maintained the 
peace so essential to German commercial development, 
and at the same time preserved the dominating 
influence of the nation, the bequest of Bismarck. 23 

Instead of losing his temper over the Franco- 
Russian alliance, the Kaiser at once set to work to 

23 Berard, La France et Guillaume II, 19-21. Dr. Sarolea {The 
Anglo-German Problem, 327) criticises the Kaiser for having no guiding 
principles in foreign policy, for being in turn Anglophile, Francophile, 
and Bussophile, and imparting to German diplomacy an incoherence 
which has been its chief weakness. But in this the Kaiser has simply 
followed the very traditions of his race and practised Eealpolitik. He 
has changed friends, but according as circumstances changed; they were 
merely the means to his end, and that end, German continental hegemony, 
he has unwaveringly pursued. 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 57 

rob it of its force. This could only be accomplished 
by maintaining friendly relations with both France 
and Russia and controlling them through moral 
suasion; he constantly exerted himself to show a 
studied amiability towards each Power. At the same 
time he drew them both into extra-European adven- 
tures, often in company with Germany. France was 
encouraged to develop her colonial policy in Africa, 
which since the occupation of Tunis in 1881 had 
embroiled her with Italy, and since the affair of Egypt 
in 1882, with Great Britain. Russia was supported 
in her penetration of Manchuria, which embittered her 
relations with Great Britain and was to lead to the 
war with Japan. With their energies thus occupied, 
France and Russia had no opportunity for disputing 
with Germany her position of supremacy upon the 
Continent of Europe. 

Both French and Russian diplomats allowed them- 
selves to fall in with German plans. In 1894 Gabriel 
Hanotaux became Foreign Minister in France, and 
except for a period of a few months, remained at the 
Quai d'Orsay until June, 1898. Brought up in the 
school of Ferry he was an ardent advocate of colonial 
expansion, considered Great Britain as the inevitable 
enemy of France, and turned to Germany for support. 24 
The Kaiser was not slow to respond and expressed 
on more than one occasion his desire for an under- 
standing with France. In 1895 the common action 
taken in the Far East by Germany, France, and Russia 

24 See the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies, May 31 and 
June 10, 1895; also cf. an obviously inspired article in Le Temps, June 
19, 1895; Pinon, France et Allemagne, 90 sq.; Elkind, The German 
Emperor's Speeches, 48; Despagnet, La Diplomatic de la Troisieme 
Bepublique- et le Droit des Gens, 765. 



58 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR 

seemed almost like the proof of a triple understanding 
between the Powers of the Dual Alliance and Ger- 
many. 25 At the same time the participation of the 
Russian and French fleets at the opening of the Kiel 
Canal emphasized the rapprochement of the two 
nations with Germany. In 1897 steps were taken 
towards a general settlement of African colonial 
questions; Togoland was delimited, and France and 
Germany seemed almost ready to develop their colonial 
accord into a general entente. 28 Russia and Germany, 
in the meantime, were going hand in hand in the 
establishment of their position in the Far East. 27 

This political understanding so anxiously sought by 
Hanotaux and the colonial party in France, and 
approved by the pacific Tsar of Russia, was strength- 
ened by the tact and cordiality displayed by the 
Kaiser towards the defeated of 1870. On every 
possible occasion he assured the French of his sym- 
pathy and admiration; paid homage to their courage 
when he celebrated the anniversary of the victories 
over France ; expressed his grief at the death of such 
opponents of Germany as MacMahon, Canrobert, and 
Jules Simon. He visited French training ships and 
telegraphed his congratulations "as sailor and com- 
rade ' ' to France ; saw that the German exhibit at the 
Paris exposition was as brilliant as possible, invited 
French generals to visit him at the time of the German 

25 Pinon, La Lutte pour la Pacifique, 76, 79 ; Reventlowj Deutschlands 
auswartige Politik, 82-86. 

26 Albin, Le Coup d'Agadir, 82-83; for the attempt of Germany to 
arrange a definite entente with France in 1898 immediately before 
Hanotaux' resignation, see Fullerton, Problems of Power, 53. 

27 Hohenlohe, Memoirs, ii, 463 ; Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige 
Politik, 103. 



THE DUAL ALLIANCE 59 

manoeuvres, and made of the French Ambassador at 
Berlin one of his closest intimates. 28 

The result of the political and sentimental rap- 
prochement which the Kaiser maintained with France 
and Russia was to give to Germany a position of 
continental control. The practical effect of the Dual 
Alliance was destroyed by the willingness of France 
and Russia to follow the lines that Germany desired 
them to take. In France, at the inspiration of Hano- 
taux, the spirit of revenge was entirely forgotten in 
the ardor for colonies; and the development of this 
colonial policy seemed to demand an understanding 
with Germany. 29 Russia's attention was entirely 
directed towards the Far East. So far as its operation 
in Europe went, the Dual Alliance was a weapon 
without edge. 

Hence, the Kaiser might fairly claim that the 
diplomatic burden that had fallen from the shoulders 
of Bismarck had been honorably and successfully 

28 Tardieu, "La Politique Exterieure de 1 'Allemagne, ' ' in Questions 
Actuelles de Politique Etrangere, 1911, 76-79; Pinon, France et Alle- 
magne, 86-90; Elkind, The German Emperor's Speeches, 50-51. Imme- 
diately after visiting the French training ship, Iphigenie, the Kaiser 
■wired to President Loubet: "I have had the pleasure of seeing young 
French sailors on board the training ship Iphigenie. Their military 
and sympathetic conduct, worthy of their noble country, has made a 
deep impression on me. My heart as a sailor and comrade rejoices at 
the kind reception which was accorded me . . . and I congratulate 
myself on the fortunate circumstance which has allowed me to meet the 
Iphigenie and your amiable countrymen." 

29 Pinon, France et Allemagne, 97; Fullerton, Problems of Power, 
28-29; General Dubarail, ex-Minister of War, wrote, "The peaceful 
intentions which the Emperor William has manifested since his acces- 
sion to the throne make it our duty to take part in the celebrations at 
the opening of the Kiel Canal. ' ' And see also an article by Jules Simon 
filled with pacific spirit towards Germany, Elkind, The German Emperor's 
Speeches, 49. 



60 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

carried. His methods and his attitude towards France 
were different from those of the great Chancellor, but 
they were no less effective. Bismarck had forced and 
maintained the isolation of France and Russia; the 
supremacy of Germany that was built up on their 
isolation he had made manifest constantly and at 
times with brutal frankness. After the fall of Bis- 
marck, the young Kaiser had been powerless to 
prevent the alliance of Eussia and France, but his 
tact and skill were sufficient to render it innocuous, 
and the new opposing combination forgot to oppose. 
From 1891 to the end of the century the hegemony of 
Germany was concealed, but it was none the less real, 
and German influence was still as fully in control of 
continental diplomacy as when Bismarck was the 
recognized dictator of Europe. 

The significance of the position occupied by Ger- 
many during this period is realized when we come to 
consider the use that she made of it. Largely because 
of her diplomatic control of the Continent and the 
peace which she had assured under conditions most 
favorable to her growth, Germany was enabled to 
pass through an extraordinary material and moral 
transformation. From this transformation there 
resulted a change in international relations which led 
directly to the diplomatic crises that marked the first 
decade of the century and finally to the general war. 



CHAPTER IV 

GERMAN WORLD POLICY: ECONOMIC 
FACTORS 

The significance of the period during which Ger- 
many occupied a position of virtual mastery in Europe 
can hardly be overestimated. It was the time when 
the young empire, having secured its military pre- 
dominance by the defeat of Austria and France and 
won political primacy through the creation of the 
Triple Alliance, began to forge ahead as a great 
industrial and commercial Power and even to threaten 
the supremacy so long held by Great Britain. Bis- 
marck never failed to recognize the necessity of 
economic prosperity to a great state, and his desire 
to preserve the peace after 1871 was actuated in no 
small degree by his ambitions for the growth of 
German industry and commerce. Largely for the 
same reason, the Kaiser William II believed it 
necessary to keep the destinies of Europe under 
German control. 

Their hopes were fulfilled. During the period of 
almost unruffled calm that followed the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1878, Germany passed through an economic 
transformation which, in conjunction with an equally 
significant moral transformation, was destined to 
exercise the most important effect upon the inter- 
national diplomatic situation. The almost unparalleled 
growth of Germany's industries, the extension of her 
commerce, her skill and success in competing for 



62 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

markets, could not be disregarded by the nations which 
had hitherto held economic control in the world at 
large. The demand for a strong navy, for the 
acquisition of colonies, and for political influence 
outside of Europe followed inevitably in Germany and 
did not allay the fears of Germany's neighbors. The 
jealousy of German economic success and the disquiet 
inspired by her ambitions played no small part in 
determining the diplomatic revolution which occurred 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, and which 
aimed at a restoration of the political balance of power 
in Europe. 

The economic transformation of Germany which 
took place during the generation that followed the war 
with Prance surpassed in rapidity and extent any 
similar phenomenon that Europe had ever seen. In 
Japan and in certain districts of America changes 
as vast and as speedy were characteristic of the 
nineteenth century; but in the old world nothing 
comparable to the alteration of Germany had been 
experienced, not even when the loom of Arkwright 
and the steam engine of Watts had made of agricul- 
tural England the first of industrial communities. 
This transformation was effected in an infinity of 
ways; its most salient features, perhaps, were the 
growth of population and its shifting from the rural 
districts to the urban centres, the development of 
industry based upon applied science, the extension of 
foreign trade, and the creation of a gigantic mercantile 
marine. 

The most obvious, and possibly the basic fact of 
significance in the economic development of Germany 
was the enormous growth of population. The number 
of inhabitants dwelling in the German Empire in 1871 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 63 

was approximately forty-one million. 1 Because of the 
new advantages that resulted from national unity, this 
population could be supported by the natural resources 
of the country with greater ease and in a higher degree 
of comfort than before the war with France. The 
benefits of more uniform legislation, the improvement 
in the means of communication and transportation, 
the security afforded by a strong national government, 
tended to lighten the economic burden that rested 
upon the working people. 

But these very factors combined to facilitate a rapid 
increase of population. The birth rate was higher in 
1876 than ever before, and although the ratio of births 
has slowly descended since that year, the loss has been 
more than counteracted by the continual decrease In 
the death rate. Germany's population has thus grown 
with startling rapidity. By the end of the century,, 
the Empire numbered more than fifty-six million souls, 
and after forty years of existence it had advanced to 
sixty-five million, thus increasing by more than half. 
Obviously, the problem that the Government was 
forced to meet r was how to find means of support for 
this human increment ; sixty million persons could not 
live upon the same resources that had been sufficient 
for forty millions. 2 

One obvious solution to this problem was the develop- 
ment of intensive agriculture; by subjecting the soil, 
which was often of a sterile and arid nature, to 
scientific treatment, it might be possible to increase 
vastly the agricultural output of Germany. Nor was 

i Statesman's Year Book, 3873, 104-106. 

2 Statesman's Year Book, 1898, 1905, 1913; Von Biilow, Imperial 
Germany, 13; 61st Congress, 2d Session, Senate Documents, no. 578, 
"Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France, 1867-1909," 151. 



64 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

this line of development neglected, and the improve- 
ment of German agricultural methods has formed not 
the least of the Empire's economic triumphs. 3 But 
this solution was not wholly adequate, for the problem 
of an increased population was further complicated 
by the rapid shifting of population, the continual 
emigration from the rural districts to the towns and 
industrial centres. In 1871 less than a quarter of the 
German people resided in the towns; at the end of 
the century, the town population comprised nearly 
half of the whole. The country districts declined 
relatively in all parts of Germany, and in some quar- 
ters there was an absolute decrease of the rural 
population. 4 In this shifting of the centre of gravity 
from country to town there is to be found partly cause 
and partly effect of Germany's economic transfor- 
mation; the problem of supporting the new town 
population led to the growth of new activities, which 
in their turn tended continually to increase the influx. 
The rise of such new activities resulted inevitably 
from the growth of population. The surplus popu- 
lation might have sought a new home in colonies 
overseas, but when Germany looked abroad for spots 
suitable for the life of Europeans, she found that they 
had already been seized upon by older nations; nor 
was she in a position to demand that land should be 
granted to her for the use of her surplus population. 
Emigration to foreign countries or alien colonies was 
distasteful to Germany for sentimental and practical 
reasons. Germans could not endure that the Father- 
land should suffer the loss of vigor and vitality that 
comes to an emigrating nation ; they believed that the 

3 Dawson, Evolution of Modern Germany, 228-237. 

4 Dawson, Evolution of Modern Germany, 39, 41-43. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 65 

increase in their numbers was essential to the preser- 
vation of their military strength; and they could not 
bear that foreign countries should profit by the surplus 
energy that Germany herself was unable to support. 
Emigration, accordingly, was not encouraged and after 
1870 the annual loss from this cause became contin- 
ually less. In 1885 about 171,000 persons emigrated 
from Germany, but in 1898 there were only some 
23,000. s 

Under these circumstances there remained for Ger- 
many but one satisfactory means of supporting her 
increasing population, namely, the creation of new 
industries and the concurrent development of foreign 
commerce. The growth of such new industries, both 
causing and resulting from the opening of foreign 
markets, provided employment and support for 
millions who otherwise would have been forced to 
leave Germany. The increase in number and size 
of new industrial enterprises was thus the essential 
condition of Germany's ability to offer a living to 
her children; in the minds of Germans, the sine 
qua non of German national existence. 8 

Previous to the war with France and the conse- 
quent unification of Germany, her characteristics 
were without question agricultural. The establish- 
ment of the customs union and its inclusion of the 
chief German states between 1819 and 1842, proved 
a strong stimulus to industrial enterprise; but both 
political and financial conditions were unsuitable 

sRohrbach, German World Policies (trans. Von Mach), 16-17; Von 
Biilow, Imperial Germany, 13; Tonnelat, L'Expansion allemande hors 
d'Europe, passim. 

e Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 14; Speech of Ambassador von 
Bernstorff, November 6, 1909 (published under title of The Develop- 
ment of Germany as a World Power). 



66 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

for the encouragement of capital. So long as Ger- 
many remained divided and the jealousy of Austria 
and Prussia seemed to preclude any solid political 
settlement, it was hopeless to attempt the development 
of manufactures upon a large scale; nor were there 
any large banking institutions capable of standing 
behind industrial enterprises. Most of the manu- 
factured articles which we now associate with the 
inscription, "Made in Germany," were then imported 
from England and France. 7 

But the national victory over France in 1871 
affected the commercial no less than the political life 
of Germany. It led to the breaking down of the 
barriers that had hindered the exercise of that busi- 
ness initiative, acumen, and pertinacity characteristic 
of the German middle class. "For the first time the 
Germans as a nation became conscious of collective 
power and of the great possibilities which this power 
placed within their reach. A new youth — that un- 
speakable gift which the gods so rarely bestow upon 
mortals — was given to them, and with all youth's 
energy and ardor and audacity they plunged at once 
into a bold competition with neighbors of whom they 
had hitherto stood in a certain awe, and who in truth 
for their part had barely taken the young rival 
seriously. ' ' 8 

A clear index of the growth of German industry is 
to be found in the activities of the banks during the 
years that succeeded the war. The Deutsche Bank, 
which was a private institution unaided by the state, 

i Sehierbrand, Germany : The Welding of a World Power, 98 ; States- 
man's Year Booh, 1850-1870, passim. 

s Dawson, Modern Germany, 37; Andrillon, L' Expansion de I'Alle- 
magne, 117. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 67 

more than quadrupled its capital in a decade, advanc- 
ing from three millions of capital in 1870 to thirteen 
millions in 1880. In the former year it carried on a 
business that amounted to sixty millions; ten years 
later it had developed its business to 2500 millions and 
doubled its dividends ; in 1890 it did a business of 7000 
millions. The state banks were equally successful, and 
by the increase in their capital and by its productive 
employment not merely gave proof of the success 
of German industry, but made possible its further 
development. 9 

The astonishing growth of the mineral and metal 
industries is equally significant, for coal and iron are 
used in the other industries and the increase in the 
output of both is at once a cause and result of the great 
industrial development. The product of Germany's 
coal mines for the year following the war was tripled 
thirty years later and quadrupled in 1906 ; in Prussia 
this industry was sextupled between 1871 and 1905. 10 
The production of iron ore showed a still more notable 
development, and the creation of the smelting indus- 
tries was rapid and successful. The amount of pig- 
iron produced in 1871 was less than a fifth of that 
put forth in 1901. Forty years ago Germany's steel 
output was barely half a million tons annually; in 
1895 it approximated three millions, in 1902 it had 
advanced to seven millions, and in 1907 to twelve 
millions. 11 The significance of this increase is easily 
appreciated, for the steel trade is the industrial 

» Schierbrand, Germany, 100-101; Statistics for Great Britain, Ger- 
many, and France, 173 sq. 

io Statesman's Year Book, 1873, 128; 1898, 552; 1907, 1000; Statis- 
tics for Great Britain, Germany, and France, 156, 157. 

ii Statesman's Year Book, 1873, 129; 1898, 552-553; 1907, 1001. 



68 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

barometer. Other indications of the economic develop- 
ment of Germany may be discovered in the statistics 
of population. It is estimated that 61 per cent of the 
earning population in 1843 were engaged in agricul- 
ture, forestry, gardening, fishing, etc. In 1882 the 
percentage of persons dependent upon agriculture, etc., 
for their livelihood had decreased to 42 per cent, and 
in 1895 it had further declined to 35 per cent. Not- 
withstanding the growth of population, the absolute 
number of persons engaged in agriculture was barely 
maintained, and practically all the increment went 
into the new industries. 12 

This transformation is realized in more impressive 
fashion the more we study the growth of other 
economic activities, especially the electrical, textile, 
chemical, and toy industries. Nor can we over- 
emphasize the fact that it was regarded by Germans 
as an essential element in the existence of the Father- 
land as a great state. These industries, gigantic in 
size and infinite in number, were believed to be the 
sole means by which the nation could support her 
vastly increased population, which otherwise must 
perforce emigrate or starve. Germany must become 
a manufacturing state if she was to maintain herself 
upon an equality with the other Powers of Europe. 

Just as the German people believed themselves to 
be thus dependent upon their industries, so in turn 
did they believe that those industries were dependent 
upon the extension of foreign trade. The complete 
success of German industrial energy could never be 
attained nor ensured, unless it were certain of a 
permanent position in the markets of the world; for 
Germany's industries were in many cases absolutely 

12 Dawson, Modern Germany, 44-46. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 69 

dependent upon the raw materials supplied by other 
countries, and free access to oversea markets was 
essential to the sale of her goods. 

The extraordinary success of Germans in selling 
their goods has been no less marked than their success 
in producing them in the first instance. Although 
they came into the commercial race late and the 
established position of their competitors laid heavy 
handicaps upon them, they succeeded in outrivalling 
most of their economic opponents, and finally even 
threatened the commercial position of Great Britain. 
Their success has been ascribed by an authoritative 
writer as due in the main to one or all of three factors : 
the cheaper price of German goods; their superior 
or at least their more serviceable character ; the more 
efficient arrangements which the German makes for 
reaching and attracting purchasers. 18 

All of these factors result in large measure from 
the fact that the German has made of his industry 
and commerce a science. The nations who entered 
the field first were not forced by competition to the 
development of scientific methods of production and 
distribution; their way being clear they proceeded 
in hit-or-miss fashion, and although they lost many 
opportunities of cheapening their goods without 
lessening their value, and neglected many prospective 
customers whom they might have secured, they still 
made their necessary profits. And as time went on, 
even with the advent of new trade rivals, they clung 
to their old-fashioned methods. But the Germans, if 
they were to overcome the start that had been gained 
by the older nations, were absolutely forced to the 
use of scientific methods both in the making of the 

13 Dawson, Modern Germany, 79. 



70 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

goods and in selling them. This they realized defi- 
nitely, with the result that the processes of manu- 
facturing and selling developed by the Germans, have 
become models for the world. That which of late 
years has been so characteristic of German Kultur 
in general — "the application of a trained intelli- 
gence to the practical affairs of life" — has been 
preeminently true of their industrial and commercial 
methods. 

Science in method has been, perhaps, the greatest 
reason for Germany's ability to produce goods more 
cheaply than her rivals. The development of mechani- 
cal labor-saving devices progressed further there 
than in any other country; and the Germans' skill 
in the coordination of the various processes of pro- 
duction has also enabled them to cut their costs. 14 
Their application of the natural sciences, especially 
chemistry, was another factor making for economy 
in manufacturing methods. Every new discovery was 
at once investigated by the German manufacturers 
in the hope that it would lead to some improvement in 
the technical details of production and thus allow 

I* A correspondent wrote to the Times, April 7, 1906: "Among the 
chief reasons for the decrease in the British iron industry must be 
placed the tendency to adhere to antiquated methods of production 
among English manufacturers. As opposed to this the German iron- 
masters have known how to avail themselves fully of modern improve- 
ments in the technical details of the metallurgy of iron and in the 
practical operation of the blast furnace. In fact, though during 1905 
there were fifty fewer blast furnaces in Germany than in Great Britain, 
the former country was able to produce no less than two million tons 
more of pig-iron than its rival, even with this great disadvantage in 
point of plant." Dawson shows (Modern Germany, 81) that in 1886 
the average production of a blast furnace in Germany was 16,500 tons, 
but by the building of larger furnaces and improved methods the pro- 
duction in 1908 reached 40,000 tons. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 71 

them to undersell their competitors. 16 Moreover, they 
were assisted by the fact that in general they could 
pay lower wages to their laborers and lower industrial 
salaries to the officers of their companies. And in the 
last instance they were apt to be satisfied with smaller 
profits ; their scale of living was lower in general than 
that of the French manufacturers, and almost inva- 
riably than that of the British manufacturers of their 
own station. The amount that in other countries 
would be spent upon luxuries was deducted from the 
price by the German manufacturers. 16 

Besides producing cheaper articles the German 
learned how to make them more to the taste of his 
possible purchasers. He watched the effect of foreign- 
made articles upon purchasers, and then either imi- 
tated them or improved them in the details in which 
they did not exactly meet the desires of the customers. 
It has been said with insight that the German is not 
an inventive genius but "he excells in adaptation, 
which under ordinary circumstances is a gift of even 
greater practical value than inventiveness. The great 
inventors have seldom become rich men; the prizes 
have generally fallen to the men who have had just 
enough originality to recognize a good idea when they 
saw it, to adapt and develop it, and to turn it to 
immediate success." 17 It is Lavoisier, Berthallet, and 
Berthelot who created organic chemistry, but Germany 
has exploited their discoveries and made the profits. 18 

In this respect the German manufacturer has been 

is Stiegel, Die chemische Industrie, 8. 
i« Schierbrand, Germany, 106. 
it Dawson, Modern Germany, 85. 

is Andrillon, L'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 120. Cf. Haller in Bevue 
generate des Sciences, November 30, December 15, 30, 1912. 



72 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

unrivalled. He has been kept in touch with the desires 
of his customers by his travelling agents, and accord- 
ing to their instructions has modelled his goods. His 
own tastes have been completely sunk in those of the 
persons to whom he wishes to sell. He has made 
it his business to discover the predilections of his 
prospective customers and to conform to them in 
the manufacture of the articles designed for that 
particular quarter. He realized, as some of his com- 
petitors did not, that the secret of industrial success 
lay not in forcing the purchaser to buy goods with 
which he was not satisfied, but rather in recognizing 
that the purchaser had the right to know what he 
wanted and making it his own business to supply it. 19 
Because of their adaptability the Germans had an 
enormous advantage over their British competitors, 
who were apt to refuse to change their models to suit 
the taste of the persons for whom they were designed. 
The attitude of the British was often that their 
articles had been made in such a style for a long time, 
and were not going to be changed ; if the customer did 
not like them, he might leave them and look for what 
he wanted somewhere else. Especially in South 
American countries and in the Par East, the Germans 
secured many markets simply by ornamenting their 
goods in a certain style, or packing them in attractive 
boxes which pleased the purchasers. The British 
failed to understand that even though their own 
article might be superior, other factors might be of 
importance. In Europe itself and in quarters where 
the British had the advantage of long established 
trade, the Germans often ousted them by their appre- 
ciation of the tastes of the purchasers. "Our market,' ' 

is Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 50, 51. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 73 

the British Consul at Cherbourg wrote in 1897, "is 
overrun with German hardware and toys. The region 
lives mainly by its trade with England; and yet the 
shopkeepers buy nothing in England. At the big 
bazaar, where I asked the reason of this, the manager 
handed me articles in wood and fayence made in 
Germany from models he had given, and in sizes 
suited to the taste of the population, with views of 
Cherbourg and scenes from Norman history." 20 

Even if the Germans had not possessed the com- 
mercial advantages resulting from cheaper goods and 
articles better suited to the tastes of their customers, 
they would have proved dangerous competitors because 
of their more expert salesmen. In the training of 
their commercial representatives, as in other respects, 
they took more pains and consequently achieved better 
results. The Government founded technical schools 
and mercantile colleges for the special purpose of 
equipping the young men with the qualities necessary 
for successful salesmanship. A thorough knowledge 
of foreign languages and a study of foreign charac- 
teristics and methods enabled them to enter their 
business career with a far better business education 
than that ordinarily given to young men of other 
countries. Upon leaving the mercantile college they 
were generally sent by the exporting house with which 
they were to be connected, on a trip around the world, 
or to remain for a term of years in some foreign 
commercial field in order to study the requirements 
of the country in which they were placed. 21 

In this way the German commercial houses secured 
a trained corps of salesmen of excellent technical 

20 Cited by Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 53. 
2i Schierbrand, op. cit., 108; Dawson, op. cit., 92-94. 



74 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

education and well acquainted with the customs and 
needs of the foreign market. They kept the home firm 
in close connection with its customers and made it 
their task to persuade the manufacturers to satisfy 
the desires of the purchasers. We need not wonder 
that the Germans were successful in their competition 
when they met the traders who still held to the 
antiquated method of forcing the goods of the houses 
they represented upon the market, regardless of the 
tastes of their customers. 

The German exporter also accommodated himself 
to the modes of payment habitual in foreign countries, 
differing from the British trader, who was apt to 
demand immediate settlement and through a British 
financial house. The German granted long credits 
and easy payments. Everything that could be done 
to win the favor of his customers was done. The 
British Consul at Havre wrote home : "The Germans 
have secured the contract for supplying the industrial 
school at Elbeuf with all its material. They have laid 
down all the machinery at a merely nominal price. . . . 
What was paid was for the sake of form only. . . . 
They have thus gained the town's good graces. And 
this gift will be amply requited by their obtaining the 
future custom of all the pupils leaving this school, 
who will have been accustomed to the articles, methods, 
tools, and skill of the Germans." 22 

By the exercise of trained intelligence and scientific 
methods in production and in salesmanship, the 
Germans thus won a secured position not merely in 

22 Cited by Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 54. For the German 
organization for influencing the press and public opinion of foreign 
countries in favor of German goods, see British Parliamentary Payers, 
1914, no. cd 7595, Despatches of Sir E. Goschen. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 75 

the markets of South and Central America and the 
Far East, but in Europe itself and in the very homes 
of their competitors. We read in a book written by 
a man who cannot be suspected of favoring Germany : 
"In my home in Paris the elevator is German, elec- 
trical fixtures are German, the range in my kitchen 
is German, the best lamps for lighting are Ger- 
man. . . . My cutlery is German, the chairs in my 
dining room are German, the mirror in my bath room 
is German, some of my food products are German, 
and practically all the patented drugs, and some of 
the toilet preparations are German. . . . All these 
things have been purchased in the Paris markets, 
without the slightest leaning towards or preference 
for articles coming from the Fatherland. I was not 
aware of the fact that I was buying German things. 
They sold themselves — the old combination of appear- 
ance, convenience, and price, which will sell any- 
thing." 23 

The success that attended Germany's efforts to win 
a place in foreign markets is realized without difficulty 
when we recall the totals of German trade statistics. 
In 1878 German imports and exports amounted to 
about six billion marks; by 1892 her commerce had 
advanced to seven billions, and in 1900 to ten and a 
half billions, while in 1906 the total sum of her imports 
and exports was not less than fifteen billions. 24 These 

23 Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 50. 

24 From. 1870 to 1900 Germany rose from fourth to second place 
in international trade; a decade later she had nearly quintupled the 
amount of exports and imports of 1870, whereas Great Britain's foreign 
trade was only about two and half times as great in 1910 as in 1870, 
Eohrbach, German World Policies, 66-81; Andrillon, L'Expansion de 
I'Allemagne, 117; Statistisches Jahrbuch, passim; Statistics for Great 
Britain, Germany, and France, 153. 



76 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

enormous figures, as von Biilow says, are lifeless, but 
they "assume a living interest when we consider how 
important they are for the welfare of the Germans, 
and that the work and very existence of millions 
of . . . citizens depends upon them." 23 Germany's 
vastly increased population found their means of 
support in her new gigantic industries, and those 
industries could never have been built up without 
the rapid and successful extension of Germany's 
commerce. 

Just as Germany's industries were dependent upon 
her foreign trade, so that trade was, to a large extent, 
dependent upon her mercantile marine. And the 
speedy growth of the German shipping industry has 
marched abreast of the expansion in industry and 
commerce. Our attention is called by one writer to 
the Latin device over the portal of the Navigation 
House in Bremen, "Navigare necesse est." 26 The 
vast majority of Germans have believed firmly since 
1890 that navigation was an absolute necessity to 
the existence of the new industrial state. It was 
necessary for the feeding of her enormous population ; 
above all it was necessary for her trade, in order to 
ensure the importation of the raw materials which 
supplied the great industries, and to carry German 
manufactured products back to foreign markets. 

The growth of German shipping first became 
notable in the nineties. Before the war with France, 
Germany could in no respect claim to be a seafaring 
Power; the Hanseatic ports, which in mediaeval days 
were amongst the chief centres of European commerce, 
had languished ever since the Napoleonic blockade. 

25 Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 14-15. 

26 Schierbrand, Germany. 131. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 77 

Hamburg, Germany's chief port, was in 1872 not so 
much a German as a British harbor : of the ships that 
put into that port the British vessels surpassed the 
German by two to one. But by 1887, the German ships 
entering Hamburg slightly surpassed the British in 
number and tonnage, and in 1900 the German shipping 
of Hamburg was more than double that of the British. 
A decade later the entire trading fleet of France was 
less than that of Hamburg alone. 27 

The increase in German shipping in this single port 
was typical of the general growth of Germany's 
mercantile marine. In the year of unification, her 
shipping was almost entirely confined to the Baltic 
and consisted chiefly of sailing vessels. By the end 
of the century she had quintupled her mercantile 
tonnage and possessed thirteen hundred steamers 
plying the high seas and entering all the ports of the 
world. With more than four thousand sea-going 
vessels, her mercantile marine was surpassed by that 
of Great Britain alone. 28 The development of certain 
lines was especially notable. In 1855 the Hamburg- 
American line had but two steamers, one of them built 
in England ; at the beginning of the twentieth century 
this line was the largest in the world, no British or 
French company comparing with it either in size or 
in steamer connections. Besides its regular service 
to New York and other American, Mexican, Canadian, 
and South American ports, it had extended branch 
lines to Italy, the West Indies, around Africa, and to 

27 Schierbrand, op. cit., 132-134; Clapp, The Port of Hamburg, 
passim; Statesman's Year Booh, 1873, 177; Statistics for Great Britain, 
Germany, and France, 166. 

28 Dawson, Modem Germany, 70-71 ; Andrillon, L 'Expansion de 
I'Allemagne, 126-127; Statesman's Year Book, 1898, 555-558; 1907, 
1007-1009. 



78 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

the Far East. The North German Lloyd operated 
twenty-seven steamer lines to all continents, and 
possessed forty-six steamers engaged in Chino-Indian 
trade. 29 

The natural corollary to the growth of Germany's 
mercantile marine was the creation of her navy. It 
was inconceivable that the Germans should be willing 
to trust the security of their ships to the chances of 
fortune and the generosity of rival Powers; for they 
believed that their commerce and industry depended 
absolutely on the preservation of their mercantile 
marine. On this point von Biilow expressed the 
conviction of the German people with unmistakable 
lucidity: "We have entrusted millions to the ocean, 
and with these millions the weal and woe of many of 
our countrymen. If we had not in good time provided 
protection for these valuable and indispensable pos- 
sessions, we should have been exposed to the danger 
of having one day to look on defencelessly while we 
were deprived of them. But we could not have 
returned then to the comfortable economic and political 
existence of a purely inland state. We should have 
been placed in the position of being unable to employ 
and support a considerable number of our millions 
of inhabitants at home. The result would have 
been an economic crisis which might easily attain 
the proportions of a national catastrophe. ' m 

29 For German pride in these lines, see Rohrbach, German World 
Policies, 100-101. 

so Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 17. Cf. also Professor Paulsen: 
"The German Empire has participated in the policy of expansion out 
of Europe — at first modestly, of late with growing decision. The 
enormous increase of its industrial production and its trade compelled 
it to take measures for the extension and the security of its overseas 
interests. In the course of a single generation Germany, as an indus- 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 79 

Convinced of the economic necessity of a formidable 
navy, Germany, although she entered the race late, 
proceded to make up for lost time. In 1888 the 
German naval estimates amounted only to some sixty- 
five million marks annually, and ten years later only 
to one hundred million; in the former year the navy 
was manned by fifteen thousand officers and sailors, 
in the latter the number was twenty-three thousand. 
In 1898 she possessed only nine armored ships of war. 
But in that year and two years later she adopted a 
far-sighted programme of naval development which, 
with the complementary law of 1906, promised her a 
fleet which would soon be of great defensive strength 
and by 1920 might hope to dispute even Great 
Britain's supremacy on the sea. By 1908 the annual 
naval estimates had risen from one hundred million 
marks to about four hundred twenty million. The 
number of officers and seamen in the navy had 
increased to over fifty thousand. The programme 
of 1900 was intended to bring the navy by the year 
1920 to a strength of thirty-eight line ships and 
fourteen large cruisers. But the complementary laws 
of 1906 and 1908 gave notable increases so that 
Germany was promised at least eighty war ships of 
the latest type in 1920. 31 

trial and mercantile State, has worked its way into the second position 
in Europe; today England alone is ahead of it, yet by no great distance, 
and the distance decreases every year. The necessity of protecting this 
position by a strong naval force has during recent decades become a 
dominant factor in the political thought of the nation," Internationale 
Wochenschrift fur Wissenschaft, Kunst, und TechniJc, October 26, 1907, 
p. 18. Cf. Usher, Pan-Germanism, 102. 

3i Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Tolitik, 57-62; Dawson, 
Modern Germany, 351 ; the German Naval programmes are printed in 
Hurd and Castle, German Sea-Power, 328 sq. 



80 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

The movement for a great fleet was supported by 
the enthusiasm of the people and above all by the 
determination of the Kaiser. "Our future lies upon 
the sea," said William II. And again, "As my grand- 
father worked for the reconstitution of this army, so 
I will work without allowing myself to be checked 
to reconstitute this navy." 32 The Naval League, 
organized to win popular support for Germany's 
new aspirations, soon included nine hundred thousand 
members and disposed of an annual budget of a 
million marks. 33 Aided by a wealth of human material, 
the great lack of which in Great Britain and France 
was undeniable, the new German navy rapidly ap- 
proached the position where it could assure the safety 
of German commerce and German control of markets. 

Correlative with the growth of the German navy 
was the hope of acquiring new colonies or at least 
spheres of influence in the undeveloped portions of 
the globe. Enthusiasm for colonies by no means 
equalled that for a great navy at the beginning of the 
century, but there were many who insisted upon the 
economic necessity of an active colonial policy. In 
their minds the acquisition of colonies which should 
furnish raw materials to German industries and in 
return purchase manufactured goods was an essential 
safeguard for the maintenance of the Empire's new 
industries. 

The German Empire had come into political exist- 
ence so late that the fairest portions of the globe had 

32 Speeches at Stettin, September 23, 1898, and at Berlin, January 1, 
1900. 

33 By 1907, the Navy League 's organ, Die Flotte, had a circulation 
of 275,000 and during the course of the year 700 lectures on naval sub- 
jects were delivered under its auspices, Annual Begister, 1908, 293. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 81 

already been taken by the older states. In the early 
seventies Germany might have secured valuable terri- 
tory in North and Central Africa had not Bismarck 
felt it necessary to restrict the scope of his policy to 
the European Continent. But both the Chancellor 
and William I were opposed to a policy of colonial 
aggrandizement; they considered that it would be a 
"political over-capitalizing" of the young Empire, 
and they feared the jealousy of Great Britain. 34 As 
Bismarck said, they valued British friendship more 
than the whole East Coast of Africa. We have also 
seen how Bismarck attempted to distract the attention 
of the French from the "gap in the Vosges" by 
encouraging Ferry in his colonial schemes, thereby 
foregoing any opportunity of winning territory for 
Germany on the North African Coast. 35 

But in the eighties Germany was caught in the wave 
of enthusiasm for colonies that swept over Europe, 
and the initiative of her traders secured certain 
territories for her. In 1882 a bay on the west coast 
of Africa was seized by Herr von Liideritz, and two 
years later, as a result of a quarrel with the British 
at Cape Town, Bismarck declared the annexation of 
the West African coast and hinterland from the 
Orange River to Cape Frio. During the next two 
years Germany won territory in the Cameroons and 
Togoland, as well as on the East African coast. At 
the same time she secured various islands in the 
Pacific: Kaiser Wilhelmsland, Solomon Islands, the 
Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall Islands. In 1897 

8* Bismarck believed that Germany already had "too much hay on 
the fork" to make any large scheme of colonization prudent, Sir Bartle 
Frere, How the Transvaal Trouble arose, 258. 

85 Supra, chap. II. 



82 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

the aggressive action of Germany in the Far East 
led to the acquisition of Kiau Chau, and in 1899 she 
secured the Caroline Islands and two of the Samoa 
group. 36 

The German colonies, however, were not of great 
value to the mother country, with the exception of 
Kiau Chau, which offered a fortified naval base in the 
Far East and gave to Germany commercial control 
of the province of Shantung. The others, regarded 
either as commercial ventures or as coaling stations 
and strategic points for the exercise of German 
political influence, were failures. Serious trouble 
developed in Southwest Africa and its latent resources 
were not developed. Elsewhere the colonial methods 
of the German administrators proved to be ill-suited 
to the problems they had to meet. The strategic value 
of the Cameroons and Togoland was nullified by the 
position of the British and French. The Pacific 
Islands were leftovers. 37 

We can therefore understand why, at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, German enthusiasm for 
colonies was not warm. They were regarded as a 
poor investment by the capitalists and the mass of 
the nation looked on them with indifference. But the 
rapid growth of the Pan-Germanist element tended 
to revive ambition for colonial success, and in 1907 
the formation of a Colonial Office gave new impetus 

36 Zimmerman, Geschichte der Deutschen KolonialpolitiTc, passim. For 
a discussion of German colonies, Keller, "Beginnings of German 
Colonisation and Colonial Policy," Yale Eeview, x, 30; xi, 390; xii, 57. 
See also Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft Jahresberichte and Deutsche 
Kolonialzeitung . 

37 For the failure of German officials, see Kohrbach, German World 
Policies, 152-156. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 83 

to the movement. The first Colonial Secretary, Dr. 
Dernburg, brought to his task abilities of the first 
order and the enthusiasm that proceeded from his 
conviction that the development of colonies was a 
" great imperial concern." In his opinion, they were 
chiefly important as capable of providing in future 
the raw products so necessary for German industries. 
He confined his colonial ambitions to the development 
of the territories that Germany already possessed 
into profitable plantation colonies. 38 

Others, however, allowed their aspirations to soar 
higher, and began to insist that colonies suitable for 
emigrating Germans should be demanded from the 
older nations. "For centuries the overflow of the 
strength of the German nation has poured into foreign 
countries and been lost to our Fatherland and to our 
nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and 
steeped with foreign sentiments. Even today the 
German Empire possesses no colonial territories 
where its increasing population may find remunerative 
work and a German way of living. This is obviously 
not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, 
or which corresponds to the greatness of the German 
people and their intellectual importance." 39 

Immediate aggression that would lead to the acquisi- 
tion of colonies suitable to the life of Europeans was 
not, however, favored by more than the smallest 
number of German chauvinists. Most of the influential 
classes resigned themselves to the alternative of 
opening and assuring new markets, sufficiently large 
to absorb the constantly increasing volume of German 

38 Dernburg, Zeilpunkte des deutschen Kolonialismus (Berlin, 1907). 
8» Bernhardt, Germany and the Next War, 76. 



84 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

exports, upon which the new increment of German 
population depended for its support. "We must 
resign ourselves in all clearness and calm," wrote 
Eohrbach, "to the fact that there is no possibility of 
acquiring colonies suitable for emigration. But if 
we cannot have such colonies it by no means follows 
that we cannot obtain the advantages if only to a 
limited extent, which make these colonies desirable. 
It is a mistake to regard the mere possession of exten- 
sive transoceanic territories, even when they are able 
to absorb a part of the national surplus of population, 
as necessarily a direct increase of power. Australia, 
Canada, and South Africa do not increase the power 
of the British Empire because they are British 
possessions, nor yet because a few million British 
emigrants with their descendants live in them, but 
because by the trade with them the wealth and with 
it the defensive strength of the mother country are 
increased. Colonies which do not produce that result 
have but little value ; and countries which possess this 
importance for a nation, even though they are not its 
colonies, are in this decisive point a substitute for 
colonial possessions in the ordinary sense." 40 

The value of commercial penetration which gave to 
Germany a share in important markets, although it 
did not lead to the acquisition of colonies, had already 
been proved, and it was clear that rich districts were 
still open to German industrial enterprise. This was 
especially true of South America, the Far East, 
Africa, and the Central East, and in each district 
extensive commercial penetration was planned by 
German individuals and societies. 

<° Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern, 159, 160. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 85 

In Brazil, as early as 1849, Germans had begun to 
establish commercial houses, and a generation later 
serious plans were on foot for the acquisition of 
territory that might be developed into a sort of 
German colony. In 1908 it was said that there were 
no less than 400,000 Germans resident in Brazil. 
Commercial penetration, however, in this instance, 
could hardly lead to political control of any sort. The 
growth in power of Brazil itself blocked any such 
scheme, and behind Brazil stood the other South 
American States who showed clearly that they were 
not inclined to permit any European colonization. 41 
The Monroe Doctrine, furthermore, could not easily 
be brushed aside. In the Far East the extension of 
German influence, which had been established by the 
acquisition of Kiau Chau in 1897, proceeded rapidly. 
The commercial penetration of the province of Shan- 
tung was developed, and the Pan-Germanists looked 
forward to winning political control of an enormous 
stretch of territory, of the utmost commercial and 
strategic value, should the break-up of the Chinese 
Empire not be arrested. 42 

But the best opportunities seemed to lie in Morocco, 
Persia, and Mesopotamia. In South America and the 
Far East German traders were confronted with the 
competition of British and Americans, a competition 
which they often met successfully by the superiority 
of their commercial methods but which made impos- 
sible absolute control. In the Near and Central East 

<i Sievers, Sudamerika und die deutschen Interessen; Ballod, Die 
Bedeutung von Siidbrasilien fur die deutsche Kolonisation ; Von Berns- 
torff, The Development of Germany as a World Power, 13. 

«2 Andrillon, L'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 171-175. 



86 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Germany might hope to develop markets capable of 
absorbing vast quantities of German manufactured 
goods and win control of districts which could furnish 
the raw materials so necessary to German industries. 
Both commercial and political motives seemed to indi- 
cate the necessity of developing the friendship of the 
Turk and the extension of German influence in the 
Near East. The weakening of the Slav element in the 
Balkans and the inclusion of Austro-Hungary and 
Turkey in the understanding would open a path from 
Germany to Mesopotamia, where the Germans hoped 
to find a country of unrivalled resources, a monopoly 
of markets, and a strategic position of unrivalled 
importance in respect to the British dominion in Egypt 
and India. 

Nor would it be long before Syria, Palestine, Persia, 
and Arabia might fall under German commercial 
control. Holding thus the shortest overland route to 
the East, the route of the mediaeval traders, the 
Germans might hope ultimately to enter India and 
compete with the British for the fifty millions of 
commerce controlled by Great Britain. Such com- 
mercial penetration into Mesopotamia might first be 
of a peaceful nature. But ultimately the commercial 
control of Germany and her allies might be trans- 
formed into a political domination. Doubtless the 
more optimistic or the more aggressive hoped that 
the establishment of German influence in the valleys 
of the Tigris and Euphrates would be merely the first 
step in an attack upon the British Moslem colonies, 
which would be assisted by the revolt of all the 
Mohammedans subject to British rule. At all events 
the Bagdad Railway was planned for the development 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 87 

of Germany's Mesopotamian policy and at the end 
of the century was definitely undertaken. 43 

It is clear that motives other than economic played 
their part in such aspirations. It was not merely the 
extension of commerce, but also of political influence 
that Germany was aiming at. Unquestionably her 
Mesopotamian policy as well as the almost universal 
enthusiasm for the navy rested largely, at least in 
their inception, upon economic grounds. The Germans 
believed that they had been forced by necessity to 
develop their industries upon a grandiose scale because 
of the growth of their population and because of the 
constant emigration from country to town. This 
industrial development compelled them in turn to 
extend their overseas commerce and to create a 
gigantic mercantile marine. Their success in com- 
merce, which cannot be over-emphasized, seemed to 
them contingent upon the security of their mercantile 
marine and their commercial position in foreign 
markets. That security was to be assured only by a 
strong navy. Inevitably there began to grow up also 
a feeling that Germany's political position in the 
world at large ought to be extended for the sake of 
her trade interests. If she was to maintain her rapidly 
developing commercial empire, she ought to win for 
herself political influence in proportion to the economic 
influence that she held. 

This sentiment, which towards the end of the century 
began to crystallize into a demand for a sort of 
political world empire, comparable to the German 

« Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn ; Cheradame, Le Chemin de Fer de 
Bagdad; Mazel, Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad; Eeventlow, Deutschlands 
auswartige Politik, 33; Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkem, 
177. See infra, chap. IX. 



88 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

commercial world empire, was thus in part based upon 
economic factors. But it would never have become 
of vital international importance, unless it also found 
support in the mental and moral transformation that 
was coming over Germany. The nation was calling 
for world empire, not merely in the interests of its 
commerce and industries, but also because it was filled 
with a vague desire for power in general. In 1900 
the German Government definitely made plain this 
new aspect of Germany's ambitions: "We shall not 
let ourselves be thrust out from an equality with other 
Powers. We shall not suffer ourselves to be denied 
the right to speak as they do in the world. There 
was a time when Germany was only a geographical 
expression, when she was denied the name of a great 
Power. Since then, we have become a great Power; 
and with the help of God, we hope to remain so. We 
shall not permit the abolition or limitation of our 
claim to a world policy based upon reflection and 
reason." 4 * The psychological factors which lay back 
of this new world policy have been, perhaps, of even 
greater importance than the economic, and to them 
must be ascribed in large measure the new status of 
international relations which characterized the first 
years of the twentieth century. 

** Cited by Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 51. 



CHAPTER V 
GERMAN WORLD POLICY: MORAL FACTORS 

The industrial and commercial transformation of 
Germany discussed in the previous chapter was 
obviously of enormous importance in determining the 
course of her imperial policy; the growth of her 
commerce and mercantile marine, upon which German 
industry largely depended, led naturally to a demand 
for the creation of a navy, the development of colonies, 
and the extension of political influence which would 
ensure the control of markets ; the economic interests 
of the Empire must necessarily be taken into con- 
sideration by the diplomats of Wilhelmstrasse. 

Of equal or greater importance was the moral 
transformation of Germany: the gradual assumption 
of a new attitude towards her neighbors and the 
growth of a new conception of the role that Germany 
ought to play in the world. The importance of this 
moral transformation it is almost impossible to over- 
state; for the diplomatic policy of Germany during 
the past fifteen years has resulted not merely from 
economic necessity, or what the nation believed to 
be economic necessity, but also from the frame of 
mind characteristic of influential Germans. Nor have 
the fears of other nations been aroused by the economic 
success of the Empire so much as by the new tone 
that she assumed in her international relations. 

A specific definition of the attitude that was 



90 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

becoming apparent towards the end of the nineteenth 
century can hardly be formulated. 1 It differed in 
different parts of the country and in different classes. 
It varied from time to time as the temper of an 
individual varies. The more aggressively minded 
enthusiasts, who came to be known as Pan-Germanists, 
laid down a clear-cut policy of acquiring colonies, or 
at least " spheres of influence," in Asia or Africa. 
Many others with varying degrees of intensity merely 
demanded that Germany should develop and maintain 
political influence in the world at large and not solely 
upon the Continent; an attitude typified by the 
Kaiser's remark that "nothing must go on anywhere 
in the world in which Germany does not play a part. ' ' 
With not a few, the new spirit remained simply a 
frame of mind, never crystallizing into proposals 
designed to lead to a specific course of action. 

Even this frame of mind was by no means uniform 
throughout the Empire. There were those whose 
attitude was characterized by supreme contempt for 
the nations who already held the empire of the world 
and by unwavering belief that their imperialism was 
hollow and effete. Others were chiefly actuated by 
fear: the fear that Germany might not be allowed 
to keep what she had already acquired, and that 
her progress would be ultimately blocked. Some 
clamored for war at the first opportune moment; a 
large number, on the other hand, trusted that the 
conflict of force might be long postponed. 

With all, however, or nearly all, there came to exist 
a sentiment almost unanimous, that Germany should 
play a part in the world proportionate to her wealth 
and population: Germany was a great nation and 

i Cf. Rohrbaeh, Deutschland miter den Weltvollcern, 55. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 91 

must be acknowledged as such. This sentiment, 
furthermore, was accompanied by the belief that the 
recognition of Germany could come only through the 
exercise of force; it was also accompanied by the 
consciousness of military strength sufficient to support 
any demands she might make. No matter how 
insistent or sincere might be the German contention 
that the dictates of self-preservation inspired such an 
attitude, that the German policy was one of self- 
defence, the German frame of mind was becoming 
undeniably aggressive and defiant in the latter years 
of the century. It was then that the effects of Prussian 
hegemony in Germany began to be realized, and 
Prussian policy has ever been characterized by a 
longing for expansion, by aggression, and by trust in 
force. 

This longing for expansion was, perhaps, first made 
manifest and found its satisfaction in the extraordi- 
nary industrial, commercial, and mercantile develop- 
ment that followed the unification of Germany. That 
development resulted largely from economic causes, 
but in it there is also to be found as motive force the 
German ambition for power. The demand for a navy 
also expressed Germany's ambition for greatness in 
the abstract, and the warm enthusiasm of the nation 
which supported that demand did not proceed 
altogether from economic causes. It is true that the 
industrial classes desired a strong navy chiefly for 
economic reasons, regarding money spent on arma- 
ments as an insurance premium paid for the safe- 
guarding of German trade; but the unhesitating 
support given to the naval policy of William II by 
the influential "Intellectuals" was based on broader 
grounds, namely, the preservation and extension of 



92 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Germany's political interests in the world at large. 
The conference of professors and representatives of 
science and learning which listened to Dr. Dernburg's 
presentation of his imperialist programme in January, 
1907, made plain the feeling that German greatness 
must find an expression in political as well a* 
economic fields. Their formal resolution reads: "A 
great civilized nation like the German nation cannot 
permanently restrict itself to internal politics, but 
must take part with other great nations in colonial and 
world politics." 2 

Even the Socialists, despite their anti-militarist 
principles, were not as a party opposed to naval 
development, and it is a significant fact that they based 
their attitude primarily upon the necessity of Ger- 
many's maintaining her political prestige amongst 
other nations. "It cannot be expected of one's 
country," said an influential Socialist, "that it shall 
take an exceptional position. As matters are to-day, 
the prestige of a State abroad depends on its readiness 
for war, both on sea and land. ' ' 3 

The new attitude of Germany was shown still 
more clearly in the Kaiser's speeches, in which a 
different note was constantly struck after 1895, when 
the economic necessity of sea-power began to be 
overshadowed by more general political motives. 
"Imperial power," he said in 1897, "denotes sea- 
power, and imperial power and sea-power are com- 
plementary; the one cannot exist without the other." 4 
Again in 1900 he spoke more plainly: "The wave- 
beat knocks powerfully at our national gates and calls 

2 Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany, 352. 

3 Sozialistische Monatshefte, November, 1905. 

* ' ' Eeichsgewalt ist Seegewalt und Seegewalt, Keichsgewalt. ' ' 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 93 

us as a great nation to maintain our place in the world, 
in other words to follow world policy. The ocean is 
indispensable for Germany's greatness, but the ocean 
also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the 
distance can any great decision be again consummated 
without Germany and the German Emperor. It is 
not my opinion that our German people conquered and 
bled thirty years ago under the leadership of their 
princes in order to be pushed on one side when great 
and momentous foreign decisions are come to. Were 
that so there would once for all be an end of the 
world power of the German nation and I am not going 
to allow that to happen. To use the fittest and if 
necessary the most drastic means to prevent this is 
not only my duty but my noblest privilege." 5 

Obviously the idea that was in the Kaiser's mind 
on this occasion was not specially connected with 
commerce or industry. The ambition for sea-power 
was based primarily not on economic motives, but 
rather on the belief that sea-power was to be the path 
leading Germany to an ill-defined but very actual 
position of political influence in every part of the 
world. The longing for expansion, first manifested 
in the field of commerce, was gradually being trans- 
ferred to a broader field. Germany began to feel that 
she ought to exercise an influence in the world 
politically, commensurate with that which by 1900 she 
already exercised commercially. The strength of that 
sentiment was enforced by the fear that unless she 
secured her influence in the world at large, her influence 
on the Continent, possibly her national existence, 
would be jeopardized. 

From the beginning of the twentieth century the 

5 Speech at Kiel, July 5, 1900. 



94 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

feeling that Germany must win all in order to preserve 
what she already had was expressed with constantly 
increasing emphasis. A widely read author wrote in 
1905: "The question for us is whether we shall 
devote all our strength in the determination to gain — 
or more truly regain — for ourselves a place by the 
side of those nations now ahead of us; whether we 
shall maintain our position amongst the nations by 
which in the twentieth century and later world-history 
will be made, or shall modestly agree to take second 
place in the concert of world policy." 6 And another 
writer, a few years later: "Even if we succeed in 
guarding our possessions in the East and West, and 
in preserving the German nationality in its present 
form throughout the world, we shall not be able to 
maintain our present position, powerful as it is, in the 
great competition with the other Powers, if we are 
contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere 
of power, while the surrounding countries are busily 
extending their dominions. If we wish to compete 
further with them, a policy which our population and 
our civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, 
we must not hold back in the hard struggle for the 
sovereignty of the world." 7 

This longing for expansion, not merely economic in 
its bearing, this desire for world prestige, this tone 
of aggression and defiance was to be found more and 
more generally throughout Germany after 1900. To 

6 Bohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern, 149. 

i Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 79. Cf . also the same 
writer (Ibid., 104): "We have fought in the last great wars for our 
national union and our position among the Powers of Europe; we must 
now decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a World 
Empire and procure for German spirit and German ideas that fit 
recognition that has hitherto been withheld from them." 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 95 

understand it we must take cognizance of various 
characteristics of the German, and especially of the 
Prussian, mentality; for since 1870, despite her 
unpopularity in southern Germany, Prussia has 
undoubtedly exercised a moral as well as a political 
domination. 

Foremost among the characteristics which account 
in some degree for the aspirations that began to take 
form at the beginning of the century is the German's 
belief in the destiny of his country. Since the days of 
Charlemagne he has been convinced that to him fell 
the mission of Rome in the ancient world : the spread- 
ing abroad of civilization and culture. From the early 
nineteenth century the idea of this mission has taken 
constantly stronger hold upon the German mind. 
"Not merely Alsace and Lorraine," wrote Heine, 
"but all France, Europe, and the whole world will be 
ours. Yes, the whole world will be German. I have 
often thought of this mission, of this universal 
domination of Germany. " 8 " Germany has a particular 
task clearly indicated by Providence," wrote von 
Meisendorf ; "she must pursue the accomplishment of 
the special mission which falls to her in the work 
of civilization." 9 

A study of the Kaiser's speeches leaves no doubt 
that he was penetrated with the idea of the German 
mission. Witness his famous speech at the Saalburg 
Museum in 1900: "I hope that it will be granted to 
our German Fatherland to become in the future as 
closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as 
once the Roman world empire was, and that just as 
in old times they said, Civis romanus sum, one may 

8 Lichtenberger, Henri Heine, 227. 

» Von Meisendorf, La France sous les Armes (French translation), 12. 



96 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

in the future need only to say, Ich bin ein deutscher 
Burger." 10 A few years later at Bremen lie said: 
"God has called us to civilize the world: we are the 
missionaries of human progress." Shortly after- 
wards, again : ' ' The German people will be the block 
of granite on which our Lord will be able to elevate 
and achieve the civilization of the world." 11 Nor in 
the German literature produced by the war has there 
been any lack of similar expressions indicating the 
sincerity with which this tenet of German faith was 
held. 

Belief in the existence and necessity of Germany's 
civilizing mission was reinforced by the conviction, 
by no means universal but widely held, that the 
German race was different and on the whole superior 
to all others. Giesebrecht wrote: "Domination 
belongs to Germany because it is a superior nation, 
a noble race, and it is fitting that it should control its 
neighbors, just as it is the right and duty of every 
individual endowed with superior intellect and force 
to control inferior individuals about him." 12 "We are 
the superior race in the fields of science and of art; 
we are the best colonists, the best sailors, the best 
merchants." 13 Nor is it difficult to discover in the 
language of the Kaiser the belief that the spirit of 
Germanism was destined to dominate the world 
because of the superiority of the German nature. 
"Far away over the sea," he said in 1902, "our speech 
is spreading and far away flows the stream of our 

i° Speech at Imperial Limes Museum, Saalburg, October 11, 1900. 
11 Speeches at Bremen, March 22, 1905, and at Miinster, September 
1, 1907. 

i 2 Zeller, Origines de I 'Allemagne, 27. 

is Bley, La Situation mondiale du Germanisme, 21. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 97 

knowledge and research. There is no work in the 
realm of later research which is not written in our 
language and no thought is born of science which is 
not first utilized by us in order later to be taken over 
by other nations." 14 

Educators and scientific writers did not fail to 
impress the idea of German superiority upon the youth 
and the masses of the nation. The anthropologist 
Woltmann wrote that "the German is the superior 
type of the homo sapiens, from the physical as well 
as the intellectual point of view." Hartmann taught 
that the European family is divided into two races, 
male and female, of which the first was of course 
exclusively German, while the second included Latins, 
Celts, and Slavs. Text-books used in schools asserted 
that the best and strongest elements of all European 
races are German; Frenchmen are monkeys, and 
Russians are slaves, as is shown by their name. 15 
"The proud conviction forces itself with irresistible 
power upon us," said Bernhardi, "that a high if not 
the highest importance for the entire development of 
the human race is ascribable to this German people." 16 

Doubtless similar quotations could be extracted 
from the literature of other nations illustrating their 
belief in their own superiority. But in no other 
nation has there been such a mass of literature on this 
point as in Germany during the past fifteen years. 
It is a fact that belief in the mission of the Germans, 
as a superior race, to civilize the world, was held by 
a large number of the influential classes and without 

i* Speech at Aix, June 19, 1902. 

is Andrillon, L 'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 13; Gibbons, The New 
Map of Europe, 29-30. 

18 Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 72. 



98 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

question pervaded all classes to a greater or less 
extent. What rendered this belief significant was the 
complementary belief that to carry out the mission, 
the political empire of the world must be German. 
In the interests of humanity the German dream of 
world empire must materialize; it was a moral 
responsibility laid upon Germany : ' ' The dominion of 
German thought can only be extended under the aegis 
of political power, and unless we act in conformity 
to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties 
towards the human race." 17 

That Germany had the right to carry out her mission 
even if it involved the use of brute force, was never 
doubted or questioned. Many were prepared to wait 
and had no wish to precipitate a conflict for world 
empire that might be long avoided: the security of 
peace, the desire for wealth, the fear of disaster, 
tempered their ambition. But by many others, whose 
influence constantly increased after 1900, preparation 
for the struggle was felt to be the most important 
duty of the German Government. "We must under- 
stand," said von der Goltz, "and make the youth of 
our generation understand that the time for repose 
has not yet come, that the prediction of a final struggle 
to assure the existence and grandeur of Germany is 
not a mere fancy born in the minds of ambitious fools, 
but that it will come one day inevitably, violent and 
serious as is every decisive struggle between peoples 
of whom the one desires to have its superiority over 
the others definitely recognized." 18 

it Bernhardi, op. cit., 77. 

is Von der Goltz, La Nation armee (French translation), 458. See 
also Bernhardi (op. cit., 84, 103): "We must be quite clear on this 
point that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 99 

Often unconsciously, but none the less inevitably, 
the attitude of the German nation was becoming 
belligerent. World sovereignty of some kind or 
another was felt to be desirable not only on economic 
but also on moral grounds ; it was to be won by force 
alone; it should be the State's first care to make 
Germany powerful enough so that she might inaugu- 
rate the conflict at the opportune moment when victory 
would be certain. 

Such sentiments were natural to Prussians, who 
have been men of war since the beginning of their 
history. They were enforced by the lessons of the 
past : in no country has military strength or weakness 
played so important a part in determining national 
history as in Prussia. It was through brute force that 
Prussia was first built up in the days of the Great 
Elector and Frederick the Great; to her military 
weakness Prussia owed her bitter humiliation by 
Napoleon in 1807; to her military force again, in the 
time of Bismarck, both Prussia and Germany owed 
their glory, and, as Germans believed, their subsequent 
prosperity. 

Belief in the necessity and morality of the use of 
force was also fostered by the universities and found 
invariable support in 'intellectual' circles. It is easy 
to exaggerate the influence of the professors, and it 
is by no means exact to state that they were of them- 
selves responsible for the sentiment, always existing 
in Germany and latterly increasing, which favored the 

hostility as ours. . . . What we now wish to attain must be fought for 
and won against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers. . . . 
Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the 
international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, 
cost what it may." 



100 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

exercise of force. Their teachings, however, repro- 
duced, in general, the emotions and desires of the 
masses, and in the case of certain notable individuals 
undoubtedly did much to mould and create opinion. 
The significance of university sentiment cannot, there- 
fore, be minimized, for the great German universities 
occupy a peculiar position, not dissimilar to that of 
the press in other nations: they mirror and they 
influence the thoughts of the masses. 19 

Whether regarded as an index or a cause, the teach- 
ings of the German professors have been characterized 
by their advocacy of force, and by their insistence that 
Germany could fulfil her destiny only by the use of 
force exerted at the proper moment. The motives 
underlying their doctrines differed. Some of the 
professors argued from historical premises and in 
admiration of the success of Great Britain, which they 
regarded as the model Power. The arguments of 
others were philosophical in their character, and many 
of them were distinguished by contempt for the 
British Empire, which was supposed to have resulted 
from blind fortune and trickery and therefore to be 
deserving neither of admiration nor fear. 

The economic school of German professors based 
their arguments in favor of force largely upon 
examples drawn from the past. Almost without 
exception they taught that history proves definitely 
that physical might and its exercise at opportune 
moments is essential to material well being. In the 

is Cf . Emery, ' ' German Economics and the War, ' ' Yale Review, 
January, 1915, 248. Andrillon (L'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 52) 
points out that Nietzsche simply condensed in his system doctrines 
already understood and practised by statesmen: a decade before his 
writings appeared, his ideas were diffused about him by the actions 
of Bismarck. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 101 

government of states, facts must be faced; as 
Sckmoller taught, a nation must be either "hammer 
or anvil," and it behooved the Government to see 
that the nation it ruled was not anvil. The professors 
did not attempt to justify the exercise of brute force 
nor did they contend that it was morally right. But 
they felt that it was useless to blink the "regrettable 
fact that in the history of the world too often moral 
ideas have been sacrificed to material advantage, and 
that right has been sacrificed to might. Since this is 
the brutal lesson of history, Germany, to survive, must 
meet the regrettable fact by action, not words." 20 

The economic prosperity that had resulted to Ger- 
many from the well-planned use of brute force by 
Bismarck was patent to everyone, and served to give 
point to the doctrines of the German economists. 
Looking abroad they contended that the greatness of 
England came from her exercise of force at the 
psychological moment. If Germany was to meet Eng- 
land successfully in the future, she must take a leaf 
from the English book and fight her with her own 
weapons. 21 German commerce must be carried every- 
where, said Voigt, "under the protection of German 
cannon. ' ,22 

20 Emery, German Economics and the War, 258. See the contributions 
of German economists to Handels- und Machtpolitik, 1900. These essays 
"are in a sense a manifesto of the general school which believes that 
the economic prosperity of Germany and the actual daily comfort of 
her people depends upon the capacity of maintaining by force of arms 
the commerce of Germany both at home and in other parts of the 
world. ' ' 

21 "We have had frequent occasions to mention English ways as 
the pattern we should follow and ... we should not shrink from going 
to school to England," Eohrbaeh, German World Policies, 205. 

22 Emery, op. cit., 261. Cf. Seeley's remark, "Commerce leads to 
war and war nourishes commerce." 



102 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

With equal intensity the philosophic historians 
preached the necessity of force, although they based 
their teachings upon different grounds. Foremost 
amongst the professors who have influenced German 
opinion in this respect stood Heinrich von Treitschke. 
Unlike Nietzsche, who preached force as a virtue in 
itself, as the sublime virtue leading to the annihilation 
of the weak and the ultimate creation of the superman, 
Treitschke never advocated force as an end in itself. 
The State must be guided by what is right and must 
always follow duty in its highest sense. "The State 
is not physical power as an end in itself, it is power 
to protect and promote the higher interests." Like 
Kant, Treitschke believed that duty was supreme over 
all "interests," and that the State and commonwealth 
of States must be pervaded by the sense of law. 23 

But while for the individual the highest duty is 
self-sacrifice, for the State the first duty is self- 
preservation; hence the necessity of power and force 
for the State.- 4 ' ' Its highest moral duty is to increase 
its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for 
the higher community of which he is a member; but 
the State is the highest conception in the wider 
community of men, and therefore the duty of self- 
annihilation does not enter into the case. The 
Christian duty of sacrifice for something higher 
does not exist for the State, since there is nothing 
higher than it in the world's history; consequently 
it cannot sacrifice itself to something higher." 25 

Since the State is supreme and what is right for it 

23 Treitschke, Politik, i, § 3. Cf . Hadley, ' ' The Political Teachings 
of Treitschke," Yale Review, January, 1915, 242. 
z* Ernest Barker, Nietzsche and Treitschke, 18. 
25 Treitschke, Politik, ii, § 31. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 103 

is determined by its interests, any self -limitation that 
it may have placed npon itself is purely voluntary, 
and may be repudiated when the State considers it 
best. International treaties need not be kept and 
international law loses its stability. In the last 
instance, questions can only be settled by the sword; 
in the performance of what it conceives to be right 
the State must be prepared to carry out its duty with 
all possible force. "When a State sees its downfall 
staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs 
sword in hand. A sacrifice made to an alien nation 
is not only immoral, but contradicts the idea of self- 
preservation which is the highest ideal of a State." 
And again: "Among all political sins, the sin of 
feebleness is the most contemptible ; it is the political 
sin against the Holy Ghost." 26 

We are less concerned with Treitschke's philosophy 
than with the way in which it affected the German 
nation. His audience was enormous and among certain 
classes, not the least influential, his ideas were 
accepted without question. But the nuances of his 
philosophy disappeared, as his doctrines were absorbed 
by the masses, and there remained only the idea most 
easily caught by the popular intelligence, namely that 
the be-all and end-all of a State is power, and that 
"he who is not man enough to look this truth in the 
face should not meddle in politics." 27 Those who 
already believed in the necessity and political value 
of war were not sorry to find what seemed to them a 
philosophic defence of the State's exercise of force 
through war. 

The argument that war is an instrument of blessing 

26 Treitschke, op. cit., i, § 3 ; ii, § 31. 
87 Treitschke, op. cit., ii, $ 28. 



104 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

found ready acceptance in Germany, the more readily 
since it was not entirely new. Some years before, 
Moltke had said without arousing criticism: "Per- 
manent peace is a dream and not even a beautiful one. 
But war is an essential element of God's scheme for 
the world." 28 And so far back as the sixteenth 
century, Luther had said : ' ' It is very true that men 
write and say often how great a curse war is. But 
they ought to consider how much greater is that curse 
which is averted by war. Briefly in the business of 
war, men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, 
the battles, the marches, etc. — that is what the petty 
and simple do, who only look with the eyes of children 
at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or saws off 
the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order 
to save the whole body. Thus we must look at the 
business of war or the sword with the eyes of men, 
asking, Why these murders and horrors? It will be 
shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as 
needful and as necessary to the world as eating or 
drinking, or any other work." And Treitschke him- 
self summarized the matter by saying, "God will see 
to it that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for 
the human race." 29 

The doctrine of the beauty and grandeur of war was 
naturally taken up by a host of smaller writers, who 
found ready auditors ; for this spirit has always lived 
in Germany. "It echoes the vigor of Norse sea-king 

28 Letter to Bluntschli, cited by Andrillon, L 'Expansion de I'Alle- 
magne, 24. Cf. Moltke 's speeches in the Eeichstag of February 16, 
1874, and January 11, 1887; also Bismarck's remark (Matter, Bismarck 
et son Temps, i, 160): "It is not by discussions that we can decide: 
sooner or later the God of battles determines." 

29 Luther, Whether Soldiers can be in a State of Salvation, cited by 
Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 55. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 105 

and Teutonic champion, of Siegfried and Arminius. 
It is instinct with the rude heroism of the Nibelung, 
the strength and cunning which enabled the early 
heroes to overcome their foes ... It is Heldenthum, 
the spirit of war and adventure, of triumph through 
danger, conflict, and suffering. ' ,3 ° Bernhardi was only 
reflecting ideas that had for many years inspired a 
large part of the German nation, when he wrote: 
"The inevitableness, the idealism, and the blessing of 
war, as an indispensable and stimulating law of 
development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The 
apostles of the peace idea must be confronted with 
Goethe 's manly words : 

1 Dreams of a peaceful day ? 
Let him dream who may. 
War is our rallying cry, 
Onward to victory.' " 31 

These various elements in the German, and espe- 
cially the Prussian, mentality, which we have briefly 
considered, help to explain the German attitude 
towards international affairs at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The sense of their own superiority 
over other nations and of their world-civilizing mis- 
sion impelled them to an ambition for world empire. 
The longing for expansion was gradually transferred 
from the economic to the broader political field. 
Germans were also acutely conscious of the necessity 
of force if they were to win their world empire, and 
they were largely convinced of the righteousness and 

30 Abbott, ' ' Germany and the Prussian Propaganda, ' ' Tale Review, 
July, 1915, 666. 

si Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 37. 



106 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

beauty of the use of force. Inevitably the attitude 
of the nation began to assume an aggressive and at 
the same time a defiant character : aggressive, because 
with some, confidence in German strength and in the 
weakness of her enemies predominated; defiant, since 
with others, there existed the anxiety that Germany 
might not be allowed by the other nations to fulfil her 
dream. 

Without question Germany had a right to have 
supreme confidence in her physical strength. The 
military force of Prussia was undeniable; whenever 
capably organized her armies have never been excelled 
and their success in war has been unbroken. In the 
latter part of the nineteenth century few questioned 
the worth of the German army, and its organization 
was the model for the world. In case of war Germany 
could draw upon a human supply far richer than 
could be found in France or England. In numbers, 
morale, and equipment she was incontestably supreme 
on land; and her power on sea threatened to become 
a factor of vital importance. Furthermore, there 
existed not merely this consciousness of strength, but 
a "consciousness of virtue — the consciousness of 
possessing a particular group of war-like virtues, 
the stern self -discipline, the thrift, the persistence 
and self-devotion, which had raised Prussia in spite 
of her poor and barren soil to be the foremost of 
German states, and which . . . had animated the 
German army in the great war of liberation from the 
Napoleonic tyranny." 32 Such virtues, according to 
the Germans, were peculiar to their own race and had 
never been displayed by any of their enemies. 

To such general confidence in German strength was 

32 Sanday, The Deeper Causes of the War, 9. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 107 

added in many quarters the belief in the essential 
weakness of the Powers which threatened to block 
German expansion. France was decadent and effete, 
hopelessly pacific, inspired by the lowest ideals. 
Russia was a giant, but a giant that did not know his 
own strength nor how to use it. The day of English 
greatness had passed and Germany need not fear to 
measure swords with her whenever the opportune 
moment arrived. British strength in the past was 
due in large part to the weakness of her rivals and 
to the fortune of history : ' ' It is not genius, it is not 
valor, it is not even great policy, as in the case of 
Venice, which has built up the British Empire; but 
the hazard of her geographical situation, the supine- 
ness of other nations, the measureless duplicity of her 
ministers, and the natural and innate hypocrisy of 
the nation as a whole. These have let this monstrous 
empire grow — a colossus with feet of clay." 33 

When the British Empire should be put to the test 
by Germany, so many Germans believed, it would fall 
to pieces. Already the native races in the Moslem 
colonies were on the point of revolt; the bond that 
held Australia and Canada to the mother country was 
one of sentiment and could not stand the force of 
material circumstances. The home government was 
hopelessly unfitted by its liberal and parliamentary 
principles for the control of an over-seas empire, and 
whatever governing qualities England had ever 
possessed had vanished in the era of peace and 
prosperity that had demoralized the whole nation. 
" Britain's world predominance is out of all proportion 
to Britain's real strength and to her worth and value, 
whatever that worth be considered in the political, 

33 Cramb (paraphrasing Treitsehke), Germany and England, 94. 



108 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

the intellectual, or the moral sphere." Her dominion 
was based on a myth and the first conflict with a Power 
willing to meet her would pitifully reveal her fatal 
weakness. 34 

But while such conviction of the weakness of the 
opposing nations filled the minds of many Germans 
and gave to their tone that timbre of confident 
aggression which we have noticed, in other quarters 
the German attitude was not untinged with fear. Not 
a few were unable to rid themselves of the feeling that 
there was a special Providence that looked after the 
affairs of England; and their study of history filled 
them with a respect for the success of British methods. 35 
They feared lest Germany should find her path blocked 
in the expansion of her commerce and development 
of her marine and navy, lest the necessary markets 
should be closed to them. 38 More generally they feared 

34 Usher, Pan-Germanism, 19-36; Cramb, Germany and England, 93. 
Cf. Bohrbach, Deutschland unter den WeltvolJcern, 67-164; and the secret 
report of a German agent dated at Berlin, March 19, 1913, published in 
the French Yellow Booh, 1914, no. 2: "If the enemy attacks us, or if 
we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred 
years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the 
enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then 
remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County 
of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine are still in the hands of the 
French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are 
groaning under the Slav yoke." 

35 « ' The English empire as the creation of the English idea . . . ia 
a thing of such grandeur that one cannot speak of it except with 
admiration," Kohrbach, German World Policies, 59. 

se Emery {German Economics and the War, 249 sq.) discusses the 
profound dread that obtained in certain quarters in Germany, that the 
future of Germany was gravely endangered, and the feeling that every 
effort must be made to anticipate a final test. He describes Sering's 
opinion that Germany would fall to a subordinate position but only 
after the most strenuous exertions on her part and probably after a 
titanic conflict fought to prevent herself from being crushed. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 109 

lest the German nationality scattered over the world 
should be definitely lost to the Fatherland, and finally 
lest the Teutonic element in Europe itself should be 
unable to resist the Slavonic advance. 87 

Such fears, coupled with the belief in the inevitable- 
ness of the approaching conflict, gave to the tone of 
many Germans a certain ring of defiance. 38 It was the 
attitude of the man with his back to the wall, contending 
against odds, but thoroughly armed and determined 
to resist to the last. Paradoxically, the two opposing 
elements of confidence and fear thus tended to produce 
in Germany the tone of belligerence, which has been 
manifested during the past fifteen years. 

This attitude was not of a year's growth and was 

37 The fear of the Slav appears clearly in the pamphlet, Truth about 
Germany, 1914, authorized by the most distinguished intellectual figures 
of Germany; it is also discussed sympathetically by J. W. Burgess in 
a letter to the Spring-field Republican, dated August 17, 1914. 

38 Curiously enough this rather defiant tone is characteristic of per- 
sons who, because of their fear of a conflict, were certainly sincere in 
their desire for peace. ' ' Not only our goods, ' ' said Rohrbach, ' ' but 
also our national existence and the future of our national idea in the 
world are at stake when our defences by land and sea are insufficient 
to make our opponents look on an attack upon us as too great a risk. 
It does not occur to us to deny the superiority of the English fleet, and 
if the English people want very much to use the word 'supremacy' 
rather than 'superiority' they are welcome to do so. But when they 
interpret their supremacy to mean that our interests shall yield to 
theirs everywhere in the world, they compel us to fight with them for 
our future, that is to say for our national existence. If they wish to 
prescribe to us how far we may go in the world to spread our ideas, 
we should be fools and cowards if we were to acknowledge this foreign 
command as binding, without recourse to arms, ' ' German World Policies, 
188; see also Ibid., 195, 196. And von Biilow (Speech in the Reichstag, 
November 15, 1906): "A policy which aimed at encircling Germany 
in order to isolate us and paralyze us would be very dangerous for peace. 
The formation of such a ring is not possible unless pressure is exercised; 
pressure creates counter-pressure; pressure and counter -pressure may 
easily produce explosions. ' ' 



110 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

definitely influenced and accentuated by the opposing 
attitude of the other nations, in particular, after 1905, 
of Great Britain. There was comparatively little of 
it during the Bismarck regime, except in certain 
cliques. During the early years of the present Kaiser 's 
reign and concurrently with the growth and success 
of German world commerce, it began to develop. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century it had become 
so general as to be almost characteristic of the German 
nation. But it was only during the two or three years 
that preceded the war that the aggressive and defiant 
attitude of Germany became definitely marked, largely 
in reaction to what she believed to be the hostile 
designs of her enemies. 

Nor, as we have seen, was this attitude invariably 
translated into a definite scheme of policy, notwith- 
standing the term " world policy" generally applied 
to it. The more aggressive certainly insisted upon 
the necessity of seizing colonies. This was their 
interpretation of the policy of obtaining a "place in 
the sun. ' ' The rapid growth of Pan-German societies 
continued and their conferences discussed the possi- 
bility of reclaiming and absorbing the Teutonic 
elements in the countries bordering the German 
Empire : Holland, Switzerland, and Poland. Develop- 
ment of German enterprise in Africa was encouraged 
and the expansion of German influence in Mesopotamia 
was sedulously cared for. 39 

But on the whole "world policy' ' remained a rather 

ss For the aims of Pan-Germanists, see Class (ed.), Zwansig Jahre 
alldeutscher Arbeit und Kampfe (Leipsic, 1910). This is a collection 
of reports, addresses, and papers delivered at meetings of the Pan- 
Germanist Society. See also, Andrillon, L'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 
80 sq., 204-236. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 111 

indefinite expression. As understood by the indi- 
viduals and classes which controlled the diplomatic 
actions of Germany, it meant simply the development 
of the fleet, the protection of commerce, and the 
preservation of free access to all markets, accompanied 
by the demand that Germany's right to a share in the 
settlement of all questions be universally acknowl- 
edged. 40 It was believed by such classes that Ger- 
many's development could best be maintained by 
preserving peace, at least for the present, always 
provided that the prestige of Germany on the 
Continent of Europe remained undimmed. 

The pacific attitude of the Government, which 
continued until 1905, was often assailed by the Pan- 
Germanists with violence, and at times by the com- 
mercial classes. But it was insisted upon as a 
necessity to German success by influential diplomats, 
such as von Biilow, and by the Kaiser himself. 41 
"Only so long as peace reigns," said the latter, "are 
we at liberty to bestow our earnest thoughts upon the 
great problems the solution of which in fairness and 
equity I consider the most prominent duty of our 

40 ' ' England herself offers the instance of a country much more 
densely populated than Germany, with insignificant numbers of emigrants 
and enjoying the acme of economic prosperity and political power 
because it is able to provide its people with safe access to the markets 
of the world. This and nothing else is what we need. If we can have 
a navy which will keep our commerce from destruction we have no need 
of an outlet for our population either now or in the immediate 
future. . . . The policy of the German idea in the world does not 
contemplate, according to our view, any conquest or violence. . . . We 
must realize the idea of national expansion on which our ability to 
exist as a nation of the first rank depends, by making ourselves so 
strong in the first place on land and sea that nobody will attack us," 
Eohrbach, German World Policies, 202-204. 

*i Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 36-40. 



112 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

time." And again: " It will be my sole task for the 
future to see to it, that the seeds which have been 
sown may develop in peace and security." 42 Nor did 
the Kaiser in any of his speeches on the necessity of 
world empire for Germany, or in his demands for 
a "place in the sun" commit himself to any specific 
means of attaining his end. 

But notwithstanding the fact that no official seal 
was placed upon the Pan-Germanist propaganda and 
that German world policy remained wholly indefinite 
in its meaning, and despite the stress laid by the 
Kaiser on the necessity of preserving peace, the other 
nations of Europe could not fail to be affected by the 
new spirit manifest in Germany. They were naturally 
troubled by the probable effects of German success 
in the development of industry and commerce and by 
the rapid increase in size of the German mercantile 
marine. The demand for colonies and the startling 
growth of a navy that threatened soon to become 
formidable troubled them yet more. "If the German 
fleet were destroyed, the peace of Europe would be 
assured for two generations"; "there are many 
people, both in England and on the Continent, who 
consider the German fleet the only serious menace to 
the preservation of peace in Europe." Such expres- 
sions attest the anxiety felt by the older nations 
because of the rise of this youngest but possibly 
strongest of Powers. 43 

The chief cause of anxiety, however, was not so 
much the growth of German commerce and the creation 
of a navy that might prove dangerous, as the new spirit 
that was believed to lie behind these outward mani- 

42 Speech at Hamburg, June 18, 1901. 

43 Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 35. 



GERMAN WORLD POLICY 113 

festations of strength and ambition. Although the 
Government, at least until 1905, reiterated its desire 
for a lasting peace, it was plain that the almost 
universal demand for expansion and political influence 
in the world at large must soon bring Germany into 
conflict with the nations which already held predomi- 
nant power in the world outside of Europe. With 
the passing of each year, the attitude of belligerence 
and defiance became more and more pronounced. 44 
Not merely the military party, but the nation as a 
whole were believed to be ready to take any steps that 
would lead to the attainment of the ideals of German 
expansion. 45 Not even the Socialists could be counted 
upon as a definitely moderating factor. 46 

Great Britain was the nation that seemed to be most 
directly menaced, and with the first clear indication 

4 * Characteristic of the feeling is the fact that in May, 1906, a 
manufacturer left a legacy of 6000 marks to the military administration, 
which was to accumulate until Germany entered a war with a European 
Power. Two-thirds of it was then to be given to the first soldier who 
captured a flag from the enemy, and the rest to the first soldier who 
took a cannon. A popular subscription for aerial craft started in 
March, 1909, amounted, a month later, to six million marks, Andrillon, 
op. cit., 61. 

45 ' ' It would be no exaggeration, ' ' wrote a former French Ambas- 
sador, "to say that if the German Government were of a democratic 
character, the most unfortunate consequences would result. It is a 
very curious phenomenon to see the Government, and the Kaiser himself 
in front line, obliged to restrain the manifestations of disgust and anger 
which constantly appear in the press and in the daily conversation of 
citizens. Anything the Government would do to bother England or 
France is sure to be applauded by the people," La Revue, August 15, 
1907. 

48 At Essen, in 1907, Bebel made it clear that the German Socialists 
were nationalistic and would take no steps in conjunction with Socialists 
of other countries which might harm German national interests. "We 
have need of the country where we were born," he said, "the land 
where we live, of the tongue we speak, to make our country the most 



114 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

of the new attitude of the German nation, British 
statesmen did not hesitate to take steps to meet it. 
In order to understand the significance of the diplo- 
matic revolution that resulted and its reactionary 
effect upon German diplomatic policy, we should first 
consider briefly the relations of Great Britain with 
the continental Powers previous to 1900. 

beautiful and perfect in the world." In January, 1906, before the 
Socialist Congress at Amsterdam, during the discussion of the use of 
the general strike as a means of preventing war, he asserted that 
German Socialists would definitely refuse any such proposition; and 
in 1911, before the Congress at Jena, he said: "French Socialists can, 
if they want, declare the general strike, but German Socialists consider 
the general strike out of the question, if war should arise," La Depeche, 
January 24, 1906; Andrillon, op. cit., 63. 



CHAPTER VI 
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 

The success of German foreign policy during the 
generation that followed the creation of united Ger- 
many depended largely upon two conditions. It was 
essential that the Franco-Russian combination should 
be kept innocuous : French policy must remain passive 
and the attention of Russia must be distracted from 
the European situation to the Far East. It was also 
of vital importance to Germany that her control of 
continental diplomacy should not be disturbed by the 
opposition of Great Britain. Towards the close 
of the century, therefore, when Germany began to 
conceive her schemes of world policy, the attitude 
of Great Britain was of the greatest concern to 
German diplomats. 

British foreign policy, since the time of Elizabeth, 
has been determined mainly by colonial and maritime 
interests ; underneath all the apparently contradictory 
manifestations of Great Britain's policy, this single 
motive is to be found. At times, as for example 
during the reign of Louis XIV and the eras of 
Frederick the Great and Napoleon, a concern for the 
maintenance of the continental equilibrium has been 
the chief characteristic of Great Britain's attitude. 
At other times, she has rigidly excluded herself from 
continental complications, and taken up a position of 
isolation. The superficial contradiction in her policy 



116 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

has, furthermore, been accentuated by her frequent 
changes in alliances. Friendship with France in the 
sixteenth century was exchanged for the bitter hos- 
tility with which she regarded Louis XIV in the 
seventeenth and Napoleon in the nineteenth centuries. 
After the fall of Napoleon her foreign relations were 
characterized by rivalry with Russia; while in the 
first decade of the twentieth century her ancient feuds 
with France and Russia were entirely forgotten in 
the growing enmity manifested towards Germany. 

Such contradictions are more apparent than real. 
They have been determined by a single aim — the 
greatness and security of the British Empire. That 
has been the sole object of her policy, and her systems 
of alliances have been merely the means toward that 
end. History shows that there are two methods of 
diplomacy : ' ' The one is a policy of system ; alliances 
are the object, particular questions are the means. 
In Realpolitik, on the other hand, alliances are the 
means, national questions the object." 1 Realpolitik 
has always been the method employed by Great 
Britain, as it was by Bismarck and Cavour. Her 
supremacy on the seas and the security of her 
colonies has been her guiding principle. Her policy 
has thus been successively anti-French, anti-Russian, 
and anti-German; for in the last hundred years she 
has had to fear the French in Africa, the Russians in 
the Near, Central, and Far East, and finally the com- 
petition of the Germans all over the world. She has 
travelled towards her goal "by the shortest route, 
and has changed friends on the way. ' ,2 

i Bene Millet in Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangere, 1911, 61. 
2 Millet, op. cit., 61. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 117 

Since the collapse of the Empire of the first Napoleon 
the relations of Great Britain with France have been 
outwardly pacific. There has been no break in the 
diplomatic connection of the two nations and the not 
infrequent rumors of war have never materialized 
into actual hostilities. But it was a very thin veneer 
of official friendliness that covered the underlying 
traditional enmity. Relations were strained during 
the period when Napoleon III was attempting to carry 
out a policy of action, and after 1870 the colonial 
aspirations of the Third Republic inaugurated an era 
of Anglo-French rivalry which threatened at times 
to develop into an open break. This rivalry centred 
chiefly around the question of domination in Africa. 

Both France and Great Britain had interests in 
Egypt : France was concerned over her trade with the 
Levant, and because of her protectorate in Algeria 
could not afford to be indifferent to anything that 
related to the North African seaboard; Great Britain 
considered that Egypt was the key to India. In 1875 
Great Britain fortified her position in Egypt and 
obtained a decisive voice in the control of a highway 
that was of vital importance to her interests, by pur- 
chasing from the bankrupt Khedive his shares in the 
Suez Canal Company. The shares had been offered to 
the French Government and had been declined, owing 
to the timidity of the French statesmen, who were at 
the moment distracted by the German war scare. But 
although France had thus through her own fault 
missed her opportunity, she could not but feel that 
Great Britain had unfairly stolen a march on her; 
and the diplomatic assistance rendered by Lord Derby 



118 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

in the continental crisis of 1875 did not entirely remove 
the sense of injury that resulted. 3 

French ill-feeling was not alleviated by further 
developments in Egypt. The financial paralysis of 
the Egyptian Government led in 1876 to the establish- 
ment of the ''Dual Control" by France and Great 
Britain, and shortly afterwards to the deposition of 
the Khedive. A nationalist rebellion under Arabi 
Pasha flamed forth, culminating in an outburst of 
Moslem fury in Alexandria that seemed to call for 
the intervention of the controlling Powers. But 
France hung back; Gambetta had just fallen and the 
new Ministry feared to involve the country in compli- 
cations, so long as her continental position was 
threatened by Germany. Great Britain therefore 
proceeded alone to the rather unwelcome task of 
crushing the rebellion and restoring order. Alexandria 
was bombarded on July 11, 1882, and in September, 
Sir Garnet Wolseley forced Arabi and his followers 
to lay down their arms. 4 

The difficulty of bringing order out of a state of 
financial and administrative chaos, and of reducing 
the turbulent nationalist spirit to a condition of 
quiescence, was not lessened by the anomalous status 
of the British Government in Egypt, for England 
refused to assume a protectorate and declared that 
her function in Egypt was confined to the giving of 
advice to the Khedive. The meaning placed upon the 
word "advice," however, was such that the rivals of 

a Annual Register, 1873, 1875, passim; Tardieu, France and the 
Alliances, 42; Hippeau, Histoire diplomatique de la Troisidme Bepub- 
lique, 410-443; Freycinet, La Question d'Egypte, 99-205. 

* Cromer, Modern Egypt, i, 149-348; Freycinet, La Question d'Egypte, 
205-325; Wallace, Egypt and the Egyptian Question, 62-108. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 119 

Great Britain recognized clearly that Egypt had 
become for practical purposes an essential part of the 
British Empire. "It should be made clear to the 
Egyptian ministers and governors of provinces," 
wrote the British Foreign Secretary, "that the 
responsibility which for a time rests upon England, 
obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the 
adoption of the policy which they recommend, and 
that it will be necessary that those ministers and 
governors who do not follow this course should cease 
to hold their office." 5 

This position of the British in Egypt, although it 
resulted mainly from the unwillingness of the French 
to assume new burdens, could not fail to accentuate 
the ill-feeling already existing between England and 
France. The French felt that they had been robbed 
of a sphere of influence essential to their position as 
a Mediterranean and Far Eastern Power; and their 
vexation was not lessened by the realization that the 
result was largely due to their own timidity. For 
half a generation every difference between the two 
nations was embittered by French jealousy of England 
in Egypt; and finally the smouldering embers of 
colonial rivalry and national hatred were almost 
fanned into open war at Fashoda, in 1898. 

Fashoda is a fortress on the upper Nile in the 
Soudan, where a British force under Kitchener met 
with a French expeditionary corps commanded by 
Marchand, September 19, 1898. The Soudan had 
formerly been a dependency of Egypt, but in 1883 
had revolted under the leadership of a religious 

6 Hazen, Europe since 1815, 559; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 
43; Milner, England in Egypt, 24 sq. 



120 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

fanatic known as the Mahdi. He had proclaimed a 
religious war and completely annihilated the Anglo- 
Egyptian troops sent against him. Gladstone, who 
was at the head of the British Government in 1884, 
decided to abandon the Soudan, but sent Chinese 
Gordon up the Nile to investigate the situation and 
report upon the best method of withdrawal. Gordon, 
whose heroism and chivalry are unquestioned, but 
whose judgment is not above reproach, allowed him- 
self to be confined in Khartoum by the rebellious 
Mahdists; the British Government was dilatory in 
the despatch of a relief expedition, and two days before 
its arrival Gordon was massacred with eleven thou- 
sand of his men (January 26, 1885). 6 For ten years 
the horror and disgrace of Khartoum remained 
unavenged, and the Soudan was left to the Dervishes. 
In 1896 an expedition for the recovery of the upper 
Nile was sent out under Kitchener. The belief that 
control of the Soudan was essential to the stability of 
the British regime in Egypt combined with the fear 
of French expansion in Central Africa to force the 
Government into a policy of action. Kitchener 
advanced slowly up the Nile, and on September 2, 
1898, crushed the Dervishes at Omdurman. But 
British control of the Soudan was not to be uncon- 
tested, for a simultaneous attempt to reach the upper 
Nile was being made by the French; and when 
Kitchener, proceeding up the river, reached Fashoda, 
he found the fort flying the French flag and occupied 
by Marchand and his small force. Neither the British 
nor the French would retire, the former being superior 

e Cromer, Modern Egypt, i, 349-592; ii, 3-18; Blunt, Gordon at 
Khartoim. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 121 

in numbers and having assured communications, the 
latter having been the first on the spot. 7 

The diplomatic tension that resulted from the 
ensuing crisis was extreme, for there seemed to be 
no possible compromise between the claims of Great 
Britain and France, Sir Edward Grey had shortly 
before declared that any intervention in the Soudan 
on the part of a foreign Power would be considered 
an "hostile act." On the other hand, France looked 
forward to linking her possessions in East and West 
Africa by the control of the upper Nile, and M. 
Hanotaux had insisted that France would preserve 
full liberty of action in that quarter. The danger 
from the clash of interests in Central Africa was the 
greater because France feared the ambitions of the 
British in Morocco, which adjoined Algeria ; in the Far 
East also, Franco-British rivalry had been rapidly 
becoming acute during the years immediately pre- 
ceding. For the moment it seemed likely that the 
whole question of French and British colonial antago- 
nism and national bitterness would be settled by the 
sword. 8 

The situation was saved by the surrender of the 
French claims and the recognition by France of the 
British and Egyptian control in the Soudan. The 
military situation in France left her in no condition 
to prosecute a general war, and little assistance could 
be expected from Russia, which was deeply engaged 
in Far Eastern affairs, and was also, in the person 
of the Tsar, advocating a general system that would 
ensure international peace. Great Britain on the 

i De Caix, ' ' La Politique Anglaise, ' ' in Questions Actuelles de 
Politique Etrangire, 30; Hanotaux, Fachoda. 
8 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 43-45. 



122 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR 

other hand, although the struggle with the Boers was 
imminent, seemed to be in a position to carry on a 
colonial war against France with all chances of 
success. 

The diplomatic victory of Great Britain in the 
Fashoda crisis did not tend to ameliorate her relations 
with France. The latter country manifested more 
clearly than ever sentiments of jealousy and hatred 
towards the nation across the Channel, and during 
the Boer War a press campaign of the utmost virulence 
was directed against her rival. It was even whispered 
that France made overtures to Germany which might 
have led to a continental coalition, with the destruction 
of the British colonial empire as its object. 9 In 
England, France continued to be regarded as the 
national enemy, and the nineteenth century closed 
with Franco-British relations strained to the limit and 
with the hope of a reconciliation apparently excluded 
from the realm of possibility. 

The intense hostility that existed between France 
and England was equalled or surpassed by that which 
had grown up in the nineteenth century between 
Russia and England. In general the interests of the 
two nations have conflicted in three quarters : in the 
Near East, in Afghanistan and Persia, and in the 
Far East. In the Near and Central East, the hostility 
of Great Britain towards Russia was largely deter- 
mined by her fear for the security of India: the 
advance of Russia towards Constantinople endangered 
her communications with her most valuable colonial 
possession; Russian intrigues amongst the border 
tribes in Afghanistan and Persia threatened India 

s Interview with the Kaiser, published in Daily Telegraph, October 
28, 1908. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 123 

directly. In the Far East the rivalry was chiefly 
commercial in character. 

On more than one occasion Great Britain has proved 
the chief stumbling block to the fulfilment of Russia's 
ambition of securing control of the Balkans and 
Dardanelles. The foresight of Canning in 1827 
brought England into the war of Grecian independence 
in order that Russia might not unduly exploit the 
defeat of the Turks. In 1841, the Treaty of the Straits, 
for which Great Britain was largely responsible, closed 
the Dardanelles to ships of war. Again in 1855 Great 
Britain, in conjunction with France, defended the 
integrity of Turkey against Russia and inflicted a 
striking defeat upon the Slav Power in the Crimean 
War. Nor was the action of Disraeli in 1878 at the 
Congress of Berlin, although it was confined to the 
diplomatic field, less vigorous in its opposition to 
Russian influence in the Near East. 10 

The result was that Russian ambitions, blocked in 
this quarter, turned to the Central East, where for 
more than a generation the advance of the Slav 
occasioned the British in India the utmost anxiety, 
for it seemed a matter of certainty that the intriguing 
agents of the Tsar were preparing for a descent upon 
India, or at least for the control of the Persian Gulf. 
During the sixties, Russian armies took possession 
of Bokhara and established themselves upon the 
borders of Afghanistan; should that country fall 
under their control, the passes leading into India 
itself would be open to them. 

During the next ten years Russia's threats became 
more direct. Her representatives secured the favor 
of the Ameer, who was alienated from Great Britain 

i° Driault, La Question d'Orient, passim. 



124 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

by the vacillation of her policy, which under the 
direction of Gladstone was anaemic, and under that 
of Disraeli, hasty and ill-considered. In the late 
seventies, a Russian army was on the march for the 
frontier and General Skobelef had drawn up two 
plans for the invasion of India. But Russia's deter- 
mination faltered, and her attention was distracted 
by difficulties at home ; in the following year she lost 
much of her advantage when a British force under 
Roberts was sent into Afghanistan and largely 
reestablished British influence. 11 

But notwithstanding the fact that Russia declared 
explicitly that she would not interfere with the special 
position of Great Britain in Afghanistan, British 
statesmen continued to regard the presence of Russian 
merchants there as indicating that the danger had not 
passed. And at certain times it was undeniable that 
the Afghans showed themselves restive under British 
influence and were doubtless not unready to accept 
Russian assistance whenever opportunity offered. 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century British 
suspicion of Russian intrigues in this quarter main- 
tained the atmosphere of hostility between the two 
nations. In 1905, Mr. Balfour identified the " problem 
of the British Army" with the defence of Afghanistan. 

In Persia, Russia carried on a successful commercial 
and financial development which did not tend to lessen 
British fears or jealousy of Russian influence in the 
Central East. Russian trade with Persia doubled 
during the last decade of the nineteenth century, and 

nBoberts, Forty-one Years in India, chs. 43-44, 46-51, 60-62; 
Hippeau, Eistoire diplomatique de la Troisieme Eepublique, 521; 
Eambaud, Eistoire de la Bussie, 705, 776, sq.; "0. K.," Skobeleff and 
the Slavonic Cause, 320-337. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 125 

through the skill of Russian financiers, the Russian 
Loan Bank became the sole creditor of Persia, a 
position which naturally secured for Russia important 
political advantages. Lord Curzon 's attempts to 
offset the influence thus gained were not entirely 
successful and served to increase Anglo-Russian 
enmity. 12 

In Thibet the ambitions of the two nations also 
clashed. In this quarter the British had constantly 
shown a disposition to advance. Finally in 1903 Lord 
Curzon despatched Colonel Younghusband on a mis- 
sion which might have been commercial in character 
as asserted, but which Russia regarded as likely to 
lead to British political supremacy over the "Roof 
of the World." For the moment, Russian attention 
was directed to the war in Manchuria and she could 
do no more than express her displeasure at the 
Younghusband mission. But the British penetration 
of Thibet was not the least amongst the factors that 
seemed to be making for a conflict between Great 
Britain and Russia. 13 

In the Far East, Russian and British ambitions 
clashed no less directly than in the Central East, and 
at the end of the nineteenth century the rivalry was 
such in this quarter as to make imminent the danger 
of open conflict. Russia's interests on the Pacific 
seaboard date back to the seventeenth century, when 
in her expansion eastwards, she founded the town of 
Okhotsk. It was only in the middle of the nineteenth 

i 2 De Caix, "La Politique Anglaise, " in Questions Actuelles de 
Politique Etrangbre, 1911, 19; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 243- 
245; Whigham, The Persian Problem, 332-378. 

is Fraser, India under Curzon and After, 78-146; Cambridge Modern 
History, xii, 490. 



126 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

century, however, that, in the pursuit of an ice-free 
port, she sought to extend southwards her possessions 
on the Pacific, and began the attack on the integrity 
of China. In 1860 she acquired from China a strip 
of territory to the east of Manchuria, known as the 
Maritime Province, at the southern end of which she 
established the naval base of Vladivostok. Here she 
was stopped for the moment. But Vladivostok is not 
an ice-free harbor, and Russia looked to the south for 
further accessions of territory; she especially hoped 
to acquire Korea, Port Arthur at the head of the 
Yellow Sea, and also the province of Manchuria, which 
would give direct communication between Korea and 
Siberia." 

The interests of Great Britain in the Far East were 
first established in 1842. Previous to that time China 
had preserved her isolation from the rest of the world ; 
foreigners had been permitted to trade in a single 
port, Canton, but under such restrictions that no 
country was able to carry on regular commerce; no 
foreign ambassadors or consuls were allowed to reside 
in China. In 1840 this wall between the Celestial 
Empire and the modern world was broken down. A 
quarrel between Great Britain and the Chinese 
Government over the smuggling of opium culminated 
in the so-called Opium War of 1840, in which China 
was speedily crushed. By the treaty of Nanking, 
Great Britain forced China to open to British trade 
four ports besides Canton ; she also secured for herself 
the island of Hong Kong. 

During the next two decades the British acquired 
further rights, including that of maintaining consuls 

i* Hazen, Europe since 1815, 681-682; Bambaud, Histoire de la 
Bussie, 780 sq., 853. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 127 

in the treaty ports, and rapidly extended their Far 
Eastern trade and their influence on the Pacific. 
In the meantime, other Powers established trading 
centres in the Chinese Empire, and China's commerce 
with Europe increased by leaps and bounds. But 
Great Britain remained the predominant Power in 
the Far East, partly because of her possession of 
Hong Kong, the most important naval and commercial 
base on the Pacific coast, partly because of her 
initiative and activity. 15 

Acute rivalry between Russia and Great Britain in 
the Far East was long postponed. Russia was far to 
the north, Great Britain to the south, and so long as 
the integrity of China was maintained there was little 
chance of a clash. Russia had no ports which would 
allow her to develop commerce likely to rival that of 
Great Britain, and the latter Power regarded Russia's 
possession of the ice-bound coast of the Maritime 
Province with indifference. But in the early nineties 
the sudden rise of Japan and her successful war with 
China produced effects that gave to Russia an oppor- 
tunity of winning Korea and acquiring a position of 
predominance on the Pacific, which seemed to Great 
Britain dangerously threatening. 

Japan's policy of isolation, to which she had long 
adhered, was broken down as a result of Commodore 
Perry's visit in 1854. The request that a port be 
opened to American trade was accompanied by a naval 
demonstration. Japan heeded the request and entered 
into relations with foreign nations. There followed 
an internal revolution disposing of the feudal system 
and introducing European institutions. The national 
transformation which resulted finds no parallel in 

is Innes, England and the British Empire, iv, 218. 



128 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

history. "Within two decades Japan made of herself 
a modern Power, whose material efficiency was proved 
conclusively by the victories over China in 1894 and 
Eussia in 1904-1905. 

The first of these wars resulted from the ancient 
quarrel of China and Japan over Korea, which was 
coveted by Japan because of its strategical position 
and agricultural fertility, and also because it offered 
markets to Japanese industry and a home for her 
surplus population. The struggle resulted in an easy 
victory for the army of Japan, trained by European 
officers and equipped in occidental fashion, and China 
quickly agreed to a peace, which was recorded in the 
Treaty of ShimonoseM (April 17, 1895). According 
to this treaty China recognized the independence of 
Korea, but on such terms that Japanese commercial 
control of the peninsula would be possible; and also 
ceded to Japan the peninsula of Liao Tung, situated 
to the west of Korea, with Port Arthur at its southern 
extremity, and the island of Formosa. 16 

But Japan was not allowed to enjoy the fruits of 
her victory. Her triumph over China was displeasing 
to Russia and Germany, since it interfered materially 
with their own Far Eastern policy; and three days 
after the Chino-Japanese treaty had been signed, the 
European Powers intervened. Together with France, 
Russia and Germany invoked the principle of Chinese 
integrity, declaring that Pekin was threatened by 
Japan's possession of Port Arthur and that Korea's 
independence would be merely nominal. Their lan- 
guage was courteous, but they made it plain that the 
treaty must be revised. Japan swallowed her dis- 

i« Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politih, 82; Hazen, op. cit., 
694-696; Vladimir, The China Japan War. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 129 

appointment, yielded to their demands, and renounced 
the acquisition of the Liao Tung peninsula and Port 
Arthur. 17 

It was easy to understand Russia 's desire to prevent 
Japan from winning a foothold on the Continent and 
especially in Korea. Since the early nineties she had 
begun practical operations which she hoped would 
enable her to secure a strong commercial and strate- 
gical position on the Pacific. In 1891 she began the 
Trans-Siberian railway, which was destined to link 
St. Petersburg with Vladivostok, and a few years later 
planned a branch line running across Manchuria and 
terminating in the Liao Tung peninsula. 18 With such 
ambitions, the Japanese terms dictated at ShimonoseM 
directly conflicted. 

The Power chiefly responsible for the tearing up 
of that treaty, however, was Germany. The Kaiser, 
as we saw, was at this time beginning to evolve plans 
of world empire and the moment seemed opportune 
for the German Government to establish its political 
influence in the Far East. Furthermore the chance 
of securing a trading post and naval base similar to 
that of the British at Hong Kong won the approval 
of the Pan-Germanists, who enthusiastically supported 
German intervention in Eastern affairs. But the 
most important reason for German action in China 
was doubtless to be found in her European policy. 
During the nineties Germany was constantly working 
to rob the Dual Alliance of European significance by 
directing the attention of France and Russia away 
from Europe, and fostering their desire for colonial 
power. Russia especially she sought to "tempt Asia- 

M Rambaud, Histoire de la Eussie, 861. 
is Rambaud, Histoire de la Eussie, 884 sq. 



130 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

wards, with a view to getting rid of her influence in 
Europe." It was eminently desirable for Germany 
that Russia should be involved in distant and dan- 
gerous adventures, and that Russian expansion should 
embitter the Anglo-Russian rivalry. The position of 
Germany on the Continent of Europe was clearly 
strengthened by every new clash of interests between 
Russia and Great Britain, no less than by the Anglo- 
French feud. 19 

The hopes of Russia and Germany were realized for 
the time being, although they were destined to ultimate 
failure, in the one case in 1905, in the other in 1914. 
But for the moment both Powers secured their desired 
position on the Pacific. Germany took advantage of 
the murder of two missionaries in 1897 to send out an 
expedition which forced China to lease for ninety- 
nine years the bay of Ej.au Chau and a zone of fifty 
kilometres around it. She thus won a naval and 
commercial base that might in the future rival Hong 
Kong. 20 She was equally successful in the "egging- 
on" of Russia. The latter Power secured in 1898 the 
lease of the all-important Port Arthur, which, as she 
herself had declared to Japan, allowed the possessor 
to threaten Pekin. This was to be the terminus of the 
Trans-Manchurian Railway, which connected Russia 
in Europe with an ice-free port on the Pacific. The 
railway itself, under an agreement made in 1896, was 
to pass ultimately to China ; in the meantime, Russian 
soldiers were allowed to guard it, and Russia already 
treated Manchuria as though it were her own. 21 

i» Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 213-216. 
20 Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 108-115. 
2i Hawkesworth, The Last Century in Europe, 409; Krahmer, Russ- 
land in Asien. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 131 

The advance of Russian influence in China had long 
been a cause of anxiety to British statesmen, and in 
1900 they realized that British commercial supremacy 
in the Far East was directly threatened. The trade 
of Northern China was falling into Russian hands, 
and even in the valley of the Yang-tse-kiang Russian 
merchants and commission agents were replacing 
British agents. In the meantime Russia was strength- 
ening her military hold on Manchuria, and despite her 
promises seemed likely to make of it a Russian 
province. England could not fail to see that Russian 
annexation of Manchuria meant not merely the acqui- 
sition of a strategic position invaluable to Slavic 
development on the Pacific, but also the closing of 
Manchuria to British trade. 

At the moment the attention and resources of Great 
Britain were occupied by the Boer War, and she 
realized the necessity of an ally in the Far East upon 
whom she could depend to oppose the Russian 
advance. She turned naturally to Japan, whose 
interests had been trampled upon by Russia and 
Germany in 1895 and who was also searching for 
some ally that could furnish her the necessary capital 
for her new industrial development. Circumstances 
thus brought Great Britain and Japan together, and 
on January 30, 1902, the Eastern and Western Powers 
signed a defensive alliance, guaranteeing the terri- 
torial integrity of China and Korea, and equal 
opportunity for the commerce of all nations in those 
countries. 22 

The Anglo-Japanese treaty did not provide that 
Great Britain should assist Japan in a war against 
Russia alone, but it naturally resulted in an increase 

22 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 217-221. 



132 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

of hard feeling between Russia and Great Britain. 
The mutual hostility of the two countries became more 
acute with the carrying out of the Russian policy of 
aggression in Manchuria in 1903 and the protests 
raised against it in the British press. Finally in 
January of the next year, the Russo-Japanese War 
broke out as a result of Russia's refusal to come to 
terms over the occupation of Manchuria, and although 
England took no part in the war, her sympathies 
were frankly with her Japanese Ally and against her 
" hereditary enemy," as the newspapers called Russia. 
The possibility of war between Russia and England 
seemed to be more imminent than at any time since 
the Berlin Congress. Russian newspapers accused 
Great Britain of having caused the war by the moral 
and financial assistance given to Japan, and also of 
instigating Russian revolutionaries. British feeling 
was excited to a pitch of frenzy by the cannonading of 
British trawlers by the Russian fleet off the Dogger 
Bank. Collision between the two nations seemed 
inevitable. 23 

The avoidance of war between England and Russia 
was due in part to the skill and temper of the diplomats 
who represented each state; it was also due in large 
measure to the importance of Anglo-Russian trade, 
which had grown constantly and was too valuable to 
each nation to be imperilled by war. Another factor 
of equal, or possibly greater weight in the arrange- 
ment of their differences was that both Russia and 
England realized the enormous advantage that Ger- 
many would draw from an Anglo-Russian war. In 
the extraordinary development of Germany is to be 
found the explanation of the continual and successful 

23 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 228-229. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 133 

efforts of the diplomats to avoid an open break between 
Eussia and England. 

England's fear of Germany, which thus led to a 
settlement of her quarrel with Russia as well as of 
that with France, did not arise until the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Her relations with Germany 
had always been determined by the principle of British 
policy which we have already observed, namely, the 
security of the British Empire. During the generation 
that followed the Franco-German War, Germany was 
a land Power, and did not threaten the maritime and 
colonial supremacy of Great Britain. Hence the latter 
Power viewed the development of German strength 
with equanimity and friendliness. Personal affection 
between the two nations was by no means strong, and 
the tone of the British press was not always cordial 
to Germany. But official relations were in general 
perfectly correct and a close understanding between 
the two nations was desired by the Governments of 
both. So long as Germany remained the land-rat, as 
Bismarck said, there was no danger of a quarrel with 
her British cousin, the water-rat. 

During the years that immediately preceded the 
formation of the Triple Alliance, Great Britain and 
Germany were on terms of increasing intimacy. The 
action of Lord Derby in 1875 in joining with Russia 
to prevent Germany's rumored attack upon France 
was soon forgotten, and the policy of the two countries 
at the Congress of Berlin brought them more closely 
together. When in 1882 Italy entered into alliance 
with the Teutonic Powers, the cordiality of Anglo- 
German relations was enhanced by the friendliness 
of England and Italy, which had existed without a 
break since 1860. To England went the gratitude of 



134 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Italy for the moral support she had received during 
her struggle for independence; England, who had not 
raised her finger for Italian freedom, benefited by 
the distrust and bitterness felt in Italy towards 
France, and after the French occupation of Tunis the 
Anglo-Italian understanding was of the most cordial 
sort. Considered in the light of the whole inter- 
national situation, this understanding was almost a 
Mediterranean prolongation of the Triple Alliance. 24 

The tendency of Great Britain to draw closer to the 
Triple Alliance was strengthened by the colonial crises 
which took place in the early eighties. It was with 
France that England was contesting for colonial 
supremacy, and she naturally turned for support to 
the enemies of France. That support she received, 
and Germany constantly took the British side in the 
Egyptian question, possibly because of hatred for 
France, possibly because she desired to have a claim 
on British gratitude. 

It is true that at times the ambitions of the German 
colonial party brought a temporary cloud over the 
mutual cordiality of Anglo-German relations and the 
path of friendship was not always smooth. The British 
were disturbed by Germany's policy of conquest and 
expansion in Southwest Africa, Togoland, and the 
Cameroons. German ambitions directed towards the 
vacant islands in the Pacific also seemed to impugn the 
assumption of Great Britain that she was legitimate 

24 Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige PolitiTc, 13 ; Schiemann, in 
New YorTc Times Current History of the War, Vol. II, no. 4, 785-786. 
"As regards England," said Bismarck, "we are in the happy situation 
of having no conflict of interests, except commercial rivalry and passing 
differences such as must always arise; but there is nothing that can 
bring about a war between two pacific and hardworking nations," 
d'Avril, Negotiations relatives au Traites de Berlin, 325. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 135 

mistress and had a sort of presumptive claim on all the 
islands of the sea. Such an assumption was charac- 
teristic of all the British diplomats. " Although the 
authority of England has not been proclaimed," said 
Lord Granville, ''the affirmation by a foreign govern- 
ment of rights of sovereignty or jurisdiction would be 
considered an affront to the legitimate rights of Eng- 
land. ' ' And Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice also spoke of 
territories "which without being actually British were 
nevertheless British by their character and history." 
It was inevitable that such an attitude should arouse 
the heated protests of the colonial party in Germany. 
On the other hand, the British considered themselves 
threatened by Bismarck's attitude at the conference 
over African affairs held at Berlin, where he declared 
that effective occupation was the sole criterion of 
sovereignty. 25 

But although public opinion in both England and 
Germany was at times aroused to mutual hostility, the 
Germans protesting against the British assumption of 
domination, and the British vexed by the new pre- 
tensions of Germany, the relations of the Governments 
remained almost invariably friendly. "England," 
said Bismarck, "is more important for us than 
Zanzibar and the whole East Coast." And after the 
disgrace of the old Chancellor, Caprivi, who replaced 
him, emphasized the fact that in this respect his 
foreign policy would follow on the lines laid down by 
his predecessor: "We have before everything, sought 
to assure our understanding with England." 26 

That understanding was sealed by divers treaties, 

25 Fitzmaurice, Life of the Second Earl Granville, ii, chap. X. 

26 De Cabc, ' ' La Politique Anglaise, ' ' in Questions Actuelles de 
Politique Etrangere, 1911, 24. 



136 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

notably in 1886 and again in 1890. By the latter 
agreement Germany recognized the legitimacy of 
British pretensions to the whole basin of the upper 
Nile and thus set her seal of approval npon British 
supremacy in Egypt. Again in 1893 British sover- 
eignty in West Central Africa was acknowledged by 
a treaty between the two Powers which delimited 
Nigeria and the German Cameroons and excluded 
certain disputed districts from the German sphere 
of influence. Such sacrifices of German colonial 
ambitions were not made without the quid pro quo; 
for while British colonial interests were thus furthered, 
the position of Germany on the Continent was strength- 
ened when Heligoland was ceded to Germany by Lord 
Salisbury, in return for the recognition of British 
rights in Zanzibar. 27 

Curiously enough the Boer War tended on the whole 
to bring about a new affirmation of the Anglo-German 
understanding. Public opinion in each country was 
hostile at the time. In England the memory of the 
Kaiser's telegram to Kruger rankled; in Germany 
sympathy was openly expressed for the Boers. But 
Germany's official attitude during the war was 
undoubtedly friendly. At the moment, England was 
absolutely isolated and it was in the power of the 
German Government to embarrass her effectively. 
But the Kaiser preferred to keep his hands free and 
await the outcome of the war. If England were 
victorious, he could claim payment for his benevolent 
neutrality; if she were defeated, then would be his 
opportunity for action. 28 

27 Keventlow, Deutschlands auswartige PolitiTc, 38-51. 

28 De Caix, op. cit., 33-34 ; interview with the Kaiser, Daily Telegraph, 
October 28, 1908. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 137 

It was during the Boer War that the most important 
of all the treaties between England and Germany was 
signed, namely, that of 1899, when Germany secured 
the chief island of Samoa. The accord of this year 
supplemented that of 1898, when the possibility of 
dividing the Portuguese possessions in Africa was 
considered, and it assured the German colonials that 
any railway from Rhodesia to the Atlantic would pass 
through their territories. 29 Lord Salisbury himself 
emphasized the importance of this understanding of 
1899 as a new link in the chain of friendship which 
bound the two nations: "This morning you have 
learned of the arrangement concluded between us and 
one of the continental states with whom more than 
with others we have for years maintained sympathetic 
and friendly relations. The arrangement is above all 
interesting as an indication that our relations with the 
German nation are all that we could desire. ' ,30 

In some quarters there even existed the hope of 
extending this Anglo-German understanding into a 
definite alliance, possibly including the United States 
so as to form a new triple "Teutonic" alliance. 
Germany had come into close relations with the 
American Power at the time of the Samoan settlement 
and the hard feelings that resulted from Germany's 
sympathy with Spain in 1898 had disappeared; the 
relations of Great Britain with the United States 
were placed on the most cordial footing by their treaty 
of February 5, 1900, which abrogated the old Clayton- 
Bulwer Treaty to the advantage of the United States. 
"There was a dream of a sort of Tugendbund, an 
alliance of the supposedly Teutonic and virtuous 

2» Reventlow, op. cit., 135 sq. 

so Speech at Lord Mayor 'b banquet, November 9, 1899. 



138 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

countries against the decadent nations, whose heritage 
might arouse conflicting ambitions amongst the strong 
states. ' m In his Leicester address, Chamberlain spoke 
distinctly of this triple Teutonic alliance, and in 
February, 1900, Rosebery recognized the reality of 
the attempt made to bring it about. "The Govern- 
ment," he said, "made pressing overtures to Germany 
and the United States for an alliance last December." 32 
Thus at the close of the nineteenth century there 
was little hint of the coming rivalry and bitterness that 
was destined to characterize the relations of England 
and Germany during the first fifteen years of the 
twentieth century. Intent upon the preservation of 
her maritime and colonial supremacy, England did 
not yet perceive the new danger that threatened, and 
continued to maintain her traditional hostility towards 
France and Russia. The centuries-old conflict with 
France had lost none of its venom, and the jealousy 
of the two nations in Africa had nearly precipitated 
open war in 1898. The fear of Russia, in the Near 
East, in Central Asia, and on the Pacific, kept alive 
the feud which seemed destined certainly to involve 
the two nations in another war. With Germany, on 
the other hand, England seemed to be on the best of 

3i Schiemann, in Neto York Times Current History of the War, 
Vol. II, no. 4, 787; De Caix, op. cit., 35. 

32 Chamberlain said : "At bottom the main character of the Teutonic 
race differs very little from the character of the Anglo-Saxon, and the 
same sentiments which bring us into close sympathy with the United 
States of America may also be evoked to bring us into close sympathy 
and alliance with the Empire of Germany. ... If the union between 
England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a 
new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great 
branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence 
in the future of the world," Annual Register, 1899, 227. Cf. Eeventlow, 
Deutschlands ausivartige Politik, 146. 



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 139 

terms. The clouds that had arisen between the two 
nations had been dissipated; and if public opinion in 
each country was none too cordial at times, the 
diplomats and Governments seemed determined on a 
close and friendly understanding, if not alliance. 

But at the very moment when relations between 
Great Britain and France and Russia were most 
strained, and connections with Germany closest, 
British policy was about to pass through an extraor- 
dinary transformation. The diplomatic revolution 
that took place during the first years of the twentieth 
century gave a totally new direction to that policy. 
Whole centuries of hatred and rivalry were forgotten 
and quarrels of long standing obliterated. Great 
Britain, for years the implacable foe of France and 
Russia, within three years concluded conventions 
with those Powers; and after maintaining friendship 
with Germany for a generation, discovered in the 
young and ambitious empire her most dangerous 
enemy. The character and scope of that diplomatic 
revolution forms the subject of the chapter which 
follows. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 

The student of recent diplomacy can find no period 
of such significance as that extending from 1898 to 
1907, for during these years took place the diplomatic 
revolution which culminated in the Triple Entente, 
and radically altered the character of the whole inter- 
national situation. Rarely has there been a time when 
the course of coming events depended so closely upon 
the policy of the diplomats in power, and of which we 
can say with equal confidence that if these statesmen 
had not been in office, the history of Europe would 
have been different. Broadly speaking, there are two 
aspects to this diplomatic revolution. The one is to 
be found in the new attitude of independence assumed 
by France. The other lies in the emergence of Great 
Britain from her magnificent isolation, and the liqui- 
dation of her ancient feuds with France and Russia. 
The result was a combination of Great Britain, France, 
and Russia in an entente of doubtful solidity, but 
pregnant with significance and destined to restore the 
balance that Bismarck destroyed. 

The most striking aspect of the change is certainly 
Great Britain's reversal of policy when she entered 
into conventions with her traditional foes, so soon 
after the sharpest of diplomatic encounters. But the 
new course of British policy would hardly have been 
possible except for the new spirit that began to inform 
French diplomacy, and which was personified by 
Theophile Delcasse, who entered the cabinet as Foreign 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 141 

Minister in 1898 immediately before the Fasboda 
crisis. Delcasse came into power too late to avert tbe 
crisis or alleviate immediately tbe bard feeling that 
resulted, but tbe new direction that French foreign 
policy assumed under his guidance, made Fashoda 
the last of the incidents that endangered Franco- 
British relations. 

We have already seen that so long as Bismarck 
remained in power, France was isolated and impotent. 
The domination of the Triple Alliance, and the friendly 
Teonnections which Bismarck maintained with Great 
Britain and Russia, prevented her from reclaiming 
the position in European councils that she had lost 
in 1871. Even the disgrace of Bismarck and the 
Franco-Russian Alliance of 1891 had not given France 
an opportunity for adopting a policy of initiative and 
independence. Russia soon made it plain that the 
alliance was, on her side at least, intended merely to 
preserve the status quo. The German Kaiser and 
diplomats had also robbed it of political weight, 
partly by their successful conciliation of French and 
Russian sympathy, partly by directing the attention 
of each nation to distant colonial ventures. France 
thus found that her ally was devoting all her energies 
to Far Eastern interests, and that she herself was 
continually involved in quarrels with Italy and Great 
Britain. Germany, by following Bismarck's policy 
of embittering the feeling between France and Great 
Britain, and France and Italy, on every occasion, 
successfully kept the victim of 1871 in diplomatic 
leading-strings. 1 

i Millet, Politique Exterieure, 1898-1905, 227; Keventlow, Deutsch- 
lands auswartige Politik, 25, sq. ; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 
12-25. 



142 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

So long as Gabriel Hanotaux guided the foreign 
policy of France, Germany was able to carry out 
the Bismarckian idea. His acquiescence in the Far 
Eastern schemes suggested to Russia by the diplomats 
of the Wilhelmstrasse practically nullified the value 
of the Dual Alliance; his hostility towards England, 
combined with Lord Salisbury's German tendencies, 
put the game in Germany's hands. But with the 
advent of Theophile Delcasse in June, 1898, the foreign 
relations of France were entrusted to a statesman 
of remarkable insight, who realized clearly the factors 
responsible for French impotence in foreign affairs, 
and who believed that he saw the means by which 
French foreign policy might be regenerated. 

Delcasse aimed above everything else at two lines 
of action: French expansive energy should be con- 
centrated in her natural field of influence, the Western 
Mediterranean; and French diplomatic independence 
of action should be established by a reconciliation 
with Italy and Great Britain. By many he was 
branded as a dangerous reviver of the "revanche" 
policy, certain to embroil his country with the Kaiser 
and bring about a conflict that must result in new 
prostration for France and new strength for Ger- 
many. Others, constantly increasing in numbers, 
approved his plans as the sole means of breaking down 
the hegemony of Germany and restoring the European 
balance. 2 

Whatever one might think of his policy, no one 
could deny Delcasse 's unconquerable will, the lucidity 
of his insight, and the charm of his personality. His 

2 Pinon, France et Allemagne, 97-110, 128-152 (unsympathetic) ; 
Fullerton, Problems of Power, 52, sq. ; Jaray, La Politique franco- 
anglaise, 153; Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 126-128. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 143 

meteoric career gave proof of his qualities. He had 
come to Paris from the South, poor and without 
friends, but equipped with a facile pen and a mar- 
vellous capacity for making foreign affairs intelli- 
gible to the man in the street. Entering the Chamber 
of Deputies at the age of thirty-seven, his assiduous 
study of colonial matters marked him out for the post 
of Colonial Secretary, which he received in 1894. 
Four years later, at the time of the most serious 
crisis of the decade, he entered the Quai d'Orsay as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post which he was to 
hold continuously during the next seven years. 

His road had not been easy. Insignificant in appear- 
ance, deprived of the physical proportions which 
count for much in French politics, with a thin voice 
so often fatal to a speaker in the Chamber of 
Deputies, lacking the gift of improvisation, he had to 
prepare his speeches with the utmost care and fore- 
thought, often only to see them utterly drowned in 
the tumult of the session. But his energy and tenacity 
in party politics were as notable as his brilliance in 
the handling of foreign affairs. In less than a decade 
from the time he had entered the Chamber he had won 
the authority which comes to most only after a long 
struggle. Similar to Thiers in person, manners, and 
clarity of method, he was now to exercise as definite 
an effect upon French history as did the first 
President of the Republic. 3 Without hesitation he 
proceeded to carry out the diplomatic revolution : first 
by completing the understanding with Italy; next by 
inaugurating political friendship with Great Britain. 

Previous to 1896 the reconciliation of France with 
Italy seemed to be excluded from the realm of political 

s Albin, Le Coup d'Agadir, 23. 



144 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

possibilities. From 1878 to 1896 the predominant 
figure among Italian statesmen was Crispi, who was 
filled with an ardent hatred of France, regarding that 
Power as the friend of the Pope, and therefore Italy's 
worst enemy ; he ' ' scented the Vatican in every breeze 
from the Biviera." 4 Crispi was also susceptible to 
Bismarckian influence, whenever the Chancellor chose 
to exert it, and Bismarck took care that Italy should 
be encouraged in her dreams of colonial expansion, 
which were bound to bring her into conflict with 
France. In 1882, Italy acquired a port on the 
Abyssinian coast, and three years later began to 
develop the colony of Eritrea. French colonial 
influence in West Africa seemed to be threatened 
thereby and French jealousy was immediately aroused. 
The relations between the two countries were not 
improved when Italy repudiated her commercial treaty 
with France and began a tariff war. A series of 
unfortunate incidents accentuated the animosity: in 
1886 Italian workmen in the south of France were 
maltreated; in 1887 the Florentine police, supported 
by Crispi, broke open the French archives; in the 
following year there was a quarrel over the status 
of French citizens in Massowah, and in 1888 the rumor 
was current that the French fleet was on the point 
of attacking the Italian coast. 5 In 1891 a Frenchman 
wrote Vive le Pape in the book lying near the tomb of 
Victor Emmanuel, in the Pantheon, with the result 
that feeling against France rose to an unprecedented 
degree of warmth. In the same year, when Italy 
renewed the Triple Alliance, she pledged herself in 

* Feiling, Italian Policy since 1870, 6. 

6 Annual Register, 1888, 243, 258, 259, 262; Eeventlow, op. cit., 17. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 145 

case of German demand, to send two army corps 
through the Tyrol to attack France.' 

With the fall of Bismarck in 1891 the diplomatic 
tension was slightly relaxed and the chance of pre- 
serving a peace which seemed so fragile, became 
greater. A monument to Garibaldi was inaugurated 
at Nice, a French fleet visited Genoa in 1892, and in 
1895 a statue of MacMahon was unveiled at Magenta. 
Most important of all was the failure of Crispi's 
colonial schemes and the end of that policy of 
adventure which had irritated France. On March 1, 
1896, the Italian army sent to penetrate into Abyssinia, 
was annihilated at Adowa by the Abyssinian Emperor 
Menelek, and Italy was forced to abandon the pro- 
tectorate she had claimed. Crispi's career was doomed 
and he immediately resigned. 7 

The fall of the aggressive anti-French statesman 
and tool of Bismarck opened the door for a recon- 
ciliation with France. Such a reconciliation was 
endorsed by public opinion in Italy as well as by all 
the commercial interests. Italy, by her pro-German 
policy had gained only doubtful advantages. She had 
sacrificed her dream of winning the Trentino and 
Trieste and was forced to limit her ambitions in 
Albania, out of deference to the wishes of Austria. 
She had exposed herself to the danger of a continental 
war and had not received guarantees from Germany 
against a naval war, nor had she strengthened her 
position in the Mediterranean. The economic conse- 
quences of the break with France were nothing less 
than disastrous to Italy's young industries. The 

8 Singer, Geschichte des Dreibundes, 100. 

i Hazen, Europe since 1815, 382-383 ; Tardieu, France and the 

Alliances, 86-87. 



146 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

repudiation of the French commercial treaty had, 
within a space of two years, diminished trade to a 
ruinous extent; Italian exports to France decreased 
by 61 per cent ; and in a single year French capitalists 
withdrew seven hundred million francs from Italian 
industrial enterprises. 8 

Thus economic circumstances, as well as the dis- 
appearance of Bismarck and Crispi, facilitated a 
settlement of the Franco-Italian quarrel. Even before 
Delcasse 's accession to office, conditions were ripe for 
his plan of an understanding between the two coun- 
tries, and a manifestation of Italian willingness was 
given in September, 1896, when Italy accepted a 
revision of the Tunisian treaties, implying a recog- 
nition on her part of the French protectorate in Tunis. 
Immediately after entering the Quai d'Orsay, Delcasse 
began further negotiations, and in November, 1898, 
carried out the first step in his policy by arranging a 
treaty of commerce with Italy. 9 

So great were the immediate advantages of this 
treaty, especially to Italy, which, according to her own 
writers, was thereby saved from economic ruin, that 
the Franco-Italian rapprochement might safely have 
rested upon a purely commercial basis. Italy would 
have gained from it the economic benefit she was 
seeking, while France would have secured the political 
advantages she hoped to find in friendship with Italy. 
But Delcasse was anxious to give the understanding 
a rather more definite political character, and with 
this in mind he entered into diplomatic negotiations 
with Rome. In 1900, 1901, and 1902, by the exchange 
of notes and in verbal conversations, the political 

s Eeventlow, op. tit., 53-54. 
• Felling, op. tit., 9. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 147 

understanding was completed. France promised to 
refrain from any interference with Tripoli, in which 
quarter Italy was to have free hand; and Italy in 
return gave France the assurance that she would do 
nothing that might hamper French policy in Morocco. 
It was furthermore understood that the character 
of the Triple Alliance, so far as Italy was concerned, 
was entirely defensive ; and that in no case could Italy 
become "either the instrument or the auxiliary of an 
aggression' ' against France. 10 

The understanding with Italy marked an important 
step towards the fulfilment of Delcasse's double 
purpose; it was essential to the security of French 
power in the Western Mediterranean, and it helped 
to restore the independence of French diplomatic 
action in Europe. Morocco is contiguous to Algeria 
and the stability of the French regime in the latter 
quarter could not be guaranteed if Morocco fell into 
the hands of a hostile Power, or if France were not 
allowed to develop her interests there. Both for the 
preservation and the extension of her Mediterranean 
influence, France must have a free hand in Morocco. 
By winning the assent of Italy to her proposed 
expansion westwards on the African seaboard, France 
averted all difficulty that might have arisen with her 
chief Mediterranean rival. The rapprochement with 
Italy also facilitated the future autonomy of French 
diplomacy by blunting the edge of the Triple Alliance. 
The feud between the two nations, which was so long 
a characteristic feature of the international situation, 
had been one of the chief factors of French weakness 

10 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 88-91; on Italian schemes in 
North Africa, see Berard, I' Affaire marocaine, 61; Journal des Debats, 
December 30, 1905; Pinon, France et Allemagne, 128-139. 



148 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

and German strength. The intensity of Italian feeling 
against France was the club that Germany held over 
her conquered rival ; with its disappearance the diplo- 
matic hegemony of Germany was no longer secure. 

The second phase of Delcasse's policy was accom- 
plished with equal success and with results of even 
greater importance. His plan of freeing France from 
German influence and of strengthening the French 
position in the Mediterranean was assisted in the 
highest degree by the second reconciliation that he 
effected, and which resulted in the Anglo-French 
Entente of April 8, 1904. Except for this rapproche- 
ment with England, the stability and value of the 
Franco-Italian understanding would have been ques- 
tionable; French expansion in Morocco would have 
been difficult if not impossible; and Germany's domi- 
nation on the Continent would not have been broken. 

As in the case of the Franco-Italian understanding, 
the personalities of the leading diplomats were of 
great importance in determining the Anglo-French 
reconciliation. So long as men like Hanotaux and 
Salisbury were in office, such a reconciliation was out 
of the question ; only with the entrance of new figures 
upon the diplomatic stage could the settlement of the 
ancient feud be attempted. Delcasse's accession to 
power in 1898 may be regarded as the first step in 
the formation of the Entente. Even in the midst of 
the Fashoda crisis, he attempted to appease the 
general hostility of French feeling towards Great 
Britain, believing firmly that France must win British 
friendship if she were to regain a position of influence 
in Europe. "I should be sorry to leave office," said 
he, in November, 1898, "before I had established a 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 149 

good understanding with England." 11 He saw in 
England a "potential ally, in Germany the only 
enemy." 12 And the new French Ambassador to St. 
James, M. Cambon, left for his post with similar 
intentions. 

On the other side of the Channel new personalities 
were coming into control of diplomatic policy, who 
were less closely bound by the traditions of the British 
Foreign Office. In October, 1900, Lord Salisbury 
ceased to be Foreign Secretary ; for half a generation, 
with the exception of one brief interval, he had con- 
ducted British foreign relations on the principle that 
France was Great Britain's natural enemy, and he 
had concentrated his energies on British expansion 
in Africa at the expense of France ; invariably he had 
worked to affirm the understanding between Great 
Britain and Germany. Salisbury was succeeded by 
Lansdowne, who although he was no enemy of Ger- 
many, soon showed himself anxious to restore the 
European balance and end the diplomatic situation 
which Germany had long exploited. 

Only three months later Queen Victoria, who was 
noted for her German tendencies and her inability 
to understand the French, was succeeded by Edward 
VII. England was fortunate in her new ruler. 
Already past middle age when he mounted the throne, 
he showed immediately that the long years during 
which his mother had kept him at arm's length from 
political affairs, had by no means been wasted. 
Although he was allowed access to State papers only 
during the years that immediately preceded the 

11 Berard, in Revue de Paris, July 1, 1905, and France et Guillaume 
II, 21. 

12 Rose, The Origins of the War, 69. 



150 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Queen's death, it was clear that he had made the most 
of his opportunities, for he displayed an ability to 
grasp international questions worthy of an experienced 
diplomat. 13 

Furthermore the time spent by him in apparently 
frivolous occupations had brought him into touch with 
men of all classes and shades of opinion. He had 
acquired a broad and, with the help of his extraordi- 
nary memory, a singularly accurate knowledge of 
trade, finance, and politics. His natural magnetism 
and geniality had not withered under the stress of his 
wearisome social duties ; rather had it developed until 
there were few who could resist the charm of his 
personality. That England should have possessed a 
sovereign of such a type at the moment when her 
interests pointed to a reconciliation with two tradi- 
tional enemies, is an instance of the special providence 
that seems to watch over the British Empire. 

The new monarch, at first under the influence of his 
imperial nephew of Germany, was not slow to realize 
the advantages that England would draw from a close 
understanding with France, and the dangers that 
would result from a continuation of the quarrel at the 
time when Germany was looking forward to world 
empire. Desirous of effecting a reconciliation, and 
bringing to his task qualities of the highest value, 
the impression which his personality produced in 
France proved to be one of the chief factors in his 
success. Well liked across the Channel and under- 
standing the French people, "he did that which no 
Minister, no Cabinet, no Ambassadors, neither treaties, 
nor protocols, nor understandings, which no debates, 

is Cf. Lord Eedesdale, Memoirs, passim. Sidney Lee in his article 
in the Dictionary of National Biography is less appreciative. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 151 

no banquets, nor speeches, were able to perform. He, 
by bis personality alone, brought home to the minds 
of millions on the Continent . . . the friendly feelings 
of the country over which King Edward ruled." 14 

The new diplomats on both sides of the Channel thus 
desired an understanding. They were warmly sup- 
ported by the commercial interests. England was 
France's most valued customer, capable of appre- 
ciating the French articles of luxury and, with her 
capital, capable of paying for them. The exports of 
French production competed only to the smallest 
degree with those made in England. But owing to 
the political relations between the two countries 
commerce had not developed to its natural limits, and 
French traders believed that the establishment of 
more friendly political connections would materially 
assist the extension of their export trade. In London, 
the commercial classes considered that friendship with 
France would be the best means of meeting the 
German competition, the effects of which were plainly 
discernible. In 1901 and the following years influen- 
tial traders began a campaign with the purpose of 
ameliorating the relations of the two countries. 
Barclay travelled through France and meeting the 
various Chambers of Commerce brought them to the 
point of vigorous advocacy of an economic entente. 
And in England, the Associated Chambers of British 
Commerce passed a resolution favoring a Franco- 
British treaty of arbitration. 15 

But the real explanation of the Entente of 1904 is 
to be found less in the friendly spirit of the diplomats 

" Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons, May 11, 1910. 
is Sir Thomas Barclay, Thirty Years' Anglo-French Reminiscences, 
175-229. 



152 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

and the material interests of the commercial classes, 
than in the fear of Germany which seized the British 
people at the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
economic transformation of Germany which led to the 
building up of her mercantile marine and overseas 
trade was an ever-increasing cause of anxiety to the 
British commercial classes. German commerce, as 
we saw, doubled in value during the decade following 
1895. Consular reports emphasized the success of the 
Germans in winning markets, and expatiated upon 
their superiority over the British in technical educa- 
tion and in methods of salesmanship. Every year 
came word of British ports declining in importance 
as a result of German initiative, of the growth of 
German ship-yards and docks, of mercantile companies 
purchased by the Germans from the British, and of 
the displacement of the British flag by the German 
in the seas of China and the Levant. Even in London 
City, Cockneys were being replaced by German clerks, 
who furnished greater efficiency at a lower wage. 18 

At the same time the British watched with conster- 
nation the development of the German naval plan. 
The first scheme of 1898, in itself sufficiently disquiet- 
ing to Great Britain, was speedily judged by the 
Germans to be inadequate and was complemented by 
the programme of 1900, which was clearly designed 
to render Germany capable of coping alone with any 
adversary upon the sea. The cousin land-rat of Bis- 
marck's day was learning to swim and was turning 
water-rat. With a clarity that was as unmistakable 
as it was unpleasant, Great Britain began to perceive 
that the danger of the future was likely to proceed not 

is Eeventlow, Deutschlands ausw'drtige PoliUJc, 86, sq. ; Tardieu, 
France and the Alliances, 54-60. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 153 

from France or Russia, but from the empire founded 
by Bismarck, which was now passing beyond the scope 
of Bismarck's dreams. 

As early as 1897 a bitter article in the Saturday 
Review dilated upon the danger that must threaten 
Great Britain if Germany were allowed to proceed 
upon her path of expansion unchecked. " England," 
the writer says, "with her long history of successful 
aggression, with her marvellous conviction that in 
pursuing her own interests she is spreading light 
among nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, 
bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with 
a lesser will-force, but perhaps with a keener intelli- 
gence, compete in every corner of the globe. In the 
Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India 
and the East, in the islands of the Southern Sea, and 
in the far Northwest, wherever — and where has it 
not? — the flag has followed the Bible, and trade has 
followed the flag, there the German bagman is 
struggling with the English pedlar. Is there a mine 
to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from 
breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade 
gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling 
to be first. A million petty disputes build up the 
greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If 
Germany were extinguished tomorrow, the day after 
tomorrow there is not an Englishman in the world 
who would not be richer. Nations have fought for 
years over a city or a right of succession. Must 
they not fight for two hundred fifty million pounds of 
commerce V 1 

The article does not stop with pointing out the 
conflict that existed between German and British 
interests but goes on to show that England could make 



154 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

war upon Germany with every prospect of success. 
1 * Her partners in the Triple Alliance would be useless 
against England; Austria because she could do 
nothing; Italy because she dare not lay herself open 
to an attack by France. The growth of Germany's 
fleet has done no more than to make the blow of 
England fall on her more heavily. A few days and 
her ships would be at the bottom, or in convoy to 
English ports ; Hamburg and Bremen, the Kiel Canal 
and her Baltic ports would lie under the guns of 
England waiting until the indemnity were settled. 
Our work over we need not even be at the pains to 
alter Bismarck's words to Ferry and to say to France 
and Russia, 'Seek some compensation. Take inside 
Germany whatever you like. You can have it.' " 17 

Here is a spirit no less fiery and belligerent than 
that of Bernhardi a decade later, although it is safe 
to say that it represented the feeling of the mass of 
the nation far less accurately than did the German 
soldier. But if such sentiments were held by only 
a small minority in 1897 the German naval programme 
of the next years converted many to the creed of the 
writer. And if few spoke out so plainly it was because 
the reality of the peril was so clearly recognized that 
plain speaking could no longer safely be indulged in. 

Nor were British fears alleviated by the moral 
transformation that was taking place in Germany, 
which demonstrated to the more clear-sighted in 
England that the menace was not merely of an economic 
character. Germany's dreams of world policy, of 
extending her political as well as her commercial 
empire throughout the world, could not but disturb 

1 7 Saturday Beview, September 11, 1897. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 155 

British imperialists. The rather indefinite schemes 
for the acquisition of colonies, the beginning of the 
Bagdad Bailway, the money spent upon fortifications 
at Kiau Chau, seemed to Great Britain to indicate a 
carefully conceived plan of expansion on Germany's 
part. The belligerent and defiant attitude of Germans, 
which we have noticed, increased British nervousness. 
Little by little the conception of a German imperialism 
making use of German continental hegemony to raise 
a European league against England and destroy her 
colonial dominion, became current. To the British, 
the future seemed to be fraught with another struggle 
like those they had formerly waged against Philip II, 
Louis XIV, and Napoleon. They remembered the 
words of Chatham, "Our first duty is to see that 
France does not become a naval, commercial, and 
colonial Power," and they applied them to Germany. 

Under these conditions a continuation of the under- 
standing with Germany which had seemed so solid 
in 1899, was clearly impossible. As we have seen, 
British policy has followed invariably a single prin- 
ciple, the security of her colonial and maritime empire, 
and in the first years of the new century British 
diplomats remained true to this principle. So long as 
Germany remained a land Power they could afford 
to be indifferent to German diplomatic hegemony on 
the Continent. But with Germany menacing their 
maritime empire, it was imperative that the conti- 
nental balance of power should be restored. The 
obvious method of restoration was an understanding 
with France. Splendid isolation was no longer even 
dignified, and it threatened to become perilous in the 
extreme. 

To Edward VII must go much of the credit for the 



156 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

successful termination of England's ancient quarrel 
with France. The efforts of the diplomats were 
greatly facilitated, it is true, by the eagerness of the 
commercial interests as well as by the new friendship 
of France and Italy; but it was the King who paved 
the way for serious negotiations by his visit to Paris. 
With Fashoda only five years away and the attitude 
of the Parisians by no means certain, Edward VII 
risked no little when he tested French sentiments in 
1903; he was at first received unenthusiastically, but 
immediately awoke in Paris and in all France the 
warm and kindly feelings for the genial monarch that 
have ever since persisted. With the return visit of 
M. Loubet, definite conversations became possible. 
Negotiations lasted eight months, and on April 8, 1904, 
the agreement was signed. 18 

The arrangement, which came to be known as the 
Entente Cordiale, settled once and for all the conflicts 
which had arisen between England and France as a 
result of their policies of expansion. Of these, the 
most serious had related to Africa and especially to 
the position of the British in Egypt and the possible 
development of French schemes in Morocco. In each 
quarter the nation chiefly interested was granted a 
free hand by the other. France recognized the British 
position in Egypt and promised not to thwart the 
British Government by asking that a date should be 
set for the British occupation to cease. In return, 
Great Britain recognized the special interests of 
France in Morocco, promising that she would do 
nothing to hamper her liberty of action in carrying 
out necessary reforms. The two signatories further 

is Barclay, op. cit., 230-236. 



THE DirLOMATIC REVOLUTION 157 

agreed to lend each other mutual help diplomatically 
for the execution of the clauses of the declaration. 19 

The direct effects of the Entente Cordiale are 
obvious. For France it completed the second phase 
in Delcasse 's policy. In return for her recognition 
of the British position in Egypt, which was no more 
than an acknowledgment of actual facts, France 
received the necessary guarantee of the development 
of her Western Mediterranean policy. Delcasse, by 
narrowing the scope of French colonial activities and 
surrendering claims which could be enforced only with 
the greatest difficulty, cleared the path for French 
control in Morocco, and increased the chance of 
sovereignty in her natural sphere of influence. The 
position of France in Morocco was further assured 
a few months after the Anglo-French Convention, by 
an understanding with Spain (September, 1904), 
according to which the spheres of influence of each 
nation in Northern Africa were delimited. 20 Taken in 
conjunction with this Spanish understanding and the 
earlier convention with Italy, the Anglo-French 
Entente apparently gave to Delcasse the full liberty 
of action in the Western Mediterranean for which he 
had been striving since his accession to office. 

But the Entente Cordiale had a wider significance 
for both France and Great Britain than lay in the 
settlement of African questions. It was a general 
arrangement of the national quarrel which had long 
been considered an axiom of international diplomacy; 

1 9 The terms of the convention are printed in Price, Diplomatic 
History of the War, 274. On Europe and Morocco see Pinon, L'Empire 
de la Mediterranee. On the bearing of the convention as it affected 
African questions, see Cromer, Modern Egypt, ii, 388-396. 

2° Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 95-106; the terms of the 
Convention are printed in Pinon, France et Allemagne, 286, 291. 



158 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

it destroyed the tension between the two countries 
which had been the "postulate of European policy, 
the favorite instrument of the policy of Germany. By 
putting an end to this state of things, the Cabinets of 
London and Paris introduced a new weight into the 
international balance of power. They mutually freed 
themselves from preoccupations that had long been 
a burden; and they guaranteed each other a liberty 
of action which was equally precious to both." 21 

Delcasse thus won for France a diplomatic autonomy 
which the alliance with Russia had not given her. Her 
feuds with Italy and England ended, she could hope 
to escape from the diplomatic domination that first 
Bismarck and then William II had imposed upon her, 
and which French ministers such as Hanotaux had 
accepted. Henceforth she might hope to transform 
her policy from one of passivity and impotence to one 
of initiative. For Great Britain, oppressed by the fear 
of Germany, the liberation of France was of the utmost 
advantage, because it lessened the chances of success 
in what was believed to be the great German " design." 
So long as Germany held the hegemony of the 
Continent there was always possible the creation of 
a continental league against the British Empire, which 
would revive the perils of the Napoleonic age. The 
Entente with France, as a step in the restoration of 
the continental balance and the breaking down of 
German primacy, offered the best defence of Britain's 
maritime empire against the German menace. 

One factor in the European situation, however, con- 
tinued to maintain Germany's position of supremacy 
on the Continent after the conclusion of the Anglo- 

21 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 66. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 159 

French understanding, namely, the mutual antagonism 
of Great Britain and Russia. So long as these two 
nations were on bad terms, little practical effect could 
be expected from England's new friendship with 
France, a nation which was at the same time the ally 
of Russia. We have seen how the interests of Russia 
and Great Britain conflicted in the Near and Central 
East, and how the danger of an open break became 
acute during the years of Russia's aggression in 
Manchuria and China. But as in the case of Franco- 
British relations, the tension was greatest immediately 
before it relaxed entirely. 

Curiously enough, the defeat of Russia by Japan on 
the plains of Manchuria did much to render a recon- 
ciliation possible. Great Britain had no intention of 
allowing Japan to dominate the Pacific, and after 1905 
was willing to make friends with Russia, who might 
be found useful as a counterweight against an ally 
that was too strong; it was to Great Britain's obvious 
interest that neither Japan nor Russia should secure 
a position of control in the Far East, and if Russia 
could be brought to an understanding with herself and 
Japan, a safe balance might be struck. 

In the Near East the causes of Anglo-Russian 
hostility were also disappearing. With the develop- 
ment of Germany's world policy and the beginning 
of the Bagdad Railway, British statesmen perceived 
that Teutonic control in the Balkans and on the 
Dardanelles threatened India and the route to India 
far more seriously than did the aspirations of Russia ; 
and they believed that an essential condition of defence 
against German development in the Near East and 
Mesopotamia was an understanding between Great 
Britain and Russia. Thus of the three quarters where 



160 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR 

Anglo-Russian rivalry had been acute, there remained 
only one, the Central East, in which possible cause for 
conflict might arise in the future. In 1907 a convention 
between the two nations settled disputes relating to 
Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, and established an 
understanding which was destined to keep the general 
policies of the countries in harmony. 

The sudden and surprising reconciliation of Great 
Britain and Russia was chiefly facilitated by the 
attitude of each nation towards Germany. Great 
Britain was consumed with fear of the economic 
development of that nation and believed herself 
threatened directly by its world policy; the same 
factors that had led to her reconciliation with France 
made for an understanding with Russia. Russia, on 
the other hand, after seeing her dream of Far Eastern 
domination shattered, was not grateful to Germany, 
who was largely responsible for the aggressive policy 
of Russia in China and Manchuria. Furthermore, the 
activity of Russia, checked in the Far East, must 
inevitably be turned towards the Balkans and Con- 
stantinople, and in this quarter Russian ambitions 
conflicted with Germany's purpose of controlling a 
sweep of territory extending from the North Sea to 
the Persian Gulf. It was unthinkable that the interests 
of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism should not clash 
in the Near East. 

The settlement of the Anglo-Russian feud was also 
facilitated by the example of the Entente Cordiale, 
which demonstrated the ease with which a long- 
standing and bitter rivalry might be terminated. 
The arrangement of the dispute which had arisen 
between England and Russia over the Dogger Bank 
incident, further proved that there was no serious 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 161 

reason why the two nations should not proceed to a 
general settlement of their differences. 

Almost immediately after the conclusion of the 
Japanese War the press of both countries assumed 
a cordial tone and the new Foreign Ministers, Sir 
Edward. Grey in England and Isvolsky in Russia, 
demonstrated their firm determination to bring about 
an understanding. 22 For the discussion of bases of 
agreement the Conference of Algeciras, in 1906, 
furnished an excellent opportunity, and the Eussian 
and British plenipotentiaries held long conversations, 
which served materially to clear the ground for 
definite negotiations. 23 In March, 1907, a semi-official 
note announced the carrying on of negotiations by the 
two Governments and the prospect of speedy success. 
Finally, on August 31, 1907, the convention was 
signed. 24 

It dealt with the one quarter in which the interests 
of the two nations might conceivably clash, Central 
Asia. Persia, into which Russian influence had 
steadily penetrated during the previous decade, was 
divided into three zones of influence: a British one 
to the southeast, a Russian to the north, and a sort of 
neutral zone between. Arrangements were also made 
to provide for financial reform and control in Persia, 
in which the British and Russian Governments were 
to act together. In Afghanistan, the preponderant 
influence of Great Britain was recognized, and Russia 
gave up her right of sending diplomatic agents to 
Cabul. Great Britain was to maintain commercial 

22 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 239-240. 

23 Tardieu, La Conference d'Algesiras, 284. 

24Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik, 288-296; Tardieu, 
France and the Alliances, 242-253. 



162 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

liberty and the political status quo. Both nations 
recognized the territorial integrity of Thibet and the 
suzerainty of China over that province, and agreed 
not to interfere with the domestic concerns of Thibet 
or attempt to secure special concessions. 

The Anglo-Kussian understanding of 1907 was 
important as providing a modus Vivendi for Great 
Britain and Eussia in the Central East, which had 
long been a breeder of trouble. It was still more 
important as a general settlement of the ancient 
quarrel between the two countries, and, regarded as 
a complement to the Anglo-French Entente, forms the 
final phase of the diplomatic revolution. Taken in 
conjunction with the conventions signed in June and 
July, 1907, between France and Japan, and Eussia 
and Japan, respectively, it made an essential part of 
a system of arrangements which tended to remove 
all risk of complications arising from an Asiatic 
conflict. It was fortified a few months later by the 
understanding reached by England and Eussia in 
1908 relative to Near Eastern affairs. 25 The three 
Powers, Great Britain, France, and Eussia, were thus 
united in an entente of less solidity than a hard and 
fast alliance, but possibly of equal diplomatic value. 
France and Eussia were bound by the Dual Alliance 
of 1891 ; France and Great Britain by the Entente of 
1904; Great Britain and Eussia by the Convention 
of 1907. The permanent character of the Triple 
Entente that resulted, was enhanced by the under- 
standing reached in 1907 between the ally of Great 
Britain, Japan, and France and Eussia. 28 

25 Pinon, L'Europe et I'Empire Ottoman, 183. 

28 Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 304; Tardieu, France 
and the Alliances, 230-237. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 163 

The international situation in 1907 was thus far 
different from that of 1898, when Delcasse entered 
the French Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
In that year Germany still held the position of primacy 
in continental diplomacy which had been won by 
Bismarck and maintained by William II. France and 
Russia had allowed themselves to undergo the domi- 
nation of German influence to such an extent that the 
effect of their Dual Alliance was practically nullified. 
In response to German suggestions France had 
apparently forgotten the gap in the Vosges and was 
busily devoting herself to extra-European interests; 
she was paralyzed by her rivalry with Great Britain. 
Russia had been quietly directed to the East where 
she was working hand in hand with Germany. Eng- 
land so far as her relations with continental nations 
extended was on the worst possible terms with both 
France and Russia; with Germany she was on the 
best of terms, British statesmen were talking of an 
Anglo-German alliance, and in the British Foreign 
Secretary Germany saw her best friend. ' ' There was 
left for Germany the simple task of sitting peacefully 
on her bulging coffers, while her merchants captured 
the trade of England and her diplomatists guided the 
diplomatists of England into perpetual bickerings 
with other countries." 27 

In 1907 it seemed like a different Europe. For the 
scene had changed abruptly from that moment in 1898 
when the tension between France and Great Britain 
had been so great that it seemed as if it could no longer 
last without a war. The appearance of Delcasse and 
the foresight of British statesmen had ruined the 
position of Germany. For a moment, in 1898, France 

27 Saturday Review, September 11, 1897. 



164 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

and England had stood "silent and face to face, 
blinking in the new light that illuminated the dread 
cross-roads of Fashoda and Ladysmith. Simultane- 
ously they saw the sardonic grin and heard the 
triumphant chuckle of Germany. France and England 
were face to face like birds in a cock pit, while Europe, 
under German leadership, was fastening their spurs 
and impatient to see them fight to the death. Then 
suddenly they both raised their heads and moved back 
to the fence. They had decided not to fight and the 
face of European things was changed.'" 8 

France by the settlement of her traditional quarrel 
with Great Britain, coming after the reconciliation 
with Italy, had taken a long step towards emancipating 
herself from German influence. Russia, having tasted 
the perils of the East, had begun once again to direct 
her attention to European problems ; it was certain, in 
view of the necessary rivalry with Austria, that she 
should oppose the ally of Austria. Most important 
of all, Great Britain had frankly entered the field of 
continental diplomacy and on the side opposed to 
Germany. She had sunk her differences with France 
and Russia, and had formed a diplomatic combination 
with them which seemed likely to prove a factor of 
the utmost importance in the future. 

It is true that the various conventions that settled 
so many national quarrels were not aimed directly 
against Germany, although the fear of German 
domination had unquestionably played an important 
part in the conclusion of the understandings. But 
if they were not designed to isolate Germany and 
could not be said to manifest openly hostile intentions, 
they restored the balance of power that had been 

28 Fullerton, Problems of Power, 56-57. 



THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 165 

destroyed by the Treaty of Frankfort and the con- 
clusion of the Triple Alliance. Germany could no 
longer dominate Europe by means of the diplomatic 
feuds that had existed between Italy and France, 
France and Great Britain, and Great Britain and 
Russia. The Bismarckian system had passed and the 
European equilibrium was restored. It remained to 
be seen whether or not Germany would accept the 
new international situation that resulted from the 
diplomatic revolution. 



CHAPTEE VIII 
THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 

The effect upon German foreign policy of the 
diplomatic combinations and understandings that took 
place from 1898 to 1907 was immediate and violent. 
It was inevitable that the retirement of Great Britain 
from her position of splendid isolation so favorable 
to the German position on the Continent, should be 
a cause of anxiety at Berlin. It is true that the 
British understanding with France was at first not 
taken too seriously, but it indicated future difficulties 
for the German Foreign Office; and the Convention 
of 1907 with Russia placed further obstacles in the 
path of German diplomacy. Equally significant, in 
the minds of Germans, as a sign of the growing 
opposition to Germany was the new spirit of initiative 
manifested in French diplomacy. The altered inter- 
national situation, suddenly realized by Germany, led 
that Power to change its tone from one of conciliation 
to one of bellicose brutality, and resulted in the atmos- 
phere of diplomatic tension characteristic of Europe 
during the past decade. 

We may remind ourselves that German foreign 
policy from 1870 to 1900 was essentially pacific in 
character. Bismarck was undoubtedly sincere when 
he emphasized the "satiation" of Germany and the 
necessity for her of a period of unruffled international 
calm. The Kaiser Wilhelm II also, despite his 



THE CONFLICT OP ALLIANCES 167 

unguarded statements that seemed to indicate an 
aggressive spirit, worked constantly for peace. Peace 
was necessary for the economic development of Ger- 
many, for the extension of German commerce, and for 
the unhampered building up of the navy that was to 
assure to Germany her position in the world at large. 
Nor did the aggressive attitude that began to be 
characteristic of the German people, find, previous to 
1904, a reflection in Germany's official diplomatic tone. 
But in the minds of both Bismarck and the Kaiser 
there was another condition of still greater importance 
for Germany than peace, namely, that German prestige 
on the Continent, first secured by the victory of 1870, 
should be constantly maintained. This was always the 
great preoccupation of the Kaiser, and was regarded 
by him and by his ministers as the sine qua non of 
Germany's further development as a world power. 

Until 1900 German prestige was successfully main- 
tained. Largely by methods of moral suasion in 
dealing with France and Eussia, Germany retained 
her hegemony on the Continent and preserved intact 
the position that Bismarck had bequeathed to the 
Kaiser. The German eagle could afford to pose as 
the dove of peace: there was no need for threats or 
violence, since the rest of Europe complaisantly 
accepted her sway. 

But the opening years of the twentieth century 
forced Germany to the conclusion that a continuation 
of her pacific policy was impossible. One of the most 
important factors in the German position of supremacy 
was the incapacity of France to practice or even 
conceive a policy of action. The principle of French 
passivity seemed to Germans the surest guarantee of 
German continental power, especially when taken in 



168 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

conjunction with the Anglo-French fend. So long as 
Germany could count upon British friendship towards 
herself and hatred towards France, and thus upon 
French weakness, her position was ensured. But the 
Entente Cordiale of 1904 proved not only that Great 
Britain was coming to regard Germany as a Power 
that must be watched, but also that France was 
assuming a new attitude and one that could not fail 
to arouse the fears of the Kaiser. The understanding 
with Great Britain seemed in itself like a claim on the 
part of France to independence of action such as 
Germany could not tolerate ; and it appeared the more 
dangerous as being but one of many indications that 
France was conceiving a policy of initiative. In quick 
succession France had come to an understanding, first 
with Italy, then with Great Britain, then with Spain ; 
and each of these Powers had guaranteed the new 
French policy of colonial development. 

There was naturally something disquieting to Ger- 
many in these conventions concluded between other 
nations, delimiting colonial interests at the very 
moment when Germany herself was indulging in 
dreams of empire overseas. But the uneasiness of the 
German diplomats was at bottom caused by the fear 
that German control of continental diplomacy was 
vanishing. Europe was organizing herself without 
the permission of the Kaiser, perhaps against him. 
France, so long passive, was beginning to assume 
diplomatic autonomy, weakening the practical force 
of the Triple Alliance by her understanding with Italy, 
threatening to become formidable by her combination 
with England. Germany was suddenly seized with 
the nightmare that Europe was escaping from her 
grasp ; it was time to strike a blow for German prestige, 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 169 

to show the world that no affair could proceed without 
Germany's participation and seal of approval. The 
diplomatic control she had so long exercised by moral 
suasion must be maintained by more active measures 
if necessary. The German eagle that had so long posed 
as the dove of peace must ruffle its feathers and 
unsheathe its talons. 

The necessity of preserving German prestige by all 
effective means was recognized by even the firmest 
adherents to the cause of peace. For without the firm 
basis of German hegemony on the Continent, the 
projected world empire, even if it became a Colossus, 
would have "feet of clay." Von Biilow, who is by 
no means a fire-eater, emphasized this point: "Our 
world policy is based upon the successes of our 
European policy. The moment the firm foundation 
constituted by Germany's position as a great European 
Power begins to totter the whole fabric of our world 
policy will collapse ... it is unthinkable that a 
sensible diminution of power and influence in Europe 
would leave our position in international politics 
unshaken. We can only pursue our world policy on 
the basis of our European policy . . . The new era 
must be rooted in the traditions of the old. ' n 

It is this principle that to a large extent determined 
the threatening and bellicose tone of German diplo- 
macy during the years that followed the Anglo-French 
Entente of 1904. Germany was consumed with the 

iVon Biilow, Imperial Germany, 48. Tardieu points out (Questions 
Actuelles de Politique Etrange~re, 1911, 70-71) that in the eight hundred 
public speeches of the Kaiser there is always to be found the same idea: 
that Germany must preserve the material and moral position acquired 
in 1871. "We would sacrifice our eighteen army corps," said the 
Kaiser in 1888, "and our forty-two millions of inhabitants rather than 
let one stone fall of the edifice raised by William I." 



170 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAE 

fear that her position on the Continent was being 
shaken by the new combinations ; she was unalterably 
convinced of the necessity of maintaining that position. 
Three distinct blows were struck for the maintenance 
of German prestige, and at intervals of three years. 
The first was in 1905 in Morocco. The second was in 
1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The third was in 1911 when the gunboat Panther was 
sent to Agadir on the African coast. It was a similar 
attempt to strike a blow for German prestige, after 
another interval of three years in 1914, that was largely 
accountable for the outbreak of the general war. In 
each of the crises that resulted, the colonial and 
commercial interests of Germany played an important 
part in determining her action; the vital motive, 
however, was her desire to reinforce her prestige at 
all costs. The crises were Machtfragen — trials of 
strength — to decide whether or not Germany was to 
maintain her position of continental dictatorship. 

It was becoming clear early in 1904 that Germany 
was meditating some coup de force that would enable 
her to assert her authority and put an end to the new 
French policy of initiative, at the same time that it 
demonstrated the hollowness of the new friendships 
of France. It is true that German diplomats rather 
ostentatiously proclaimed their indifference to the 
establishment of the Anglo-French Entente and to the 
French policy of expansion in Morocco. 2 But it was 
possible to deduce from the language of the Kaiser 

2 Von Biilow had taken the Franco-Italian reconciliation lightly: 
"We have no gable front on the Mediterranean; we are pleased to see 
that France and Italy, who each have important interests there, have 
come to an understanding on the question." On April 4, 1904, com- 
menting on the Entente Cordiale, he said: "We have nothing to 
object to in it from the point of view of German interests.' ' The 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 171 

that these developments were producing a profound 
discontent at Berlin. Three weeks after the conclusion 
of the Franco-English Accord the Kaiser, speaking 
at Karlsruhe said : ' ' Let us think of the great epoch 
when German unity was created, of the combats of 
Woerth, Weissenberg, and Sedan. Present events 
invite us to forget our domestic discords. Let us be 
united in preparation for the occasion when we may- 
be constrained to intervene in the policy of the world." 
And three days later, when dedicating a bridge at 
Mainz, and when no military allusion was apt to the 
occasion, he said: "This bridge, designed to develop 
pacific relations, may have to serve for more serious 
purposes." Such language was far removed from the 
tone used by the Kaiser only some few months pre- 
viously, when he ' * rendered homage to the adversaries 
of 1871. "■ 

For ten months, however, his menacing words were 
not translated into action. The moment was favorable 
for the striking of a blow so far as France was con- 
cerned, for the Combes Ministry seemed to be at the 
mercy of socialists and pacifists ; and as Germany well 
knew,T)elcasse in his development of an active colonial 
policy had not seen to it that the military and naval 
resources so necessary to such a policy, were equally 
developed.' France was in no position to resist any 
strong demand made by Germany. From England, 
little was to be feared; the Conservatives had been 
losing steadily at every bye-election and the advent 

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (semi-official) said on March 25: 
"There is no need, so far as Germans are concerned, to take umbrage 
at the Franco-English understanding which is at present in force," 
French Yellow Book, "Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905." 

3 Tardieu, ' ' La Politique Exteneure de 1 'Allemagne, ' ' in Questions 
Actuelles de Politique Etrangere, 1911, 85. 



172 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

of the Liberals was already foreshadowed. Germany- 
did not believe that France would receive effective 
assistance from such men as Campbell-Bannerman and 
Lloyd George. But before acting, Germany must be 
sure of the position of Russia, France's ally. The war 
with Japan was still indecisive in the spring of 1904, 
and Germany must wait until the exact situation 
denned itself. In September the Russian armies 
underwent their first check at Liao-Yang, and in 
March, 1905, they were definitely crushed at Mukden. 
It was the moment for Germany to act. 

The blow was struck in Morocco, on March 31, 1905, 
when the Kaiser disembarked at Tangier and declared 
himself ready to support the Sultan in the maintenance 
of his complete independence. In language that hardly 
veiled a threat he referred to the efforts of the French 
to secure a monopoly and to their hopes of annexation ; 
he insisted that their policy must be blocked. 4 It was 
a declaration of diplomatic war, for the acceptance of 
Germany's veto on French expansion in Morocco 
meant the crumbling of Delcasse's whole policy, the 
renunciation of the new French attitude of diplomatic 
independence, and the demonstration of the practical 
uselessness of the Entente Cordiale. As such a 
declaration rather than as an aspect of a colonial 
question, the action of the Kaiser was regarded by 
the more acute minds in both Germany and France. 6 

To give force to the intended humiliation of France, 

4 The Kaiser 'a speech is printed in Gauss, The German Emperor as 
shown in his Public Utterances, 242. See also Eeventlow, Deutschlands 
auswdrtige Politik, 254-265. 

5 Tardieu reports a personal conversation with von Biilow (France 
and the Alliances, 190) in which the German Chancellor made it plain 
that the Kaiser's Moroccan policy resulted from general diplomatic 
motives rather than from commercial ambitions: "In the incidents 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 173 

Germany further insisted upon two points: an inter- 
national conference was to be called to settle the 
questions at issue, and the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs was to present his resignation. In other words 
France must appear before the court of Europe to 
answer for her actions, a humiliation which later, in 
1908 and 1914, Germany declared to be impossible for 
the national honor of Austria, and Delcasse, the 
personification of the new French policy, must be 
dismissed. On the latter point the personal repre- 
sentative of the Kaiser spoke in no uncertain language : 
"We are not concerned with M. Delcasse 's person, but 
his policy is a menace to Germany and you may rest 
assured that we shall not wait for it to be realized. . . . 
If you are of opinion that your Minister of Foreign 
Affairs has engaged your country in too adventurous 
a course, acknowledge it by dispensing with his services 
and especially by giving a new direction to your 
foreign policy. . . . Give up the minister whose only 
aspiration is to trouble the peace of Europe, and adopt 
with regard to Germany a loyal and open policy, the 
only one which is worthy of a great nation like yours, 
if you wish to preserve the peace of the world." 8 

which have arisen during the past six months or so there are two dis- 
tinct things to consider. Morocco is the first; general policy is the 
second. In Morocco we have important commercial interests: we 
intended and we still intend to safeguard them. 

"In a more general way we were obliged to reply to a policy which 
threatened to isolate us and which in consequence of this avowed aim 
assumed a distinctly hostile character with regard to us. The Moroccan 
affair was the most recent and most clearly manifested example of such 
policy. It furnished us with an opportunity to make a necessary retort 
(riposte)." Cf. also Eachfahl, Kaiser und Beich, 233. 

o Interview given by Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck and published 
by the Gaulois, June, 1905, cited by Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 
183. 



174 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

The immediate success of Germany was complete, 
for the French Government yielded everything. Con- 
scious of her military weakness and of the prostration 
of her ally, Russia, France was in no state to resist. 
Delcasse left the ministry and the French Government 
agreed to the calling of an international conference 
that would take up the whole Moroccan question. The 
humiliation of France was absolute, and Germany 
made it plain to the world that her claim to the diplo- 
matic mastery of Europe was no mere academic 
formula, but as much a reality under William II as 
in the days of Bismarck. 7 

The victory of Germany, however, was only tem- 
porary. When the Conference of Algeciras met, 
before which Germany had hoped to register the 
principle that no country could act without German 
consent, she found that she could by no means impose 
her absolute will upon the other Powers. During the 
six months that had elapsed, the international situation 
had changed essentially. France had spent large 
sums upon ammunition, equipment, and railways; if 
pushed too far she was capable of fighting. Russia 
had signed peace with Japan, and despite the chaotic 
condition of her finances and domestic politics, was 
able to bring invaluable diplomatic assistance to 
France. And England had had time not merely to 
realize the immensity of the danger that threatened 
from Germany, but to draw up military plans in case 
Germany should push the matter to war. Further- 
more, it soon became apparent that Italy would not 
play the role of second which Germany had counted 
upon. Without denying the value of the Triple 
Alliance to her policy, she soon made it plain that she 

7 Pinon, France et Allemagne, 152-167. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 175 

would not sacrifice her understandings with France 
and with England at the behest of Germany. Even 
Austria, although she was later to receive the personal 
thanks of the German Kaiser for her assistance, 
adopted at times an independent attitude and by no 
means played the part of German agent. 

The result was that the essential demands of Ger- 
many were refused by the Conference of Algeciras and 
the approval of Europe was practically granted to the 
French policy of expansion. All the vital interests 
of France in Morocco were safeguarded by the powers 
of policing North Africa that were given her in 
conjunction with Spain. On none of the crucial issues 
discussed during the Conference, did Germany receive 
the support of the other Powers. 8 

The effect of the humiliation imposed upon France 
in 1905 was not entirely effaced by the setback to 
German policy administered by the Conference of 
Algeciras in the following year. The striking effect 
of the German threats was not forgotten and the 
prestige won by Germany was not entirely dimmed. 
Nevertheless the real failure of Germany to maintain 
her success in 1906 was generally recognized by the 
German press. The Kaiser had brought France before 
the court of Europe, but he had not succeeded in 
putting a stop to French expansion; the Entente 
Cordiale with England had not been dissolved, but 
had rather acquired weight; "it had changed from 
the static to the dynamic condition." 9 And by a 
curious irony, Germany in demanding the Conference 

s Berard, L' Affaire Marocaine; Tardieu, La Conference d'Algesiras; 
Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politilc, 265-280; Annual Register, 
1906, 304. 

» Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 204. 



176 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

of Algeciras had brought English and Russian repre- 
sentatives together upon a common ground, and thus 
paved the way for the Anglo-Eussian Accord of 1907. 10 

We have already remarked that one of the chief 
qualities of William II is his capacity for making the 
best of an unpleasant situation. This self-restraint 
he exercised admirably during the months that 
followed the Moroccan crisis. The utmost care was 
taken to indicate Germany's entire satisfaction with 
the results of the Conference, and an utter indiffer- 
ence to the understandings into which France had 
entered. With an almost suspicious vehemence von 
Biilow disclaimed any idea of attempting to cause a 
rupture of the newly formed friendship between 
France and Great Britain. 11 For the moment, French 
expansion in Morocco, despite the wails of the Pan- 
Germanists, was regarded with equanimity. All that 
Germany had striven to demolish in 1905 she proceeded 
to accept in a spirit of the utmost good-nature. 

But it was not to be expected that Germany would 
definitely accept the check placed upon her diplomatic 
position. The chief aim of the Kaiser had always 
been to preserve the situation which Bismarck had 
bequeathed to him. The new combinations that had 

loTardieu, La Conference d'Algesiras, 284. 

11 "We have no thought of attempting to separate France and Eng- 
land. We have absolutely no idea of attempting to disturb the friendship 
of the western Powers. The Franco -Eussian Alliance has never proved 
a menace to peace; on the contrary it has acted like a weight which 
regulated the smooth working of the clock of the world. We hope that 
the same thing can be said of the Franco-English entente. Cordial 
relations between Germany and Eussia have not in any way disturbed 
the Franco-Eussian alliance; cordial relations between Germany and 
England are in perfect consonance with the entente, if the latter com- 
bination follows pacific purposes," Speech in Eeichstag, November 14, 
1906. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 177 

grown up since 1900 disturbed that situation, and he 
was not likely to neglect any opportunity of restoring 
it. Nor was his determination weakened by the 
Anglo-Russian understanding which, as we saw, was 
arranged in 1907 and which seemed to indicate more 
clearly than ever the termination of German diplo- 
matic supremacy. In the Bosnian crisis of 1908 
Germany believed that she had the opportunity for 
which she sought, and once again struck a blow for 
the rehabilitation of her prestige. 

The origin of this crisis dates back to the Congress 
of Berlin in 1878. It will be remembered that after 
the Turkish defeats suffered in the war against Russia, 
the Treaty of San Stefano parcelled out among the 
Balkan States the greater part of Turkey in Europe. 
But England and Austria, fearing the predominance 
of Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula, combined 
to prevent the proposed arrangement from going into 
effect. The revised treaty, signed at Berlin, July 13, 
1878, left a large part of the peninsula in the hands 
of Turkey and tended to offset the advance of Russian 
influence in that quarter by granting the administra- 
tion of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina to Austria. It also authorized Austrian troops 
to occupy the district of Novi Bazar, which separates 
Montenegro from Serbia. 12 

During the generation which followed the Treaty 
of Berlin, Austria busied herself in reducing the two 
provinces to order, and worked constantly in the hope 
of definitely subjecting them to Hapsburg rule. 
Because of the large number of malcontent Slavs 
with which the provinces were peopled, the immediate 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not desir- 

12 Supra, Chap. II. 



178 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

able; but they opened a pathway to the Adriatic and 
it was of importance that they should not be taken 
over by Serbia nor complete sovereignty be reassumed 
by Turkey. In view of the nationalist spirit of the 
Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Serbia, if she 
should win the provinces, would threaten the peace 
and integrity of Austria, as well as her political and 
economic influence in the peninsula. It was essential 
that Turkey should not resume her rights in Bosnia, 
for despite the friendship of the Teutonic Powers with 
the Porte, Turkish policy was not to be entirely 
trusted. 13 

. In 1908 came the Young Turk Eevolution, which led 
Austria to a fateful step. The Young Turks aimed 
above everything at a regeneration of their country's 
foreign policy and especially at a strengthening of 
Turkish power in the Balkans. Austria and Germany 
favored a strong government at Constantinople, since 
Turkey was guarding the Dardanelles in their interests. 
But a Turkey predominant in the whole Balkan 
Peninsula was undesirable, for it would threaten 
Austria's road to the Adriatic and .ZEgean. Further- 
more it seemed likely that the Young Turks would not 
hesitate to demand the termination of Austrian 
administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the 
provinces legally belonged to Turkey, and if the 
new Government could prove its capacity, the Porte 
would have every right again to assume direct 
administration over them. 14 

Under the circumstances, Austria decided to antici- 

13 Jaray, "La Question d 'Autriche-Hongrie, ' ' in Questions Actuelles 
de Politique Etr anger e, 1911, 109-171. 

i* Pinon, L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie, 149-193; Eeventlow, 
Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 311, sq. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 179 

pate any action on the part of Turkey, and determined 
to tear up the Treaty of Berlin. Without consulting 
the other signatories of the treaty, the Austrian 
Government, on October 3, 1908, proclaimed the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 15 It was the 
official declaration of Treitschke's doctrine that inter- 
national treaties need not be considered binding when 
they conflict with the higher political interests of the 
State. 

Austria's action was directed most obviously against 
Turkey and at once brought forth a strong protest 
from the Porte as well as retaliatory measures which 
culminated in a general boycott of Austrian goods. 
The annexation was also a blow to Serbia and more 
generally to Slavic interests in the Balkans. To 
Russia, guardian of the Slavs, it was a direct affront 
and one that could not be disregarded. From St. 
Petersburg came a protest, cautious in language but 
clear in its firmness, setting forth the international 
bearing of the question and demanding that it should 
be laid before a European congress, as had been done 
in the case of the Moroccan question in 1905. To the 
protest of Russia was added that of France and 
England. 16 

But Russia's capacity for enforcing her protest was 
regarded by Austria with contempt. Russian military 
resources had been shattered by the disasters in 

15 Annual Eegister, 1908, 309-310; Moulin et de Messin, Vne Annie 
de Politique Exterieure; Printa, "La Bosnie et 1 'Herzegovine, ' ' in 
Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, February 16, 1909; Reventlow, 
op. cit., 324; Sosnosky, Die BalJcanpolitih Oesterreich-Ungarns, 151; for 
Aerenthal's policy, see Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 224-230. 

is Annual Register, 1908, 323; 1909, 314, 326; Pinon, L'Europe et la 
Jeune Turquie, 203-214; Singer, Geschichte des Dreibundes, 180; 
Sosnosky, Die BalkanpolitiJc Oesterreich-Ungarns, 156-170. 



180 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Manchuria, and the weight of her opinion in inter- 
national affairs was shaken by the political chaos that 
had resulted from the internal revolution of 1905. 
The financial disorganization of Russia had prevented 
the outlay of sums necessary for the development of 
her military power, and it seemed improbable that 
she would have the courage or the foolhardiness to 
resort to arms. It is certain that Russian weakness 
was taken into consideration by Austria before she 
embarked upon her aggressive course of action; as 
a French publicist remarked, "The annexation of 
Bosnia was the direct corollary to the battle of 
Mukden." 17 

Hence it was that the demand for a congress made 
by Russia was evaded by Austria: the latter Power 
was willing that a congress should be held, but the 
annexation of the provinces must first be considered 
a fait accompli. 19 The congress might be allowed to 
register and approve the action taken by Austria, but 
it was not to discuss it. For the moment, Russia, 
supported by France and England, held firm, and the 
crisis assumed a more serious aspect. Instead of a 
local phase of the Near Eastern question, it suddenly 
became a matter of European concern, and very 
clearly began to appear as a conflict between the 
Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. 19 

The moment the crisis was transported to the broad 
field of continental diplomacy, Germany realized that 
in it was to be found a second occasion for a manifes- 
tation of German prestige. 20 It was all the more 

m Paul Deschanel, lecture, 1909. 

18 Pinon, L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie, 203, 208. 

is Tardieu, Le Prince de Billow, 199, sq. 

20 See the speech of von Biilow in the Keichstag, March 29, 1909. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 181 

opportune in that Germany was desirous of humilia- 
ting Russia, as a punishment for her understanding 
of 1907 with England. France had been taught in 
1905 that she could not assert her diplomatic inde- 
pendence with impunity, and a similar lesson admin- 
istered to Russia would not be amiss. Furthermore, 
Germany's diplomatic temper was ruffled over the 
Casablanca incident, when certain German deserters 
from the French Foreign Legion had been arrested 
by France, and no apology satisfactory to German 
pride subsequently offered. 21 German political and 
economic interests, also, coincided in this instance 
with those of Austria, and the Balkan policy of the 
latter Power received Germany's cordial approval. 
But even if that had not been so, the larger diplomatic 
interests of Germany would have impelled her to 
support her ally with all her resources. 

The result was that when the Entente Powers 
showed themselves persistent in the demand for a 
congress, they were briefly notified of Germany's 
determination that there should be no congress until 
the annexation of Bosnia was first recognized as 
an accomplished fact. Their surrender meant the 
humiliation of Russia, the exaltation of German 
prestige, and a serious defeat for the Triple Entente 
in the second year of its existence. Nevertheless when 
the German sword rattled in its sheath they refused 
to accept the risk of a settlement by force of arms. 
France and England, seeing in the crisis merely an 
issue of the Eastern question, and not considering its 
broader bearing, would not imperil themselves for the 
sake of Russia. And the latter Power, weakly sup- 

21 Annual 'Register, 1908, 298-299; Pinon, France et Allemagne, 184; 
Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 308. 



182 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

ported and in no condition for a war, did not dare 
face Austria and her ally, the latter, as the Kaiser 
said, appearing "in shining armor." The annexation 
was recognized by the Powers that had signed the 
Treaty of Berlin, Serbian protests were unheeded, 
and Turkey was mollified by pecuniary compensation. 22 

The success of Austrian aggression supported by 
German threats apparently fortified the prestige of 
the Teutonic Powers as fully as they could have 
desired. Every point in the German policy seemed 
to have been gained. German and Austrian commer- 
cial and political interests in the Near East were 
ensured, and the alienation of Turkey, which was 
threatened for the moment, was avoided. It is true 
that a rift in the Triple Alliance was foreshadowed 
by Italy's discomfiture at the annexation of Bosnia; 
but this was more than offset by the incapacity or 
unwillingness of the Triple Entente to take common 
action. Russia's weakness was made manifest by the 
deep humiliation which she had been forced to 
undergo, and the rising tide of Pan-Slavism had 
received a very obvious check. Most important of all, 
Germany, by her simple statement that she would 
support Austria in her high-handed action, had 
imposed her will upon Europe. The hegemony of 
Germany in Europe was reestablished. 

For a year or more German diplomats seemed to 
be confident that the European revolt against the 
German overlordship had collapsed. The triumph 
of 1908 appeared to them to be conclusive. Germany 
had no further need of insisting upon her position, 

22 Annual Register, 1909, 311; Pinon, L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie, 
229-231; von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 50-61. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 183 

and for a period her tone became almost one of 
benevolence. By the accord of February 8, 1909, she 
recognized the exceptional position of France in 
Morocco and admitted that the political interests of 
the French in that quarter gave her special rights. 23 
Having established the fact that she possessed the 
controlling voice in European councils, Germany 
seemed inclined to allow her opponents to go ahead 
about as they pleased. 

In another quarter Germany apparently reinsured 
her diplomatic position by her accord of 1910 with 
Russia. The result of the Bosnian crisis had been 
a humiliation for Russia and a set-back to Russian 
interests. But the skill of the Kaiser, who had 
inflicted that humiliation seemed to be sufficient to 
alleviate the rancour of the Tsar. In November, 1910, 
Nicholas visited William at Potsdam and after dis- 
cussing international affairs apparently came to a 
complete reconciliation. He agreed that Russia should 
not oppose the Bagdad Railway scheme and even 
promised to link up the railway with Persian lines. 
Germany, on her side, agreed to recognize that Russia 
had special interests in Persia. The German and 
Russian Governments further agreed that each would 
enter into no engagement that might prove unfavor- 
able to the interests of the other. 24 Thus Germany 
not merely won a diplomatic triumph in 1908 and 
weakened the Triple Entente, but by this special 

23 Annual Register, 1908, 296; 1909, 310-311; Pinon, France et 
Allemagne, 185-187; Tardieu, Le Mystere d'Agadir, 1-25; Morel, 
Morocco in Diplomacy, Chap. X. 

24 Pinon, L' Europe et la Jeune Turquie, 243-250; Eeventlow, 
Deutschlands auswartige Politilc, 367-369; Raehfahl, Kaiser und Beich, 
331-332. 



184 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

agreement with Eussia seemed to have completely- 
emasculated it. 25 

The triumph of 1908, however, like the Potsdam 
Accord of 1910, did not permanently satisfy German 
diplomats, and early in 1911 the German Foreign 
Office began to consider the advisability of reinforcing 
their prestige by another victory. Eussia no longer 
threatened directly, but on the other side, France was 
displaying an attitude not dissimilar to that which had 
resulted in the first conflict of 1905. In December, 
1910, an influential French writer declared, with the 
approval of a cabinet minister, that Germany had 
failed in her attempt to preserve her continental 
supremacy, and expressed confidence that she would 
not draw the sword to regain it. 26 Such was not the 
attitude liked by Germany. 

Again, in March, 1911, Delcasse was recalled to the 
Ministry, and his mere official reappearance seemed 
to indicate that France was minded again to embark 
upon her aggressive and adventurous course. Such 
fears on the part of Germany were largely justified 
by the trend of events. Taking advantage of a Berber 
revolt, a French army entered Morocco in April, and 
on May 21, took possession of the capital, Fez. The 
Sultan of Morocco, threatened by his brother, who 
assumed the role of pretender, saw himself forced to 
accept the protection of the French. It was the end 
of Moroccan independence. 27 

Germany had only slight economic interests in 
Morocco, and she had admitted that she possessed no 

25 La Sevue des Questions diplomatiques, January, June, 1911. 

26 Tardieu, in Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangere, 1911, 98. 
2?Keventlow, op. cit., 349, sq.; Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 

75-77; Picquet, Campagnes d'Afrique, 290, sq. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 185 

political interests at all in that quarter. But she could 
not allow France to proceed unhindered, if she cared to 
maintain the principle that the German seal of approval 
must be secured before France took up a policy of 
initiative. And that principle was believed at Berlin 
to be as all-important in 1911 as it had been in 1905. 

Furthermore the moment was propitious for another 
diplomatic success. The Government in France was 
weakened by domestic difficulties and could not be 
expected to take a strong position on foreign affairs 
at the moment when it was harassed by opposing fac- 
tions. On June 23, the parliamentary crisis came to a 
head and the Monis Cabinet was overthrown. To it 
succeeded one led by Caillaux, who was known as a 
skillful financier and expert politician, but whose 
capacity in dealing with foreign questions was as little 
known as were his sentiments. At the Foreign Office 
appeared de Selves, well considered as an adminis- 
trative official, but who lacked the experience and 
special knowledge in diplomatic matters such as would 
enable him to guide France triumphantly through a 
delicate international situation. Delcasse, it is true, 
was in the new Ministry, but merely as Minister of 
Marine, and his influence on Caillaux in matters of 
foreign policy seems to have been discounted. The 
industrial situation in France, also, was believed to 
preclude the possibility of a strong attitude on the 
part of France in the face of the projected action of 
Germany. The great railway strike had been termi- 
nated with difficulty, and had resulted in acts of 
sabotage, which to German minds must have appeared 
immediate precursors of an internal revolution. 28 

From Great Britain, Germany believed that she had 

28 Annual Register, 1911, 301-311; Albin, Le Coup d'Agadir, 7, sq. 



186 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

nothing to fear. The Government, in which the 
supposed pacifist, Lloyd George, exercised prepon- 
derating influence, appeared to have little interest in 
foreign questions. British policy seemed to have 
become a "policy of parochialism. The Imperial 
Idea seemed to have vanished from the brains of 
British politicians." 29 The British Empire was 
apparently falling apart, and the suggested reci- 
procity of Canada with the United States looked like 
the first step in the process of dissolution. On May 
18, Haldane said, "We are going to leave . . . the 
British Empire to hold together by bonds of sym- 
pathy. ' ,3 ° In such a spirit as that, Germans could see 
no possible danger of British interference on the 
Continent. 

Furthermore, the industrial discontent in England, 
as in France, had culminated in a gigantic strike, and 
the inability of the Liberal Government to control its 
own political allies, seemed to Germany the clearest 
manifestation of weakness. The country was torn by 
the question of Home Rule, and the political situation 
was marked by a constitutional crisis which surpassed 
in importance and danger anything that England had 
seen since 1832. 

Doubtless German diplomats were of the opinion 
that a better opportunity for disrupting the Triple 
Entente would never again present itself. Russia 
they believed to be wavering in her allegiance to the 
combination, and if the German blow were delivered 
in Morocco, she would probably take small interest 
in a dispute over an African province. France might 
be brought to perceive the futile character of her 

29 Fullerton, Problems of Power, 178. 

30 Speech in House of Lords, May 18, 1911. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 187 

understanding with England, and, if bribes were 
judiciously mingled with the German threats, might 
be again drawn into the orbit of German influence. 
England, immersed in domestic difficulties, would be 
again isolated. A German victory under the circum- 
stances would almost certainly result in a revival of 
the conditions that had existed from 1891 to 1900, 
when German diplomacy was supreme. 

At the moment when it was least expected, Germany 
struck her blow. At noon of July 1, 1911, the German 
Ambassador to France called upon M. de Selves and 
informed him that disturbances in Morocco threatened 
the interests and lives of German citizens, and that 
to give them protection the German gunboat Panther 
had been despatched to the port of Agadir. The 
meaning of the action was clear, namely, that France 
must cease her policy of expansion until such time 
as she had given satisfaction to Germany and received 
German approval. 31 

The peril of German traders in Morocco was 
obviously a pretext. Agadir was a town that had 
never been opened to foreign commerce and where 
Europeans entered at their peril; if Germans risked 
their lives by going there it was their own fault. 
Furthermore, German trade in Morocco was so small 
as hardly to warrant such brusque action on the part 
of the German Government ; the total sum of German 
commerce in that quarter could hardly have amounted 
to fifty thousand marks a year. Everyone perceived 
that the despatch of the Panther did not result from 
Germany's commercial policy, but was rather another 
attempt to enforce the position of Germany as arbiter 

3i Annual Register, 1911, 312, 339; Tardieu, Le Mystere d' Agadir, 
423, sq. 



188 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

of European affairs, and equally designed to break 
up the Triple Entente. Germany had apparently lost 
faith in the policy of conciliation inaugurated after 
1908, and had again reverted to that of intimidation. 32 

During the first weeks of the crisis the demands of 
Germany amounted to practically a partition of 
Morocco between herself, France, and Spain. Such a 
partition would satisfy the colonial aspirations of the 
Pan-Germanists, and would achieve the diplomatic 
purpose of Wilhelmstrasse by humiliating France. 
But Germany miscalculated the international situation. 
She counted on a France which, as in 1905, would 
succumb at the first threat, on a Government unsure 
of its position, and on a nation riddled with socialism 
and willing to make all sacrifices in the cause of peace. 
The news of the despatch of the Panther, however, 
followed by the extreme demands of Germany gal- 
vanized France into a spirit of resistance. All parties 
agreed that no concessions should be made to Germany 
that would touch the national honor. The French 
Government, with the most correct attitude, consented 
to discuss the demands of Germany, but yielded 
nothing, and made it plain that France would undergo 
no humiliation like that of Russia in 1908. 33 

To the surprise of Berlin, France found strong 
support across the Channel. In the heat of the parlia- 
mentary struggle over the Lords' veto, Asquith 
announced publicly that England would not allow 
Germany to ride rough-shod over France in the 
Moroccan affair. And the "pacifist," Lloyd George, 

32Fullerton, Problems of Power, 173-175; Albin, op. cit., 11. 
33 Turner, "The Morocco Crisis of 1911," in South Atlantic Quarterly, 
January, 1912, 5-8 ; Albin, op. tit., 173-226. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 189 

who had risked his career in the previous decade by his 
opposition to the Boer War, warned Germany that 
she must not count upon British passivity as a result 
of party quarrels ; the British Empire was still intact 
and the security of Great Britain's international 
position was not a party question. Shortly afterwards 
the leader of the Opposition strengthened the firm 
attitude of the Ministry by also insisting that party 
differences had no place in foreign affairs. "If," said. 
Mr. Balfour, "there are any who supposed that we 
would be wiped from the map of Europe because we 
have difficulties at home, it may be worth while saying 
that they utterly mistake the temper of the British 
people and the patriotism of the Opposition." 34 

In the face of such an attitude on the part of both 
England and France, the easy diplomatic victory that 
Germany had expected was out of the question. The 
reawakening of the French national consciousness and 
the realization on the part of England that her own 
position was endangered, destroyed the value of 
German threats. We may well ask ourselves whether, 
if circumstances had been propitious in Germany, the 
Great War might not have begun in 1911 instead of 
1914. Indeed at various moments during the crisis 
the probability of war seemed great. Even after Ger- 
many moderated her first demands, she continued to 
insist that special economic privileges in Morocco 
should be given her, as well as certain political rights 
which would have made French authority in that 
quarter merely nominal. On the other hand, France, 
supported by England, would hear of nothing but 
absolute political control and would grant no special 

3* Tardieu, Le Mystere d'Agadir, 456-469; Turner, op. cit., 9. 



190 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

privileges to Germany. It seemed like a deadlock that 
could only be broken by force. 35 

But the situation in Germany was not such as to 
favor the desires of the militarist party. The mass 
of the nation cared little about Morocco, and were by 
no means eager to fight France ; the fear of the Slavs, 
which in 1914 affected all classes profoundly, was not 
a factor in 1911. The Socialists protested against a 
war waged solely in the interests of German prestige 
and for the sake of the Pan-Germanists. Further- 
more, the financial condition of Germany was unsat- 
isfactory. French bankers began to call in their loans 
from Germany, bank reserves were low, the Berlin 
Bourse was weak, discount rates were raised, and a 
colossal panic threatened. Almost without exception 
the capitalists exercised their great influence against 
war. 36 

Under such circumstances the German Government 
decided to yield, and after the beginning of September 
bent all its efforts towards covering up its diplomatic 
defeat. In this task it was assisted by France, who 
showed herself ready to grant such territorial com- 
pensations as would enable the diplomats of Berlin 
to justify their efforts at home. In return for Ger- 

35 Tardieu, op. cit., 476; Annual Register, 1911, 313, 339. 

36 Tardieu, Le Mystere d'Agadir, 483, sq. ; Turner, op. cit., 11. See 
also, Singer, Geschichte des Dreibundes, 219, for the attitude of Austria 
and Italy. Army officers themselves did not believe that Germany was 
ready. A secret report, dated March 19, 1913, speaking of the Agadir 
crisis, says : "At that time, the progress made by the French army, 
the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm 
of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less 
easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the English 
fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to 
the necessity for an increase in the army," French Yellow Boole, 1914, 
No. 2. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 191 

many's recognition of the French protectorate in 
Morocco, she was given extensive territories of 
doubtful value along the Congo, in the southern and 
eastern Cameroons. 37 

But the accession of territory thus resulting to the 
German colonial empire could not hide the fact of 
Germany's failure in her Coup d'Agadir. It was in 
vain that official communications dilated upon the 
advantages that Germany had won; the Berlin press 
could not restrain its intense disappointment and 
covered the diplomats with invective; even the more 
staid journals fell into hopeless melancholy over the 
set-back to Germany. The nation had not wanted to 
fight in the summer of 1911, but discontent at the final 
settlement was general and profound. Germany had 
set out to win a diplomatic victory over France and 
to separate her from Great Britain ; her diplomats had 
led the Pan-Germanists to believe that a coaling- 
station or even a sphere of influence in Morocco would 
result. But France had refused to be humiliated, she 
had drawn closer to Great Britain, and had definitely 
excluded Germany from any political position in 
Morocco. 38 

Remembering the stress laid by German diplomats 
upon the necessity of maintaining German prestige, 
and the blows struck for this purpose in 1905 and 1908, 

37 Annual Register, 1911, 340; Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy, 304- 
323; Tardieu, Le Mystere d'Agadir, 535, sq.; the terms of the convention 
are printed in Pinon, France et Allemagne, 260, 267. 

38 Tardieu, Le Mystere d'Agadir, 599, sq. The German Chancellor 
made an attempt to show that Germany had not undergone a humiliation, 
but his speech was received in dead silence except for derisive laughter. 
He was followed by the Conservative leader, who in a furious and 
chauvinistic speech, contended that the settlement had put France 
in complete mastery of Morocco and that Germany's compensation was 
of questionable value. He was bitter in his denunciation of England, 



192 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

it was easy for the more far-sighted to judge that the 
defeat of Germany in 1911 would not be the last of 
the conflicts of the alliances. If, after carrying her 
point in the Bosnian crisis, she had felt it necessary 
to reinforce her position by another blow in 1911, how 
much more important was it for her, after her failure 
in that year, to regain the ground then lost! It was 
a matter of certainty that at the next favorable 
opportunity she would strike another blow, similar to 
those delivered in 1905, 1908, and 1911. 

The occasion presented itself in 1914 and under 
circumstances which were propitious for the most 
energetic action. The financial state of Germany was 
such as to enable her to take any steps that might 
seem desirable. The crisis involved the fear of the 
Slav, a sentiment which united the whole nation. 39 
Furthermore, since 1911 there had occurred changes 
in the Balkans, so that in 1914 there was at stake the 
most vital purpose of Germany's economic policy, 
which unlike the Moroccan venture inspired the com- 
mercial and capitalist classes with the utmost enthu- 
siasm. Then if ever was the time for Germany to 
insist upon the peculiar diplomatic position that she 
had claimed since the days of Bismarck. 

The crisis found the Kaiser and his Ministers ready 
to risk everything, even the long-dreaded war, pro- 
vided that German prestige could be regained and the 
path to Asia Minor reopened. William II had long 

calling Lloyd George's speech a "humiliating challenge of a kind that 
German people would not put up with. ' ' The Colonial Minister resigned 
almost immediately, and even the Socialist press denounced the Govern- 
ment, Annual Register, 1911, 342; Andrillon, L'Expansion de I'Alle- 
magne, 65. 

39 See especially the pamphlet, ' ' Truth about Germany, ' ' in New 
York Times Current History of the War, Vol. I, No. 2, 244., sq. 



THE CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES 193 

and sincerely striven to keep the peace. His action 
in the three preceding crises had been restricted to 
threats. But because of his failure in 1911, because 
of the influence of his son and that militarist class to 
which he instinctively turned for advice, he was 
resolved that next time his threats should, if necessary, 
be supported by arms. 40 The occasion which forced 
Germany to action and which led to the crisis of 1914 
and to the outbreak of the Great War, arose from 
conditions and events in the Near East. These con- 
ditions are obviously worthy of special consideration. 

*o For the change in the Kaiser 's attitude, see the letter of Jules 
Cambon, dated at Berlin, November 22, 1913, published in the French 
Yellow Book, 1914, No. 6. 



CHAPTER IX 
THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 

Of the great international problems which were 
prominent during the first part of the nineteenth 
century, the Near Eastern Question was one of the 
few which had not found its settlement by 1871. We 
have already had occasion to refer to it at various 
times, and its importance in affecting the policy of 
the Powers is obvious. The irreconcilable interests 
of Russia and Austria in the Balkans were largely 
accountable for Bismarck's failure to realize his 
dream of transforming the League of the Three 
Emperors into a definite alliance. The Balkan crisis 
of 1887 furnished impetus to the movement for the 
bringing together of France and Russia into the Dual 
Alliance. And it was the clash of Russian and 
Austrian interests in the Near East that produced 
the international crisis of 1908-1909, which was so 
skillfully utilized by Germany. For a generation 
after 1871 European policy was "dominated by the 
Balkans, ' ' and it is not surprising that when the long- 
feared conflict broke forth, its occasion was to be found 
in a phase of this ever vexatious problem. 

Historians have frequently pointed out that the 
Near Eastern Question is as old as history or legend. 
Achilles and Hector fighting on the Trojan plain, 
Spartans at Thermopylae, Athenians at Salamis, 
Octavius* victory over the fleet of Cleopatra at 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 195 

Actium — all represent various phases of the Eastern 
Question. Richard Cceur de Lion warring against 
Saladin, and Prince Eugene defending Vienna from 
the attacks of the Ottoman Turks, may likewise be 
regarded as the protagonists in the twelfth and seven- 
teenth century aspects of this never-ending problem. 
In fact whenever occidental civilization has conflicted 
with near-oriental, the world has witnessed some 
manifestation of the Eastern Question. 

In recent times the Near Eastern Question has 
taken on a more exact connotation and is subject to 
more specific definition. In the sense in which the 
term is generally used, it means the problem or group 
of problems that result from the occupation of Con- 
stantinople and the Balkan Peninsula by the Turks. 
Regarded broadly the problem may be said to have 
two main aspects: the one concerns the position of 
the Christian nations of the Balkans, which, previous 
to the nineteenth century, were subject to Turkish 
domination; the other concerns the attitude taken by 
the great European Powers towards the Balkans and 
Dardanelles, and their control. The solution of the 
problem thus has depended upon the answer to two 
questions : Was Turkey to be excluded entirely from 
Europe, and if so, how was her territory to be dis- 
tributed? Was Russia, or Austria, or any other 
Power to win practical mastery of the Danube and 
Dardanelles by establishing a semi-protectorate over 
the Balkan nations or Turkey? 

The crumbling of the Turkish dominion in Europe 
began early in the nineteenth century. The revolt 
of Serbia in 1804 led to a long and bitter struggle for 
autonomy, which was finally conceded by the Sultan 
in 1815. Six years later a far more serious rebellion 



196 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

in Greece inaugurated an eight years' war, in which 
Great Britain and Russia finally participated. The 
final result was the absolute independence of Greece, 
which was granted by Turkey in 1829. The dismem- 
berment of the Turkish Empire, thus begun, could not 
be arrested. In 1862 the provinces of Moldavia and 
Wallachia received practical autonomy under the name 
of Rumania, and in 1878 they were granted complete 
independence. The rebellion which flared out in 1876, 
led two years later to the autonomy of Bulgaria, which 
was in 1908 extended into absolute independence. 1 

Finally in 1912 and 1913 a successful war waged 
by the Balkan States upon Turkey robbed her of 
Thrace, Macedonia, Albania, Crete, and the islands 
of the JEgean. With the exception of Albania and 
some of the islands, the territory won at that time 
was distributed between Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. 
But the answer to the first question still remains 
incomplete. Turkey has not been driven from Europe, 
although her territories have been greatly diminished 
and she has been ousted from the Balkans. And the 
distribution of the conquered territory has not been 
sufficiently satisfactory to all parties to assure the 
permanency of the settlement. 

The second question, namely, which of the great 
Powers should exercise predominant influence in the 
Balkan Peninsula, has been the one most difficult 
of solution, possibly, of modern times, and has been 
productive of numerous diplomatic crises as well as 
wars. In the first half of the nineteenth century the 
rivalry of Great Britain and Russia in the Near East 
was acute, and was perhaps the most striking char- 

1 Driault, La Question d' Orient, passim; Hazen, Europe since 1815, 
601, sq. 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 197 

acteristic of the situation. This rivalry accounted 
for the joint intervention of those Powers on behalf 
of Greece in 1827, for Great Britain feared that if 
Russia were allowed to act alone, she would secure 
an unassailable position on the Dardanelles. It also 
led to the Crimean War of 1854, when Great Britain 
combined with France to protect the Turkish Empire 
from the attack of Russia. Again in 1878, Great 
Britain, under Beaconsfield, found herself ranged with 
Austria to prevent the complete dismemberment of 
the Ottoman Empire, which seemed likely to result 
in the mastery of the Slavs over the Balkans. 

Since 1878, however, Great Britain has come to 
believe that the extension of Russian influence in the 
Balkan Peninsula would be comparatively innocuous 
to British interests, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry 
has been effaced by the more serious conflict of 
Austrian and Russian ambitions. Germany has stood 
behind Austria in this conflict, and it may fairly be 
said that during the last decade the international 
aspect of the Eastern Question has been the struggle 
of the forces of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism. 

The interests of all the great Powers in the Eastern 
Question are obvious. Certain of the European 
states have desired that Ottoman power should be 
weakened if not destroyed, while others have desired 
that it should be reaffirmed. But to none of them has 
the fate of the Turkish Empire been a question of 
indifference. For Russia it has always been a matter 
of vital importance that the Dardanelles should not 
be held by a strong nation. Every symptom of 
convalescence on the part of the Sick Man has caused 
tremors of agitation at St. Petersburg. To secure 



198 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Byzantium for herself has been the dream of Russia 
since the days of Peter the Great and Catherine II. 

Sentimentally, the Russians look to Byzantium as 
the source from which their civilization has been 
derived, and they regard themselves as the natural 
legatees of Justinian and Theodosius. Strategically, 
the control of the Dardanelles would give them 
absolute mastery of the Northeast Mediterranean; 
it would transform the Black Sea into a Russian lake, 
from which in time of war their vessels might emerge, 
perfectly equipped at their Crimean base, and in which 
they might take refuge, safe from pursuit. And 
economically, the control of the Straits would give 
to Russia a protected outlet for those vast supplies 
of food-stuffs exported from Odessa. South Russia 
has become the granary of Europe, and the closing 
of the Straits means economic paralysis to an impor- 
tant part of the Russian Empire. 

Another factor has vitally affected the desire of 
Russia to win Constantinople. Nature has been 
bounteous to her in many respects, but in one, has 
laid a tremendous handicap upon her; for Russia 
has no outlet to the open sea that is available during 
the whole year, and notwithstanding all her efforts 
has never been able to secure one. Russia has seen 
her attempts to win an ice-free port frustrated one 
after the other; her history has been the endeavor 
to reach the ocean waterways, and she has always 
found herself blocked. It was in vain that Peter the 
Great moved his capital from Moscow to the Baltic, 
for the Baltic has been closed by the rise of Germany. 
Hope of gaining access to the Pacific, except on an 
ice-bound coast, has been cut off by Japan. And the 
Russian ambition of reaching the Persian Gulf was 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 199 

sacrificed to the Convention of 1907 with Great 
Britain. For these failures, one success will atone: 
the winning of control over the Dardanelles. 2 

For Russia, the extension of her influence in the 
Near East has thus become more important in 
recent years. Great Britain, on the other hand, has 
exchanged her fear of the Russian advance in this 
quarter for a complaisance almost kindly. Before 
the last years of the nineteenth century, Russian 
control of the Balkans and the Dardanelles seemed 
to threaten the path to British India. The Turk was 
thus the protege of Great Britain, and received British 
support, military and diplomatic, in 1854 and 1878. 
But when Great Britain purchased the controlling 
interest in the Suez Canal and a few years later 
established a practical protectorate in Egypt, she 
began to consider that the route to India was safe. 
Egypt is the key to the East, and so long as British 
influence in Egypt was assured, Russian power in the 
Balkans or even on the Dardanelles might be regarded 
with comparative indifference. Furthermore, as the 
century came to a close, Germany began to appear 
as a more dangerous rival than Russia, and British 
statesmen believed that the advance of Germany in 
the Near East could best be met by encouraging or at 
least not contesting the claims of Russia. Hence when 
Russia and Great Britain compromised their claims 
in Afghanistan, Persia, and Thibet in 1907, Great 
Britain made no objection to Russia's renewed interest 
in the Balkans. 

Instead of Anglo-Russian rivalry, the conflict of 
Slav and Magyar, with the Teuton in the background, 

2 Von Biilow, Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungam und die Ballcanstaaten, 
30, sq. 



200 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

tended to dominate the Near Eastern Question. The 
interest of Austria in the Balkans and Dardanelles 
has always been keen. In the sixteenth and seven- 
teenth centuries Austria was on the defensive against 
the Turks. So long as the Ottoman power was 
militant and aggressive, she acted as the bulwark of 
Europe against the advance of Islam. When the 
Turkish flood receded, Austria began to take great 
interest in the control of the Danube, as a vital outlet 
for Austrian trade. But the trade of the Danube 
depends ultimately upon the Dardanelles. Were 
Russia to control the Straits, Austrian control of the 
Danube would be meaningless. Austria has accord- 
ingly watched Russia's attempts to extend her influence 
in the Balkans with jealousy; in 1855, at the time of 
the Crimean War, notwithstanding the debt that she 
owed to Russia for her invaluable assistance in the 
Hungarian rebellion of 1848-1849, she mobilized 
against her, and without actually entering the war, 
helped to determine its outcome. Furthermore, 
Austria has always looked forward to free access 
to the iEgean and Adriatic Seas, and her desire to 
clear the path to Salonika or Avlona has determined 
her interest in the Balkan settlement. 

After 1866 Austria's Balkan policy received new 
impetus. Her defeat by Prussia established the fact 
that she could no longer hope to pose as a great 
German Power, and that she must seek compensations 
in Southeastern Europe for loss of influence in Central 
Europe. In 1867, furthermore, the Magyar and Ger- 
man elements reached a settlement of their claims to 
power in the Hapsburg Empire; the resulting com- 
promise, which excluded the Slav element, gave the 
Magyars opportunity for extending their domination 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 201 

over the Slavs of the Danube. But such domination 
could be made firm and permanent only if the Slavs 
of the Balkans, outside of the Austrian boundaries, 
were also brought under Hapsburg influence. The 
Austrian Empire would never be safe from disinte- 
gration so long as the disaffected Slavs of the Empire 
were encouraged to intrigue and revolt by their kins- 
men across the border. 

Extension of Austrian influence in the Balkans, 
or preferably a sort of protectorate over the Christian 
nations of the peninsula, thus became a cardinal point 
in Austrian policy. But at every turn she met the 
resistance of the Slavs, and behind the Slavs stood 
their protector, Eussia. For each nation the question 
was of the most vital importance. Russia could not 
afford to forego her ambition of winning control of 
the Straits and extending her influence in the Balkans. 
Austria must keep the Dardanelles free from Russia 
unless her position on the Danube was to be without 
practical value; Russian influence in the Balkans 
meant the blocking of her path to the iEgean and the 
Adriatic ; and Slav power in the peninsula threatened 
the integrity and existence of the Austrian Empire. 3 

Germany's interest in the Near Eastern Question 
dates from more recent times. It is, in fact, only since 
Germany began to conceive the possibility of world 
empire that the solution of the problem has been for 
her a point of vital concern. Prussia took no part 
in the Crimean War, and it will not be forgotten that 
Bismarck observed that the whole Eastern Question 
was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian 
grenadier. So long as the scope of Germany's policy 

s Von Biilow, Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungarn und die Balhanstaaten, 
87, sq. 



202 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

was restricted to the Continent, she had no axe to 
grind in the Balkans. At the Congress of Berlin, 
Bismarck's action was, if not disinterested, at least 
confined almost altogether to the support of Austria. 
As a ground of conflict between Austria and Bussia, 
the Eastern Question was forced upon the attention 
of Germany ; but until the accession of William II her 
attitude towards the problem was that of an outsider. 

Towards the end of the century, as we have seen, 
Germany began to search for new markets, in order 
to provide for the demands of those growing indus- 
tries upon which the life of the nation seemed to 
depend. In most of the markets of the world she had 
to meet the long-established trade of the British. 
Such was the case in the Far East and in South 
America. By superiority of commercial methods 
German competition often proved successful, but at 
best it was a fight against cruel odds, and German 
traders looked for a region in which their commercial 
penetration might find a free field. Such a district 
was to be found in the great valleys of the Tigris and 
Euphrates, which were still largely untouched by alien 
commerce, and from both the economic and strategic 
point of view appeared to be of the greatest value. 
It was in this direction therefore that Germany turned, 
and the commercial penetration of Mesopotamia 
received enthusiastic support from both the Govern- 
ment and the capitalists. 4 

The first definite disclosure of the German plans 
appeared in 1899, when a concession was granted for 
the construction of a railway from Konia, a point in 

4 Andrillon, L 'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 236-243; Verney et Damb- 
mann, Les Puissances au Levant; Rene Henry, La Question d 'Orient 
and Des Monts de Boheme au Golfe Persique. 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 203 

Mesopotamia, to the Persian Gulf. This was the 
extension of a line projected a decade previously by 
a group of German financiers who received the sup- 
port of the powerful Deutsche Bank. It was the 
beginning of the Bagdad Railway and revealed the 
ambitions of Germany. Four years later the Bagdad 
Railway Company was formed. The line was designed 
so as to connect Haidar Pasha, one of the Asiatic 
suburbs of Constantinople, with one of the harbors 
conceded to Germany on the Persian Gulf. German 
engineers drew up plans for the connection of the 
Asiatic terminus, by means of a tunnel, with the 
European side of the Bosphorus and with the Euro- 
pean railway, which was under German management. 
The railway was to follow the route of Cyrus and 
the Ten Thousand in the Anabasis, over the Taurus 
and down into the plains of Mesopotamia. Two 
branch railways of the utmost importance were 
secured by the German company: the one was the 
most direct trade route to Smyrna; the other gave 
connection with the port of Alexandretta. Further- 
more, the Germans later obtained the concession of 
the line planned to run between Aleppo, Damascus, 
and Mecca, the route which would naturally be taken 
by all Moslem pilgrims. 5 "Even the Holy Land will 
become a German province. The network of German 
railways will radiate from Mecca to Constantinople, 
and from Smyrna to the Persian Gulf. One terminus 
will be within twelve hours of Egypt, another terminus 
will be within four days of Bombay. ' ,G 

s See especially, Eohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn; Cheradame, Le Chemin 
de Fer de Bagdad; Mazel, Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad; Fraser, The 
Short Cut to India; Chirol, The Middle East; Martin, Die Bagdadbahn. 

6 Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem, 266-267. 



204 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

At the moment when German plans were taking 
shape, Russia was so closely involved in the Far 
Eastern problem that she could offer no effective 
resistance; she did, however, prevent the construction 
of a line following the most convenient and cheapest 
route along the imperial road of the Romans and 
passing through the plain of Nineveh, which would 
have threatened her Transcaucasian possessions 
directly. France not merely did not oppose the 
German plan, but her financiers offered precious 
assistance and subscribed large and necessary sums. 
M. Rouvier himself, who allowed Delcasse to be ejected 
from his cabinet in 1905 at the behest of Germany, 
was said to be financially interested. 7 Great Britain, 
by her influence over the Sheik of Koweit, hoped to 
close the most desirable terminus on the Persian Gulf 
to the German line ; but the Germans evidently hoped 
to overcome British opposition. 8 At all events they 
never faltered in their determination to win an open 
path from Hamburg to the Gulf, with a branch line 
and terminus on the Mediterranean. 

The constitution of the Bagdad Railway Company 
may be said to be an event of the first importance in 
the history of European diplomacy. It was the first 
step in Germany's southeastern policy which was 
designed to win for German traders complete economic 
control over the Turkish dominions and ultimately, 
possibly, a political protectorate; Germany was to 
"add to her sway the ancient empire of Semiramis 
and Nebuchadnezzar, of Cyrus and Haroun al 

i Cheradame, Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, 275. 

sEose, The Origins of the War, 83-84; Spectator, November 8, 1902, 
April 4, 1903, June 5, 1909; Nineteenth Century and After, June, 1909. 
For the feebleness of the opposition of the French and British, see 
Nineteenth Century and After, May, June, 1914 (articles by M. Geraud). 



THE NEAE EASTERN QUESTION 205 

Raschid." 9 It gave Germany an outlet for her 
expanding industries and her teeming population. 
Asia Minor and Mesopotamia are districts which have 
been among the most prosperous and productive in 
the whole world. It is true that stupid deforestation 
on the part of Turkish governors has led to climatic 
changes and lessened the fertility of the soil. But 
the science of German agriculturists would soon revive 
the prosperity of regions which because of short- 
sighted exploitation have become arid. The natural 
resources of the country are rich and merely waiting 
for development. 10 

But the Germans were attracted not so much by the 
commercial and industrial opportunities which the 
Bagdad Railway was to open to them, as by the 
political advantage which control of the Ottoman 
Empire would offer. If in the future there should 
arise a struggle with Great Britain for the control 
of the seas and colonial empire, German domination 
in Mesopotamia would threaten the British Empire 
in two vital points: India and Egypt. This was the 
point of view adopted by Rohrbach, whose views on 
German policy were accepted as sound and who by 
no means belonged to the belligerent party in Ger- 
many. "One factor," said he in 1911, "and one alone 
will determine the possibility of a successful issue for 
Germany in such a conflict : whether or not we succeed 
in placing England in a perilous position. A direct 
attack upon England across the North Sea is out of 
the question; the prospect of a German invasion of 
England is a fantastic dream. It is necessary to 
discover another combination in order to hit England 

9 Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem, 250. 
io Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 59-60. 



206 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

in a vulnerable spot — and here we come to the point 
where the relationship of Germany and Turkey and 
the conditions prevailing in Turkey become of decisive 
importance for German foreign policy, based as it 
now is upon watchfulness in the direction of Eng- 
land . . . England can be attacked and mortally 
wounded by land from Europe only in one place — 
Egypt. 

1 'The loss of Egypt would mean for England not 
only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal, 
and of her connections with India and the Far East, 
but would probably entail the loss also of her posses- 
sions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of 
Egypt by a Mohammedan Power like Turkey would 
also imperil England's hold over her sixty million 
Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing 
her relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, 
however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until 
she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia 
Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of 
the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad, she is in a position 
to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. 
The Turkish army must be increased and improved, 
and progress must be made in her economic and 
financial position . . . The stronger Turkey grows, 
the more dangerous does she become for England . . . 
Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth 
the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with 
England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is 
now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the 
desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a 
war with England." 11 

At the moment then when Great Britain had come 

ii Eohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn, 18, 19. 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 207 

to the conclusion that Russia was no longer dangerous 
and had given up her role of protector of the Porte, 
Germany was stepping forward to save and strengthen 
the Ottoman Empire. "She saw that in Asia Minor 
and Mesopotamia there was a great field open for 
German influence, organizing power, and capital. The 
key to this was in the hands of the Turkish govern- 
ment. Germany would give her support to the 
maintenance of Turkish power; Turkey would grant 
the necessary concessions by which her Asiatic pos- 
sessions would be opened up to German enterprise. 
And behind was a more grandiose conception: Ger- 
many, the ally and patron of Turkey, might become 
the organ for a general reassertion of Islam which 
would be the strongest weapon against England and 
France. Here at least was a field for expansion in 
which sea power would be useless; once let a reor- 
ganized and powerful Turkish government, with an 
army disciplined and trained by German officers, be 
established in Syria and Bagdad, and then would 
come the time for a move from the most vulnerable 
side on Egypt and on India. ' m 

From the beginning of his reign William II had 
realized the necessity of winning and preserving 
friendship with the Turk. 13 His first official journey 
in 1889 was to the Holy Land when he inaugurated 
that understanding with the Porte which has since 
been broken only once and for a brief period after the 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908. German influence 
was solidified by the reorganization of the Turkish 

!2 Headlam, "The Balkans and Diplomacy,' ' in Atlantic Monthly, 
January, 1916, 124-125. 

is Friendship between Prussia, and Turkey had been traditional since 
the days of Frederick the Great. 



208 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

army by von der Goltz. German diplomacy saved the 
Turk from reform at the hands of the Powers. Ger~ 
many not only enabled Turkey to crush Greece and 
restore her military prestige, but also enabled her to 
reap the fruits of victory. 14 Public manifestations of 
German regard for Turkey were made upon every 
possible occasion by the Kaiser, and he stirred the 
world by his proclamations of affection towards Islam : 
"Say to the three hundred million Moslems of the 
world that I am their friend. ' ' With skill and tenacity 
German agents worked at the Sublime Porte, exploit- 
ing the affinity that exists between Prussian and Turk, 
an affinity which German writers themselves have 
pointed out, more and more replacing British and 
French by German influence. 15 

If Germany was to carry her Mesopotamian and 
Turkish policy to success, another aspect of the Near 
Eastern Question concerned her very closely, namely, 
the position of the independent Balkan States. Should 
those nations become powerful and diplomatically 
autonomous the security of the path from Germany 
to Constantinople would be threatened. They must, 
therefore, be subjected to the domination of Germany, 
or better still, to that of Germany's ally, Austria; 
for Austria has always had greater success than 
Germany in dealing with the Slavs. In no event could 
the Slavs be allowed to control the Balkans, lest Ger- 
many's communications with Asia Minor be cut. Thus 
a regenerated Turkey must guard the Straits while 
Austria dominated the Balkans. With her ally, 

14 Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem, 263. 

IB Sir H. Eumbold, Final 'Recollections of a Diplomatist, 296; Head- 
lam, The Balkans and Diplomacy, 125; Gibbons, The New Map of 
Europe, 61, 62-64. 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 209 

Austria, supreme on the Danube, and her friend, 
Turkey, in control of the Dardanelles, Germany might 
reasonably hope to be master of a sweep of territory 
extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. 
She would cut Russia from her Mediterranean trade, 
hold the shortest route to the East, and threaten the 
position of the British in Egypt and India. 18 

Broadly speaking, the attitude of the Great Euro- 
pean Powers towards the Eastern Question in 1907 
was thus about as follows. Great Britain, relieved 
of her fear of the Russian peril, was willing that the 
Tsar should make what profit he could out of the 
weakness of Turkey; even the possibility of Russian 
control over the Dardanelles was regarded by Great 
Britain with equanimity. Russia, pushed back in the 
Far East, was pressing with the greater eagerness 
upon Constantinople and seeking to throw her 
influence more and more into the Balkans. Pan- 
Slavism, a shadowy but a potential force, was aiming 
at supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, and looking 
forward to driving the Turk across the Straits. But 
for Austria and Germany, the position of Turkey as 
their protege guardian of the Dardanelles must remain 
unassailed. The turbulent Balkan States must be 
discouraged and restrained, and the influence of the 
Slav in the peninsula eliminated. Germany was 
replacing Great Britain as the Power that protected 
Turkey and prevented the Russian advance on Con- 
stantinople, and was at the same time replacing Russia 
as the Power that threatened the British dominion 
of India and the route to India. 

For a generation after 1878 the not infrequent 

I 6 Bauer, Der Balkankrieg und die deutsche Weltpolitilc, 45, sq. ; 
BSrard, Le Sultan et I'Islam, 225; Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 235. 



210 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

crises of the Eastern Question were localized and the 
Powers were able to prevent an open clash of the 
states of first importance whose interests conflicted. 
The acquisition of Eastern Eumelia by Bulgaria in 
1885 and the defeat of Greece by Turkey in 1897 were 
not allowed to precipitate serious trouble and set fire 
to the heap of combustible material that was gathered 
in the Near East. 17 But in 1908 came the capital event 
which carried in its train a whole set of circumstances, 
and was destined ultimately to bring about the inevi- 
table contest of arms. This event was the revolution 
of the Young Turks. 

For many years there had existed in the Ottoman 
Empire factors productive of lively dissatisfaction. 
The inefficiency of Turkish administration, the cor- 
ruption prevalent among the official classes, and 
especially the anaemia of the Sublime Porte in its 
relations with foreign Powers, led to a feeling of 
humiliation and disgust. A large number of Turks 
gradually came to believe that Turkish decadence 
resulted in great part from the despotic regime of 
Abdul Hamid and trusted that her recrudescence 
might be found in the introduction of western liberal 
institutions. Amongst the civilian class the liberal 
element was not large, inasmuch as the Government 
had sent into exile or imprisonment every one sus- 
pected of liberal views. In the army, however, there 
were to be found many officers who had received their 
training in Germany or France and had there imbibed 
ideas of western civilization and become convinced 
of its benefits. That such officers really understood 
the principles of western liberalism may be questioned ; 

w Hawkesworth, The Last Century in Europe, 453-454; Songeon, 
L'Histoire de la Bulgarie, 358-367. 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 211 

but they were all imbued with a sense of shame for 
the weakness of Turkey, and were firm believers in 
the necessity of change. An added cause of dissatis- 
faction was the fact that their pay was often far in 
arrears. 18 

The revolutionary movement was thus in part one 
of liberalism, an aspect represented by the idealistic 
views emitted by the Committee of Union and Pro- 
gress; it was also, and perhaps chiefly, patriotic and 
chauvinistic. The immediate impetus towards revo- 
lutionary action is perhaps to be found in the agree- 
ment of Great Britain and Russia that the Powers 
must intervene to settle the Macedonian question. 
The meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas II at Reval, 
in June, 1908, infuriated the Young Turkish officers 
beyond measure. It was the public manifestation of 
the fact that Turkey was unable to settle her own 
affairs, another proof that she had sunk so low that 
her private concerns were to be made the business of 
Europe. The direct answer was the revolution of 
July 24, 1908, when the Hamidian regime was over- 
thrown and constitutional government inaugurated. 
Abdul Hamid, however, remained on the throne and 
continued to plot for the restoration of his absolute 
power. This first revolution was the work of the 
Committee of Union and Progress, whose power was 
solely moral, and in April, 1909, came the inevitable 
counter-revolution. The constitution was torn up, and 
the Young Turks in Constantinople annihilated. 19 

But the Sultan had not realized the power that lay 

18 Eeventlow, Detitschlands ausw'drtige Politik, 319; Pinon, L'Europe 
et la Jeune Turquie, 50, sq. 

is Annual Begister, 1908, 324-327; Bauer, op. cit., 18; Eeventlow, 
op. cit., 322, sq. ; Pinon, op. cit., 78, sq. 



212 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

behind the Committee of Union and Progress. The 
real force of the revolution lay in the determination 
of the officers in the army to resuscitate Turkey. When 
the news of the counter-revolution came to Salonika, 
Shevket Pasha, the commanding officer, immediately 
prepared to support the Young Turkish movement by 
force of arms. Marching upon Constantinople, he 
brought to the service of the revolutionaries his 
military skill and the best troops of the Empire. The 
Sultan, undefended, was compelled to revive the 
constitution and to abdicate in favor of his brother. 
The Young Turks immediately assumed control of 
Ottoman destinies. 20 

A full consideration of the Young Turkish regime 
would pass the scope of this book. Everyone remem- 
bers the exalted hopes aroused by the accession to 
office of the men who seemed to be filled with the 
highest ideals for the regeneration of Turkey; sym- 
pathy with their ambitions was freely and sincerely 
expressed. Nor will be forgotten the intense disap- 
pointment when it became obvious that they were 
incapable of fulfilling their task and that they were 
merely continuing the despotism of the Hamidian 
regime. Inexperienced and untaught, they soon made 
it clear that they lacked the skill of their predecessors, 
as well as the will to maintain their promises of justice 
and efficiency. An authoritative study of the causes 
of their failure is yet to be made. Our purpose is 
merely to consider the effects of their accession to 
power upon the international situation. 

First of all, perhaps, should be noted the effect upon 
Austrian policy and Serbian ambitions. It will not 

20 Annual Register, 1909, 328-333 ; Pinon, op. cit., 94, sq. ; Ramsay, 
The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey. 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 213 

be forgotten that in 1878 the Congress of Berlin had 
placed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina under 
the administrative control of Austria. The Sultan 
retained nominal sovereignty over the provinces, but 
Austria was determined that actual sovereignty should 
never be reclaimed by the Sublime Porte. The 
Revolution of 1908 caused tremors at Vienna and 
Buda-Pesth. It was well known that the Young Turk 
leaders were inspired with patriotic if not jingoistic 
sentiments, and the first demand that Austria might 
expect from a rejuvenated Turkey was the return of 
the two provinces. To forestall such a demand Austria 
determined to tear up the Treaty of Berlin. On 
October 3, 1908, the Austrian Ambassador at Constan- 
tinople informed the Porte that his Government had 
annexed the provinces, renouncing the right of military 
occupation of Novi Bazar, the territory belonging to 
Turkey and lying between Serbia and Montenegro. 21 
The European crisis that resulted has already been 
discussed. The protests of Serbia and of Russia, her 
protector, were quelled by the threat of force on the 
part of Germany. Serbia's ambitions were for the 
moment sacrificed to the peace of Europe. Turkey, 
after a boycott of Austrian goods, carried on for four 
months, agreed to accept financial compensation for 
the provinces. But the importance of the crisis in the 
history of the Near Eastern Question is to be found 
in the desperate spirit of the Serbian Government 
after the surrender of Russia to Germany. The 
annexation of the provinces seemed to Serbia a fatal 
blow to all her national ambitions. The action of 
Austria apparently destroyed her hope of winning for 

2i Supra, Chap. VTII ; Eeventlow, op. cit., 324 ; Annual Begister, 1908, 
309-310. 



214 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

herself these provinces, the centre of the Serbian race ; 
it seemed to cut her off forever from the sea. Not 
merely was her dream of a great Serbian Empire 
ruined, but she must look forward to the ultimate 
domination of Austria. Any change in the status quo 
would be for her a relief. Serbia's action in 1912 
against Turkey can be understood only if we realize 
that her people believed that some compensation must 
be found for the loss of Bosnia, if she were to preserve 
her independence. 22 

Another vitally important result of the Young 
Turkish regime is to be found in Macedonia and in 
the altered attitude of Bulgaria towards the Mace- 
donian problem. Before 1908, Bulgaria, although 
aspiring to the ultimate lordship of Macedonia, had 
favored its autonomy rather than its immediate 
independence. The absolute independence of Mace- 
donia would necessarily give rise to serious trouble 
with Serbia and Greece, since each of these states 
claimed much of Macedonia on racial and linguistic 
grounds. Autonomy, on the other hand, would allow 
Bulgaria to carry on a propaganda, by schools and 
priests, which would end in making the province in 
reality Bulgarian. She might then hope to imitate 
successfully her own example of 1885 when she had 
annexed Eastern Rumelia. 23 

But the Young Turks soon made it evident that the 
granting of autonomy to Macedonia formed no part 

22 Georgevitch, Die seroisclie Frage; Kautskcy, " Oesterreich und 
Serbien," in Neue Zeit, xxvii, 1; Eeventlow, Deutschlands austvdrtige 
Politik, 328. 

as Annual Register, 1912, 349; Songeon, L'Histoire de la Bulgarie, 
383-385; Dragonoff, Macedonia and the Reforms; Pinon, "La Question 
de MacSdoine et des Balkans," in Question Actuelles de Politique 
Etrangere, 1911, 181-233. 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 215 

of their policy. They immediately began a process 
of bringing in Turks of the lowest classes to strengthen 
the Moslem element in districts where it was weak, 
and forcing the Christians to serve in the Ottoman 
army. Bulgaria perceived that the possibility of 
autonomy was rapidly receding. Furthermore, ter- 
rible persecutions of the Bulgarians in Macedonia 
were inaugurated. A cry of despair went up from 
them and was answered by a cry of rage from their 
kinsmen in Bulgaria. For the Tsar of Bulgaria to 
refuse the aid which the Macedonians so anxiously 
sought, and the Bulgarians so eagerly desired to give, 
possibly meant the overthrow of the dynasty. Hence 
it came about that Bulgaria, like Serbia, found herself 
impelled by reasons of policy and of sentiment, 
towards a disturbance of the status quo in the Near 
East. 24 

The accession of the Young Turks to power had 
momentous results in a third quarter, namely, in Crete ; 
and the new aspect of the Cretan question which 
developed after 1908 bulks large among the factors 
that resulted in the reopening of the whole Eastern 
Question, and ultimately led to the European War. 
Crete, which lies to the south of Greece and is largely 
inhabited by Greeks, had taken part in the insurrection 
of 1821 ; but at the time of the emancipation of Greece 
had been handed over to Egypt, and ten years later 
reverted to Turkey. Frequent insurrections broke out 
and the Turks were never able to reduce the island to 

2 * Keport of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes 
and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
national Peace, Publication No. 4), 36; Gibbons, The New Map of 
Europe, 206-210. On the Balkan States from 1909-1912, see the volume 
issued by the Cambridge Press, Russia and the Balkan States, Appendix 
I, 177, sq. 



216 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

complete subjection. Finally in 1897, as a result of a 
massacre at Canea, popular feeling was so aroused in 
Greece that the Government was forced to intervene. 
A Greek army was sent to the aid of the Cretans, and 
war broke forth with Turkey. 25 

In this war the defeat of Greece was so complete 
that the Powers were forced to intervene; but the 
purpose of the war was at least partially attained, 
for Crete was granted autonomy and placed under 
the protection of France, Russia, Great Britain, and 
Italy. Prince George of Greece was appointed High 
Commissioner, and upon his resignation in 1906 he 
was succeeded by a Greek statesman, Zaimis. The 
autonomy of the island was complete : it had its own 
postal system, flag, and laws; in its relations with 
Turkey the latter Power treated it like a foreign 
country. Ultimate union with Greece was confidently 
expected. 26 

This state of affairs was definitely threatened by 
the Revolution of 1908. Here, as in Macedonia, the 
Young Turks began to make it clear that Turkish 
sovereignty over the island would be reclaimed. 
Annexation to Greece would never be allowed by 
them. Their mission, as they conceived it, was to 
regenerate the Ottoman Empire, and smarting under 
the loss of Bosnia, they were determined to find com- 
pensation in winning back Crete. Their policy was 
clearly manifested in the spring of 1910, when they 
began to press the Powers for the restoration of 
Turkish rights, and demanded from Greece renun- 

25 Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige PolitiJc, 104-105; Berard, Les 
Affaires du Crete; Cahuet, La Question d' Orient, 477, sq.; Eambaud, 
L'Histoire de la Bussie, 842, sq. 

26 Hawkesworth, The Last Century in Europe, 477-478. 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 217 

ciation of any intention of annexing the island. To 
enforce their demands they began a boycott of Greek 
goods, with disastrous effects upon Greek commerce. 27 

The leader of the Cretans during the latter days 
of the island's autonomy was Eleutherios Venizelos. 
A practical statesman, who like Cavour knew how to 
be prudent and also daring, he had advocated con- 
tinuing the regime of autonomy until Crete was so 
far Hellenized and the Powers so far prepared, that 
annexation to Greece would be simple and peaceable. 
The new policy of the Young Turks made it plain 
that peaceable annexation as a result of diplomatic 
manoeuvres was out of the question. Crete must look 
to Greece for liberation by force of arms. In 1910 
Venizelos left Crete for Greece, established himself 
as Prime Minister within the space of a few months 
and began the reorganization of the country. In 
eighteen months he had so far succeeded in his finan- 
cial and constitutional reforms, and in his improve- 
ment of the army and navy, that Greece . was well 
prepared for any policy of action against Turkey 
that might be necessary. By taking away from Crete 
her prospect of continued autonomy, the Young Turks 
had forced Greece to prepare for attack on Turkey. 28 

Three states of the Balkan Peninsula, Serbia, Bul- 
garia, and Greece, thus had strong motives for a 
disturbance of the status quo in the Near East. It 
remained for the Young Turks to furnish to one of 
the great European Powers equally strong motives 
for reopening the Eastern Question. By their policy 
in Tripoli they forced Italy to make the first attack 

27 Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 220-240. 

28 Nikolaides, Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkanlcriegen, 12; 
Schurman, The Balkan Wars, 42-48. 



218 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and begin 
the series of wars which has culminated in the general 
struggle. 

To the interests of Italy in North Africa allusion 
has already been made. We have seen how the dream 
of Italian control of Tunis was dissipated by French 
enterprise in 1881, thereby opening a gulf of bitterness 
between the two Latin nations. Shortly afterwards 
England assumed control of Egypt, and in the nineties 
Italy's ambitions for empire in Abyssinia were 
destroyed by the annihilation of her expeditionary 
force at the battle of Adowa. But in 1901 the interests 
of Italy in Tripoli were recognized by France, in 
return for Italian acquiescence in the French develop- 
ment of Morocco ; and at the Conference of Algeciras 
the principle of Italian rights in Tripoli was accepted 
by all the great Powers. 29 

Italy was not slow to make the most of the privileges 
which Europe recognized and which Turkey did not 
protest, and began to develop a carefully prepared 
campaign of commercial penetration. She had every 
hope of winning economic control of the Tripolitaine 
and of so increasing the prosperity of that region that 
the native inhabitants would prefer Italian rule to 
that of the Turks. The resources of the country were 
developed, trading-posts established, branches of 
Italian banks set up, and Italian steamship lines 
maintained; Italian capital in the meantime prepared 
to finance a whole system of railways. The trade of 
the hinterland was captured by the Italian parcel 

29 Lapworth, Tripoli and Young Italy, 42-110; McClure, Italy in 
North Africa, 1-19. On Italy's recent colonial policy, see Tittoni, Italy's 
Foreign and Colonial Policy (selections from the speeches given by the 
Italian Foreign Minister in Parliament, translated by di San Severino). 



THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 219 

post. Except for its political status Tripoli was in 
1908 practically an Italian province. 

Italian hopes of the peaceable, economic conquest 
of Tripoli were crushed by the Young Turk Revolution. 
The regenerators of the Ottoman Empire were deter- 
mined that Tripoli should not be lost like Bosnia. 
They sent out new officials to Tripoli, who immediately 
began a campaign of systematic obstruction directed 
against every form of Italian enterprise. Italians 
were subjected to consistent persecution, concessions 
were refused to Italian capital, and steps of a military 
nature taken, which indicated clearly that Turkey 
intended to retain what was left of her African 
provinces for herself. 30 If Italy was not to lose her 
last chance of a colony on the North African seaboard, 
she must obviously support her claims to Tripoli by 
force of arms. In 1911, after Italian opinion had been 
prepared by a long press campaign, Italy took the 
fateful step of declaring war on Turkey and setting 
the example for the attack on the integrity of the 
Turkish Empire. 31 

It was thus that the accession of the Young Turks 
and their chauvinistic policy led to a reopening of the 
Eastern Question. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece were 
all ready for the opportunity offered by the Italian 
War on Turkey. For each of them a change of the 
status quo in the Near East seemed vitally necessary: 
for Serbia, because of the annexation of Bosnia, which 

3° Letter of the Foreign Minister, the Marchese di San Guilano, 
cabled to New YorTc Times, September 30, 1911, setting forth Italy's 
grounds for the declaration of war; Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 
234-245. 

si McClure, Italy in North Africa, 19, sq. The documents relating 
to the outbreak of the war are published in Barclay, The Turco-Italian 
War and its Problems, 109, sq. 



220 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

followed the Revolution of 1908 ; for Bulgaria, because 
of her interests in Macedonia; for Greece, because of 
her interests in Crete. But the moment that the 
position of Turkey was threatened, the question 
became one of European concern. Neither Austria 
and Germany on the one hand, nor Russia on the other, 
could for the sake of their vital interests watch 
unmoved any alteration in the Balkan balance. It 
was for this reason that the Turks could never believe 
that Italy would draw the sword. "If she does attack 
us," said the Grand Vizier, "all Europe will be eventu- 
ally drawn into the bloodiest struggle of history — a 
struggle that has always been certain to follow the 
destruction of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." 33 

32 Personal conversation related by Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 
247. 



CHAPTER X 
THE BALKAN WARS 

The vital significance of the Italian declaration of 
war upon Turkey, September 27, 1911, was not 
generally realized at the time. None of the Powers 
approved Italy's aggressive action, bnt apparently 
they failed to perceive the far-reaching consequences 
that might result from it. France and Great Britain 
feared that it would lead to a disturbance of the 
Mediterranean balance, and although they had con- 
sented to Italy's occupation of Tripoli, when it was 
put before them in the light of a rather indefinite 
possibility, they were obviously troubled by the active 
steps taken by Signor Giolitti. Germany and Austria 
were naturally displeased by this attack made by their 
ally upon Turkey, with whom they themselves were 
anxious to remain on terms of close friendship. But 
all the Powers trusted that the conflict would be 
confined to Tripoli and that it would not reopen the 
Eastern Question. 1 

Italy herself desired sincerely to avoid any disturb- 
ance of Turkey's position in the Near East; she hoped 
that the war would be brief, and even that the result 
of her declaration of war would be the peaceable 
surrender of Tripoli by the Turks. Hence she confined 
her first military actions to the African seaboard. 

i Barclay, The Turco-Italian War and its Problems, 38, sq. ; McClure, 
Italy in North Africa, 35, sq. 



222 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Tripoli was bombarded on September 30, and a week 
later surrendered. An expeditionary corps disem- 
barked early in October and succeeded in foiling all 
attempts made at counter-attacks by the Turks. On 
November 5, the Italian Parliament approved the 
decree that declared the annexation of the Turkish 
provinces in North Africa. The following months 
were spent in merely securing the foothold that had 
been won on the coast. 2 The Government continually 
made clear its unwillingness to prosecute an aggres- 
sive war against the Porte, provided Tripoli were 
surrendered. 

But the Turkish Government refused to take advan- 
tage of the opportunity offered her of escaping from 
further attack, and the position of Italy, both from 
the military and diplomatic point of view, was difficult. 
Turkey was, it is true, incapable of winning back the 
military positions that she had lost, or of driving out 
the invaders. But the Arabs continued a vexatious 
and at times effective resistance under Turkish leader- 
ship, and in February, 1912, it became clear that if 
Turkey refused to acknowledge the Italian conquest, 
it would be years before Italy could hope to pacify 
and control her new possessions. The sole way of 
striking Turkey and forcing her to admit defeat was 
to shift the war to the Adriatic or the iEgean. Action 
in the Adriatic was not possible because of the interests 
of Austria, Italy's ally. An attack upon the Dar- 
danelles threatened the position of Turkey so vitally 
that it might reopen the whole Eastern Question ; and 

2 The decree of annexation is printed in Barclay, op. cit., 113. The 
expedition and the occupation of Tripoli is briefly described in Beehler, 
The History of the Italian- Turkish War, 5-23. See also, Corradini, La 
Conquista di Tripoli (letters from the front) ; McClure, op. cit., 38, sq. 



THE BALKAN WARS 223 

as we have seen, the ambitions of Italy's other ally, 
Germany, demanded that the status of the Eastern 
Question remain unchanged. Turkey's position as 
guardian of the Straits was essential to the German 
policy in Mesopotamia. 

Italy had promised at the beginning of the war that 
she would not under any circumstances disturb the 
status quo in the Balkan Peninsula. But by April, 
1912, as the deadlock in North Africa was becoming 
more and more apparent, it was obvious that a direct 
attack upon Turkey must be undertaken. Only thus 
could Turkey be forced to recognize the Italian con- 
quest of Tripoli. On April 18th the forts of Kum 
Kale at the mouth of the Dardanelles were bombarded, 
and early in May, Rhodes was invaded. Other islands 
in the .iEgean were also occupied. Turkey's answer 
was the closing of the Dardanelles. Had the hands 
of Turkey been absolutely free, Italy would have found 
difficulty in wringing acceptance of her conditions 
from the Porte, even after the direct attack upon the 
Ottoman Empire. The Dardanelles were impene- 
trable and Turkey might well have prolonged the 
deadlock. But revolution had broken out in Albania 
and taxed the military resources of the Young Turks 
to their fullest extent. 8 Furthermore, the Balkan 
States were assuming a hostile attitude and an out- 
break in that quarter began to appear imminent. 

The result was that in June, 1912, Turkish repre- 
sentatives met the Italians to discuss bases for a 
settlement of the conflict. Oriental methods prolonged 
the negotiations until October, when Italian patience 
was finally exhausted and a distinct threat conveyed 

3 Annual Register, 1912 347-348; Beehler, The History of the Italian- 
Turkish War, 23, sq. 



224 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

to Turkey that in case of war in the Balkans, Italy 
might be found in alliance with the Balkan States. 
Turkey yielded and the preliminaries of peace were 
signed on October 15, 1912. 4 The Treaty of Lausanne 
provided for the withdrawal of the Turkish army from 
Tripoli and of the Italian army from the islands of 
the iEgean; nothing was said about the cession of 
Tripoli to Italy for the sake of Turkish pride, but the 
recognition of the conquest was absolute, although 
merely tacit. Italy's restoration of the islands, pro- 
vided for in the treaty, has never taken place. Nor 
has Turkey complained, inasmuch as they must later 
have fallen into the hands of Greece had they not been 
held by Italy. 

The real significance of Italy's war with Turkey is 
not to be found in the conquest of Tripoli. That was 
an eventuality already foreseen by the Powers, and 
before 1911 Italy had taken long steps toward its 
accomplishment. The importance of the war lies 
rather in the example of direct attack upon Turkey 
that had been set by Italy. • It was too much to 
expect that the Balkan States would not follow the 
lead thus given, and take advantage of the favorable 
opportunity offered in 1912. 

We have seen that three of the Balkan States had 
very strong motives for an alteration of conditions 
in the Balkan Peninsula. The horrible persecution of 
Christians in Macedonia affected sentimentally both 
Bulgaria and Greece. Of equal importance was the 
fact that the diplomats of both nations realized that 
the attitude of the Young Turks threatened their 
dearest policies. Bulgaria had been willing to accept 
autonomy for Macedonia in the belief that by vigorous 

4 Annual Register, 1912, 352. 



THE BALKAN WARS 225 

propaganda she could prepare the way for ultimate 
annexation. But the Young Turks made it plain that 
Macedonia was to remain under Turkish authority. 
They had also destroyed the autonomy of Crete and 
thus driven Greece into a state of desperation. Serbia, 
moreover, had been rendered equally desperate by the 
definite loss of Bosnia and looked forward to com- 
pensation in the conquest of Novi Bazar, and possibly 
the opening up of a pathway to the Adriatic, through 
Albania. 

It was obvious that the Balkan States could bring 
effective pressure upon Turkey only by means of an 
alliance. The defeat of Greece, in 1897, was in the 
minds of all and a second attempt of the same kind 
promised no better success. On the other hand, Serbia 
and Bulgaria together could not hope to stand out 
against the Turk without the assistance of Greece. 
The cooperation of the Greek navy was essential, since 
that alone could prevent the disembarkation of Turkish 
reinforcements from Asia on the shores of Thrace. 
The possibility of a Balkan Alliance was scoffed at 
by Turkey and generally regarded by foreign diplo- 
mats as a dream that could never be realized. The 
hatred of Serbia for Bulgaria was only surpassed by 
that of Bulgaria for Greece ; and all three Powers had 
interests in Macedonia which seemed absolutely 
irreconcilable. Circumstances, however, forced them 
to sink their differences and act together, and it was 
obvious that the advantages to be gained from union 
outweighed the disadvantages that would result from 
mutual compromise. 

It is probable that the organization of the Balkan 
League resulted from the determination of Venizelos 
to bring such pressure upon Turkey as would lead to 



226 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

a restoration of Cretan autonomy. His position as 
Prime Minister of Greece made him practically arbiter 
of the situation, for the naval power of Greece was 
the sine qua non of a successful attack upon Turkey. 
That Venizelos, as well as the Governments of Bul- 
garia and Serbia, hoped to avoid a war with Turkey 
is almost certain. Military success was by no means 
assured even to their combined forces. It was known 
that the Ottoman Empire could put large armies in 
the field, which were supposed to be perfectly disci- 
plined and well equipped; no one will forget that the 
unanimous verdict of military experts at the beginning 
of the war was entirely favorable to Turkey. Further- 
more it was certain that any attack upon Turkey would 
be viewed by the Powers with disapproval, a consid- 
eration, possibly, of far less weight in the minds of 
the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian diplomats. But 
even in the event of a successful war it was by no 
means clear that the results would be commensurate 
with the costs. 5 

Events, however, forced the Balkan Allies to give 
up their hopes of a peaceable adjustment. Turkish 
arrogance and incredulity as to the possibility of a 
real alliance between the Balkan States, forbade any 
concession to the demand that effective reforms be 
introduced in Macedonia. 6 It was obvious that if the 
new Allies were to maintain their position they must 
act vigorously and quickly. Fear of Turkish military 
strength vanished before the opportunity that was 
open: for the war with Italy had demoralized the 

5 Statement of Herr von Jagow to the Budget Committee of the 
Reichstag, April 3, 1913; Annual Register, 1912, 349-350; Songeon, 
Eistoire de la Bulgarie, 388-392; Schurman, The Balkan Wars, 34, sq. 

• Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 267. 



THE BALKAN WARS 227 

Turkish administration, and the revolution in Albania 
had weakened her strength. If they were to strike, 
it was advisable to strike before the full effects of the 
money spent upon army reorganization in Turkey were 
realized. 

But the real force that led the Balkan Allies to war 
was popular opinion. There is a limit to the capacity 
of Governments for resisting the temptation to make 
war; and that limit came when it was evident that 
the dynasties of Bulgaria and Serbia faced the choice 
of war or internal revolution. The massacres of the 
summer of 1912 in Macedonia had so inflamed the 
Bulgarians that there was no holding them back. 
The inevitable result of popular sentiment and Turkish 
refusals was the declaration of war by Montenegro 
on October 8, 1912, and the ultimatum of Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Greece a week later, demanding the 
autonomy of the European provinces of the Turkish 
Empire. 7 

Too late Turkey perceived that the Balkan Alliance 
was an accomplished fact and that the Allies were 
serious. Hastily the Ottoman Government offered to 
Bulgaria the complete reversal of its Macedonian 
policy, and to Greece the annexation of Crete. These 
offers were refused, although had they been carried 
out the ambitions of both states would have been 
largely realized. For the sake of her dignity Turkey 
could not accept the terms of the ultimatum and on 
the eighteenth of October declared war on Serbia and 
Bulgaria. On the same day Greece declared war on 
Turkey. 8 

The course of the conflict that followed is well- 

7 Annual Register, 1912, 352. 

s Songeon, Histoire de la Bulgarie, 395-404. 



228 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

remembered. According to the plan of the Allies, 
Greece and Serbia were to keep the Turkish army in 
Macedonia in check and prevent reinforcements being 
sent from Albania. The Greek navy was to win control 
of the water communications between Constantinople 
and Asia Minor, so that no troops could be hastily 
transported to Macedonia. It fell to the lot of Bulgaria 
to advance into Thrace and meet the main attack of 
the Turks. In each field the success of the Allies was 
complete. 

In Thrace the Bulgarians began immediately the 
investment of Adrianople, and from the twenty-first 
to the twenty-third of October were engaged with the 
Turkish armies, which were attempting an encircling 
movement. The valor of the Bulgarians and the 
tendency to panic displayed by the Turkish troops, 
as well as the mistakes of the Turkish generals, led 
to an overwhelming victory of the Bulgarians at Kirk 
Kilisse. A week later the Turks made a desperate 
stand at Lule Burgas, where for three days, despite 
their faulty equipment and lack of food, they threw 
back the furious Bulgarian charges. But on November 
1, their powers of resistance broke and they fled to 
the Tchatalja lines, the final bulwark of defence before 
Constantinople. 9 

The Bulgarian attack on these lines was halted, 
largely, as seems probable, because of the success of 
the Greeks and Serbians in Macedonia. The major 
part of the Greek army, under the command of the 
Crown Prince Constantine had crossed the frontier 
into Thessaly and, advancing in the face of rather 
slight opposition, had cleared the way to Salonika. 

a Annual Begister, 1912, 353-356; Songeon, Histoire de la Bulgarie, 
404-445. 



THE BALKAN WARS 229 

Notwithstanding the fact that the city was well 
garrisoned and completely supplied, it surrendered 
unconditionally on November 9, and the Greek army 
took possession. On the following day an auxiliary 
corps of Bulgarians also entered the city and placed 
the Bulgarian flag on the towers of St. Sophia. 10 

In the meantime the Serbians had expelled the 
Turks from Novi Bazar, and driving them back, 
marched upon Monastir. By skillful strategy, com- 
bined with the utmost daring, the Turks were forced 
to withdraw, and ultimately encircled by the Serbian 
left wing, they were compelled to surrender. Monastir, 
coveted by each of the three Balkan nations, was 
captured. 11 

The disasters of Turkey had led to the fall of the 
Young Turk Administration, and the return to power 
of the veteran Kiamil Pasha. Eealizing the necessity 
of peace, he had authorized negotiations with the 
Balkan States, and on December 3, 1912, an armistice 
was signed. The demands of the Allies for the cession 
of European Turkey, with the exception of a strip 
to the north of Constantinople as well as the Gallipoli 
Peninsula, were not excessive when one considers the 
desperate situation in which the Ottoman armies 
found themselves. And the opinion of Kiamil Pasha 
that even the holy city of Adrianople must be sacrificed 
to win the respite so necessary for Turkey, was 
endorsed by a Divan, or congress of Turkish notables. 
But the Young Turks were unbending in their deter- 
mination to continue the struggle. On January 23, 
1913, they carried out a palace revolution. Led by 
Enver Bey, they assassinated Nazim Pasha, the 

io Nikolaides, Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkarikriegen, 47, sq. 
ii Schurman, The Balkan Wars, 53-54. 



230 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

military representative of the Kiamil administration, 
and forced the Sultan to reinstate Shevket Pasha with 
a cabinet pledged to the continuation of the struggle. 
Further negotiations were clearly useless and the war 
reopened. 12 

During the second period of the war little was 
accomplished except the capture by the Allies of the 
fortresses of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari. The 
Bulgarians were unwilling to push their attack against 
Constantinople, inasmuch as their interests lay rather 
to the west, in Thessaly, and they were occupied in 
watching the Greeks. Shevket Pasha soon realized 
the hopelessness of the Turkish position, and early 
in February began secret negotiations with the great 
Powers for their mediation. After the fall of Adrian- 
ople a basis of negotiations was proposed, accepted 
at once by Turkey, and on April 20, after a month's 
delay, by the Allies. 13 

The Treaty of London, which resulted from the 
negotiations that followed, decreed the dismember- 
ment of Turkey in Europe. Everything was ceded 
by the Porte except the strip of territory bounded on 
the west by a line running from Enos on the .ZEgean 
to Midia on the Black Sea. Albania was given to the 
Powers, who were to decide upon its status and 
frontiers. The rest of the territory west of the Enos- 
Midia line was ceded to Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece 
for division amongst themselves, doubtless in the well- 
founded hope that they could not agree. Crete was 
given to the Allies, but the .iEgean Islands were left 
to the Powers. 

12 Annual Register, 1913, 342-347; Songeon, Histoire de la Bulgarie, 
446-451. 

13 Annual Register, 1913, 347-348. 



THE BALKAN WARS 231 

It was generally understood that Crete would be 
handed over to Greece, but two circumstances made 
the division of conquered territory on the mainland 
an extremely delicate operation. The first of these 
circumstances was the disposition of Albania made 
by the great Powers. This province is of the utmost 
importance strategically because of its position guard- 
ing the entrance to the Adriatic Sea; it was coveted 
by Austria and Italy for this reason, and by Serbia 
as offering an outlet to the ocean waterways. It 
possesses no really national character that would 
allow of its absorption by any state or enable it to 
stand alone ; and yet the forcible conquest and annexa- 
tion of Albania presented extraordinary difficulties; 
the sturdy and half -civilized mountaineers have never 
been actually subjected by any of the dominant states 
of the Balkan Peninsula. 

Since the establishment of united Italy, the rivalry 
of Austria and Italy for the control of the Adriatic 
has been keen. Italy's coastline is the longer, but 
Austria's possession of the indented shore of Dalmatia 
has assured her the advantage. Italy's ambition of 
winning an Albanian port in order to control the 
Straits of Otranto has not been veiled; Austria, on 
the other hand, has been equally determined that Italy 
should not thus establish herself at the point of vital 
importance. For thirty years each state has main- 
tained a constant propaganda in the hope of winning 
an economic and intellectual ascendancy in Albania. 

The two states, however, were allies and felt it 
essential to their larger relations to arrive at some 
sort of accord on the Albanian question. After 1907 
they came to the conclusion that the point of greatest 
importance was to prevent Albania from falling into 



232 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

the hands of Serbia in the event of the dismember- 
ment of European Turkey. For behind Serbia they 
saw Eussia, and Serbian control of Albania seemed 
to presage the extension of Pan-Slavism to the 
Adriatic, an eventuality that neither of the Powers 
could afford to consider. Accordingly they agreed to 
support the national movement in Albania, as the 
solution least inimical to their interests; and the 
principle of an independent Albania was maintained 
by them and accepted by the other Powers. 14 

The result was that after the close of the first Balkan 
War, Serbia and Montenegro saw themselves forced 
to renounce the conquest of Albania. Montenegro 
surrendered her claim on Scutari, which was to have 
been the outlet to the sea for that State and the Serbs, 
and Albania fell into the hands of the Powers. An 
independent state was created, and a German prince, 
William of Wied, put upon the new throne. 15 Even 
apart from his lack of ability as a ruler, his failure 
might have been expected, for there was in the turbu- 
lent province no spirit of national consciousness that 
would enable it to stand by itself as a separate entity. 
With the outbreak of the general war the supporting 
contingents of the Powers left Durazzo, and were 
shortly followed by William himself. Albania was 
left to itself, and Durazzo fell into the hands of Essad 
Pasha, self-appointed ruler. 

The disposition of Albania had important effects 
upon the Balkan situation in the spring and summer 

14 Chlumecky, Oesterreich-Ungarn und Itclien; Bauer, Der Balkan- 
Tcrieg und die deutsche Weltpolitik, 28; Hanotaux, La Guerre des 
Balkans, 209. 

is Annual Register, 1912, 356; Ibid., 1913, 332, 339, 344-345, 356; 
Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns, 301. 



THE BALKAN WARS 233 

of 1913. When the division of conquered Turkish 
territory was brought under consideration, Serbia 
could justly complain that her share of the booty had 
been snatched from her by the Powers. The Serbian 
Government had signed a treaty of partition with 
Bulgaria in March, 1912, by which the greater part 
of Macedonia was allotted to Bulgaria; but this was 
on the understanding that Serbia was to find her 
aggrandizement in Albania. If Albania were inde- 
pendent and the partition treaty were carried out, 
Bulgaria would gain everything and Serbia practically 
nothing. Furthermore, Monastir and Salonika, the 
portions of Macedonia that were coveted by Bul- 
garia, were in the hands of the Serbian and Greek 
armies, which were in a position to defend them. 
To strengthen their position, Serbia and Greece, 
early in 1913, concluded an alliance against Bul- 
garian ambitions, reciprocally guaranteeing their 
Macedonian conquests. 

For Bulgaria the situation was difficult. Her 
armies had, it was felt, borne the brunt of the 
Turkish campaign and deserved the recompense. But 
the territory she had won was Thrace, which she did 
not care for, while Macedonia, which had been 
conquered by the Serbs and Greeks, was the home 
of the Bulgarian race and the object of all Bulgarian 
efforts. Her conquest of Adrianople meant little to 
her ; but the acquisition of Salonika and Monastir was 
all important. The Bulgarians felt "that they had 
accomplished everything to receive nothing. ,n6 

Bulgarian discontent became constantly keener, as 

18 Annual Register, 1913, 349-352; International Commission Report, 
21; Dehn, Die V biker Sudeuropas und ihre politischen Probleme. 



234 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

the resolve of Serbia to secure her hold on Macedonia 
became more obvious. That discontent was increased 
by the stories of Serbian cruelty towards the Bulgarian 
inhabitants of Macedonia. At first the Bulgarian 
Government hoped to bribe Greece by the offer of 
Salonika, if Greece would assist Bulgaria against 
Serbia. With the refusal of this offer by Venizelos, 
the extreme party in Sofia began their schemes for 
carrying through their ambitions by force of arms. 

The belligerent policy of Dr. Daneff, the leader of 
the Macedonian party in Bulgaria, who replaced the 
pacific minister, Gueshoff, was supported by the 
Germanic Powers. For Austria and Germany the 
outcome of the first Balkan War had been by no means 
pleasant. German military prestige had been dimmed 
by the defeats of Turkey, and the effectiveness of the 
French Creusot guns as well as the faults of Turkish 
army organization, led to many whispers that German 
military superiority was not what it was supposed to 
be. Austrian opinion had supported Turkey, and 
Austrian diplomatic prestige had been lowered by 
this backing of the wrong horse. Furthermore, if 
Serbia and Greece carried out their scheme of parti- 
tion it meant a vast increase of Serbian power in the 
Balkans, which must threaten the safety of the 
Austrian Empire. Nothing would suit the policy of 
Germany and Austria better than to see an internecine 
quarrel between the victorious Balkan States. 

The attack of Bulgaria, designed to win for her 
Macedonia and destined to end in Bulgarian humilia- 
tion, began suddenly. On June 29, 1913, a general 
advance against the Greeks and Serbs was ordered, 
without declaration of war or any intimation of 



THE BALKAN WARS 235 

attack. 17 Apparently it was believed at Sofia that 
merely a demonstration would suffice to result in an 
immediate arrangement according to the Bulgarian 
demands. But the positions held by the Greeks and 
Serbs were excellent and Bulgaria was worn out by 
her efforts of the year before. Instead of negotiations, 
both states ordered a counter-advance on the Bulgarian 
armies. The retreat of the Bulgarians began on July 
6, and continued for three weeks. The victories of 
the first week satisfied the Serbs, who then rested 
quietly ; the Greeks, on the other hand, pushed forward 
rapidly, so much so that on July 29, they found 
themselves in a difficult position. 

But any chance of Bulgarian success against Greece 
at the end of July was eliminated by the action of 
Rumania. This Power saw in the circumstances of 
1913 an opportunity for winning advantage out of 
what at first seemed to her a distinctly unfavorable 
situation. The initial success of Bulgaria in 1912 
against the Turks had threatened Rumania's position, 
for it seemed to lead towards the supremacy of 
Bulgaria in the Balkans. To neutralize the advantage 
of Bulgaria, Rumania asked in the spring of 1913 for 
a cession of territory from Bulgaria that would give 
to Rumania a strategically defensible frontier on 
her southern border. She adduced her benevolent 
neutrality in 1912 as well as her assistance in the lib- 
eration of Bulgaria in 1877 as claims upon Bulgarian 
gratitude. 18 

Bulgaria refused to admit the justice of the Ruma- 

i7 Nikolaides, Griechenlands Anteil an den Ballcankriegen, 252, sq. ; 
Schurman, The Balkan Wars, 94-108; International Commission Report, 
65-69. 

is Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 338-340; Schurman, The Balkan 
Wars, 112-116. 



236 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

nian demands, although a small part of the territory- 
asked for was ceded in April, 1913. Rumania was not 
satisfied, and the victorious advance of the Serbian 
and Greek armies in the first week of July furnished 
her with the opportunity for which she had been 
waiting. She declared war on July 10, invaded 
Bulgaria, and advanced upon Sofia. Her action ended 
the war. On July 30, an armistice was declared and 
the delegates of the five states of the Balkan Peninsula 
met in conference at Bukarest. 19 

The terms of the settlement of Bukarest were 
naturally unfavorable to Bulgaria; with a Rumanian 
army in her rear she could not hope to continue the 
war with Greece and Serbia, and must perforce submit 
to their demands. Greece not only secured Salonika 
but extended her coastline to the east so as to include 
Kavalla, thus taking from Bulgaria the port on the 
iEgean so vitally essential to the economic develop- 
ment of the small portion of Macedonia won by 
Bulgaria. Crete was granted to Greece without 
serious discussion. Serbia extended her territories 
southwards as far as Monastir, and Rumania took 
from Bulgaria the territory on her own southern 
border, the desire for which had caused her entrance 
into the struggle. Another humiliation was reserved 
for Bulgaria, namely, the successful reclamation of 
Adrianople by Turkey. The frontier running from 
Enos on the IEgean was to take a sweep to the north- 
wards, cutting the railway communications of Bulgaria 
with the sea. 20 

i9 Annual Register, 1913, 352-353; Hanotaux, La Guerre des Balkans, 
374, sq. ; Nikolaides, Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankriegen, 321, sq. 

20 Annual Register, 1913, 355; Bee map published in International 
Commission Beport, 70. 



THE BALKAN WARS 237 

It has been a matter of common knowledge that the 
Balkan settlement of 1913 was so unsatisfactory as 
to make it extremely improbable that it could remain 
permanent. The discontent of Bulgaria at her portion 
can be realized when we remember that though in 
weakened condition she had gone to war in order to 
prevent exactly this settlement. Serbia had won 
territory in Macedonia to which her claim on racial 
and linguistic grounds was very shadowy, and which 
at Sofia was regarded as Bulgaria irredenta. The 
aggrandizement of Greece on the Macedonian littoral 
was so great as to threaten Bulgarian economic 
development, at the same time that it brought a 
considerable portion of the Bulgarian race under 
Grecian domination. 21 

But the Balkan States were so worn out by the 
efforts made during the two wars, especially during 
the second, that pure exhaustion might have ensured 
peace in the Balkans, had it not been for the effect 
of the settlement at Bukarest on the great Powers. 
All the Powers were troubled by the upsetting of the 
status quo in the Near East. For Great Britain, 
Eussia, and France, who were involved in domestic 
difficulties, the crisis of 1912-1913 had occurred at a 
most inopportune moment; internal troubles in each 
country were such that the prospect of international 
affairs being thrown back into the Balkan melting-pot, 
from which might emerge the unknown, had at the 
beginning of the war terrified the Foreign Ministers 
of all three nations. 

21 Dominian, ' ' Linguistic Areas in Europe: Their Boundaries and 
Political Significance," in Bulletin of the American Geographical 
Society, Vol. XLII, No. 6, 435-437; Leger, Turcs et Grecs contre Bul- 
gares en MacSdoine. 



238 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

The diplomatic prestige of the Powers suffered all 
through the wars. They had in effect prohibited any- 
armed attack upon Turkey, and the Balkan States, 
led by Montenegro, laughed at the prohibition. They 
had insisted that there should be no alteration in the 
territorial status quo, and Turkey in Europe had been 
carved up. Their impotent efforts largely justified 
the remark of Venizelos that the Powers were 
"venerable old women." 

Nevertheless the settlement of Bukarest calmed 
the Powers with the exception of Austria and Ger- 
many. If only that settlement could be made solid, 
France and Great Britain were by no means dissat- 
isfied with the result. These Powers took no direct 
interest in the Near East, except for their desire that 
a permanent peace in that quarter might be obtained. 
The victory of Serbia and Greece was not displeasing 
to Russia. And Italy, although she watched the rise 
of these two states with alarm, was content with the 
settlement, since it ensured an independent Albania, 
where the Italian propaganda might be continued. 

But to Austria and Germany the settlement of 1913 
presented itself in far different colors. For both 
Powers it was a humiliation to their prestige and a 
menace to their interests. It is true that Austria had 
prevented Serbian influence from touching the littoral 
of the Adriatic by insisting successfully on the inde- 
pendence of Albania. But this triumph of Austrian 
diplomacy was more than offset by Serbia's vast 
accession of territory in Macedonia. Austria's politi- 
cal and economic control of the Balkans, which in 1908 
seemed on the point of establishment, was threatened 
with annihilation. Salonika, toward which Austria had 
long cast covetous eyes was in the hands of Greece. 



THE BALKAN WARS 239 

Bulgaria, bitter at the results of the war of 1913, was 
in bad temper and blamed the Hapsburgs. Rumania 
could no longer be counted upon by Austria and Ger- 
many, and seemed to be moving towards the Russian 
side. Turkey herself, apparently abandoned by her 
Teutonic friends, was overtly being brought under the 
influence of the Entente Powers. 

Furthermore Austria was threatened at home. An 
echo of the waxing greatness of Serbia ran through 
Bosnia, already honeycombed with disaffection, and 
the Hapsburgs were facing an internal revolution of 
their Slav subjects. The disintegration of their 
Empire seemed to be at hand, unless the newly won 
power of Serbia were broken. Magyar domination 
over Slav, so carefully planned by Andrassy a gene- 
ration before, ran the risk of destruction, not merely 
in the Balkans but in Austria-Hungary itself. 22 

Austrian prestige as well as Austrian interests had 
received a staggering blow by the Balkan Wars. In 

22 « ' Since the annexation crisis, ' ' wrote Freiherr von Giesl to Count 
Berehtold, ' ' the relations between the monarchy and Serbia were on 
the part of the latter poisoned through national chauvinism, enmity, 
and an effective propaganda of the Greater Serbian aspirations in our 
countries populated by Serbs; since the last Balkan war the success 
of Serbia increased this chauvinism to a paroxysm, the outbursts of 
which at some points bear the stamp of madness. ... an accounting 
with Serbia, a war for the position of the monarchy as a great Power, 
yes for its very existence as such, cannot permanently be evaded. If 
we neglect to bring clarity into our relations with Serbia, we shall 
become accomplices in blame for the difficulties and disadvantage of 
the relations in a future conflict which after all, whether sooner or 
later, must be settled. For the local observer and the representative 
of the Austro-Hungarian interests in Serbia, the question has so 
constituted itself that we cannot endure a further damaging of our 
prestige," Austrian Bed Book, 1914, No. 6. Cf. also Ibid., No. 8, Count 
Berehtold to the Imperial and Boyal Ambassadors at Berlin, Borne, 
St. Petersburg, Paris, London, and Constantinople. 



240 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

each of them the Austrian diplomats had guessed 
badly and supported the losing side. In the first they 
had counted upon Turkey and trusted in its victory 
over the Allies. In the second, Austria had instigated 
Bulgaria and had given moral support to the attempt 
made to alter the partition of territory. In each of 
these struggles the protege of Austria had been woe- 
fully unsuccessful. In all respects but one (the 
autonomy of Albania), the settlement of 1913 was thus 
a disaster to Austria and she felt that it must be 
speedily retrieved. Some blow must be struck that 
would rehabilitate Austrian prestige and recover the 
political and economic influence that she had lost in 
the Balkans. So early as the autumn of 1913 the 
determination of Austria was indicated, when she 
suggested to Italy that the latter Power join with her 
in an attack on Serbia. 23 

For Germany, the Treaty of Bukarest was no less 
inacceptable. The diplomatic defeat of Austria was 
her own, and the general feeling in Germany was ' ' that 
what was a danger for their ally, was also a danger 
for them, and that they must do all in their power to 
maintain Austria-Hungary in the position of a great 
Power." 24 German military prestige had further- 
more received a direct blow in the defeat of the 
German-trained Turkish army in 1912; like Austria 
she had failed manifestly in her diplomacy when she 

23 Speech of Signor Giolitti, in Italian Chamber, December 5, 1914, 
For the conditions that were tending to separate Austria and Italy and 
possibly disrupt the Triple Alliance, see Fullerton, Problems of Power, 
276 ; statement of Signor di Sonnino in New York Times Current History 
of the War, Vol. II, No. 3, 495. 

24 1 1 Truth about Germany, ' ' in New York Times Current History 
of the War, Vol. I, No. 2, 248. Cf. also Ibid., 260; Annual Register, 
1912, 229-342. 



THE BALKAN WARS 241 

instigated Bulgaria against Serbia and Greece in 
1913. Remembering the stress laid by German 
diplomats on the importance of maintaining German 
prestige, and the blows struck in 1905, 1908, and 1911 
for that purpose, it was not to be expected that 
Germany would suffer quietly the verdict of 1913 to 
pass unprotested. 

Germany's political and economic interests also, 
like those of Austria, demanded that the settlement 
of 1913 should not be allowed to stand. We have 
noticed the interest taken by Germany in the develop- 
ment of her Mesopotamian policy and her efforts for 
the realization of her Bagdad Railway scheme. After 
1910 the success of this scheme was a factor of greater 
importance in her aspirations than ever before, owing 
to the exclusion of Germany from Persia. At first 
German commercial and political agents had hoped 
to find a field for exploitation in Persia, and to slip 
in between the ancient rivals in that country, Russia 
and England. But the Accord of 1907 between those 
Powers apparently closed the door in Germany's face. 
Despite her strenuous efforts, Germany found that 
Russia and England were in Persia to stay, and, 
making the best of the situation, she accepted the fact 
of her exclusion. In November, 1910, Germany and 
Russia exchanged views, which were embodied in the 
Accord of Potsdam: Russia promised not to inter- 
fere with the Bagdad Railway, in return for which 
Germany agreed to declare that she had no political 
interests in Persia. 25 

The retirement of Germany from Persia naturally 
made the development of her Mesopotamian policy 

25 Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politilc, 367-369; Kaehfahl, 
Kaiser und Reich, 331-332. 



242 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR 

more than ever essential to the carrying ont of German 
world policy. The raison d'etre of the Potsdam 
Accord is to be found partly in the hope of separating 
Russia from England; but chiefly in the desire of 
ensuring Germany's position in the valleys of the 
Tigris and Euphrates. But the Balkan settlement 
of 1913, if it proved to be permanent, would be fatal 
to German control of Mesopotamia, for it threatened 
to block the road to Asia Minor. So long as Austria 
was supreme in the Balkans and Turkey on the Dar- 
danelles, the path from Hamburg to Bagdad was 
clear. But the Treaty of Bukarest seemed likely to 
give control of the Balkans to the Slavs. The power 
of the Turks was weakened and their allegiance to the 
Teutonic cause possibly shaken. The islands of the 
-ZEgean were held by Greece, the protege of the 
Entente Powers, and by Italy, who would not sacrifice 
her interests in the cause of Pan-Germanism. Bul- 
garia was crushed and the chance of Eumanian 
assistance doubtful. 

Germany, like Austria, was thus forced to regard 
the Balkan settlement as inimical to her interests as 
well as a humiliation to her prestige, and determined 
that it must be upset. By diplomacy or force the new 
Serbia must be paralyzed and Turkey strengthened. 
Bulgaria must be dragged back under German influence 
and reinforced by the Macedonian provinces which 
she had failed to secure in 1913. Greece must sur- 
render the islands to Turkey, and Rumania again be 
attracted within the Teutonic orbit. If possible this 
rearrangement must be rendered permanent by the 
creation of an understanding or league between 
Turkey, Bulgaria, and Rumania, into which Greece 
also might be drawn; such a league, supported by 



THE BALKAN WARS 243 

Germany and Austria, would offset the influence of 
Serbia and ensure the exclusion of Russian interests 
from, as well as the predominance of German interests 
upon, the Danube and Dardanelles. Towards the 
execution of this plan Austrian and German diplomats 
are said to have worked during the autumn of 1913. 26 

But it speedily became apparent that direct diplo- 
matic efforts would prove unavailing. The demand 
that the Treaty of Bukarest should be laid before 
Europe for revision, was refused by the Powers ; and 
Rumania, the most important of the Balkan States, 
soon made plain her determination to uphold the 
settlement at all costs. Bulgaria and Turkey were 
disorganized and could give no assistance. Obviously 
the destruction of the Balkan settlement must come 
through force, and preferably in a direct conflict with 
Serbia, such as Austria secretly suggested to Italy. 

During the autumn of 1913 and the spring of the 
following year Austria watched and waited for the 

26 E. J. Dillon, whose knowledge of secret diplomacy is extensive 
if not always critical, asserts (A Scrap of Paper, 23) on what he says 
to be first-hand knowledge but without adducing proof, that ever since 
the signing of the Treaty of Bukarest it was the inflexible resolve of 
the Central Powers to upset it. Furthermore Berchtold admitted to the 
British Ambassador that the settlement was unsatisfactory to Austria, 
British Correspondence, 1914, No. 161. We find moreover in the "Truth 
About Germany ' ' (New YorJc Times Current History of the War, Vol. I, 
No. 2, 248), that as soon as the Balkan troubles began the Central 
Powers had been preparing for war, a war specially directed against 
Serbia, because it was felt that behind Serbia stood the great Slav 
Power. The German White Booh (preface) states the belief prevalent 
in Austria and Germany that Bussia was busy in attempting to direct 
a Balkan League against Austria, and goes on to say that "under these 
circumstances it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of 
self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation 
across the border." And cf. the speech of Giolitti, December 5, 1914, 
cited above. 



244 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

opportunity that might furnish a pretext for the attack 
on Serbia. On the other hand, the Serbian Govern- 
ment exercised the utmost skill in preserving a per- 
fectly correct attitude. The national aspirations of 
the Serbs could not be extinguished, and the nation- 
alistic secret society, the Narodna Odbrana, flourished 
and wove its web of plots and intrigues in Bosnia. 
But no official sanction was given by the Belgrade 
Cabinet to the anti-Austrian propaganda, and the 
Austrian agents could discover no casus belli. Austria, 
with Germany behind her, was ready to strike, but 
the occasion was lacking. 

Suddenly, on June 28, 1914, the opportunity waited 
for, came in startling form. Archduke Franz Ferdi- 
nand, heir apparent to the Austrian imperial crown, 
was assassinated with his wife, in the streets of the 
Bosnian town, Serajevo. The murder was done by a 
member of the Serb nationalistic society, and clearly 
formed part of a Serb intrigue, whether or not it had 
been sanctioned by Belgrade. The pretext for the 
projected attack on Serbia was at hand, and Austria 
and Germany realized that the moment for action 
had come. 27 

27 Austrian Red Booh, 1914, Nos. 6, 8; German White Book, preface. 



CHAPTER XI 
THE CRISIS OF 1914 

It is incontestable that the murder of the Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand furnished an unexpected but not 
altogether unwelcome opportunity to German diplo- 
mats. Sincerely horrified by the brutality of the 
assassination of the heir apparent to the neighboring 
throne, they could not but realize that in it lay an 
opening for the aggressive action which their general 
policy demanded. Ever since the formation of the 
Franco-British Entente in 1904, Germany had watched 
the rise of an international opposition with increasing 
anxiety. The conditions under which Bismarck had 
maintained German hegemony had departed. Delcasse, 
by arranging the quarrels of France with Italy and 
Great Britain, had enabled France to free herself 
from German control and establish her diplomatic 
autonomy. Germany's failure to maintain her mas- 
tery of continental diplomacy was further manifested 
in 1907 when Great Britain and Russia ended their 
long quarrel and came to an understanding. 

The conventions made by the Powers of the Triple 
Entente were not openly directed against Germany. 
But she saw in them a concerted policy designed to 
isolate the German Empire. 1 In any case they 

i A very clear exposition of the belief prevalent in Germany since 
1911 that Great Britain built up the Triple Entente in order to 
"encircle" and throttle Germany is to be found in an article by 
Th. Schiemann in New York Times Current History of the War, Vol. II, 



246 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

destroyed the peculiar position of primacy that she 
had held under Bismarck and during the first decade 
of the reign of William II ; German diplomatic prestige 
suffered undeniably by the restoration of the balance 
of power. Such a situation was intolerable to the 
diplomats of Wilhelmstrasse. The diplomatic as well 
as the military primacy of Germany had been laid 
down by Bismarck as an essential condition of Ger- 
many's success and even of her existence. With the 
economic transformation of the Empire, the mainte- 
nance of her position in Europe became still more 
vitally necessary. The Kaiser and his ministers 
firmly believed that the commercial and political 
world empire of Germany must be founded upon 
continental hegemony, and that any serious defeat 
for German prestige on the Continent would destroy 
her scheme for the future. 2 

To disrupt the opposing combination and regain the 
position which she had lost, Germany, as we saw, 
struck a blow at France in 1905, when the Kaiser 
disembarked at Tangier and offered to protect the 
Sultan of Morocco from French aggression. France 
was humiliated for the moment and Delcasse was 
forced to resign. But Germany's victory was in a 
large measure cadmean and she did not receive all 
that she sought in the following year at Algeciras; 
and in 1907 was compelled to witness the reconciliation 
of Great Britain and Russia. She struck another blow, 
accordingly, in 1908, this time levelled at Russia, and 

No. 4, 784-795. Cf. also Reventlow, Deutschlands ausw'drtige Politik, 
280, and Rohrbach, German World Policies, 159; the latter holds that 
the object of the Triple Entente was to isolate Germany, so that France 
might win back Alsace-Lorraine and Great Britain divide Turkey for 
her own profit. 

2 Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 45-46. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 247 

by supporting Austria in the annexation of Bosnia 
imposed her will upon Europe. Again in 1911 she 
made another attempt to reinforce her prestige and 
destroy the Triple Entente, by the Coup d'Agadir. 
But she failed in her double purpose. Her diplomacy 
did not succeed in imposing itself upon the other 
Powers, and France and Great Britain were brought 
still more closely together by her aggressive move. 
General considerations forced the diplomats at Berlin 
to believe in the necessity for some new aggressive 
action which would retrieve the fiasco of 1911 and 
reestablish conditions similar to those that had 
guaranteed German hegemony under Bismarck and 
in the nineties. 3 Surely no better pretext for such 
action could be found than that presented by the 
murder of the Archduke. 

The special conditions that had resulted from the 
Balkan Wars also seemed to call for some action that 
would rectify, from the German point of view, the 
settlement of 1913. German military prestige had 
suffered in the Turkish and Bulgarian defeats, and 
German diplomatic prestige had been lowered by the 
Treaty of Bukarest. The advantages won by Serbia 
were regarded in Germany as an affront to her ally, 
Austria, and as a victory for Russia. The fear of a 
great Slavic advance and of the annihilation of 
Teutonism by an inferior civilization was oppressing 
Germany. Furthermore, the commercial classes and 
the Pan-Germanists saw in the Treaty of Bukarest 
the end of their plan of penetration into Mesopotamia 
and of a Greater Germany extending from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf. For the execution of such a plan 
Germany must control the Balkans and Dardanelles 

3 Supra, Chap. VIII. 



248 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

by means of Austria and Turkey. But the Balkan 
Wars had shaken Austrian influence in the peninsula, 
and the position of Turkey on the Straits was not one 
of strength.* 

General and special considerations thus impelled 
German diplomats to strike a blow similar to those 
of previous years, and one which would simultaneously 
reinforce her diplomatic prestige and benefit her 
political and commercial interests in the Near East. 
By forcing Serbia to disgorge what she had won at 
Bukarest, Germany would win a great diplomatic 
victory over Eussia, the protector of Serbia, would 
weaken the Slavic element in the Balkans, and open 
the way to Constantinople and Mesopotamia. 

It was probable that Germany could never hope to 
find more propitious circumstances for such action 
than those of the early summer of 1914. Her ally, 
Austria, would grant her hearty assistance in the 
overturning of the Balkan settlement and the humilia- 
tion of Serbia, for in this case Austrian interests 
coincided with those of Germany. The diplomats of 
Vienna and Buda-Pesth had not always enjoyed the 
role of brilliant second accorded to Austria, and could 
not be counted upon invariably as tools for the 
furtherance of German prestige or German world 
policy. But Austria had every reason to desire the 
weakening of Serbia and the checking of Slavic 
development in the Balkans; she would willingly 
exercise her right to punish Serbia for the crime of 
Serajevo, in order to reestablish her own prestige and 
influence in the peninsula, as well as to protect herself 
from the intrigues of disaffected Serbs. 

Certain of Austrian co-partnership in any attack 

* Supra, Chaps. IX, X. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 249 

upon the status quo in the Near East, Germany- 
believed that she could count upon the abstention of 
the other Powers from any interference. The 
brutality of the murder of the Archduke had horrified 
the whole world and aroused the keenest sympathy 
with Austria. The ministers of the various Powers, 
even of Russia, agreed that Austria would be justified 
in taking strong measures calculated to prevent a 
repetition of such an atrocity. 6 Serbia was identified 
with crime of the most monstrous sort and Austria 
became the representative of law and justice. If, as 
seemed to be the case, the assassination of June 28 
was merely a typical act of one of the Serbian 
societies with which Bosnia was honeycombed, Austria 
had every right to maintain the forces of civilization 
and preserve her own existence, even if the most 
stringent action should prove necessary. It was not 
impossible that the Serbian Government itself had 
been concerned in the murderous intrigues of the 
secret political organizations, and the memory of the 
murder of Alexander and Draga in 1903 did not 
weaken the general belief throughout the world that 
Serbia merited severe punishment. 

Even if the projected action of Austria proved to 
be wider in its scope than was generally expected, it 
would not, in the belief of Germany, lead to the inter- 
vention of the Entente Powers. They had accepted 
the high-handed action of Austria and Germany in 
1908, when Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed, 
and would doubtless allow Serbia and Russia to 

6 Cf. British White Paper, Cd. 7467, 1914, Nos. 5 and 62, Sir Edward 
Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen and Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. 
This collection of documents is hereafter referred to as British Corre- 
spondence to distinguish it from the German White Booh. 



250 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

undergo a similar humiliation in 1914. Furthermore, 
any protests they might enter would be futile because 
of their total incapacity of supporting them by force 
of arms. 

Russia, the natural protector of the Serbs and the 
Power most directly interested in preventing the 
annihilation of Slavic influence in the Balkans, was 
believed in both Austria and Germany to be in no 
condition to risk a war. Every report from St. 
Petersburg emphasized the fact that Russia could not 
take the field and was acutely aware of her own 
impotence. It was known that the Russian Govern- 
ment had borrowed barely enough money to cover 
the cost of the Japanese War, and that entirely 
insufficient amounts had been spent upon the rebuild- 
ing of her naval and military equipment. Ammunition 
and guns demand heavy expenditure and such expen- 
diture had not been made. There were hardly three 
million rifles in Russia and the lack of high explosives 
was a matter of common knowledge. It was under- 
stood that Russia was on the point of beginning a 
thorough military reorganization and development; 
but at the moment she was ill-prepared and her own 
experts, with few exceptions, believed that a war 
against the Teutonic Powers would be suicidal. 6 

Confidence in Russia's inability to take the field 
was increased by Germany's conviction that the 
financial condition of the Slav Empire was chaotic. 
German agents reported that the gold reserve sup- 

« Dillon, A Scrap of Paper, 28-39. In using this work, of which the 
thesis is often utterly unsupported by evidence, the reader must dis- 
tinguish between Dillon's theories and his statements of fact. Much 
of the book seems rather fantastic, but the author's knowledge of 
general conditions and especially of the German attitude may be accepted 
as exact. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 251 

posedly kept in the Imperial Bank for a national 
emergency, had been loaned out, and that a large 
amount of it was in the hands of private corporations 
and individuals, many of them actually German. 
Should a political crisis occur, the Russian Govern- 
ment would face bankruptcy. Furthermore, the 
internal dissensions of Russia would necessarily 
prevent her from entering into war: the Finns, the 
Poles, and the Jews would take advantage of the 
situation to create a revolution; industrial discontent 
would find its opportunity; the greater part of the 
Russian army could never be used on a campaign, 
for it would be needed at home to preserve order and 
maintain the dynasty on the throne. Add to all this 
the fact that Russia's system of transportation, 
inadequate at best, was paralyzed by serious strikes 
and labor difficulties. All such factors were com- 
mented upon by German and Austrian diplomats with 
acrimonious pleasure and they felt abundantly justi- 
fied in their confidence that no effective protest would 
come from Russia. 7 

With Russia inactive, it was not likely that France 
or Great Britain would take any step to oppose the 
humiliation of Serbia and the breaking down of 
Slavic influence in the Balkans. And even if they 
should desire to do so, like Russia they were practi- 

7 According to the French Ambassador in Berlin, Germans realized 
that Eussia was making great improvements in her army and her navy, 
but that those improvements were by no means completed, French 
Yellow Book, 1914, No. 14. A few weeks later the German Ambassador 
in Petrograd reported that Eussia would never go to war, British 
Correspondence, No. 139, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. 
An interesting point to note in this connection is that at the beginning 
of the war, Austria, which ought naturally to be fearful of Eussia, 
sent heavy siege guns and a considerable force of troops to Belgium. 



252 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

cally impotent. Germany believed France to be 
politically and nationally decadent. Her distaste for 
war, and her desire for material comfort and well- 
being were definitely manifested by the debates on 
the three year military system. She was pacifist to 
the core. The French army was ill-trained and ill- 
equipped, according to the testimony of the French 
Minister of War himself. Her system of trans- 
portation, the most important of auxiliary factors 
in modern warfare, was totally lacking in the essen- 
tial qualities of order and rapidity; it was inevitable 
that the French mobilization should go to pieces. 

Furthermore, the political system of France was 
thought by Germans to be totally incapable of stand- 
ing the stress and strain of war. The corruption 
characteristic of the republican form of government 
would be fatal to the efficiency of operations. The 
weakness and division of the nation was being demon- 
strated at the very moment by the scandals of the 
Caillaux case, which in itself so paralyzed the nation 
that the Ministry would be incapable of taking 
effective action in foreign affairs. 8 

Great Britain also was believed to be in no condition 
to intervene in continental matters. The German 
secret service agents laid great stress upon the fact 
that British public opinion was opposed to war, and 
that the Radicals and Laborites, upon whom the 
Liberal Ministry depended, were invariably hostile 
to any action upon the Continent. The Government 
was in the throes of the Ulster crisis, and the proba- 
bility of a civil war in Ireland seemed undeniable; 

8 Annual Register, 1914, 272-273, 281 ; British Correspondence, No 
32, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey; French Yellow Book, No. 14; 
Dillon, A Scrap of Paper, 43-49. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 253 

at the moment when this fratricidal struggle was 
about to begin, Great Britain would be in no position 
to devote attention to the situation in the Balkans. 
Add to this the impression created in Germany by 
the British Government's impotence in attempting to 
deal with the militant feminists; a state which could 
not suppress its own women must realize its total 
incapacity to oppose a Power like Germany! 9 

Such were the arguments upon which Germany and 
Austria based their conviction that the moment was 
ripe for the destruction of the Serb power in the 
Balkans and the clearing of the path to Constanti- 
nople. Serbia was to be stung to a resistance which 
would justify the entrance of an Austrian army and 
the subsequent annihilation of Serb power. Austria 
herself need not annex any portion of Serbian terri- 
tory, but the districts acquired by the Treaty of 
Bukarest could be divided between Rumania, Bul- 
garia, and possibly Greece, who would thus be 
reclaimed by Austrian influence. Such a humiliation 
of Serbia would result in a diplomatic victory over 
Russia, a striking reaffirmation of Teutonic primacy 
in Europe, and the reestablishment of favorable 
commercial conditions in the Near East. The danger 
of a general war, which might result if Russia dared 
to intervene, was slight in the extreme, because of 
the unreadiness of all the Entente Powers. But 
should Russia refuse to accept the humiliation 
designed for her and her protege, Germany was 
thoroughly prepared and could hardly hope to find 
a better opportunity for enforcing her position by 
means of war. 

Under these circumstances the Austrian Govern- 

» Cf. Eose, The Origins of the War, 151-152. 



254 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

ment prepared the note to Serbia which set forth the 
punishment she must undergo for the murder of the 
Archduke, and which gave the first indication of 
the Austro-German scheme of destroying Slavic 
influence in the Near East. Whether or not Germany- 
assisted in the drafting of the note is a matter of 
doubt. It is certain, however, that she was fully 
aware of the general character of the Austrian 
demands and that she had given her promise to 
support them to the uttermost. Germany later 
admitted that the two Governments consulted together 
with regard to the measures that should be taken, 
and that Austria received carte blanche from her 
more powerful ally. The German White Book says 
in this connection: "The Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment advised us of its view of the situation and asked 
our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure 
our Ally most heartily of our agreement with her 
view of the situation, and to assure her that any 
action that she might consider it necessary to take 
in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia 
directed against the existence of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, would receive our approval." 10 
Thus supported by Germany, Austria presented 
her note to Serbia on July 23, 1914. The moment 
chosen for the despatch of the note was carefully 
selected and the situation seemed to favor the chances 

io German White Boole, preface ; Bunsen wrote that he had private 
information that the German Ambassador had knowledge of the text of 
the note before it was sent and wired it to the Kaiser, British Corre- 
spondence, No. 95, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey; the Bavarian 
Prime Minister admitted that he "had knowledge of the note to 
Serbia," and it was hardly likely that under such circumstances the 
Imperial German Government would have been kept in ignorance, 
French Yellow Book, No. 21. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 255 

of Austria's carrying through her project before the 
Powers could intervene, even if they dared. During 
the weeks immediately preceding, Austria had given 
assurances that her demands would be moderate, and 
expressed the belief that there would be no serious 
crisis. 11 None of the diplomats were prepared for 
extreme measures on the part of Austria. The 
Eussian Ambassador at Vienna, having received 
formal assurances that the situation was not grave, 
had left Vienna for a fortnight's vacation. The 
French President, Poincare, was in Russia with 
Viviani, the Prime Minister. 12 The French Ambas- 
sador to Serbia was away from Belgrade. The 
attention of British statesmen was wholly directed 
towards the Home Rule conference; the note to 
Serbia, in fact, was despatched upon the very day 
that the conference failed and when civil war in 
Ulster seemed unavoidable. The diplomats of the 
Entente Powers thus could not easily meet to arrange 
a concerted protest to the Austrian demands, and the 
Germanic Powers would be dealing solely with Serbia. 
The character of the demands made in the note of 
July 23 was such as to indicate the extent to which 
Germany and Austria meant to alter the Balkan 
situation. 13 Only forty-eight hours was allowed 

ii French Yellow Boole, Nos. 11 and 12. On July 23 the general 
secretary of the Austrian Foreign Office assured the French Ambassador 
that "a pacific conclusion could be counted on," Ibid., No. 20. 

12 British Correspondence, No. 161, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward 
Grey; French Yellow Book, Nos. 18 and 25. 

is The terms of the note to Serbia are printed in British Corre- 
spondence, No. 4, and in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, of July 
25, 1914, with comments illustrating the German point of view. Both 
England and Italy agreed that the terms of the note were of the most 
threatening character, British Correspondence, Nos. 5 and 41; French 
Yellow Book, No. 56. 



256 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Serbia in which to make her reply; clearly she was 
not to have time to consult her friends, or place the 
question before Europe. She was given her choice 
of complete submission before the end of this period, 
or of war. And the conditions laid down for her 
acceptance were such that if she submitted she would 
become to all intents and purposes a vassal state of 
Austria. 

The Hapsburg Monarchy demanded that the Serb 
Government should officially condemn the anti- 
Austrian propaganda and promise to punish all 
Serb officials who should later take part in it; that 
it should dissolve the Narodna Odbrana, the great 
nationalistic organization, suppress all publications 
directed against Austria, dismiss all teachers con- 
nected with the anti-Austrian movement and all 
military officers and civil functionaries named by the 
Austrian Government as being concerned in that 
propaganda; that it should arrest two Serbians, 
specially named as implicated in the plot of Serajevo, 
prevent all illicit traffic in arms across the frontier 
and punish the officials who had facilitated such 
traffic. These terms were such that Serbia might 
possibly have accepted them without loss of anything 
but pride. But there followed two further demands 
which no state claiming to be independent could 
accord: Austria insisted that representatives of her 
Government should be allowed to collaborate in the 
suppression of the anti- Austrian movement, and, 
furthermore, that Austrian officials take part in 
the judicial investigation relating to the plot that 
culminated on June 28. 

The acceptance of the two latter conditions would 
have rendered the Serbian Ministers liable to a charge 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 257 

of high treason, for such cooperation as Austria 
suggested was not merely contrary to criminal pro- 
cedure but also to Serbian law. 14 As an independent 
nation Serbia could not be expected to surrender her 
sovereign rights and quietly accept the suzerainty of 
Austria, which the note suggested. It seemed obvious 
that Austria had so constructed her demands as to 
make their acceptance an impossibility, in order that 
she might have an excuse for the military invasion 
of Serbia and a complete overturning of the balance 
in the Balkans. The Austrian people were clamoring 
for war and the diplomats realized that their plans 
found popular support. "The impression left on my 
mind," said the British Ambassador at Vienna, "is 
that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as 
to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government are fully resolved to have war with 
Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great 
Power at stake; and that until punishment has been 
administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will 
listen to proposals of mediation. This country has 
gone wild at the prospect of war with Serbia, and 
its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly 
be a great disappointment." 15 

From the first, Germany showed an uncompromis- 
ing attitude: the affair was a local one, according to 
her expressed views of the situation, and any inter- 

i* Eussian Orange Book, No. 25. 

is British Correspondence, No. 161, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward 
Grey. Cf. also letter of the Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berehtold, 
Austrian Bed Book, No. 6 : " An accounting with Serbia, a war for the 
position of the monarchy as a great Power, yes for its very existence 
as such, cannot permanently be avoided." The Militarische Bundschau 
said: "If we do not make up our minds to go to war now, we shall 
have to do so in two or three years' time and under much less favorable 



258 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

vention of the other Powers was not to be considered. 
Nor did the German press conceal their pleasure at 
the prospect of seeing Serbia brought under the 
suzerainty of Austria, and Austrian influence once 
more predominant in the Balkans to the profit of 
Germany. The one fear expressed was that the 
Austrian conditions would be accepted en bloc, and 
that there would be no war against Serbia. 16 

That fear was almost realized, for the Serbian 
reply to the note, delivered on July 25, was practically 
a complete submission. Serbia promised to make the 
official declaration against the anti-Austrian propa- 
ganda that was demanded of her, and of the other 
ten conditions, she agreed to accept eight. Two she 
accepted with reserves: the Serbian Government 
expressed its inability to understand the kind of 
collaboration which Austria demanded in the attack 
on the propaganda, but promised to permit such 
collaboration as was in conformity with international 
law and criminal procedure; the cooperation of 
Austria in the judicial investigation was impossible, 
since it was contrary to law, but Serbia promised to 
communicate the results of such investigations to the 
Austrian officials. Finally, if Austria were not 
satisfied with the terms of the reply, the Serbian 
Government declared itself ready to place the matter 
either before the Hague Tribunal or the great 

conditions." The Neue Freie Presse was indignant at the thought 
of attempting a pacific arrangement; it believed that a peaceful settle- 
ment could follow only a "war to the knife against Pan-Slavism," 
French Yellow Book, Nos. 12, 17. Bunsen wrote to Grey that "the 
language of the press leaves the impression that the surrender of Serbia 
is neither expected nor really desired, ' ' British Correspondence, No. 20. 
is British Correspondence, Nos. 2, 32, 33, 71. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 259 

Powers. 17 Thus even in the two points that were not 
completely accepted, Serbia left wide opportunity 
for a peaceful understanding, if Austria so desired. 

Had Austria accepted the Serbian reply as satis- 
factory, she would have secured a notable diplomatic 
victory and would probably have been able to cripple 
Serb influence so effectively as to nullify the effect of 
the Treaty of Bukarest and reestablish her own 
influence in the Balkans; she would have punished 
Serbia for the murder of the Archduke and would 
have received guarantees for the future. But Austria 
was apparently determined that her troops should 
enter Serbia and to all appearances had made up her 
mind to find the Serb reply unsatisfactory. The 
Austrian Minister in Belgrade spent only forty 
minutes in an examination of the document, supposed 
to be of all-importance, declared it unsatisfactory, 
and immediately left for Vienna. 18 At the moment, 
no reason was given for the rejection of Serbia's 
response, and it was not until July 28, that a brief 
note explained that the Serb answer made no real 
concessions, and was entirely evasive in character. 19 

Once more Serbia attenrpted to avert the open 
hostilities that threatened. On July 28, the Serbian 
Charge d'affaires at Rome made a proposition to the 
Italian Foreign Minister which displayed Serbia's 
eagerness to find any solution, no matter how humiliat- 
ing for herself: "If some explanation were given 
regarding the mode in which Austrian agents would 

it British Correspondence, No. 39; Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
July 29, 1914 (with official comments). 

is Durkheim et Denis, Qui a voulu la guerre? 19. 

is German White Book; French Yellow Book, No. 75; British Corre- 
spondence, No. 31; Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 29, 1914. 



260 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

require to intervene . . . Serbia might still accept 
the whole Austrian note." And the Italian Minister 
suggested that if Austria considered that she would 
compromise her dignity by giving explanations to 
Serbia, she might communicate them to the Powers, 
who would pass them on to Serbia. 20 But Austria 
would not consider this last proposal and on the 
evening of July 28, declared war on Serbia. 21 

Everything now depended upon the attitude taken 
by Russia. If that Power accepted the German 
demand that the question between Austria and Serbia 
should be localized, and permitted Austria to prose- 
cute her aggressive action against Serbia, it was not 
likely that France or Great Britain would intervene. 
Sir Edward Grey had made it perfectly clear that 
the Austro-Serb quarrel in itself did not interest 
Great Britain, and that if Russia did not step in, he 
would not act. 22 In Austria the belief was strong that 
Russia would not intervene and that war with Serbia 
would not result in a general European conflict; the 
British Ambassador at Vienna wrote that few seemed 
to reflect that the forcible intervention of a great 
Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other great 
Powers into the field. 23 In Germany the possibility 
of Russian intervention began to be regarded more 
seriously; but on July 24, the German Ambassador 
at Vienna expressed his conviction that Russia would 
stand aside. 2 * Hence the uncompromising brutality 
with which Austria disposed of every attempt to 
prevent war with Serbia. 

20 British Correspondence, No. 64, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

21 British Correspondence, No. 50. 

22 British Correspondence, Nos. 10, 24, 44. 

23 British Correspondence, No. 161. 

2 * British Correspondence, Nos. 32, 161. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 261 

And yet from the very first Russia attempted to 
make it clear that she could not afford to stand aside 
from the unequal quarrel; it was morally and politi- 
cally impossible for her to remain an indifferent 
spectator of Serbia's annihilation by Austria. The 
bonds of ethnic relationship and historical tradition 
that connected the two nations, the role of protector 
of the Slavic peoples assumed by Russia, definitely 
prevented her from leaving Serbia defenceless. All 
the political interests of Russia in the Near East, 
moreover, impelled her to intervene and save Serbia 
from falling under Austrian suzerainty. During the 
Balkan crisis of the previous year Russia had made 
it clear to Austria that war with Russia must inevi- 
tably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia; should 
Russia tolerate such action, in the opinion of M. 
Sazonof, she would have to face a revolution. 25 
Russia felt with equal intensity in 1914 that " Austrian 
domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia 
as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany 
would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia 
a question of life and death." 26 

Such sentiments were frankly expressed by the 
Russian diplomats and had not Germany and Austria 
been deceived by the reports of their secret service 
agents and the obtuseness of certain of their own 
diplomats, they must have realized that Russia would 
not allow herself and Serbia to be humiliated as in 
1908, but would certainly intervene. From the first, 
Sir Edward Grey had feared that Russia could not 
stand aside, and that the clash between Austria and 

25 British Correspondence, No. 139. 

26 British Correspondence, No. 139, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward 
Grey. 



262 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR 

Eussia would at once bring in Germany and precipi- 
tate a general war. He had therefore suggested that 
the Powers should exercise concerted pressure upon 
both Austria and Russia in the hope of discovering 
a peaceful solution of the Austro-Serb crisis. 27 But 
for this the cooperation of Germany was necessary, 
and when suggested it was categorically refused; the 
German Government replied that it could not "mix 
in the conflict." Germany desired that pressure 
should be brought upon Russia to prevent her inter- 
vention on Serbia's behalf, but at the same time 
insisted that Austria should be left with free hands. 28 
On July 26, after the diplomatic rupture between 
Austria and Serbia but before the former's declara- 
tion of war, Sir Edward Grey made another attempt 
at conciliation. He proposed that the four Powers 
not directly interested should authorize their Ambas- 
sadors to meet in conference and seek some formula 
of agreement; in the meantime Serbia, Austria, and 
Russia should enter upon no military operations. 29 
To this suggestion Prance and Italy agreed, and it 
was also favored by Russia, who had already made 
overtures to Austria for the purpose of entering into 
direct conversations. 30 But Germany refused the 
project of this conference although she approved its 
"principle"; it would be, in her opinion, tantamount 
to calling Austria and Russia before an international 
court, which was out of the question. 31 In vain did 

27 British Correspondence, No. 24, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. 
Buchanan. 

28 French Yellow Book, Nos. 36, 37. 

29 British Correspondence, No. 36, Sir Edward Grey to Sir P. Bertie, 
Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Bodd. 

so British Correspondence, Nos. 49, 51, 53, 55. 
3i British Correspondence, Nos. 43, 67, 71. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 263 

the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, point out to 
Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, that 
in such a crisis questions of form should be left on 
one side, and that if a peaceable solution could not be 
speedily discovered, the responsibility for the catas- 
trophe would rest upon Germany. The German 
diplomat replied in evasive terms and still refused 
the conference. 32 The Russian proposition for con- 
versations was likewise refused by Austria, and on 
July 28, Count Berchtold withheld from the Austrian 
Ambassador the powers necessary if he was to discuss 
with Russia the terms of the note to Serbia. 33 

Previous to the Austrian declaration of war upon 
Serbia (July 28), there were thus three definite 
attempts made by the Entente Powers in the hope of 
preventing the crisis from becoming so acute as to 
force the entrance of Russia into a conflict with 
Austria. The offers of Sir Edward Grey to bring 
pressure upon Russia if Germany would act in similar 
fashion at Vienna, and his suggestion of a conference 
of the Powers not directly interested, had been refused 
by Germany. Russia's offer to enter into conversa- 
tions with Austria had been equally refused by that 
Power. Evidently both Germany and her ally still 
clung to their belief that Russia would stand aside. 
So firmly convinced had they been of the impossibility 
of any effective protest on the part of the Slav Power, 
that they still failed to realize that Russia was serious 
in her expressed determination to support her protege, 
and still believed that they could carry through their 
plan for overturning the Balkan balance of power 
without a general war. 

32 French Yellow Boole, No. 74. 

33 British Correspondence, No. 61. 



264 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

For another forty-eight hours, following the Aus- 
trian declaration of war upon Serbia, the situation 
was not materially changed. It is true that Germany 
gave assurances that she was working for peace, but 
she continued to reject all pacific proposals, and in 
her White Book there is no document suggesting that 
she attempted to bring pressure to bear upon Austria 
which would lead the latter Power to moderate her 
action. 

Russia, on the other hand, although she had ordered 
partial mobilization in answer to that of Austria, 
continued to offer suggestions that were calculated 
to facilitate an arrangement. On July 29, the Russian 
Government signified its willingness to concur in any 
procedure proposed by France or England for the 
safeguarding of peace. 34 And on the same day, M. 
Sazonof, in a conversation with the German Ambas- 
sador, made an offer which, if accepted, would have 
provided the delay necessary for a peaceful arrange- 
ment. "If Austria," he said, "recognizing that the 
Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character 
of a European question, declares herself ready to 
eliminate from her ultimatum the points which are 
an infringement of the sovereign rights of Serbia, 
Russia undertakes to cease her military operations." 35 
But the German Foreign Minister, without even 
consulting the Austrian Government, declared that 
this suggestion could not be accepted at Vienna. 36 

Previous to July 30, both Austria and Germany thus 
maintained their uncompromising attitude. But on 

34 French Yellow Boole, No. 86. 

35 Kussian Orange Boole, No. 60; French Yellow Boole, No. 103. 

36 Russian Orange Boole, No. 63 ; French Yelloiv Boole, No. 107. 
There is no trace of these latter negotiations in the German White Boole. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 265 

that day certain effects of the partial mobilization 
of Eussia were discernible in Vienna. On July 31, 
Austria having decreed general mobilization, Eussia 
also ordered the mobilization of her entire army and 
fleet a few hours later ; 37 the fact was capital and from 
this moment the scene changed abruptly. Austria 
suddenly realized that the execution of her plan was 
impossible, since it had become obvious that the pro- 
jected annihilation of Serbia would not be quietly 
permitted by Eussia, who was serious in her deter- 
mination to intervene. Austria found herself facing 
a general war and began to draw back in fear of the 
consequences. 38 

Germany, on the other hand, accepted the conse- 
quences. Disappointed that the crisis was not to end, 
as she had hoped, in a diplomatic victory, she was 
nevertheless determined that the position she had 
taken up should be maintained, even at the cost of 
war. Although she had been convinced that Eussia 
would allow herself to be quietly humiliated, she had 
weighed the possibility of Eussian resistance and was 
well prepared to break down that resistance by force 
of arms. From two o'clock of July 31, Germany 
began to force the issue, anxious for military reasons 
that the war which seemed to her inevitable, because 
of her own and Eussia 's determined attitude, should 
be precipitated at the earliest possible moment. 

37 German White Book, preface; French Yellow Boole, Nos. 115, 118. 
as Austrian Bed Boole, Nos. 48, 49 ; British Correspondence, No. 96. 



CHAPTER XII 
THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 

The realization on the part of Austria that she had 
gone too far and was treading on dangerous ground, 
seems to have been first awakened by the partial 
mobilization of Russia. M. Sazonof had hoped that 
this military measure would be regarded as a clear 
intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding 
the fate of Serbia, and the hope was largely justified. 
Count Berchtold, who two days before had brusquely 
refused to allow direct conversations with Russia by 
withholding the necessary powers from the Austrian 
Ambassador, agreed on July 30, to a resumption of 
such conversations; his refusal, he explained, had 
been due to a misunderstanding. And for the first 
time Austria made a concession of enormous import- 
ance when she admitted the subject of the Austro- 
Serb quarrel to discussion. The Austrian Ambassador 
was authorized "to discuss what arrangement would 
be compatible with the dignity and prestige which 
was of equal importance to both Empires." And 
the Russian Ambassador gave his assurance that 
"his Government would take into consideration the 
demands of the Austrian Monarchy in a far more 
generous spirit than was expected." 1 

The general mobilization of the Russian forces on 
the next day (July 31) increased the pacific spirit 

1 Austrian Bed Book, TTos. 50, 51 ; French Yellow Boole, No. 104. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 267 

of Austria in the most striking fashion. The Austrian 
Government agreed to discuss the substance of their 
ultimatum of July 23 to Serbia. They further agreed 
to accept the mediation of the Powers, based on a 
proposition suggested by Sir Edward Grey and 
drafted by M. Sazonof, to the effect that after the 
occupation of Belgrade, Austria would cease her 
advance into Serbia and would discuss a settlement, 
Russia also agreeing to suspend further military 
preparations. 2 Austria thus conceded the main point 
of the Russian demands and showed clearly her 
desire for a peaceful settlement. Count Berchtold 
begged the Russian Ambassador to do all that lay in 
his power to remove the false impression that St. 
Petersburg had received of the Austrian attitude; 
it was not true, he said, that Austria had "brutally 
banged the door on -negotiations. ' ' And he hastened 
to inform Paris and London that the Austrian 
Government had no intention of impugning the 
sovereign rights of Serbia. 3 It was all that Russia 
asked for. 

The willingness of the diplomats of the Ballplatz 
to compromise, once they were convinced that Russia 
would not stand aside, was thus complete, and the 
path to a peaceable arrangement seemed clear. 
Russia was prepared to accept any reasonable settle- 
ment which would not force humiliation upon Serbia 
and herself, and Austria was negotiating in the most 
amicable spirit. Provided no other factor obtruded 
itself, the peace of Europe was assured. But now 
for the first time Germany definitely entered into 

2 Austrian Bed Boole, Nos. 53, 55, 56; Russian Orange Boole, No. 67; 
British Correspondence, 103, 120, 133, 135. 

3 Russian Orange Boole, No. 73 ; British Correspondence, No. 137. 



268 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

the situation and her intervention cnt short the 
conciliatory conversations between St. Petersburg 
and Vienna. Germany has constantly maintained 
that her influence with the Austrian diplomats had 
always been of a moderating character, that she was 
" pressing the button" for peace; but the first 
moment that her action can be clearly traced, it was 
evidently calculated to prevent the concessions offered 
by Austria. 

From the moment of Eussian mobilization, which 
marked the beginning of Austria's conciliatory tone, 
the attitude of Germany became increasingly bellicose. 
The news of Russia's mobilization, received at Vienna 
without protest or feeling, provoked the sharpest of 
rejoinders at Berlin. At two o'clock on July 31, the 
Kaiser sent to the Tsar a telegram conceived in the 
spirit of menace and warning him in threats hardly 
veiled that unless Russia ceased her military prepara- 
tions war must result, and the responsibility would 
be Russia's. 4 At the same time the German Govern- 
ment declared Kriegsgefahr, thus allowing the virtual 
mobilization of the German forces. 5 Finally, at 
midnight, Germany delivered an ultimatum to Russia, 
demanding that she cease all military preparations, 
whether on the side of Austria or Germany; a reply 
was requested within twelve hours. 6 

The brevity of the period allowed for response by 
the ultimatum was such that regard for her own 
dignity made an acceptance by Russia difficult, if not 
impossible. It would not have been illogical for 
Germany to point out that the Russian mobilization 

< German White Book, Annex 24. 
6 German White Boole, Annex 25. 
6 German White Boole, Annex 26. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 269 

on the German frontier could not be regarded with 
equanimity at Berlin, although Russia had specifically- 
declared that her military preparation did not signify 
hostile intentions. 7 But it was beyond reason that 
Germany should insist that Russia cease to protect 
herself on her Austrian frontier at the moment that 
Austria was arming in that quarter and although 
Austria herself had not taken umbrage at the Russian 
mobilization. Germany's intervention in the fashion 
she employed clearly signified that she meant to 
insist on the complete surrender of Russia, and she 
backed her demand by a threat of war. As the German 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg said, "if it was not 
yet war, it was not far from it. ' ' 

Thus at the moment when the situation between 
Austria and Russia was growing brighter, Germany 
transferred the dispute to the more dangerous ground 
of a direct conflict between Russia and herself. Nor 
would she accept the mediation proposed by Sir 
Edward Grey, the principle of which was almost 
eagerly seized by Austria. In vain did the British 
Ambassador at Berlin point out to the German 
Foreign Secretary that the dispute was in reality 
between Austria and Russia, and that Germany's 
interest in it was merely as Austria's ally. If Austria 
and Russia were ready to discuss matters, it seemed 
only logical that Germany should hold her hand, "if 
she did not desire war on her own account." Von 
Jagow only replied that it was too late ; if Russia had 
not mobilized, all would have been well; Russia had 

7 The despatches of the German military attache at St. Petersburg 
show that Bussia's mobilization was directed against Austria and not 
against Germany : ' ' Mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. 
It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and elsewhere it has probably not 
been ordered," German White Book, Annex 7. 



270 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

forced Germany to demand demobilization, and if that 
demand were not heeded, war would result. 8 

The ultimatum of Germany to Russia, drawn up in 
terms which were manifestly inacceptable for a great 
Power, threw the Serbian aspect of the crisis totally 
into the background. Russia and Germany were now 
face to face and neither would yield. It is true that 
the Tsar, without accepting the German demand, 
made one last effort to prevent war. "I can see that 
you are obliged to mobilize," he telegraphed the 
Kaiser, "but I would have from you the same guar- 
antee that I have given — that these measures do 
not mean war and that we shall pursue our negotia- 
tions for the good of our two countries and the 
general peace, which is so dear to our hearts." But 
the Kaiser remained deaf to what he doubtless 
considered to be merely an attempt to gain time. "An 
immediate reply from your Government," he tele- 
graphed, "clear and unequivocal, is the sole means 
of preventing an infinite calamity. Until I receive 
that reply it is, to my great regret, impossible to take 
up the subject of your telegram." 9 

The reply was never sent by Russia. The demobili- 
zation of her army, with Germany's threats hanging 
over her and at the moment when her principal 
antagonist accepted that mobilization and yet nego- 
tiated, would have meant the deepest humiliation 
ever undergone by a first-class Power. For the sake 
of her national honor and her position in Europe, 
Russia could not consent to the reply that Germany 
demanded. Germany, on the other hand, was deter- 
mined to carry through her plan, cost what it might. 

8 British Correspondence, No. 138. 

9 Exchange of telegrams, August 1. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 271 

From the first she seems to have set her heart 
on the reaffirmation of German prestige and to have 
believed that her scheme could be executed by- 
means of diplomatic threats, as in 1908. To draw 
back at the last moment would mean a diplomatic 
reverse not less serious than that of 1911. Now 
that it became apparent that her hegemony was not 
to be reestablished by a diplomatic victory, she was 
prepared to assert it by means of war. At ten 
minutes past seven, on August 1, having received from 
St. Petersburg no reply to her ultimatum, Germany 
officially declared war upon Russia. 10 

That France would be included in the war thus 
begun, no one doubted. Germany had expected it and 
her mobilization had been carried out upon her 
western as upon her eastern front. Premier Viviani 
had in effect given warning that France would assist 
her ally against Germany, when he had answered the 
German question as to whether she would remain 
neutral, by stating that France would do that which 
her interests dictated. 11 But France, in order to 
demonstrate the defensive character of the war on 
her part, carefully abstained from inaugurating any 
act of hostility ; the French Government believed that 
it was of importance to lay stress on the fact that she 
was the attacked party, both to win the public opinion 
of the world and to ensure the neutrality of Italy. 
Hence the French troops received orders to retire 
ten kilometres from the frontier. 12 

Germany, however, because of her plan of campaign, 
which called for an immediate advance into France, 

io Eussian Orange Booh, No. 76. 
ii German White Boole, Annex 27. 
12 French Yellow Book, No. 136. 



272 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

could not afford to wait. On the morning of Sunday, 
August 2, the Germans crossed the French frontier, 
and on the evening of the following day the German 
Ambassador asked for his passports and handed in a 
declaration of war. Acts of aggression alleged to 
have been committed by French aviators in Germany, 
formed the justification. 13 

Germany was entirely prepared for war with 
France and Eussia. She had long realized that the 
maintenance of her continental hegemony might lead 
to a conflict of arms, and since 1912 had been putting 
herself in condition to carry on the war on both of 
her frontiers. Although she was disappointed that 
the scheme of annihilating Slavic influence in the 
Balkans could not be carried through by means of an 
Austro-Serb war solely, as had been planned, and 
although she was equally surprised that Russia and 
France dared to pick up the gauntlet, she recognized 
that war with these Powers could be waged with 
better hopes of success in 1914 than a few years later. 
War with Great Britain, however, she earnestly 
desired to avoid. Such a contingency might ultimately 
arrive, as Germany pressed on her path towards 
world empire, but she hoped steadfastly that it would 
not be necessary before she had regained control of 
the Continent through the defeat, either diplomatic 
or military, of Russia and France. She must not 
fight all the Entente Powers at once. 

is The falsity of these allegations is manifest. It was said that bombs 
were thrown on the railway near Nuremberg, but the Franlcische Kurrier 
made no mention of them on August 2, and it was only on August 3 
that Nuremberg received word of the attack by a telegram from Berlin. 
The Eolnische Zeitung of August 3 reported that the Bavarian Minister 
of War doubted the story of aviators and bomb-dropping near Nurem- 
berg. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 273 

During the Balkan crisis of 1912 and 1913, when 
Germany realized that the struggle for primacy on 
the Continent might be precipitated at any moment, 
she had done her best to improve her relations with 
Great Britain. Her attempts had found response in 
the British Liberal Ministry, and it was largely due 
to the combined efforts of Sir Edward Grey, Lord 
Haldane, and Bethmann-Hollweg that the first Balkan 
War had been localized." "With the opening of the 
crisis that resulted from the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia, the German Chancellor immediately renewed 
his efforts to secure British neutrality in case of a 
general continental war. 

He made his first attempt on July 29, at the moment 
when Germany was beginning to menace Russia with 
threats of war if that Power continued its mobilization. 
In a conversation with Sir W. E. Goschen, the British 
Ambassador at Berlin, Bethmann-Hollweg promised 
that if Great Britain would stand aside, Germany 
would seek no territorial aggrandizement at the 
expense of France, although she could promise 
nothing in respect to the French colonies. The 
neutrality of Holland would be respected, and although 
Germany could give no assurance as to Belgium until 
the French plan of action was revealed, her integrity 
would be respected at the end of the war, if she had 

14 Cf . ' ' Truth about Germany, ' ' in New York Times Current History 
of the War, Vol. I, No. 2, 247; and Schiemann, "England and Ger- 
many," Ibid., Vol. II, No. 4, 788, 794. Schiemann tells of the pacific 
attitude of British statesmen during his visit to London in March, 
1914, and quotes a personal letter from Haldane: "My ambition is, 
like yours, to bring Germany into relations of ever closer intimacy and 
friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the 
world as well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear 
on this work special endowments and qualities. May the cooperation 
which I believe to be now beginning, become closer and closer. ' ' 



274 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

not sided against Germany. Finally the German 
Chancellor recalled the fact that his policy had 
always aimed at an understanding with England, and 
said that he "had in mind a general neutrality agree- 
ment between England and Germany . . . and the 
assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which 
the present crisis might produce, would enable him 
to look forward to the realization of his desire." 15 

The offer of a general neutrality agreement would 
doubtless prove a great temptation to British Radi- 
cals, and Germany probably hoped thus to keep Great 
Britain out of the way while she was engaged in 
dealing with Russia and France. The British Ambas- 
sador, however, refused to fetter his Government's 
liberty of action by any promises, and on the same 
day Sir Edward Grey warned the German Ambas- 
sador at London not to be misled by England's 
friendly tone into thinking that she would necessarily 
stand aside. He said frankly that it was impossible 
to say who might not be drawn into the conflict. 16 And 
on July 30, the British Foreign Secretary definitely 
refused the German offer of the day before, in terms 
that could hardly be misunderstood. What Germany 
asked, he said, was in effect "to engage to stand by 
while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, 
so long as Germany does not take French territory 
as distinct from the colonies. From the material 
point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for 
France, without further territory in Europe being 
taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her 
position as a Great Power, and become subordinate 

15 British Correspondence, No. 85, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward 
Grey. 

i« British Correspondence, Nos. 89, 90. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 275 

to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it 
would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with 
Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from 
which the good name of the country would never 
recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to 
bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have 
as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not 
entertain that bargain either. ' m 

Germany therefore had clear warning that the 
neutrality of Great Britain was not a postulate upon 
which she could count. And the German Ambassador 
in London became convinced that in the event of a 
German attack upon France, Great Britain would 
surely support the latter Power. 18 But at Berlin, 
confidence in the British pacifist spirit still persisted. 
The diplomats there counted upon Lord Haldane, 
who was regarded as Germany's friend and had been 
prominent in favoring an understanding with Ger- 
many; the peace-making influence of Lord Morley 
and John Burns was also believed to be such that no 
Cabinet advocating war would receive the support 
of the Radical and Labor elements, which were not 
likely to refuse the offer of a general agreement of 
neutrality between Great Britain and Germany. 
Above all, the diplomats of Wilhelmstrasse counted 

it British Correspondence, No. 101. 

is The diplomats at Berlin apparently left England so completely 
out of their calculations that Grey's very serious warning was received 
by the German Chancellor without any comment except that his mind 
was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering 
it unless a written memorandum were given him, British Correspondence, 
No. 109. The German Ambassador to St. James, on the other hand, was 
so perturbed at the danger of British intervention that he tried to 
extract the promise that Great Britain would remain neutral if Ger- 
many promised not to violate Belgian neutrality, Ibid., No. 123. 



276 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

upon the consciousness of unreadiness which they 
felt must be in the minds of the British statesmen. 

It is true that notwithstanding the firm attitude of 
Sir Edward Grey, neither Cabinet nor people in 
England were undivided as to the policy that Great 
Britain should follow. So long as the question was 
one of Balkan diplomacy and seemed to involve 
merely a struggle between Austria and Russia for 
leadership in the Near East, British public opinion 
remained cold to the idea of intervention. Even the 
danger that Great Britain would face if France were 
attacked and subjugated by Germany was not univer- 
sally appreciated. For a decade the fear of Germany 
in England had been a very real fact and had led to 
popular approval of the understandings with France 
and Russia. But it was one thing to recognize the 
German menace abstractly, and quite another to enter 
into a concrete war against Germany for the defence 
of France. 

Of such sentiments the Berlin Government was well 
aware, and the reports of German agents in England 
buoyed up the German hope that England would not 
approve intervention on the Continent for the pro- 
tection of France. It is almost inconceivable that the 
opinions of Sir Edward Grey would not finally have 
triumphed, but it is possible that if Germany had not 
herself forced to the front the one issue that could 
unite Great Britain against her, the latter Power 
might have found great difficulty in making up her 
mind. But Germany made up Great Britain's mind 
for her on August 3, by the invasion of Belgium; it 
was practically impossible for Great Britain to stand 
aside after this violation of a treaty which she was 
pledged to maintain, and with Germany threatening 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 277 

to occupy a strategic position which would render 
England practically defenceless. 

The neutrality of Belgium is, perhaps, hardly less 
essential for the safety of England than the mainte- 
nance of the British fleet, and ever since the Middle 
Ages it has been a definite principle of British policy 
that the Low Countries should not be held or con- 
trolled by a first-class Power. Geography and history 
have alike emphasized the necessity of maintaining 
this principle, if British security is to be assured. 19 
The Scheldt is directly opposite the mouth of the 
Thames, and control of this river is one of the first 
conditions of a successful raid on, or invasion of the 
east coast of England, which is far easier to approach 
than the south coast. This fact has been recognized 
by the enemies of England as by her statesmen; 
Napoleon once said, "Antwerp is a pistol aimed 
point-blank at the heart of England." 

All through her history England has never hesitated 
to oppose with all her power the acquisition of the 
Low Countries by one of the great continental nations. 
The Hundred Years' War began in 1340 with the 
battle of Sluys, when England protected the Flemish 
burghers from the King of France. Howard and 
Drake fought the Spanish Armada in 1588 when 
England was helping the Low Countries win their 
independence from Spain. Pitt attacked France in 
1793, not so much because Robespierre and Danton 
had cut off the head of Louis XVI as because France 
was conquering Belgium. As between England and 
Napoleon, Belgium was always one of the chief issues, 
and it was the French Emperor's determination to 
hold on to this strategical position that largely deter- 

i9 Cf. Eose, The Origins of the War, 176-177. 



278 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

mined the undying enmity of the British Government 
towards him. 

After the fall of Napoleon, Belgium was united with 
Holland, but revolted in 1830 and demanded the 
recognition of her independence. To this demand the 
Powers agreed, but as it was impossible to form of 
Belgium a state strong enough to defend itself, they 
imposed upon her the condition of perpetual neu- 
trality. Belgium thus received the guarantee of 
security from foreign invasion or absorption by a 
great Power, and paid for it the price of remaining 
neutral under all circumstances. In 1831 her neu- 
trality was confirmed, and on April 19, 1839, Belgium 
and Holland signed a treaty which provided that 
''Belgium forms an independent state of perpetual 
neutrality"; on the same date Prussia, France, Great 
Britain, Austria, and Eussia signed a treaty, by 
which those states became the "guarantors" of such 
neutrality. 20 

Upon the outbreak of the Franco-German War, in 
1870, Gladstone entered into special treaties with 
France and Prussia which reinsured Belgian neu- 
trality, but which did not abrogate the Treaty of 
1839. 21 Bismarck also emphasized the security of 

20 The treaties of 1831 and 1839 are published in Hertslet, Map 
of Europe by Treaty, ii, 858, 979, Nos. 153, 183. For discussion of the 
status of Belgium, see Descamps, La Neutrality de la Belgique (1902) 
and L'Etat neutre d Titre permanent (1912). 

2i The treaties of 1870 are published in Hertslet, Map of Europe by 
Treaty, iii, 1886, 1889, Nos. 427, 428. For Gladstone on the importance 
of Belgian neutrality, see Beer, in New York Times Current History of 
the War, Vol. I, No. 3, 448-450. The necessity of Belgian neutrality 
for Great Britain also appears from a letter of Queen Victoria written 
to the King of the Belgians in 1852, at the time of the alleged designs 
of Napoleon III on Belgium: "Any attempt on Belgium would be 
casus belli for us," Letters of Queen Victoria, ii, 438. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 279 

Belgium's position by promising to respect her 
neutrality, a promise which he declared to be quite 
superfluous in view of the treaties in force. 22 The 
Hague Convention of 1907 laid further emphasis on 
the fact that the territory of neutral countries is 
inviolable and the transport of troops through them 
forbidden. 23 

During the crises that marked the first decade of the 
twentieth century, the possibility of an invasion of 
Belgium by Germany was more than once considered. 
And it appears that in 1906 and 1912, officials of Great 
Britain and Belgium discussed what measures of 
defence Belgium could take and what assistance Great 
Britain could offer if Belgian neutrality were violated 
by Germany. 24 But in 1911 and 1913, the German 
Foreign Secretary stated distinctly that "the neu- 
trality of Belgium is determined by international 

22 Bismarck wrote : "In confirmation of my verbal assurance I 
have the honor to give in writing a declaration, which in view of the 
treaties in force is quite superfluous, that the Confederation of the 
North and its allies will respect the neutrality of Belgium, on the 
understanding, of course, that it is respected by the other belligerent," 
cited by Beck, The Evidence in the Case, 194. 

23 The Hague Convention in its chapter on ' ' The Eights and Duties 
of Neutral Powers," declares: "Art. I: The territory of neutral 
Powers is inviolable . . . Art. II: Belligerents are forbidden to move 
troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the 
territory of a neutral Power . . . Art. X: The fact of a neutral Power 
resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be 
regarded as a hostile act." 

24 Papers discovered in Belgium by the invading Germans show that 
Col. Barnardiston discussed the problem of Belgium's defence with the 
chief of the Belgian military staff in 1906. There is nothing to show 
that the conversations were official, and it is clear that British interven- 
tion was not to be considered unless Belgium found herself unable to 
withstand invasion, "Official abstract of Papers," in New York Times 
Current History of the War, Vol. I, No. 2, 370. 



280 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

conventions, and Germany is resolved to respect 
those conventions." 25 

Nevertheless the construction of strategic railway- 
lines by Germany on the Belgian frontier, which did 
not seem to be entirely justified by the commercial 
necessities of the territory, kept alive the suspicion 
that in case of war with France, Germany would seek 
the speediest means of striking into the heart of 
France, which was through Belgium. And on July 
31, 1914, when it became obvious that a European war 
could be averted only with difficulty, Sir Edward Grey 
asked both France and Germany whether they were 
prepared to respect Belgian neutrality, provided it 
were violated by no other Power. 26 To this question 
France immediately replied in the affirmative. 27 But 
the German Government refused to give a definite 
answer, and the British Ambassador reported his 
belief that for strategic reasons they would probably 
decline to give any assurance. 28 

It was thus plain that Germany was actually 
meditating an advance through Belgium and on 
August 2, the German Government sent a note to 
Belgium which definitely expressed the determination 
to violate her neutrality with or without her consent. 
The note stated that "reliable information'' gave 
evidence that France was planning an entrance into 
Belgium, and explained that Germany was thus 
obliged to violate Belgian territory. If Belgium 
consented to the invasion and took up an attitude 
of benevolent neutrality she was promised that her 

25 Belgian Gray Book, No. 12. 

26 British Correspondence, No. 114. 

2 T Belgian Gray Boole, No. 15; British Correspondence, No. 125. 
28 British Correspondence, No. 122. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 281 

territorial integrity would be respected at the end 
of the war and that Belgium would be immediately 
evacuated by the German army. If she opposed the 
German advance, she would be treated as an enemy. 29 

Although Germany adduced the prospect of a 
French invasion of Belgium as justification for her 
violation of the Treaty of 1839, in which Prussia 
appeared as a guarantor of Belgian neutrality, the 
material reason for Germany's action was laid bare 
in a speech by the German Chancellor. In this speech 
he admitted the illegality and wrong committed by 
Germany and entered the plea of military necessity. 
''We are now in a state of necessity," said Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag, "and necessity 
knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg 
and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, 
that is contrary to the dictates of international law. 
It is true that the French Government has declared 
at Brussels that France is willing to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium so long as her opponent 
respects it. "We knew, however, that France stood 
ready for invasion. France could wait but we could 
not wait. A French movement upon our flank might 
have been disastrous. So we were compelled to over- 
ride the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian 
Governments. The wrong — I speak openly — that we 
are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon 
as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who 
is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for 
his highest possessions, can only have one thought — 
how he is to hack his way through. ' ' 30 

The efforts of the German diplomats to persuade 

29 Belgian Gray Booh, Nos. 20, 21 ; British Correspondence, No. 153. 
so The Times, August 11, 1914. 



282 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Great Britain to stand aside, which in any event could 
hardly have been expected to succeed, were completely 
frustrated by the military designs of the German 
staff. The invasion of Belgium was contrary to a 
solemn treaty guaranteed by Great Britain which both 
Conservative and Liberal statesmen felt bound to 
protect. Belgium had been the special protege of 
Gladstone, and even that advocate of a pacific policy 
had expressed clearly his feeling that Belgian neu- 
trality must be maintained at all costs. If it was a 
matter of life and death to Germany's military success 
that she should advance through Belgium, so it was, 
in the opinion of British statesmen, a ''matter of life 
and death for the honor of Great Britain that she 
should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost 
to defend Belgium's neutrality, if attacked. That 
solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what 
confidence could anyone have in engagements given 
by Great Britain in the future?" 31 

Nor was it merely a question of honor for Great 
Britain, but also one of vital security. The control 
of Belgium by Germany meant that she would acquire 
naval bases of inestimable value in time of war, which 
might be used either for attacks upon British shipping 
or for launching an invasion against the east coast 
of England. Should portions of the French coast fall 
into German hands during the war and be retained 
at its close, Germany would have what she so ardently 
desired, ports on the open sea with all the advantages 
they would give her in the commercial competition 
with Great Britain. 

It is true that Germany had promised to respect 
the territorial integrity of Belgium, but in the event 

si British Correspondence, No. 160. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 283 

of a successful war she could not be held to that 
promise. She would even have the legal right to 
break it, for Belgium, if she had quietly permitted 
the German violation of her neutrality would have 
forfeited her right to independence, which had been 
guaranteed her only on the condition of her perpetual 
neutrality and with the assumption that she would 
do all in her power to preserve it. Germany's promise 
to withdraw ultimately, made at the very moment 
when she was violating a solemn treaty, seemed to 
indicate that the German diplomats were possessed 
of a peculiar sense of cynical humor or of extraor- 
dinary confidence in British naivete. And British 
statesmen could not escape the conviction that if they 
peacefully accepted the German invasion of Belgium, 
they would be surrendering in the twentieth century 
all that England had fought and risked her existence 
for, in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. 

On August 3, at seven o'clock in the morning, 
Belgium delivered her reply to the German demand 
and expressed her resolve to repulse by every means 
in her power any attack upon her rights. 32 Later in 
the day German troops having crossed the frontier, 
the King of the Belgians sent to England an appeal 
for diplomatic intervention. 33 On the following day, 
Great Britain, with her national honor and vital 
interests at stake, protested to the German Govern- 
ment, and Sir Edward Grey sent word to the British 
Ambassador at Berlin to hand in what was practically 
an ultimatum : he was again to ask for German assur- 
ances that Belgian neutrality would be respected and 
warn the German Government that if a satisfactory 

32 Belgian Gray Boole, No. 22. 

33 British Correspondence, No. 153 ; Belgian Gray Book, No. 25. 



284 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

reply were not received by midnight, he would ask for 
his passports; Great Britain was determined to take 
all steps in her power to uphold the treaty to which 
both she and Germany were parties. 34 

As might have been expected, Germany refused to 
give the required assurances ; her troops were already 
being despatched across the Belgian border, and the 
plans of her military staff could not at that moment 
be altered for diplomatic reasons. At midnight of 
August 4, Great Britain thus entered the war. 

Although the German diplomats must have realized 
that the invasion of Belgium almost certainly meant 
the intervention of Great Britain, it was with undoubt- 
edly sincere emotion that they saw their hopes of 
keeping her out of the conflict shattered. Nor could 
they conceal the bitterness of their disappointment. 
"Just for a word — neutrality — ," said the German 
Chancellor, "a word which in war-time had been so 
often disregarded — just for a scrap of paper, Great 
Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation 
who desired nothing better than to be friends with 
her." "What Great Britain had done," he continued, 
"was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from 
behind while he was fighting for his life against two 
assailants." 35 

There is no gainsaying the fact that the emotion 
of the German diplomats was justified, for the 
entrance of Great Britain into the war changed its 
character materially, and affected vitally Germany's 
chances of success. The violation of Belgian neutral- 
ity was thus a great diplomatic blunder ; for if British 
statesmen had decided to intervene in the war purely 

84 British Correspondence, No. 159. 
sb British Correspondence, No. 160. 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 285 

for the defence of France, they would have been 
supported by far less enthusiasm on the part of the 
British people than was aroused by the German 
attack on Belgium. Germany thus provided Great 
Britain with an occasion for the intervention which in 
any event was demanded by British interests. 

But if the violation of Belgian neutrality was a 
diplomatic blunder, it was one that could hardly have 
been avoided, nor can the German diplomats be held 
responsible. For, as von Jagow pointed out, Ger- 
many's sole hope for success in a war against Eussia 
and France lay in a speedy invasion of France, which 
could be carried out only through Belgium. The 
Germans ' ' had to advance into France by the quickest 
and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead 
with their operations and endeavor to strike some 
decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter 
of life and death for them, as if they had gone by 
the more southern route, they could not have hoped, 
in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of 
the fortresses, to have gone through without formid- 
able opposition entailing great loss of time. This 
loss of time would have meant time gained by the 
Russians for bringing up their troops to the German 
frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German 
asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply 
of troops." 38 

The invasion of Belgium and the participation of 
Great Britain in the war was thus the inevitable 
result of Germany's forcing of war upon Russia and 
France. The aggressive character of her diplomacy 
all through the crisis of 1914 resulted with almost 
equal directness from the policy she had followed 

36 British Correspondence, No. 160. 



286 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

since 1871. Bismarck had believed in the necessity 
of German hegemony on the Continent, and had 
maintained that hegemony by means of the Triple 
Alliance until his downfall. The Kaiser William II 
was equally determined to maintain the position that 
Bismarck had won for Germany, and largely succeeded 
in so doing for the first ten years of his reign. But 
the reconciliation of France with Italy and Great 
Britain, and the termination of Anglo-Russian hos- 
tility which culminated in the formation of the Triple 
Entente, unquestionably threatened, if it did not 
destroy, Germany's position of primacy. Hence the 
attempts made to reinforce German prestige in 1905, 
1908, and 1911. Hence also in large measure, the 
determined attitude of Germany in 1914, which was 
also actuated by her desire to readjust the Balkan 
settlement of the previous year. Germany believed 
that the time had come definitely to settle two ques- 
tions : the one related to general policy, the second to 
her aspirations in the Near East. She must reaffirm 
her continental position, the necessary foundation 
of her world policy; she must also destroy Slavic 
influence in the Balkans, so as to reopen the path to 
Constantinople and Mesopotamia. 

It is not for the historian to anathematize the uncom- 
promising tone assumed by Germany in the crisis of 
1914. That may be left to the reader, provided the 
evidence in the case is fairly stated. Without question 
the extraordinary growth of German population and 
the resulting development of German industry forced 
a natural expansion of commerce and led to the demand 
for a protecting navy. It was inevitable, given the 
German mentality, which has been dominated by 
Prussia in recent years, that there should follow a 



THE DIPLOMATIC BREAK 287 

demand for political influence in the world at large, 
proportionate to the commercial influence exercised 
by Germany. 

Any philosophical discussion of the moral right of 
the German nation to such political influence is un- 
necessary. We are concerned with facts and the chief 
fact to remember, if we would explain to ourselves the 
origin of the conflict, is that the Germans sincerely 
believed that they, as well as the nations first in the 
field, had a right to world empire, and, if they were 
capable of seizing it, to supreme world empire. It 
was because political primacy on the Continent seemed 
the essential basis of Germany's world empire that 
she was determined to give the law to Europe in 1914, 
either by diplomacy or by war. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The brief bibliography that follows is designed 
merely to introduce the lay reader to the more 
interesting and important books on recent aspects of 
European diplomacy; it makes no pretence of giving 
a complete list of authorities. An effort has been 
made to select books which are easy of access and, 
so far as possible, books published in English are 
preferred. 

Chapter I 

Introduction 

There is no book in English that covers fully the general 
diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to the present time. 
For the most important aspects of international relations 
the general histories may be consulted; see especially, The 
Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII; Hazen, Europe since 
1815; Hawkesworth, The Last Century in Europe; Seignobos, 
History of Contemporary Europe; Rose, The Development 
of the European Nations; Andrews, Contemporary Europe, 
Asia, and Africa; Gooch, History of our Time. The annuals 
published in the different countries give a resume of the most 
significant events, year by year; the most important are the 
Annual Register; Viallate, La Vie politique dans les deux 
mondes; Schiemann, Deutschland und die grosse Politik. 
See also Driault, Le Monde actuel (1909). Books of especial 
value on general diplomatic history are, Debidour, Histoire 
diplomatique; Tardieu, France and the Alliances; Fullerton, 
Problems of Power; Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige 
Politik; and Rose, The Origins of the War. For the estab- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 289 

lishment of united Germany, see Denis, La Fondation de 
I 'Empire allemand; Sybel, The Founding of the German 
Empire; White, Seven Great Statesmen (Bismarck) ; Valfrey, 
Histoire du Traite de Francfort; Marcks, Das Zeitalter des 
Kaisers Wilhelm I. 

Chapter II 

Bismarck and the Triple Alliance 

For the policy of Bismarck, see Bismarck: His Reflections 
and Reminiscences (translated by A. J. Butler), which 
should, however, be used with caution and preferably should 
be checked by the critical studies of Ehrich Marcks ; consult 
also, Busch, Prince Bismarck (Busch was the Chancellor's 
secretary) ; Matter, Bismarck et son Temps, Vol. Ill (a clear 
account embodying the French point of view) ; Lowe, Prince 
Bismarck; and Oncken, Das Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm I, 
Vol. III. On the relations between France and Germany, 
Thiers, Notes et Souvenirs, Correspondance relative a la 
Liberation du Territoire; Gavard, Le Proces d'Arnim; 
Hanotaux, Contemporary France; Broglie, Le Due de 
Gontaut-Biron a Berlin. For the war scare of 1875, Blowitz, 
Memoirs. For the relations of Germany, Russia, and Austria, 
Beust, Memoirs, Vol. II; Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy; 
Beer, Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs; Bourgeois, 
Manuel historique de Politique Etrangere, Vol. III. For 
Italian policy, Crispi, Memoirs; Feiling, Italian Policy since 
1870 (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Chapter III 

Consult especially Daudet, Histoire diplomatique de 
I' Alliance franco-russe, the main facts in which are sum- 
marized in Tardieu, France and the Alliances, Chapter I. 
For the policy of William II, Reventlow, Deutschlands 
auswdrtige Politik and Elkind, The German Emperor's 
Speeches. See also Hansen, L'Ambassade du Baron de 



290 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Mohrenheim; Adam, Apres V Abandon de la Revanche; 
Rambaud, Eistoire de Russie and Jules Ferry; Berard, La 
France et Guillaume II; Hippeau, Histoire diplomatique de 
la troisieme Republique; Pinon, France et Allemagne; 
Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe, Memoirs. 

Chapter TV 

German World Policy: Economic Factors 

The statistics of German industry and commerce are pub- 
lished in the various trade reports and summarized in 
Statesman's Year Book, in Statistisches Jahrbuch fur den 
Deutschen Reich, and briefly in 61st Congress, 2d Session, 
Senate Documents, No. 578 ; German success in commerce is 
strikingly portrayed by the British Consular Reports. 
Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany, gives a com- 
prehensive and authoritative survey of German development ; 
see also Schierbrand, Germany; J. Ellis Barker, Modern 
Germany; Collier, Germany and the Germans (readable, but 
based on hasty observations and conclusions) ; Lair, L'lmpe- 
rialisme allemande; Hubert, L'Effort allemand. The signifi- 
cance of Germany's economic development in its relation 
to her diplomatic policy is clearly exposed in von Billow's 
Imperial Germany, the study of which is essential to an 
understanding of the German attitude. See also Rohrbach, 
German World Policies; Andrillon, L'Expansion de V Alle- 
magne; and Fraser, The Short Cut to India. On German 
colonies, Keller, "Beginnings of German Colonisation and 
Colonial Policy," Yale Review, x r 30; x^ 390; xii, 57. 

Chapter V 

German "World Policy : Moral Factors 

See the works of von Billow and Dawson cited for the 
previous chapter. An exhaustive study of the German men- 
tality in its relation to the growth of the German nation is 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 291 

to be found in Lichtenberger, L'Allemagne moderne. Con- 
sult also Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern and 
German World Policies; Cramb, Germany and England; 
Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War; Usher, Pan-Ger- 
manism; Andrillon, L' Expansion de VAllemagne; Sarolea, 
The Anglo-German Problem; Von der Goltz, La Nation 
armee (Fr. trans.) ; Elkind, The German Emperor's 
Speeches; Gauss, The German Emperor as shown in his 
Public Utterances; Emery, "German Economics and the 
War," in Yale Review, January, 1915; and Abbott, "Ger- 
many and the Prussian Propaganda," Yale Review, July, 
1915. On Treitschke, see Davis, The Political Thought of 
Eeinrich von Treitschke; Hausrath, Treitschke; Go wans, 
Selections from Treitschke 1 's Lectures on Politics; Hadley, 
"The Political Teachings of Treitschke," in Yale Review, 
January, 1915; Ernest Barker, Nietszche and Treitschke 
(Oxford Pamphlets). 

Chapter VI 

British Foreign Policy 

For British imperial policy, see Dilke, Problems of Greater 
Britain and The British Empire; Lucas, Historical Geography 
of the British Empire; Zimmerman, Die Europaische 
Kolonien; Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, La Colonisation chez les 
Peuples modernes; Berard, British Imperialism (trans. 
Foskett) ; Cromer, Modern Egypt; Fitzmaurice, Life of the 
Second Earl Granville; Roberts, Forty-one Years in India; 
Blunt, With Gordon at Khartoum. For the rivalry with 
France, Piequet, La Colonisation francaise dans VAfrique 
du Nord and Campagnes d'Afrique. For the Far Eastern 
struggle, Douglas, Europe and the Far East; Driault, La 
Question d' extreme Orient; Pinon, La Lutte pour la Paci- 
fique; Berard, La Revolt e de VAsie; Skrine, The Expansion of 
Russia; Kuropatkin, "Revelations," in McClure's Magazine, 
September, 1908. 



292 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

Chapter VII 

The Diplomatic Revolution 

For French policy, see Millet, Politique Exterieure, 1898- 
1905; Reventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik; Mevil, 
De la Paix de Francfort a la Conference d'Algesiras; 
Despagnet, La Diplomatie de la troisieme Repuolique et le 
Droit des Gens. For the relations of France and Italy, Billot, 
La France et I'ltalie; Pinon, L'Empire de la Mediterranee; 
Feiling, Italian Policy since 1870. For the Franco-British 
understanding, Barclay, Thirty Years' Anglo-French Remin- 
iscences; Tardieu, France and the Alliances and Questions 
diplomatiques de I' Annie 1904; Jaray, La Politique franco- 
anglaise; Darcy, La France et VAngleterre. For the texts 
of the conventions, Albin, Les grands Traites politiques; 
Pinon, France et Allemagne. 



Chapter VIII 

The Conflict of Alliances 

For an excellent resume of the diplomatic conflict, consult 
Albin, La Querelle franco-allemande: Le Coup d'Agadir. 
On the crisis of 1905 the chief authority is Tardieu, La 
Conference d'AlgSsiras; see also Morel, Morocco in Diplo- 
macy; Berard, L' Affaire marocaine; Albin, Les grands 
Traites politiques; and the speeches of von Bulow in the 
Reichstag. On the crisis of 1908, see Tardieu, Le Prince de 
Billow and the works suggested for Chapter IX. On the 
crisis of 1911, Tardieu, Le Mystere d'Agadir; the works of 
Albin referred to; Schiemann, Deutschland und die grosse 
Politik, 1911 ; Reventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik; 
Turner, "The Morocco Crisis of 1911," in South Atlantic 
Quarterly, January, 1912. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 293 

Chapters IX and X 

The Near Eastern Question and the Balkan Wars 

For these chapters the chief general authorities are: 
Driault, La Question d' Orient, Bamberg, Geschicte der 
orient alischen Angelegenheit, Landemont, L 'Europe et la 
Politique orientate, Beer, Die orientalische Politik Oester- 
reichs, Pinon, L'Europe et l f Empire Ottoman, Urquhart, 
The Eastern Question (Oxford Pamphlets). See also Bar- 
bulesco, Relations des Roumains avec les Serbes, les Bulgares, 
les Orecs et la Croatie en liaison avec la question macedo- 
serbe, and Geffcken, Frankreich, Russland und der Dreibund. 
Important articles dealing with the earlier aspects of the 
Eastern Question are to be found in the Revue des Deux 
Mondes: December, 1876, " Panslavisme, " by Leroy-Beau- 
lieu; October, December, 1878, "Les evolutions du probleme 
orientale," by Klaczko; July, 1880, " L ' Angleterre et la 
Russie en Orient," by Laveleye. On Germany's Near Eastern 
Policy there are excellent chapters in Sarolea, The Anglo- 
German Problem, and Rose, The Origins of the War. Most 
important are Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn, and Cheradame, 
Le Chemin de Per de Bagdad. On the Young Turks, Ramsay, 
The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey; Berard, 
La Revolution Turque, and La mort de Stamboul; Pinon, 
L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie. On the Turkish Italian "War, 
McClure, Italy in North Africa, Barclay, The Turco-Italian 
War and its Problems. On the wars of 1912-1913, Schurman, 
The Balkan Wars; Gueshoff, The Balkan League. The clear- 
est statement in English of the Near Eastern problem in its 
most recent aspects is to be found in Gibbons, The New Map 
of Europe. 

Chapters XI and XII 

The Crisis of 1914 and the Diplomatic Break 

For these chapters the reader should consult the documents 
published by the various Governments, especially the German 



294 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

White Book, the British White Papers, the Russian Orange 
Book, the French Yellow Book, the Belgian Gray Book, and 
the Austrian Red Book. The chief documents together with 
important treaties of preceding years are published in Price, 
Diplomatic History of the War. An unbiassed analysis of 
the documents is to be found in Stowell, The Diplomacy of 
the War. The German White Book gives the official justi- 
fication for German diplomacy ; the most skillful presentation 
of the German case is Schiemann, Deutschland und die grosse 
Politik, 1914. The opposite point of view is developed in 
Durkheim and Denis, Qui a voulu la Guerre (a detailed and 
scientific analysis) ; Dillon, A Scrap of Paper (valuable 
because of the author's special sources of information) ; 
Beck, The Evidence in the Case; Rose, The Origins of the 
War. See also Headlam, The History of Twelve Days. On 
the question of the invasion of Belgium, see Descamps, La 
Neutralite de la Belgique; Weiss, La Violation de la Neu- 
tralite beige; Von Mach, Germany's Point of View. The 
New York Times Current History of the War has published 
the gist of the official and newspaper comment upon the 
crisis on both sides. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abbott, 291. 

Abdul Hamid, Sultan of Turkey, 
210, 211; deposed, 212. 

Abyssinia, Italian penetration 
into, 144. 

Adam, 290. 

Adowa, Italian defeat, 145, 218. 

Adrianople, invested by Bulga- 
rians, 228; captured, 230. 

Afghanistan, threatened by Bus- 
sia, 123, 124; influence of Great 
Britain in recognized by Bussia, 
161. 

Agadir, crisis of 1911, 187, sq. 

Agriculture, intensive, in Ger- 
many, 64. 

Albania, Italian ambitions in, 145, 
231; revolt in, 223; interests of 
Powers in, 231; independence 
of, 232. 

Albin, 292. 

Aleppo, 203. 

Alexander II, Tsar of Bussia, af- 
fection for William I, 17; inter- 
view with Francis Joseph and 
William I, 19; attitude towards 
France, 20; pacific influence of 
in 1875, 24, 43. 

Alexander III, Tsar of Bussia, 45. 

Alexander of Serbia, murdered, 
249. 

Alexandretta, 203. 

Alexandria, revolt in, 118. 

Algeciras, Conference of, 174, 175. 

Alsace-Lorraine, taken from 
France, 9; effects of annexation, 
14, 21; closed to French citi- 
zens, 46. 



Andrassy, leader of Magyar 
party, 18; understanding with 
Bismarck, 19; attitude towards 
League of Three Emperors, 20; 
understanding with Bussia, 25. 

Andrews, 288. 

Andrillon, 290, 291. 

Anglo-French Convention of 1904, 
see Entente Cordiale. 

Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, 
131. 

Anglo-Bussian Convention of 1907, 
161, 162. 

Arabi Pasha, leads rebellion in 
Egypt, 118. 

Asquith, British Premier, on Ger- 
many's Moroccan policy, 188. 

Austria, defeated by Prussia in 

1866, 8; relations with Prussia 
after 1866, 17; compromise of 

1867, 18; understanding with 
Bussia, 19; interests in Near 
East, 25, 200, 201; attitude 
towards Treaty of San Stefano, 
27; takes administration of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 28, 
177; clash of interests with 
Bussia, 28; alliance with Ger- 
many, 30; attitude towards 
Italy, 33; Triple Alliance, 35; 
attitude at Conference of Alge- 
ciras, 175; annexes Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 179, 213; disre- 
gards Bussian protests, 180; 
effect of Young Turk Bevolu- 
tion upon, 213; interests in 
Albania, 231; attitude towards 
Treaty of Bukarest, 238, 239, 



298 



INDEX 



240; position in 1914, 248; 
sends note to Serbia, 254; popu- 
lar desire for war, 257; de- 
clares Serbian reply unsatisfac- 
tory, 259; orders mobilization, 
264, 265; conciliatory attitude, 
266, 267. 

Austrian Bed Book, 294. 

Austro-German Alliance of 1879, 
30. 

Avlona, 200. 

Bagdad Eailway, 87; feared by 
Great Britain, 159; not opposed 
by Bussia, 183; German devel- 
opment of, 203, 204. 

Balfour, A. J., on Afghanistan, 
124; on Edward VII, 150, 151; 
on German policy, 189. 

Balkan League, formation of, 225, 
226. 

Balkan States see, Bulgaria, Mon- 
tenegro, Rumania, Serbia. 

Balkan War of 1912, 228, sq. 

Balkan War of 1913, 234, 235, 236. 

Balkans, interests of Powers in, 
200, sq.; settlement of 1912, 
230, sq. ; settlement of 1913, 236, 
237; attitude of Powers, 238. 
See Near East. 

Bamberg, 293. 

Banks, in Germany, growth of 
activities, 67. 

Barbulesco, 293. 

Barclay, Sir Thomas, works for 
understanding between England 
and France, 151, 292, 293. 

Barker, Ellis, 290. 

Barker, Ernest, 291. 

Barnardiston, 279 n. 

Bavaria, jealousy of Prussia, 8, 
13 n. 

Beaconsfield, Lord, see Disraeli. 

Beck, 294. 



Beer, 289. 

Belgian Gray Book, 294. 

Belgium, neutrality guaranteed, 
278; conversations with Great 
Britain, 279; Germany demands 
free passage through, 280; rea- 
sons for German invasion of, 
281, 285; invaded by Germans, 
appeals to England, 283. 

Berard, 290, 291, 292, 293. 

Berchtold, refuses conversations 
with Russia, 263; conciliatory 
attitude of, 266, 267. 

Berlin, Congress of, 28, 44. 

Berlin, Treaty of, 28, 177; in- 
fringed by Austrian annexation 
of Bosnia, 179. 

Bernhardi, General von, on Ger- 
man superiority, 97; on neces- 
sity of war, 98 n; on blessing 
of war, 105, 291. 

Berthallet, 71. 

Berthelot, 71. 

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, German 
Chancellor, proposition to Great 
Britain, 273, 274; exposes rea- 
son for German invasion of Bel- 
gium, 281. 

Beust, Austrian Chancellor, hatred 
of Prussia, 17, 289. 

Billot, 292. 

Bismarck, accomplishes German 
unity, 7-9; pacific policy after 
1871, 11, 13, 166; fear of coali- 
tion, 15; desires alliance with 
Austria and Russia, 16-17; op- 
position to Beust, 18; under- 
standing with Andrassy, 19; at- 
titude towards France after 
1871, 21; threatening language 
of, 23; attitude towards Near 
Eastern Question, 29, 201; al- 
liance with Austria, 30; Triple 
Alliance, 35; cultivates Russian 



INDEX 



299 



friendship, 36-37, 45; on pos- 
sibility of Franco-Eussian al- 
liance, 43 ; tone of intimidation 
in 1888, 47; dismissal of, 49; 
on Dual Alliance, 53; colonial 
policy, 81; on necessity of war, 
104 n; on Anglo-German friend- 
ship, 133, 134 n, 135; influence 
over Crispi, 144; end of his 
diplomatic system, 165; belief 
in necessity of maintaining Ger- 
man prestige, 167; on Belgian 
neutrality, 279. 

Bismarck Archipelago, German 
colony, 81. 

Blowitz, journalist, on war scare 
of 1875, 24, 289. 

Blunt, 291. 

Boer War, 131, 136. 

Bokhara, captured by Eussia, 123. 

Bombay, 203. 

Bosnia, revolt of 1875 in, 26; 
administered by Austria, 28, 
177; annexed by Austria, 179, 
213. 

Bosnian crisis of 1908, 179, sq. 

Bosphorus, 10. 

Boulanger, 46. 

Bourgeois, 289. 

Brazil, German commercial pene- 
tration into, 85. 

Bremen, 76; Kaiser's speech at, 
96. 

British foreign policy, see Great 
Britain. 

British White Papers, 294. 

Broglie, 289. 

Bukarest, Treaty of, 236, 237; 
attitude of Powers towards, 238, 
sq. 

Bulgaria, becomes autonomous, 28, 
196; acquisition of Eastern 
Eumelia, 210; ambitions in 
Macedonia, 214; effect of Young 



Turk policy upon, 215; war de- 
clared by Turkey upon, 227; 
campaign in Thrace, 228; atti- 
tude towards Balkan settlement 
of 1912, 233, 234; attacks 
Greece and Serbia, 234; cam- 
paign of 1913, 235, 236; atti- 
tude towards Treaty of Buka- 
rest, 237. 

Biilow, Prince von, on growth of 
German trade, 76; on German 
navy, 78; on isolation of Ger- 
many, 109 n; on necessity of 
maintaining Germany's position 
on Continent, 169; on Franco- 
Italian understanding and 
Entente Cordiale, 170 n, 176 n; 
on Morocco as a Machtfrage, 
172 n. 

Bunsen, 55. 

Burgess, J. W., on Slavonic dan- 
ger, 109 n. 

Burns, John, 275. 

Busch, 289. 

Butler, 289. 

Caillaux, French Premier, 185. 

Caillaux case, 252. 

Cambon, Jules, French Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin, attempts at con- 
ciliation in 1914, 263. 

Cambon, Paul, French Ambassa- 
dor at St. James, anxious for 
understanding with England, 
149. 

Cambridge Modern History, 288. 

Cameroons, German colony in, 81, 
82; acquisitions in, 191. 

Canea, revolt in, 216. 

Canton, 126. 

Caprivi, German Chancellor, atti- 
tude towards Great Britain, 135. 

Carlos, King of Portugal, 1, 



300 



INDEX 



Caroline Islands, German colony, 
82. 

Casablanca, 181. 

Oavour, 116. 

Central East, rivalry of Great 
Britain and Eussia in, 123, 124. 

Chamberlain, Joseph, on German 
alliance, 138. 

Chatellerault, French arms fac- 
tory, 51. 

Chatham, Earl, on British policy, 
155. 

Checkerboard diplomacy, 41. 

Chemistry, use of by German man- 
ufacturers, 70. 

Cheradame, 293. 

Cherbourg, German commercial 
success in, 73. 

China, commercial penetration 
into, 127; war with Japan, 128. 

Collier, 290. 

Combes, French Premier, 171. 

Commerce, of Germany, growth 
of, 69; factors in German suc- 
cess, 70, sq.; competition with 
British, 72, 73; German trade 
statistics, 75. 

Commerce, of Italy with France, 
146. 

Colonies, of Germany, 80, sq. 

Constantine, Crown Prince of 
Greece, 228. 

Constantinople, coveted by Eussia, 
198. 

Cramb, 291. 

Crete, 215; Young Turk policy in, 
216, 217; annexed to Greece, 
236. 

Crimean War, 41, 123, 197. 

Crispi, Italian statesman, policy, 
144; resignation, 145, 289. 

Cromer, 291. 

Curzon, Lord, Persian policy, 125. 



Damascus, 203. 

Daneff, 234. 

Danube, trade of, 200. 

Darcy, 292. 

Dardanelles, closed to ships of 
war, 123; control of coveted by 
Eussia, 199; Austrian interest 
in control of, 201. 

Daudet, 289. 

Davis, 291. 

Dawson, 290. 

Debidour, 288. 

Delcasse, French Foreign Minis- 
ter, 141; aims and career, 142- 
143 ; arranges understanding 
with Italy, 146-147; desires un- 
derstanding with England, 148; 
Entente Cordiale, 156; effects 
of his policy, 157, 158; resigna- 
tion forced in 1905, 174; re- 
enters French cabinet, 184; 
member of Caillaux Ministry, 
185. 

Denis, 289, 294. 

Derby, Lord, pacific influence in 
1875, 24. 

Dernburg, German Colonial Secre- 
tary, 83. 

Descamps, 294. 

Despagnet, 292. 

Deutsche Bank, growth, 66; sup- 
ports Bagdad Eailway scheme, 
203. 

Dilke, 291. 

Dillon, 294. 

Diplomatic revolution, 140, sq. 

Disraeli, at Congress of Berlin, 
123, 197; policy in Central 
East, 124. 

Dogger Bank, British trawlers 
sunk by Eussian fleet, 132, 160. 

Donnersmarck, Prince Henckel 
von, demands resignation of 
Delcasse, 173. 



INDEX 



301 



Douglas, 291. 

Draga, murder of, 249. 

Drake, 277. 

Driault, 288, 291, 293. 

Dual Alliance, of France and 
Eussia, 3; events leading up to, 
49, sq.; effects of, 53, sq., 141. 

Dual Control, of France and 
Great Britain in Egypt, 118. 

Durazzo, 232. 

Durkheim, 294. 

Edward VII, King of England, 
149; character and policy, 150; 
visit to Paris, 156; interview 
of Eeval with Nicholas II, 211. 

Egypt, British and French inter- 
ests in, 117, sq. ; Fashoda crisis, 
121; British position recog- 
nized by France, 156. 

Elizabeth, Empress of Austria, 1. 

Elkind, 289, 291. 

Emery, 291. 

Emigration, from Germany, dis- 
couraged, 65. 

England, see Great Britain. 

Enos, 230, 236. 

Entente Cordiale, conditions lead- 
ing up to, 148-155; arranged, 
156; effects, 157, 158; attitude 
of Germany towards, 170, 171. 

Enver Bey, 229. 

Eritrea, Italian colony, 144. 

Essad Pasha, in Albania, 232. 

Euphrates Eiver, 202. 

Far East, Eussian advance in, 
126; British interest in, 126; 
Chinese- Japanese War, 128; in- 
terests of Powers in, 129, 130; 
Eusso- Japanese War, 132. 

Fashoda, 119, 120; crisis result- 
ing from, 121. 

Favre, Jules, 33. 



Feiling, 289, 292. 

Ferry, Jules, colonial policy, 34, 
35; resignation, 46. 

Fez, occupied by French, 184. 

Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, 135, 
291. 

Floquet, 42 n. 

Force, necessity of emphasized by 
German economists, 100, 101; 
Treitschke upon, 103. 

Formosa, acquired by Japan, 128. 

France, defeated by Germany in 
1870, 9; revenge spirit in, 14; 
attitude towards Germany, 22; 
attitude towards Italy, 33; 
occupies Tunis, 35; isolation of 
after 1882, 36; necessity of ally 
in East for, 39, 40 j relations 
with Eussia previous to 1878, 
41, 42; reinvigoration of na- 
tional policy, 46; effect of Wil- 
liam II 's accession upon, 49; 
financial assistance to Eussia, 
51; alliance with Eussia, 52; 
understanding with Germany, 
58; rivalry with Great Britain 
in Africa, 117, sq.; Fashoda 
crisis, 120, 121; intervenes 
against Japan, 128 ; relations 
with Italy, 143, sq. ; understand- 
ings with Italy, 146, 147; de- 
sires understanding with Eng- 
land, 148; Entente Cordiale, 
156; convention with Spain, 
157; position in 1905, 171; 
Morocco crisis, 172-174; accord 
of 1909 with Germany, 183; 
expansive activities in Morocco, 
184; condition of in 1911, 185; 
Agadir crisis, 187, sq. ; attitude 
towards Bagdad Eailway, 204; 
believed by Germany to be deca- 
dent in 1914, 252; agrees to 
conference on Serbian question, 



302 



INDEX 



262; orders retirement of troops 
from border, 271; promises to 
respect Belgian neutrality, 280. 

Francis Joseph, accepts German 
unification under Prussia, 17; 
interviews with William I, 19; 
attitude towards Italian occu- 
pation of Eome, 33. 

Franco-British Convention of 1904, 
see Entente Cordiale. 

Franco-German Accord of 1909, 
183. 

Franco-German Accord of 1911, 
191. 

Franco-German War, 9, 10. 

Franco-Japanese Convention of 
1907, 162. 

Franco-Russian Alliance, see Dual 
Alliance. 

Franco-Spanish Convention of 
1904, 157. 

Frankfort, Treaty of, 9; Thiers 
upon, 22. 

Franz Ferdinand, Austrian arch- 
duke, assassinated, 1, 244. 

Fraser, 290. 

Frederick Barbarossa, 5. 

Frederick III, German Emperor, 
49. 

Frederick William IV, King of 
Prussia, 55. 

French Yellow Booh, 294. 

French Bepublic, proclaimed, 22. 

Fullerton, 288. 

Galicia, Russian fear of Poles in, 

19. 
Gambetta, 22. 
Gavard, 289. 
Geffcken, 293. 
George, King of Greece, 1. 
George, Prince of Greece, High 

Commissioner of Crete, 216. 



German foreign policy, see Ger- 
many. 

German Liberals, fail to create 
united Germany in 1848, 6. 

German White Booh, 294. 

German world policy, see Germany, 
World policy. 

Germany, creation of Empire, 4, 
9; attempts at unity, 5-6; diffi- 
culty of fusing different states 
after 1871, 13 ; inspires fears 
of smaller states, 14; war spirit 
in 1875, 23; alliance with Aus- 
tria, 30; Triple Alliance, 35; 
success of policy after 1891, 
56; understanding with France 
and Russia, 58; diplomatic 
hegemony after 1891, 60; eco 
nomic transformation of, 62, 
sq. ; growth of population in, 
63; intensive agriculture in, 64; 
shifting of population, 64; 
emigration from discouraged, 
65; industry in previous to 
1870, 65; effect of unification 
upon, 66; activities of banks, 
67; mining and steel industries, 
67; growth of commerce, 69; 
factors in commercial success, 
69, sq. ; scientific methods in 
manufacturing and commerce, 
70; adaptive skill of Germans, 
71, 72; successful competition 
with British, 73; trade statis- 
tics, 75; mercantile marine, 76, 
77; growth of navy, 78; colo- 
nies, 80, sq.; attitude towards 
colonies, 82, sq. ; commercial 
penetration into Brazil, 85; in- 
to Central East, 86, sq. ; world 
policy of, 88, 90, sq. ; moral 
transformation of, 89, sq. ; be- 
lief in destiny, 95, 96; belief 
in superiority, 96, 97; belliger- 



INDEX 



303 



ent attitude of, 99-106, 109, 
110, 111, 113; belief in neces- 
sity of force, 101; belief in 
blessing of war, 103-105; con- 
tempt for rivals, 107; nervous- 
ness in certain quarters of, 108, 
109; fear of Slavonic advance, 
109; effect of new attitude of 
upon other Powers, 112, 113; 
conditions on which success of 
foreign policy of depended, 115; 
intervenes with France and 
Eussia against Japan, 128; ac- 
quires Kiau Chau, 130; rela- 
tions with Great Britain, 133, 
sq. ; recognizes British preten- 
sions in Egypt and Zanzibar, 
136; treaties of 1898 and 1899 
with Great Britain, 137; sug- 
gested alliance with England, 
138 ; diplomatic hegemony, 
threatened by new policy of 
France, 147, 148, 158; reasons 
for change in German attitude, 
168, 169; attitude towards 
Entente Cordiale, 170, 171; de- 
mands cessation of French ex- 
pansion in Morocco, 172; de- 
mands resignation of Delcasse, 
173; Conference of Algeciras, 
174; supports Austrian annexa- 
tion of Bosnia, 180, 181, 182; 
accord of 1909 with France, 
183; Potsdam accord of 1910, 
183; despatch of Panther, 187; 
Agadir crisis, 188-191; position 
in 1914, 192; interests in Near 
East, 201, sq. ; plans Bagdad 
Bailway, 203, 204; friendship 
with Turkey, 207; interests in 
Balkans, 208; attitude toward 
Treaty of Bukarest, 240, 243, 
247; attitude toward Austro- 
Serb quarrel, 257, 258; refuses 



conference, 262; refuses Sazon- 
off's proposal, 264; declarea 
Kriegsgefahr and sends ulti- 
matum to Eussia, 268; declares 
war on Eussia, 271 ; declares 
war on France, 272; proposition 
to Great Britain, 273, 274; re- 
fuses to promise to respect 
Belgian neutrality, 280; invades 
Belgium, 283; reasons for in- 
vasion of Belgium, 285. 

Gervais, French admiral, visits 
Kronstadt, 52. 

Gibbons, 293. 

Giesebrecht, on superiority of 
Germans, 96. 

Giesl, Freiherr von, on Serbian 
aspirations, 239 n. 

Giolitti, 240 n. 

Gladstone, sends Gordon up Nile, 
120; policy in Central East, 
124; enters into special treaties 
guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, 
278. 

Goltz, von der, on necessity of 
war, 98; reorganization of Turk- 
ish army, 208, 291. 

Gooch, 288. 

Gordon, General, massacred at 
Khartoum, 120. 

Gortchakoff, Eussian Chancellor, 
20; animosity towards Bis- 
marck, 25, 29; on Congress of 
Berlin, 29; assistance to France 
in 1875, 44; resignation, 37. 

Goschen, Sir W. E., British Am- 
bassador at Berlin, 273. 

Gowans, 291. 

Granville, Earl, 135. 

Great Britain, saves Turkey in 
1856, 26, 197; attitude towards 
Treaty of San Stefano, 27; un- 
derstanding with Italy, 36; com- 
merce threatened by Germany, 



304 



INDEX 



73, 152, sq. ; German belief in 
weakness of, 107; principles of 
foreign policy, 115, 116, 155; 
relations with France, 117, sq.; 
purchase of Suez Canal shares, 
117; position in Egypt, 118, 
119; Fashoda crisis, 120, 121; 
hostility towards France, 122; 
relations with Kussia, 122, sq. ; 
rivalry roth Eussia in Near East, 
123, 196, 197; interests in Cen- 
tral East, 124; ambitions in 
Thibet, 125; interests in Far 
East, 126; fear of Eussia, 131; 
alliance with Japan, 131; hos- 
tility towards Eussia, 132; rela- 
tions with Germany, 133, sq. ; 
cedes Heligoland, 136; treaties 
of 1898 and 1899, 137; sug- 
gested alliance with Germany, 
138; desires understanding with 
France, 150, 151; fear of Ger- 
many, 152-155, 160; Entente 
Cordiale, 156; effects, 157, 158; 
fear of Germany in Near East, 
159; factors in reconciliation 
with Eussia, 160; Convention of 
1907, 161, 162; position in 
1905, 172; condition of in 1911, 
186; crisis of 1911, 189; atti- 
tude towards Near Eastern 
Question, 199; attitude towards 
Bagdad Eailway, 204; believed 
by Germany to be weak in 1914, 
252, 253; suggests compromise 
on Austro-Serbian question, 262; 
refuses offer of Bethmann- 
Hollweg, 274, 275; attitude 
towards Belgian neutrality, 277, 
282, 283; sends ultimatum to 
Germany, 283; enters war, 284. 

Great Elector, 55, 99. 

Greece, obtains independence, 196; 
defeated by Turkey in 1897, 



210, 216; campaign of 1912, 
228, 229; alliance with Serbia, 
233; campaign of 1913, 234, 
235. 

Grevy, President of France, op- 
posed to alliance with Eussia, 
42; resignation, 46. 

Grey, Sir Edward, on British 
rights in Soudan, 121; desire 
for understanding with Eussia, 
161; efforts for peace in 1913, 
273; on Austro-Serb quarrel, 
260; attempts conciliation, 262; 
refuses offer of Bethmann- 
Hollweg, 274, 275; asks France 
and Germany to respect Bel- 
gian neutrality, 280; sends ul- 
timatum to Germany, 283. 

Gueshoff, Bulgarian statesman, 
234, 293. 

Hadley, 291. 

Hague Convention of 1907, 279. 

Haidar Pasha, 203. 

Haldane, Lord, on British Empire, 
186; pacific attitude, 273 n, 275. 

Hamburg, German shipping in, 77. 

Hamburg-American Line, growth 
of, 77. 

Hannover, annexed to Prussia, 8. 

Hanotaux, Gabriel, French Foreign 
Minister, 57; attitude towards 
Germany, 59; on French rights 
in Central Africa, 121; foreign 
policy, 142, 289. 

Hansen, 289. 

Hartmann, on superiority of Ger- 
mans, 97. 

Hausrath, 291. 

Hawkesworth, 288. 

Hazen, 288. 

Headlam, 294. 

Heine, on destiny of Germany, 95. 

Herzegovina, administered by 



INDEX 



305 



Austria, 28, 177; annexed by 

Austria, 179, 213. 
Hippeau, 290. 
Hohenlohe, 290. 
Holstein, disposal of leads to war 

of 1864, 7; incorporated by 

Prussia, 8. 
Home Eule, for Ireland, effect 

upon British position in 1911, 

186. 
Hong Kong, acquired by Great 

Britain, 126. 
Howard, 277. 
Hubert, 290. 

Humbert, of Italy, 1, 33. 
Hundred Years' War, 277. 

Industry, in Germany, condition 
of previous to 1870, 65; effect 
of unification of Germany upon, 
66; mining and steel, 67; indus- 
trial occupations, 68. 

Ireland, prospects of civil war in, 
252, 255. 

Irredentism, in Italy, 32; checked, 
34. 

Ischl, interview of Francis Joseph 
and William I, 19. 

Isvolsky, Jtussian Foreign Minis- 
ter, desire for understanding 
with England, 161. 

Italy, unified in 1870, 10; rela- 
tions with France previous to 
1870, 31; hostility towards Aus- 
tria, 32; ambitions in North 
Africa, 34; Triple Alliance, 35; 
understanding with Great Brit- 
ain, 36; relations with France 
after 1881, 143, sq.; Crispi's 
policy, 144; understanding with 
France, 146, 147; attitude at 
Conference of Algeciras, 174, 
175; attitude on annexation of 
Bosnia, 182; declares war on 



Turkey, 219, 221; interests in 
Albania, 231; agrees to confer- 
ence on Austro-Serb quarrel, 
262. 

Jagow, von, German Foreign Min- 
ister, 263, 269; on reasons for 
German invasion of Belgium, 
285. 

Janina, captured, 230. 

Japan, policy of isolation aban- 
doned, 127; war with China, 
128, 129; alliance with Great 
Britain, 131; war with Bussia, 
132; Conventions of 1907 with 
Bussia and France, 162. 

Jaray, 292. 

Kaiser Wilhelmsland, German col- 
ony, 81. 
Kant, 102. 

Karlsruhe, Kaiser's speech at, 171. 
Kavalla, acquired by Greece, 236. 
Keller, 290. 
Khartoum, captured by Mahdists, 

120. 
Kiamil Pasha, 229. 
Kiau Chau, acquired by Germany, 

82, 85. 
Kiel Canal, opened, 58. 
Kirk Kilisse, defeat of Turks, 

228. 
Kitchener, Lord, at Omdurman 

and Fashoda, 119, 120. 
Klaczko, 293. 
Konia, 202. 
Korea, independence of recognized, 

128. 
Koweit, 204. 
Kronstadt, visit of French fleet 

to, 52. 
Kruger, telegram of William II 

to, 136. 
Kulturkampf, 22. 



306 



INDEX 



Kum Kale, forts bombarded, 223. 
Kuropatkin, 291. 

Laboulaye, French diplomat, works 
for Eussian alliance, 51. 

Lair, 290. 

Landemont, 293. 

Lansdowne, Lord, succeeds Lord 
Salisbury as British Foreign 
Secretary, 149. 

Lausanne, Treaty of, 224. 

Laveleye, 293. 

Lavoisier, 71. 

League of the Three Emperors, 
character, 20; dissolution, 21, 
25. 

Leroy-Beaulieu, 291, 293. 

Liao-Yang, defeat of Russians, 
172. 

Lichtenberger, 291. 

Lloyd George, British Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, 186; on Ger- 
many's Moroccan policy, 188. 

London, Treaty of, 230. 

Loubet, French President, 156. 

Lowe, 289. 

Lucas, 291. 

Liideritz, 81. 

Lule Burgas, defeat of Turks, 228. 

Luther, upon blessing of war, 104. 

Luxemburg, invaded by Germany, 
281. 

McClure, 293. 

Macedonia, Bulgarian ambitions 

in, 214; campaign of, 1912, 228, 

229. 
Mach, Dr. von, 294. 
Magyars, position in Austrian 

Empire, 18. 
Mahdi, The, 120. 

Mahdists, capture Khartoum, 120. 
Mainz, Kaiser's speech at, 171. 
Manchuria, Bussian advance in, 

130; Russo-Japanese War, 132. 



Marchand, Captain, at Fashoda, 
119, 120. 

Marcks, 289. 

Maritime Province, acquired by 
Russia, 126. 

Marshall Islands, German colony, 
81. 

Massowah, 144. 

Matter, 289. 

Mazzini, on Italian ambitions in 
North Africa, 34. 

Mecca, 203. 

Meisendorf, von, on destiny of 
Germany, 95. 

Menelek, Abyssinian Emperor, 145. 

Mercantile marine, of Germany, 
growth, 76, sq. 

Mesopotamia, German penetration 
into, 86, 202, 205. 

Metz, taken from France, 22. 

Mevil, 292. 

Midia, 230. 

Millet, 292. 

Mining, in Germany, growth of, 
67. 

Moltke, General von, 8, 9; attitude 
towards France in 1875, 23; on 
blessing of war, 104. 

Monastir, 229, 233, 236. 

Monis, French Premier, 1^5. 

Montenegro, declares war on 
Turkey, 227. 

Morel, 292. 

Morley, Lord, pacific attitude, 275. 

Morocco, French position in, 147; 
French interests in recognized 
by England, 156; crisis of 1905, 
172, 173; Conference of Alge- 
ciras, 175; Franco -German Ac- 
cord of 1909, 183; French ex- 
pansion in, 184; crisis of 1911, 
187, sq. 

Mukden, defeat of Russians, 172. 



INDEX 



307 



Nanking, Treaty of, 126. 

Napoleon I, effect on German 
unity, 5; on position of Ant- 
werp, 277. 

Napoleon III, 8. 

Narodna Odbrana, 244; dissolu- 
tion demanded by Austria, 256. 

Nationality, principle of, violated 
in 1870, 10. 

Naval estimates, of Germany, 79. 

Naval League, of Germany, 80. 

Nazim Pasha, 229. 

Near East, crisis of 1875-1878, 26, 
sq. ; crisis of 1887, 47; German 
friendship with Turkey, 86, 207; 
rivalry of Russia and Great 
Britain in, 123, 196, 197; break- 
up of Turkish Empire, 195, 196; 
Eussian interests in, 198, 199; 
British attitude towards, 199; 
Austrian interests in, 200, 201 ; 
German interests in 201, sq. ; 
Young Turk Revolution, 210, 
211, 212; Bosnian crisis of 1908, 
179, 213; Young Turk policy, 
215-219; Italo-Turkish War, 221, 
sq. ; Balkan League, 225 ; cam- 
paign of 1912, 228, 229; Treaty 
of London, 230; settlement of 

1912, 230-233; Balkan War of 

1913, 234, 235, 236; settlement 
of 1913, 236, 237; attitude of 
Powers, 238, sq. 

Near Eastern Question, character, 
194, sq. See Near East. 

Nice, monument to Garibaldi, 145. 

Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, Pots- 
dam interview with William II, 
183; interview of Reval with 
Edward VII, 211; telegram to 
William II, 270. 

Nietzsche, on virtue of force, 102. 

Nihilists, arrested in France, 51. 

North German Confederation, 8. 



North German Lloyd, 78. 

Novi Bazar, occupied by Austria, 
177; right of military occupa- 
tion in renounced by Austria, 
213. 

Odessa, 198. 

Okhotsk, founded by Russia, 125. 

Omdurman, Kitchener crushes 

Mahdists at, 120. 
Opium War, 126. 
Otto the Great, 5. 

Pan-Germanists, colonial schemes, 
85, 90, 110; on Conference of 
Algeciras, 176. 

Pan-Slavism, 209, 232. 

Panther, sent to Agadir, 187. 

Paris, Treaty of, 10, 26, 41. 

Paulsen, on German navy, 78 n. 

Perry, Commodore, visit to Japan, 
127. 

Persia, Anglo-Russian rivalry in, 
124, 125; delimited by Conven- 
tion of 1907, 161 ; Russian in- 
terests in recognized by Ger- 
many, 183; exclusion of Ger- 
many from, 241. 

Picquet, 291. 

Pinon, 290, 291, 292, 293. 

Pitt, 277. 

Poincare, President of France, 
255. 

Population, of Germany, growth 
of, 62, 63; shifting of, 64. 

Port Arthur, acquired by Japan 
but surrendered, 128. 

Potsdam Accord of 1910, 183, 241. 

Prague, Treaty of, 8, 17. 

Price, 294. 

Prussia, war with Denmark, 7; 
war with Austria, 8, war with 
France, 9; wins Venetia for 



308 



INDEX 



Italy, 32; domination in Ger- 
many, 91, 95; military power, 
106. 

Eadieal party in France, policy 
in 1885, 46. 

Eambaud, 290. 

Ramsay, 293. 

BealpolitiJc, 116. 

Reinsurance Treaties, 37, 45. 

Reval, interview of Edward VII 
and Nicholas II, 211. 

Reventlow, 288, 289, 292. 

Rhodes, invaded by Italians, 223. 

Ribot, French Foreign Minister, 
works for Russian alliance, 51. 

Roberts, Lord, sent into Afghan- 
istan, 124, 291. 

Rohrbach, on German colonies, 84; 
on position of Germany and 
England, 109 n; on necessity of 
maintaining peace, 111 n; on 
Bagdad Railway, 205, 206, 290, 
291, 293. 

Roon, 8. 

Rose, 288, 293, 294. 

Rosebery, Lord, on alliance with 
Germany, 138. 

Rouvier, French Premier, attitude 
towards Bagdad Railway, 204. 

Rumania, wins independence, 28, 
196; attacks Bulgaria, 236. 

Rumelia, Eastern, acquired by Bul- 
garia, 210. 

Russia, violates neutrality of 
Black Sea, 10, 16, 41; relations 
with Prussia, 16; understand- 
ing with Austria, 19; attitude 
towards France in 1875, 25; 
interests in Near East, 25, 197, 
198; declares war on Turkey in 
1877, 26; bitter attitude to- 
wards Germany in 1878, 29; iso- 
lation of after 1878, 39; rela- 



tions with France previous to 
1878, 41, sq.; effect of Bis- 
marck's dismissal upon, 50; 
loans floated on French market, 
51; Dual Alliance, 52; under- 
standing with Germany after 
1891, 57, 58; relations with 
Great Britain, 123, sq.; ambi- 
tions in Central East, 124, 125; 
advance in Far East, 126; in- 
tervenes against Japan, 128; 
secures lease of Port Arthur, 
130; war with Japan, 132; fac- 
tors making for reconciliation 
with Great Britain, 160; Con- 
vention of 1907, 161, 162; pro- 
tests Austria's annexation of 
Bosnia, 179; diplomatic humil- 
iation, 182; Potsdam Accord 
with Germany, 183; rivalry with 
Great Britain in Near East, 196, 
197; attitude towards Bagdad 
Railway, 204; believed by Ger- 
many to be weak in 1914, 250, 
251 ; attitude towards" Austrian 
demands on Serbia, 261; at- 
tempts to open conversations 
with Austria, 262; orders mobil- 
ization, 264, 265, 266; does not 
reply to German ultimatum, 271. 

Russian Orange Boole, 294. 

Russo-Japanese Convention of 
1907, 162. 

Russo-Japanese War, 132. 

Russo-Turkish War, 26, 27. 

Saalburg, Kaiser's speech at, 95. 

Sadowa, 8. 

Salisbury, Lord, German tenden- 
cies, 36, 142; cedes Heligoland, 
136; ceases to be British For- 
eign Secretary, 149. 

Salonika, 200, 212; entered by 



INDEX 



309 



Greeks and Bulgarians, 228, 233, 
236. 

Salzburg, interview of Francis 
Joseph and William I, 19. 

Samoa, 82. 

San Stefano, Treaty of, 27, 177; 
revised at Berlin, 28. 

Sarolea, 291, 293. 

Saturday Eeview, on German men- 
ace, 153, 154. 

Sazonof, on Austrian demands on 
Serbia, 261; attempts concilia- 
tion, 264. 

Scheldt Eiver, strategical position, 
277. 

Schiemann, 288, 292, 294. 

Schierbrand, 290. 

Schleswig, disposal of leads to 
war of 1864, 7; incorporated 
by Prussia, 8. 

Schmoller, on necessity of force, 
101. 

Schnoebele, arrest of, 46. 

Schurman, 293. 

Science, in German manufactures 
and commerce, 70. 

Scutari, captured, 230; surren- 
dered by Montenegro, 232. 

Sedan, 9. 

Seignobos, 288. 

Selves, de, French Foreign Minis- 
ter, 185, 187. 

Serajevo, 244. 

Serbia, wins autonomy, 195; effect 
of annexation of Bosnia upon, 
213, 214; war declared by 
Turkey upon, 227; campaign of 
1912, 229; alliance with Greece, 
233; campaign of 1913, 234, 
235; anti-Austrian agitation in, 
244; Austrian note to, 254-257; 
reply to Austrian note, 258. 

Bering, on future of Germany, 
108 n. 



Shantung, German commercial po- 
sition in, 82. 

Shevket Pasha, Young Turk lead- 
er, 212, 230. 

Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 128. 

Silesia, conquered by Prussia, 17. 

Skiernevice, interview of the three 
Emperors at, 45. 

Skobelef, Russian general, 124. 

Skrine, 291. 

Slavs, in Austro-Hungary, 18, 201, 
239. 

Smyrna, 203. 

Socialists, in Germany, not op- 
posed to naval development, 92; 
nationalistic attitude of, 113 n; 
on Moroccan policy, 190. 

Solomon Islands, German colony, 
81. 

Soudan, 119, sq. 

Southwest Africa, German colo- 
nial difficulties in, 82. 

Spain, friendliness toward Ger- 
many, 36. 

Steed, 289. 

Steel industry, in Germany, 67. 

Stowell, 294. 

Straits, Treaty of, 123. 

Suez Canal shares, purchased by 
Great Britain, 117, 199. 

Sybel, 289. 

Tardieu, 288, 289, 292. 

Tchatalja lines, 228. 

Thibet, Younghusband expedition 

in, 125; territorial integrity 

recognized by Great Britain and 

Russia, 162. 
Thiers, President of France, 20; 

on Treaty of Frankfort, 22; 

resignation, 33, 289. 
Thrace, campaign of 1912 in, 228. 
Tigris River, 202. 



310 



INDEX 



Togoland, delimited, 58; German 
colony in, 81, 82. 

Trans-Manchurian Eailway, 130. 

Trans-Siberian Eailway, 129. 

Treitschke, Heinrich von, on the 
State, 102; on use of force, 103. 

Trentino, retained by Austria in 
1866, 32; Italian ambitions for 
winning, 145. 

Trieste, 32, 145. 

Triple Alliance, 2; formation of, 
16, 35; effect upon German 
position, 36; effect upon posi- 
tion of Russia, 45; text of pub- 
lished, 47; diplomatic conflict 
with Triple Entente, 180. See 
Germany, Austria, Italy. 

Triple Entente, 3; formation of, 
162; diplomatic conflict with 
Triple Alliance, 180; position 
of in 1911, 186, 187; belief that 
it isolated Germany. See Great 
Britain, France, Russia. 

Tripoli, interests of Italy in, 218; 
Young Turk policy in, 219; war 
in, 221, sq. 

Tunis, coveted by Italy, 34; 
French expedition to, 35 ; French 
protectorate in recognized by 
Italy, 146. 

Turkey, decadence of, 26, 195, 
196; war with Russia, 27; 
Treaty of Berlin, 28; German 
friendship with, 207; defeats 
Greece in 1897, 210, 216; revo- 
lution of 1908 in, 178, 210, 211, 
212; Young Turk policy, 215- 
219; war declared by Italy 
upon, 219, 221; declares war 
upon Serbia and Bulgaria, 227; 
war of 1912, 228, sq. 

Turner, 292. 



Ulster crisis, 252, 255. 
Universities, in Germany, influence 

of, 100. 
Urquhart, 293. 
Usher, 291. 

Valfrey, 289. 

Valona, see Avlona. 

Venizelos, Prime Minister of 
Greece, 217; attitude towards 
Turkey, 225, 226; refuses to as- 
sist Bulgaria against Serbia, 
234; upon Powers, 238. 

Viallate, 288. 

Victor Emmanuel, King of uni- 
fied Italy, 10, 32. 

Victoria, Queen of England, pa- 
cific influence in 1875, 24; death 
of, 149. 

Viviani, French Premier, 255, 271. 

Vladivostok, established as naval 
base by Russia, 126. 

Voigt, on necessity of force, 101. 

Wallenstein, 5. 

War, doctrine of blessing of, 103- 
105. 

War scare of 1875, 23-24, 43. 

Weiss, 294. 

White, 289. 

William I, King of Prussia, 7; 
German Emperor, 9; affection 
for Alexander II, 17; inter- 
views with Francis Joseph, 19; 
opposition to Austrian alliance, 
30; death of, 48; attitude on 
colonial aggrandizement, 81. 

William II, German Emperor, ac- 
cession, 49; character, 55, 176; 
mitigates effects of Dual Al- 
liance, 57, 59; attitude towards 
France, 58; maintains hegem- 
ony of Germany, 60; on Ger- 



INDEX 



311 



man navy, 80; on German 
world policy, 92, 93; on destiny 
of Germany, 95, 96; on supe- 
riority of Germans, 97; on 
necessity of maintaining peace, 
111, 112, 167; telegram to 
Kruger, 136; belief in neces- 
sity of maintaining German 
prestige, 167; attitude towards 
Entente Cordiale, 171; speech 
at Tangier, 172; Potsdam inter- 
view with Nicholas II, 183; 
change in attitude after 1911, 
193; policy of friendship to- 
wards Turkey, 207; telegrams 
to Tsar, 268, 270. 

"William of Wied, in Albania, 232. 

Wolseley, Six Garnet, 118. 



Woltmann, on superiority of Ger- 
mans, 97. 

World policy, of Germany, 3; 
partly a result of economic 
necessity, 87; partly result of 
moral factors, 88, 91, 105; 
characteristics, 90, sq., 110. 

Younghusband, Colonel, mission 
in Thibet, 125. 

Young Turks, Eevolution of 1908, 
178, 210, 211, 212; policy in 
Macedonia, 215; policy in Crete, 
216, 217; policy in Tripoli, 219; 
palace revolution of 1913, 229. 

Zaimis, High Commissioner of 

Crete, 216. 
Zimmerman, 291. 



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